

# **On the Beat**

**An evaluation of beat policing in Queensland**

**A Crime and Misconduct Commission Research Report**

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
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**2003**

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# Preface

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Beat policing constitutes an important shift in the nature of operational policing. In recent years, there has been much interest expressed in expanding this form of policing throughout Queensland. Consequently, it is important that rigorous evaluations are conducted to allow policy makers to make informed decisions.

In June 2002, Crime Prevention Queensland (CPQ) was asked by the Department of Premier and Cabinet to evaluate beat policing in this State. CPQ is responsible for implementing the Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy — *Building Safer Communities*. It provides leadership and support to develop innovative, evidence-based and targeted crime-prevention initiatives across both government and the local community.

CPQ asked us to conduct the evaluation of beat policing in recognition of the Crime and Misconduct Commission's extensive experience and expertise in evaluating beat-policing initiatives. It was the Commission — then known as the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) — that in 1993, in conjunction with the Queensland Police Service (QPS), established a pilot beat-policing project in Toowoomba as a means of encouraging the QPS to implement information-driven, proactive policing strategies. At the time of this evaluation, there were 28 similar initiatives (neighbourhood police beats) across Queensland with a further five beats to be established by the end of this financial year. In addition, 43 police beat shopfronts were operating in many shopping centres throughout Queensland with four additional shopfronts to be established by the end of June 2003.

A reference committee, comprising representatives from the CMC, Department of Premier and Cabinet, CPQ, QPS and the Department of Treasury was formed to advise us on the conduct of the evaluation.

## Structure of the report

The report is divided into eight chapters, with supporting documentation contained in the appendixes.

**Chapter 1** gives the background to beat policing, describes the models operating in Queensland, and highlights previous evaluations of beat policing in this State.

**Chapter 2** describes the methodological approach employed in the evaluation, including the key evaluation questions, methods of data collection and measures used.

**Chapter 3** presents calls-for-service rates and the findings in relation to the impact of beat policing on official reported crime rates. It also compares the rate of calls for service in one neighbourhood beat in 1994 to the rate in the same beat in 2002. This analysis assesses whether long-term declines in calls for service are evident in beats.

**Chapter 4** examines the impact of neighbourhood beats and shopfronts on perceptions of crime and perceptions of personal safety. The chapter includes information drawn from a series of surveys and offers a systematic comparison of beats and comparison sites on several indicators of perceptions of crime, disorder and personal safety.

**Chapter 5** focuses on community satisfaction with policing services. The first section provides information on residents' awareness of their neighbourhood beat, their reasons for contacting a beat officer, and their satisfaction with the services provided. This is followed by an analysis of the level of satisfaction with police services expressed by residents of beats and comparison areas. Finally, shopfronts and comparison centres are examined in terms of visibility and awareness of police as well as shopper and retailer satisfaction with police services.

**Chapter 6** assesses the cost of establishing and maintaining a police beat, and compares the workload and cost-effectiveness of beat officers and general duties officers. It also examines the cost of attending calls for service and the differences between the role of beat officers and general duties officers.

**Chapter 7** considers challenges associated with the implementation and management of neighbourhood beats and shopfronts, such as site selection, the role and rostering of beat officers, organisational support for beat officers and the job satisfaction of beat officers.

**Chapter 8** sums up the key findings of the evaluation, discusses issues that had an impact on the findings, and identifies issues and challenges that should be considered by policy makers in planning the future for beat policing in Queensland.

## Acknowledgments

This evaluation represents the product of four months' intensive work by a small team of researchers from the CMC's Research and Prevention area. The research team designed and administered several major surveys, conducted over fifty interviews with police and community members, analysed all the data collected during the course of the evaluation, including several thousand records of crime and calls for service, and prepared the final report. The members of the research team are to be commended for their efforts under challenging circumstances.

Special thanks are owed to Dr Mark Lynch, Dr Gabi Hoffmann, Maggie Blyth, Charlotte Sibley and Elena Miceski for their assistance with data collection and to Lisa Evans, Jodie Boland and Cathy Tregua for providing administrative support to the project.

The CMC wishes to acknowledge the involvement of a number of police personnel, whose insight, experience or point of view made an important contribution to this report. Community members and key stakeholders in the beat locations also willingly provided their time and personal experiences to assist us in our understanding of beat policing.

Finally, the CMC would like to thank Dr Nancy Spencer from the Office of Economic and Statistical Research for providing assistance with the community survey. The various members of the project's reference group are owed special thanks for their advice throughout the duration of the project. In particular, we wish to acknowledge the assistance of David Melville, Rob Gillam, Diana Beere, Ann Dalton, Jackie Martin, Sonia Caton, Mary Burgess, Sue Bell, Tracy O'Carroll, Kim Lazenby, Peter Crawford and especially Lindy Creighton. The Commission also appreciates the support provided to the evaluation by Michael Hogan, Paul Friedman and Peter Crawford from the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.

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**Dr Paul Mazerolle**  
Director, Research and Prevention  
Crime and Misconduct Commission

# Summary

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***This report presents the findings of an evaluation of beat policing in Queensland conducted by the Crime and Misconduct Commission, in response to a request from Crime Prevention Queensland.***

Beat policing is a community policing strategy designed to make an individual police officer responsible for the community's policing needs in a defined geographical area (the beat). Beat officers are encouraged to take 'ownership' of their area and employ proactive strategies to address the underlying causes of crime and community problems within their beat.

Two primary models of beat policing currently operate in Queensland. The first is a neighbourhood police beat model in which a police officer resides within the designated beat area and operates from an office attached to the residence. The second model is the police beat shopfront in which a police office is established in a shopping centre or mall and provides services to retailers and shoppers. At the time of the evaluation, there were 28 neighbourhood beats and 43 police shopfronts operating throughout Queensland. Five more neighbourhood beats and four more shopfronts will be established by the end of June 2003.

The current evaluation brings together a range of methodological strategies and data sources to provide a comprehensive analysis of beat policing. The evaluation is framed around three key questions.

- 1) Is beat policing effective?
- 2) Is beat policing cost-effective?
- 3) Are community members satisfied with, and do they support, beat policing?

## **Is beat policing effective?**

The effectiveness of beat policing is addressed by examining the rate of reported crime in conjunction with measuring perceptions of crime and personal safety. The results reveal that the presence of a neighbourhood beat is associated with a reduction in the overall rate of reported crime, including property crime, within the beat area. Although neighbourhood beats do not seem to be associated with a significant change in the rate of calls for service received by police when measured over a short period (i.e. 12 months), they do appear to be associated with a reduction in the rate of calls for service over a longer period. Importantly, and consistent with one of the primary objectives of beat policing, neighbourhood beats are also associated with a decrease in chronic repeat calls for service over a longer period.

Shopfronts are effective in raising awareness and visibility of police but do not appear to be associated with a decrease in the overall rate of reported crime, including reported property crime, within their area of responsibility.

After analysing reported crime rates, the evaluation focuses on measuring the effect of beat policing on citizens' perceptions of crime and personal safety. The higher visibility of police and increased police activity in an area could be expected to reduce citizens' perceptions of crime in the area, increase feelings of personal safety, and also increase willingness to report crime. However, the evaluation reveals that police beats are not associated with a reduction in perceptions of crime levels, increased feelings of safety, or increases in the public's willingness to report crime.

### **Is beat policing cost-effective?**

The evaluation of cost-effectiveness is based on Queensland Police Service (QPS) costing data and analysis of the workloads of beat officers and general duties officers. The results reveal that the workload of beat officers is at least equal to, and in some cases greater than, their general duties counterparts. As expected, beat officers tend to be more involved in community-based activities than is the case with general duties officers. It was generally found that the response provided by the beat officer is more cost-effective than the response provided by a general duties crew to the same type of call. However, this cost saving is largely due to the difference between the cost of a single officer versus a two-officer response.

### **Are community members satisfied with, and do they support, beat policing?**

Community satisfaction and support are assessed using data collected from surveys and interviews. Analyses reveal that residents in neighbourhood beats strongly support the beat-policing model and express praise for the work of the beat officer. While the presence of a neighbourhood beat raises awareness and knowledge of police activity, there is no significant difference between residents in beat and non-beat areas in terms of their level of satisfaction with policing services. Similarly, while the visibility of police is high in shopping centres with a shopfront, this is not associated with an increase in the level of satisfaction with police services expressed by shoppers and retailers.

Several procedural aspects of delivering beat services are also examined. Some of the key elements of effective delivery are:

- ▶ flexible working arrangements over which the beat officer has autonomy, together with an equitable allowance scheme to compensate beat officers for working evening and weekend shifts
- ▶ formal training in problem-oriented policing and access to timely and accurate data for the purpose of identifying local policing problems (the QPS is examining ways to improve training of beat officers and increase their accessibility to data)
- ▶ support and encouragement from managers for beat officers to engage in community partnerships and proactive policing.

The evaluation reveals that police beats, particularly neighbourhood beats, are a worthwhile investment of police resources. In general, police beats are effective in addressing crime and disorder problems and provide a cost-effective means of delivering police services. In addition, the public are very satisfied with, and supportive of, police beats. There are, however, several issues that are identified by the evaluation as being important for the ongoing development of beat policing.

## Issues for future consideration

- ▶ **The process for selecting police beats** — community demands and operational policing requirements need to be carefully balanced on the basis of clearly defined criteria.
- ▶ **Tenure arrangements for new beats** — police beats need to be able to adapt to changing contextual needs in order to remain effective. Consideration should be given to reviewing a beat every three to five years to ensure that it meets the needs of beat-area residents.
- ▶ **Performance management** — police beats should be subject to regular assessments to ensure they are achieving the goals and aims of beat policing.
- ▶ **Marketing** — the level of awareness and knowledge about the beat by beat-area residents or shoppers could be improved.
- ▶ **Training** — training courses need to be provided for new beat officers and ongoing training needs to be regularly conducted with existing beat officers.
- ▶ **Access to information** — beat officers' access to information systems to allow timely identification of local crime trends and community problems needs to be improved.
- ▶ **Alternative models of beat policing** — it may be useful for the QPS to explore some alternative styles of beat policing such as mobile police beats, zone police beats or non-residential neighbourhood beats.

**Police beats are likely to continue as an essential part of police service delivery in Queensland for the foreseeable future. As this study has shown, such innovative policing initiatives need to be comprehensively evaluated to assess their effectiveness.**

**Ultimately, the goal of delivering effective police services to all communities is best achieved by a commitment to police innovation, community satisfaction and program evaluation.**

# Glossary

---

|                           |   |                         |  |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|
| <b>ANCO</b>               | Australian National Classification of Offences  | <b>Metro</b>            | Metropolitan   |
| <b>CA</b>                 | Comparison area   | <b>NPB</b>              | Neighbourhood Police Beats   |
| <b>CAD</b>                | Computer Aided Dispatch   | <b>NUD*IST</b>          | Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising  |
| <b>CJC</b>                | Criminal Justice Commission (now the Crime and Misconduct Commission)   | <b>OESR</b>             | Office of Economic and Statistical Research  |
| <b>CMC</b>                | Crime and Misconduct Commission<br>The CMC was established in January 2002 by the <i>Crime and Misconduct Act 2001</i> (Qld), which merged the functions of the CJC and the Queensland Crime Commission. In addition to its investigatory and oversight functions, the CMC conducts research into matters relating to the administration of criminal justice. Section 52 of the Act allows the CMC to research:<br>a) QPS methods of operation<br>b) police powers and the use of police powers<br>c) law enforcement by police, and<br>d) the continuous improvement of the QPS. | <b>POP</b>              | Problem-oriented policing  |
|                           |   | <b>POPP</b>             | Problem-oriented and partnership policing  |
|                           |   | <b>Problem-solving</b>  | Problem-solving is a practical application of Professor Herman Goldstein's original concept of problem-oriented policing (POP). As the term is used in this report, it is a structured method of inquiry that can be used to help resolve particular policing problems.  |
|                           |   | <b>QPS</b>              | Queensland Police Service  |
|                           |   | <b>Repeat addresses</b> | Addresses generating between three and five calls for service during the study period. The term 'chronic repeat addresses' refers to addresses generating six or more calls for service.   |
| <b>CPQ</b>                | Crime Prevention Queensland<br>CPQ is responsible for implementing the Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy — <i>Building Safer Communities</i> . It provides leadership and support to develop innovative, evidence-based and targeted crime-prevention initiatives across both government and the local community.  | <b>SWAS</b>             | Statewide Activity Survey, QPS<br>The SWAS is a regular assessment of the amount of policing time directed to 35 core policing activities. The data included in the analysis were collected by the QPS between 27 May and 2 June 2002. Over 7500 operational police and staff members were involved in the survey; of this number, 116 responses were received from 58 of the 74 police beats. |
| <b>CRISP</b>              | Crime Reporting Information System for Police — the system that records official information on reported crime.   | <b>WAR</b>              | Work activity report<br>The work activity report is a measure developed by the project team on this evaluation to gather information about the number and type of community contacts by beat officers.   |
| <b>CSC</b>                | Comparison shopping centre  | <b>WEPB</b>             | West End Police Beat<br>The WEPB was established in 1995 as the first inner-city police beat. It was evaluated by the CJC in 1996.   |
| <b>Fitzgerald Inquiry</b> | Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct 1987–89, conducted by Tony Fitzgerald QC  |                         |  |
| <b>Hot spot</b>           | For this report, a hot spot is a location generating five or more calls for service over the observation period.  |                         |  |
| <b>IMS</b>                | Incident Management System, QPS   |                         |  |

# Chapter 1: The development of beat policing

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## 1.1 What is beat policing?

Beat policing is an operational strategy designed to make individual police officers responsible for the community's policing needs in a defined geographical area called 'the beat'. Beat officers are encouraged to take ownership of their area and employ proactive strategies to address the underlying causes of crime and community problems within their beat.

Beat policing has been part of the policing landscape for well over a century. The traditional English Bobby walked the beat, talked to community members and was known by everyone. The advent of car patrols and sophisticated communication technology, combined with urban sprawl, led to policing becoming, primarily, a reactive response to crime — an approach that has been criticised as treating the symptoms rather than the causes of crime (Bayley 1998). Escalating violence in the United States and scepticism about the effectiveness of emergency responses and criminal-investigation strategies have resulted in academics and practitioners considering alternative policing models (Bayley 1998), including a return to community or beat policing.

Policing evaluations conducted in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted four basic lessons:

- 1 Increasing the numbers of police does not reduce crime.
- 2 Police cannot do their job effectively without the assistance of the community.
- 3 Reactive strategies do not address the reasons for crime.
- 4 Police strategies are not responsive to the particular needs of individual communities. (Bayley 1998)

In response to these identified problems with traditional, reactive policing, the concept of

**Neighbourhood beats bring the strength of country policing — personal interaction, community involvement and proactive enforcement — to urban areas.**

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community policing emerged as a prominent policing philosophy during the 1990s through to the current day. In 1994, Trojanowicz (p. 6) defined community policing as:

a philosophy of full-service, personalised policing where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a de-centralised place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems.

These central tenets of community policing have been adopted by the Queensland Police Service (QPS).

Modern-day beat policing involves the permanent assignment of a small number of officers to a designated geographical area. Under this model, usually one or two officers are required, depending on the hours of service that the beat operates. Officers are required to take responsibility for their beat and build strong relationships within the community. In addition to the traditional role of responding to calls for service, they are expected to use problem-solving strategies and community partnerships to target the underlying causes of problems.

**The primary aspects of beat policing are:**

- ▶ **problem-solving**
- ▶ **crime prevention**
- ▶ **effective responses to calls for service**
- ▶ **focused patrolling.**

## 1.2 Beat policing in Queensland

The decision to adopt beat policing as a major policing strategy in Queensland followed a recommendation of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, which criticised the reactive style of policing then in favour (Fitzgerald 1989).

After the release of the Fitzgerald report, the QPS moved quickly to embrace the concept of community policing. A special State Government grant funded a two-year trial, which commenced in Toowoomba in 1993 (the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project). The pilot, based on a concept of beat policing originally developed in the 1980s in Edmonton, Canada, provided a useful reference point for police who were interested in designing community-based, problem-oriented initiatives in other police districts and regions.

The operational management of the Toowoomba project was the responsibility of the Southern Police Region with considerable support from the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) in terms of design, implementation and evaluation. The project was fully evaluated by the CJC and a formal report published in 1995 (CJC 1995a). The report concluded that community beat policing was a success in Toowoomba and should be extended throughout the State. In the nine years since the commencement of the original Toowoomba project, the QPS has established beats in over 70 locations statewide.

## 1.3 Beat-policing models

There are two primary models of police beats operating in Queensland:

- 1 the **neighbourhood police beat** (referred to in this report as ‘neighbourhood beat’ or ‘beat’)
- 2 the **police beat shopfront** (referred to in this report as ‘shopfront’ and the more common of the two in Queensland).

Under the neighbourhood beat model, a police officer resides within the beat area and operates from an office attached to their residence. The officer takes ownership of policing issues in their neighbourhood. Under the shopfront model, a police office is established in a shopping centre or mall and provides services to retailers and shoppers in the centre. Under both models, an increased police presence is expected to have a material impact on crime.

Table 1.1 compares the traditional model of general duties policing with the two primary models of beat policing.

The following sections provide a more detailed description of each beat-policing model.

### 1.3.1 Neighbourhood beats

Neighbourhood beat officers undertake normal operational duties within a defined geographical area and are expected to use traditional law enforcement strategies when necessary. One of the explicit components of this model is to instil a more ‘country’ style of policing into suburban or urban areas, as stated in a QPS report:

Neighbourhood police beats are an integral part of the problem-oriented approach to policing and focus on individual communities ... NPBs, in effect, bring the strength of ‘country policing’ — personal interaction, community involvement and proactive enforcement — to urban areas. (QPS 2001a)

#### Neighbourhood beats aim to:

- ▶ **reduce repeat calls for service**
- ▶ **encourage problem-solving**
- ▶ **develop problem-oriented and partnership policing (POPP) strategies, targeting policing and community problems**
- ▶ **increase police–community interaction and information flow**
- ▶ **reduce the incidence of certain types of offending and undesirable behaviour**
- ▶ **increase community satisfaction with the police**
- ▶ **increase the public’s sense of safety**
- ▶ **increase job satisfaction for beat officers**
- ▶ **win acceptance of beat policing from other police**
- ▶ **contribute to the Police Service Strategic Plan (QPS 2001b).**

These objectives are achieved through establishing a residential or non-residential office in a relatively small geographical area staffed by police officers who take individual responsibility for their area. The major focus of neighbourhood beat officers is on implementing locally generated solutions to local



**Table 1.1 Comparison of the characteristics of general duties patrols, neighbourhood beats and shopfronts**

*Information presented in the table is provided as a simple comparison between policing models — much overlap occurs in terms of the role definitions of general duties police officers and beat officers.*

|                             | <b>General duties patrols</b>  | <b>Neighbourhood beats</b>  | <b>Shopfronts</b>  |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--|
| <b>Base unit</b>            | the 'division'   | the designated area within a residential suburb   | the shopping centre/mall and usually attached car parking area   |
| <b>Size of base unit</b>    | town or suburb   | small enough area for a single officer to patrol  | small enough area for two officers to patrol   |
| <b>Patrol method</b>        | motorised patrols by pairs of officers   | foot, motorcycle or vehicle patrol by a single officer  | foot patrols by pairs of officers  |
| <b>Duty assignment</b>      | required to work within the division or, if tasked, to respond to any call in proximity                        | assigned to work exclusively in the beat area on a long-term basis to promote a sense of ownership  | assigned to the shopping centre  |
| <b>Operating base</b>       | police station   | office or residence within the beat area  | office within the shopping centre  |
| <b>Rostering</b>            | determined by the officer in charge of the station   | beat officer determines when they work, based on their perception of the needs of the area  | determined by officer in charge of the beat  |
| <b>Policing emphasis</b>    | responding to calls for service, general patrolling  | problem-solving, working with the community, crime prevention,  | problem-solving, patrolling, working with shop owners and shopping centre management, responding to calls for service  |
| <b>Information sources</b>  | reliance on division and district level analysis of crime via the CRISP system and police intelligence reports | access to standard police information sources, but also a special emphasis placed on the officer's local knowledge and 'intelligence' provided by the community | access to standard police information sources and also local knowledge and information gathered from shop owners and private security providers in shopping centre |
| <b>Performance measures</b> | response times, clearance rates  | successful problem-solving initiatives, increased community involvement and public satisfaction   | successful problem-solving activities, public safety and increased public satisfaction   |

Source: Adapted from CJC 1995a.

problems within this defined geographical area. They do so by concentrating on monitoring calls for service, identifying and targeting problem areas and implementing solutions in cooperation with other agencies and the community.

### 1.3.2 Shopfronts

The Shopfront Program was launched in December 1992 as a result of the Government Shopping Centre Security Policy. In accordance with the Fitzgerald Inquiry's emphasis on community policing, the shopfront initiative is aimed at placing an effective policing presence in shopping centres and central business areas. The clients of a shopfront are primarily owners, managers and staff of commercial premises, and shoppers.

#### Shopfronts aim to:

- ▶ **improve the community's sense of personal safety**
- ▶ **reduce the community's fear of crime**
- ▶ **satisfy the need for people to communicate more easily with police**
- ▶ **raise the perception that offences will be detected**
- ▶ **contribute to the QPS Strategic Plan (QPS 2001c).**

Shopfronts provide an operational policing presence in areas that have a high flow-through of people and consequently ongoing potential for crime and disorder problems. They are usually located within the hub of a community with centralised entertainment facilities (e.g. cinemas, hotels) and transit centres (e.g. bus terminals). Shopfront beat officers provide a visible police presence and opportunity for frequent interaction with shop owners and personnel, which allow them to gather timely and accurate information that can inform preventive and reactive responses.

## 1.4 The current status of beat policing in Queensland

At the time of the evaluation, there were 28 neighbourhood beats and 43 shopfronts operating in Queensland. A further five neighbourhood beats and

four shopfronts will be established this financial year. See Appendixes 1 and 2 for a summary of characteristics of all neighbourhood beats and shopfronts currently operating in Queensland. An examination of this information reveals the variety across police beats. Many beats have both residential and shopping centres within their borders, or may service a popular tourist area that has dramatic increases in population during holiday seasons.

While most police beats are classified as either a neighbourhood beat or a shopfront, few conform completely with the standard description. Variations occur depending on the requirements of the particular area. Consequently, there is considerable heterogeneity in the beats currently operating in Queensland.

QPS documentation acknowledges that no one strict model of police beats is suitable for all locations, particularly as the focus of the program is on local ownership, negotiated response and proactive problem-solving aimed at dealing with local needs. For example, in cases where a number of businesses are in the neighbourhood beat it may be more desirable to situate the beat officer in a shopfront where high visibility can be achieved and contact with the residents of the beat can be optimised. In other instances it may be desirable for the beat officer to work alongside general duties officers and operate from an office situated in the police station. In the latter case, it is necessary to ensure that the role of the beat officer is clearly distinguished from that of general duties officers.

In addition to contextual needs determining the type of beat established in an area, another reason for differences between beats is that each region has been responsible for establishing its own beats. There were no standard guidelines or operating procedures to ensure consistency and quality of beat offices. Thus, the level and quality of resources and equipment provided to officers were different in each region, and sometimes even between districts. This had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the beat and the ability of the QPS to attract the most suitable applicants for beat-officer positions.

In July 2001, the position of State Beat Coordinator was created. This has resolved many of the problems associated with the regional-based process for establishing beat offices.

There are now:

- ▶ statewide standing operating procedures
- ▶ a standard schedule for allocating resources
- ▶ a nationally accredited five-day training course focusing on the core roles and functions of each beat model with a strong emphasis on problem-oriented partnership policing (POPP)
- ▶ a marketing plan.

In addition, there are now beat-proposal guidelines for establishing a new beat, and proposal documents containing instructions for completing a comprehensive environmental scan. New beat officers receive a comprehensive report detailing hot spots and other crime-related information.

An evaluation plan and tools are currently under development to facilitate ongoing evaluation of the program at both operational and strategic levels.

Operational support and effective supervision are essential for the beat program to succeed. At the start of each new beat, supervisors and officers in charge are now given information sessions and beat-specific introductory booklets.

## 1.5 Previous beat-policing evaluations

This section summarises the methodologies and findings of several published evaluations of various beat-policing projects. International research is mentioned briefly, followed by several Queensland evaluations that are described in more detail.

Evaluations of the effect of community-policing programs on crime levels provide mixed results, with some showing a reduction in crime and others showing no impact on crime trends (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux 1994).

However, most evaluations reveal that community perceptions of safety are generally improved by community-policing initiatives (such as foot patrolling) and that community police officers generally have more job satisfaction. For example, research by Hornick, Burrows, Tjosvold & Phillips (n.d.) revealed that the Edmonton Neighbourhood Foot Patrol Program was associated with higher levels of community satisfaction with police and greater problem-solving by police officers.

Similarly, Mastrofski, Parks, Reiss & Worden (1998; 1999) found that community satisfaction with police was high and community police officers spent more time on self-generated activities such as problem-solving than did general patrol officers.

### 1.5.1 Toowoomba evaluation

The CJC conducted the first major evaluation of beat policing in Queensland when it evaluated the original beat police sites established in Toowoomba in 1993. The key evaluation questions were:

- ▶ How aware were beat-area residents of the beat-policing project? Were they able to easily get in contact with the beat officers?
- ▶ Were significant community-policing problems identified and solved by the beat officers?
- ▶ Did the project make beat-area residents more satisfied with the service provided by police?
- ▶ Were beat-area residents more willing to report offences?
- ▶ Was there any impact on the level of crime in the beat areas?
- ▶ Did the establishment of the project make residents in the beat areas feel safer?
- ▶ Did the project promote job satisfaction among the beat officers?

To ensure that outcomes could be attributed to the initiatives generated by the beats, two comparison areas were selected based on census and calls-for-service data. The evaluation used several different sources of information including pre-beat and post-beat community surveys, analysis of calls-for-service data, a service users survey, interviews with police, and an analysis of activity logs and rosters.

For a detailed discussion of the results of the evaluation, see *Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project: Main Evaluation Report* (CJC 1995a). The key findings were that:

- ▶ problem-solving strategies were successfully identified and developed
- ▶ there was significant increase in satisfaction with police among residents of beat areas
- ▶ there was some reduction in property-related offences and stealing offences
- ▶ there was no significant effect on residents' feelings of personal safety, and

- ▶ beat officers experienced increased job satisfaction in their new role.

The conclusion was that the pilot project was successful and should be continued and expanded across the State. Its success was attributed to:

- ▶ appropriate resourcing and careful planning that ensured the beat was located in a suitable area
- ▶ the commitment of beat officers who had good community and problem-solving skills
- ▶ all levels of police management recognising beat policing as a model of operational policing and not simply a public relations exercise.

In 1995, the CJC published a kit to help other areas establish beats (CJC 1995b). The kit drew heavily on the Toowoomba project and described the various stages in planning, implementing and evaluating beat-style projects. It also listed criteria that could be used to identify a suitable site for a police beat:

- a) The area should impose a high demand on police, as demonstrated by an analysis of calls for service, but not so high a demand as to be beyond the beat officer to handle: ideally, the beat officer should be seen as the major provider of policing services.
- b) The beat area should exist within the confines of an existing police divisional boundary and contain a stable mix of residential and business properties.
- c) The beat area should be no larger than an officer can patrol by foot or bicycle, as there is evidence to suggest that this style of patrolling encourages residents to share information, which gives the officer a better understanding of local issues and makes it easier to target localised crime and disorder problems.
- d) Preference should be given to areas that contain a number of 'repeat calls for service' so that the beat officer will have ample opportunity to apply their problem-solving skills.
- e) The beat should be located in an area that allows the officer to have easy access to calls-for-service information.

### 1.5.2 Shopfront evaluations

The first evaluation of shopfronts was conducted by the QPS and the Queensland University of Technology in 1993 and covered the three trial sites of Garden City (Mt Gravatt), Chermside Shopping

Centre (Chermside) and K-Mart Plaza (Rockhampton). This report was quickly followed by another in 1993, covering the three new sites of Mooloolaba Shopping District (Mooloolaba), Westfield Shopping Centre (Strathpine) and Pacific Fair Shopping Centre (Gold Coast) (QPS 1993).

The data sources used for these evaluations included a survey of shoppers conducted before and after establishing the shopfront, interviews with police, interviews with shop managers and shopping centre managers, and analysis of offences.

Both these evaluations demonstrated overwhelming support from the community and shop managers for the implementation of permanent policing services in shopping areas.

More recently, the QPS Review and Evaluation Unit conducted two evaluations of the Shopfront Beat Program. The first evaluation used a survey of 32 shopfronts to gather information on the characteristics of shopfronts and any specific challenges (QPS 2001d). Beat officers reported that their greatest challenges came from:

- ▶ resource restrictions
- ▶ dealing with the unlawful use of motor vehicles
- ▶ limited time to do proactive policing due to the overwhelming reactive workload
- ▶ a reluctance by retailers and shop security staff to work with relief officers.

Resource restrictions were perceived as primarily the result of regions not passing on the total shopfront funds allocated, which prevented beat officers from operating over all core shopping hours. Officers suggested that:

- ▶ the number of reactive policing tasks should be reduced
- ▶ beat officers should be eligible for an operational shift allowance
- ▶ the officer in charge should be a sergeant
- ▶ more training, particularly in administrative duties and proactive policing, should be provided.

Yet, despite the challenges, shopfront beat officers reported that the program was a success and valued by all stakeholders.

The second evaluation took the approach of identifying the factors that were essential to achieving best practice in shopfront operation

(QPS 2001e). The methods used in this evaluation included a detailed analysis of four of the ‘best’ shopfronts and four of the ‘worst’ shopfronts. The report pinpointed four sets of key characteristics of a model shopfront:

- 1 practices that effectively support the concept of beat policing — including building and maintaining positive relationships with beat clients, POPP, exchanging information and ideas with other shopfront officers and other police, and supportive supervision
- 2 highly motivated, committed staff who feel a sense of ownership for the shopfront and who are committed to beat policing
- 3 location of the shopfront in a medium to large shopping centre that has substantial, but not overwhelming, policing problems
- 4 adequate funding to allow two-officer deployment during core shopping hours.

### 1.5.3 Neighbourhood beat evaluations

The QPS Review and Evaluation Unit has recently released two evaluations on neighbourhood beat policing. The first was based on a survey of all neighbourhood beats operating as of January 2000. It reported on the characteristics of these beats and examined barriers to their effectiveness as well as some positive factors (QPS 2001f). The evaluation found that the most demanding tasks for the neighbourhood beat officers were:

- ▶ managing their time in order to perform a diverse range of tasks
- ▶ working with particular groups within the community such as juveniles and Indigenous people.

Neighbourhood beat officers believed that it was beneficial to have the beat office located close to trouble spots and close to the division police station, and for the beat to have clearly defined boundaries. They also believed that the distinction between the role of general duties police and beat officers needed to be more clearly defined while at the same time liaison and cooperation between beat officers and general duties officers needed to be improved.

The second evaluation identified the factors necessary for achieving best practice in neighbourhood beat policing and used the same methodology as the shopfront evaluation by comparing three of the ‘worst’ and three of the ‘best’ neighbourhood beats

(QPS 2002). It pinpointed five essential elements of best practice:

- 1 effective service delivery
- 2 the right beat officer
- 3 effective supervision
- 4 suitable beat area
- 5 appropriate infrastructure.

The QPS advises that they are working towards addressing many of the issues raised from these previous evaluations of neighbourhood beats.

#### *In short ...*

The central characteristic of beat policing is an effective service-delivery model that uses a problem-oriented approach and builds partnerships with the communities to address local problems. The provision of effective service delivery is supported by having a beat officer who is committed, able to work autonomously and preferably at the rank of Senior Constable. The beat officer must be supported by an effective supervisor who understands beat policing and ensures the officer undertakes a balance of reactive and proactive activities while allowing the officer sufficient autonomy. The beat area should be situated in a neighbourhood with natural boundaries to assist the officer in building a sense of community and must be small enough to be patrolled easily by the officer. Finally, the house, office and equipment must be sufficient for the job and of a standard that will attract and retain officers.

### 1.5.4 West End Police Beat evaluation

Another model of beat policing is the ‘beat police station’ or split-force model of beat policing in which several beat officers operate from one location but each retains responsibility and ownership for designated geographical areas. All officers working in a beat police station are beat officers. An example of such a beat police station is West End Police Beat (WEPB), which was established in 1995 as the first inner-city police beat.

In 1996, the CJC evaluated the WEPB. The evaluation focused on four key questions:

- 1 To what extent did the WEPB pilot project increase community satisfaction with policing services?

- 3 Were community-based solutions to problems developed and applied by the beat officers?
- 3 To what extent has the WEPB improved the level of job satisfaction for beat officers?
- 4 Has the WEPB increased the acceptance of beat policing by other police?

The WEPB evaluation used various data sources including community surveys, a service users survey, calls-for-service data, interviews with police, and activity logs. It found that the integration of the beat officers into the West End police station facilitated communication between beat officers and general duties police and assisted in the effectiveness of the pilot project. The beat officers did engage in the type of work proposed by the pilot proposal, but the size of the beat area was too large for the beat officers to be the main providers of policing services as was desired. While the WEPB did make progress in identifying community problems and developing appropriate solutions, there was no difference between community satisfaction with either beat officers or general duties officers. However, at the time of the evaluation, the WEPB had not been operating long.

## Summary

**Beat policing in Queensland began in the early 1990s in response to an emerging philosophy of community policing and to a recommendation by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Neighbourhood beats and shopfronts are the primary models of beat policing in this State, though there is considerable variance in the application of these models in the field. A number of evaluations have been conducted on beat policing in Queensland. Some of the evaluations have included comparisons with similar areas that do not have a police beat, and most of the studies have used a wide variety of data sources. The current evaluation brings together a range of methodological strategies in providing a comprehensive study of beat policing in Queensland.**

**The next chapter provides information on the methodology employed in this study.**

# Chapter 2: Methodology

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**This evaluation is based on a detailed analysis of six police beats: four neighbourhood beats and two shopfronts. Three of the neighbourhood beats and the two shopfronts were matched with a comparison location that did not have the services of a beat officer. Differences between beats and comparison locations on a range of outcome measures helped evaluate the overall effectiveness of beat policing.**

## 2.1 Key evaluation questions

### 1. Is beat policing effective?

In other words, is it having any impact on crime trends and community perceptions of crime and safety?

### 2. Is beat policing cost-effective?

Does it make good use of finite police resources? We examined how beat policing was being implemented and managed, and looked at the costs of providing a specific community with a beat office. This is particularly important given the increasing demand for beat-policing services throughout the State.

### 3. Are community members satisfied with, and do they support, the beat-policing program?

Without community support, beat policing cannot be a success.

## 2.2 Methodological strategy

Essentially, the strategy involved identifying and selecting a sample of police beats from which quantitative and qualitative data were collected, analysed and compared to matched comparison locations. We:

- 1 used information gathered through a series of in-depth interviews with key community stakeholders and police personnel to identify themes relevant to beat policing and to construct various surveys

Three key questions:

- 1 Is beat policing effective?
- 2 Is beat policing cost-effective?
- 3 Are community members satisfied with, and do they support, the beat-policing program?

- 2 identified a set of beat areas and comparison locations for in-depth analysis

Specific beat-policing sites were selected to cover variations in beat locations, beat models and beat histories. For example, some chosen sites had been established for a long time, others quite recently. Comparison locations were selected because of their similarity to the selected beats — apart from not having a beat operating in the area. Areas were matched on key demographic criteria using census data. We adopted a rigorous methodological approach that involved the use of a matched-pair research design to assess and compare the impact of beat policing in the selected beats to the impact of general duties policing in non-beat locations.

- 3 undertook a longitudinal analysis of one of the selected beats and comparison locations.

This analysis examined significant changes in the number of calls for service since the beat was established. Issues such as citizens' perceptions of community safety in a beat and comparison location in 2002 could be compared with citizens' perceptions in the same locations in 1994. This approach allowed for a powerful assessment of the impact of beat policing in that particular jurisdiction. Depending on the representativeness of the beat selected, the results would be relevant to other beat-policing sites throughout the State.

## 2.3 Site selection and description

Specific criteria were used to select the locations and care was taken to ensure that the sample reflected a range of beats.

Selection criteria for the sample beats were:

- ▶ the beat must have been operating for at least 12 months
- ▶ the beat officer must have been in the position for at least 12 months
- ▶ the beats chosen must represent geographic diversity, including a mix of regional/metropolitan and southern/northern sites
- ▶ data for the beat were readily available, reliable and accurate, and
- ▶ identifiable comparison locations were available.

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*Due to commercial and community sensitivities, for the purpose of this report the name and location of each neighbourhood beat and shopfront will be identified by a regional or geographic designation only. One of the two Toowoomba Neighbourhood Beats has been included in the evaluation to allow for comparisons with information collected during previous evaluations.*

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The following beats were chosen for analysis:

- 1 **Regional Neighbourhood Beat** (Far Northern Region). This beat, established in 1999, is probably most representative of the pure neighbourhood beat model because it is staffed by a single officer who resides and works out of a house located in a defined residential suburb. The beat is situated north of Cairns with a population of under 5000 people. The population fluctuates during the holiday season as it is a popular holiday destination offering resorts and motels. The area is also popular with youth from surrounding districts who congregate along the esplanade, particularly on weekend nights.
- 2 **Metropolitan Neighbourhood Beat** (Metropolitan North Region). Established in 1999 in a Northern Brisbane suburban area, this beat is staffed by two senior constables. One officer lives with his family at the beat residence while the other lives a short distance away in another Service-provided house. The beat has under 7000 people and includes a small shopping complex, two primary schools and a high school. The initial boundaries of the beat did not include

the high school, but after lobbying by the local community the beat area was expanded to incorporate the school and surrounds in 2000.

- 3 **Toowoomba Neighbourhood Beat** (Southern Region). This site was chosen for this evaluation because it is the original neighbourhood beat established in Toowoomba in 1993 and therefore could provide data to help assess changes in the effectiveness of beat policing. The beat remains a single-officer residential beat with a population of about 5000.
- 4 **Outer Urban Neighbourhood Beat** (South Eastern Region). This beat was established in 1999 and is an example of a police beat station that operates out of a shopfront site. There are four officers stationed at the beat, which has a population of about 8000. There are about 20 shops and two primary schools within the beat.
- 5 **Regional Police Beat Shopfront** (Northern Region). This shopfront, established in 1995, is situated in a large shopping centre and is staffed by two senior constables and one civilian administrative officer.
- 6 **Metropolitan Police Beat Shopfront** (Metropolitan South Region). Established in 2000, this shopfront is situated at one of the entrances to a large Brisbane suburban shopping centre. The beat is staffed by one full-time senior constable, a rotating constable position, and one civilian administrative officer.

Figure 2.1 shows the location of each of the beats assessed in this evaluation. (See also Appendix 1.)

## 2.4 Beats and comparison sites

To gain a more thorough understanding of these beats, we analysed beat policing using a matched-pair design. This approach allowed us to compare outcomes of beat policing with outcomes of traditional policing in similar neighbourhoods or shopping centres. The use of a matched-pair design allowed some of the confounding factors such as demographic variables (e.g. gender, income) to be controlled. Thus, it helped us see whether the presence of beat policing in a community was systematically affecting outcomes.

Comparison areas were selected for all neighbourhood beats, except one, and for both shopfronts. (A comparison area was not selected for the Outer Urban



Beat because of the heterogeneous mix of shops and residential homes and the limited time frame of the evaluation period.) Using census data, comparison areas were matched to neighbourhood beats on demographic characteristics: age, gender, income, unemployment and ratings from the Socioeconomic Index for Areas. Because most larger shopping centres in Queensland have a shopfront, it was difficult to find comparison shopping centres that matched on every dimension. However, suitable comparison sites were found for both shopfronts. Table 2.1 shows the beats and their comparison area or centre.

## 2.5 Data sources

Measuring the effectiveness of policing is notoriously difficult. The task is even more daunting when evaluating a model of policing that seeks to combine reactive and community-policing objectives. Reliance on an analysis of crime rates alone can give rise to misleading conclusions regarding overall program effectiveness. Therefore, this evaluation draws on data that were collected from various sources, including interviews, surveys, detailed activity schedules, reported crime and calls for service. The report provides a comprehensive analysis through collating information from internal police sources, the community and key stakeholders.

### 2.5.1 Interviews

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 34 key police personnel, comprising 10 beat officers, 6 district officers, 6 divisional officers in charge, 5 regional assistant commissioners, the police beat State Coordinator, and a further 6 police officers associated with the early development of beat policing.<sup>1</sup> Questions related to the daily work of beat officers, resource requirements, problem-solving initiatives, partnership building, and management.

As part of the evaluation of shopfronts, we interviewed shopping centre managers at beat centres and comparison shopping centres. We asked them what they thought of shopfronts and, in the case of comparison shopping centres, general police services.

As part of the evaluation of neighbourhood beats, we interviewed key stakeholders such as the police minister and shadow police minister, local and state politicians, school principals and local business-promotion organisations. Approximately 60 hours of interviews were conducted and analysed.<sup>2</sup>

**Figure 2.1. Map of selected beats**



Source: QPS organisational units mapping data 2002.

**Table 2.1. Selected beats and their respective comparison area/centre**

| Beat                            | Comparison                              |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Regional Neighbourhood Beat     | Regional comparison area                |
| Metropolitan Neighbourhood Beat | Metropolitan comparison area            |
| Toowoomba Neighbourhood Beat    | Toowoomba comparison area               |
| Regional Shopfront              | Regional comparison shopping centre     |
| Metropolitan Shopfront          | Metropolitan comparison shopping centre |

1 The opinions expressed by individual officers during interviews may not necessarily represent the official position or opinion of the QPS.

2 For the analysis we used NUD\*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising) software.

## 2.5.2 Surveys of key client groups

We surveyed key stakeholders, including community members, retailers, and shoppers. Appendixes 4–8 contain copies of all surveys used for the evaluation.

### **Community survey**

We engaged the Office of Economic and Statistical Research (OESR) to survey by telephone 200 randomly selected community members in each neighbourhood beat and comparison area. About 1400 people aged 18 years or over who were residents in private dwellings and who were listed in the electronic White Pages provided information to gauge the perception of community members on a range of policing issues. The telephone survey included measures of:

- ▶ perceptions of the neighbourhood in terms of crime and disorder problems
- ▶ perceptions of police
- ▶ perceptions of crime
- ▶ experiences reporting crime
- ▶ knowledge of, and experience and satisfaction with, beat officers (beat areas only).

See Appendix 3 for the precise measures included in the analysis.

The response rates for each area ranged from 40 to 61 per cent, with an average response rate across all areas of 52 per cent. The average time taken to complete each telephone interview was 9 minutes for beats and 8 minutes for comparison areas.

The survey was well received and respondents appeared comfortable talking about police in their local area. (See Table 2.2 for a detailed summary of demographic characteristics of the residents who participated in the survey.) Respondents in beats and comparison sites did not differ in age, gender, or the length of time living in the community. There was a significant difference between residents in terms of education levels, with more respondents in comparison areas having a degree or higher degree than respondents in neighbourhood beats.<sup>3</sup> There was also a significant difference between the marital status of respondents in beats and comparison areas.<sup>4</sup> Respondents from a neighbourhood beat were more likely to have never married (19 per cent) compared with respondents in the comparison area (13 per cent).<sup>5</sup>

Demographic information for each of the neighbourhood beats and their respective comparison areas is reported in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 (pages 15–17). Table 2.6 (page 18) presents demographic characteristics for the Outer Urban Beat.

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.3 show marked similarity in the demographic characteristics across the Metropolitan Neighbourhood Beat and its comparison area; however, there was a significant difference in the marital status of respondents,<sup>6</sup> with there being more respondents at the Metropolitan Neighbourhood Beat (20 per cent) who had never been married than in the comparison area (10 per cent).

Despite the similarity in demographic criteria in the Regional Neighbourhood Beat and its comparison area (see Table 2.4, page 16), two significant differences were observed:

- 1 The age category of respondents between the two differed significantly,<sup>7</sup> with more 18- to 34-year-old respondents at Regional Neighbourhood Beat (21 per cent) than at its comparison area (11 per cent).
- 2 Regional Neighbourhood Beat also differed in relation to respondents' highest education level,<sup>8</sup> with fewer respondents having a degree or higher degree (20 per cent compared to 32 per cent).

Analysis of the demographic information of residents surveyed in the the Toowoomba Neighbourhood Beat and its comparison area revealed no significant differences. Compared with the Regional Neighbourhood Beat and its comparison area, the population of these areas tends to be older with almost half of residents being in the over 55-year age bracket.

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3  $\chi^2 = 14.68, p < .05$

4  $\chi^2 = 9.48, p < .05$

5 Beats and comparison areas were originally matched using census data. Demographic information on the 200 residents randomly selected for the telephone survey in each location may not necessarily represent the views of all residents in the area, which is evident from the response rates.

6  $\chi^2 = 8.88, p < .056$

7  $\chi^2 = 8.92, p < .05$

8  $\chi^2 = 14.65, p < .05$

**Table 2.2. Demographic characteristics of residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas**

| Demographic variables               | Neighbourhood beat |       | Comparison area |       |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
|                                     | %                  | (n)   | %               | (n)   |
| <b>Age</b>                          |                    |       |                 |       |
| 18–34 years                         | 22                 | (183) | 18              | (112) |
| 35–54 years                         | 45                 | (372) | 46              | (281) |
| > 55 years                          | 33                 | (278) | 36              | (221) |
| <b>Gender</b>                       |                    |       |                 |       |
| Male                                | 42                 | (350) | 41              | (254) |
| Female                              | 58                 | (483) | 59              | (360) |
| <b>Indigenous</b>                   | 1                  | (11)  | 1               | (7)   |
| <b>Years lived in neighbourhood</b> |                    |       |                 |       |
| < 1 year                            | 3                  | (27)  | 5               | (30)  |
| 1–2 years                           | 13                 | (110) | 12              | (71)  |
| 3–5 years                           | 20                 | (170) | 19              | (116) |
| 6–10 years                          | 21                 | (175) | 20              | (120) |
| > 10 years                          | 42                 | (351) | 45              | (277) |
| <b>Type of dwelling</b>             |                    |       |                 |       |
| Detached house                      | 87                 | (728) | 92              | (564) |
| Semi-detached/unit/townhouse        | 12                 | (105) | 8               | (50)  |
| <b>Dwelling tenure</b>              |                    |       |                 |       |
| Own/mortgage                        | 74                 | (614) | 79              | (485) |
| Rented/other                        | 27                 | (219) | 21              | (129) |
| <b>Employment</b>                   |                    |       |                 |       |
| Full-time work                      | 32                 | (269) | 33              | (202) |
| Part-time work                      | 12                 | (97)  | 13              | (77)  |
| Casual work                         | 6                  | (49)  | 7               | (45)  |
| Self-employed                       | 6                  | (52)  | 6               | (38)  |
| Unemployed                          | 1                  | (11)  | 1               | (8)   |
| Student                             | 3                  | (23)  | 3               | (17)  |
| Home duties                         | 11                 | (89)  | 11              | (65)  |
| Retired                             | 24                 | (199) | 24              | (145) |
| Sick/disability pension             | 4                  | (36)  | 2               | (11)  |
| Other                               | 1                  | (7)   | 1               | (3)   |
| <b>Education</b>                    |                    |       |                 |       |
| No formal education                 | 1                  | (5)   | 0.3             | (2)   |
| Primary                             | 12                 | (101) | 11              | (68)  |
| Junior secondary                    | 25                 | (204) | 25              | (153) |
| Senior secondary                    | 19                 | (161) | 16              | (98)  |
| Certificate/trade                   | 31                 | (261) | 29              | (177) |
| Degree or higher degree             | 12                 | (101) | 19              | (116) |
| <b>Marital status</b>               |                    |       |                 |       |
| Married/de facto                    | 57                 | (476) | 64              | (390) |
| Separated/divorced                  | 15                 | (122) | 15              | (90)  |
| Widowed                             | 9                  | (78)  | 9               | (53)  |
| Never married                       | 19                 | (157) | 13              | (81)  |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

### **Retailers surveys**

Surveys were distributed by hand to all retailers in the Metropolitan and Regional Shopfront shopping centres, and also to retailers in comparison shopping centres (i.e. centres without a shopfront). Retailers were able to remain anonymous and were asked to return the completed survey to the CMC in a reply-paid envelope.

The survey for the shopfront centres included questions on perceptions of safety, awareness of the shopfront, recognition of the beat officers, use of shopfront services, and satisfaction with those services. The survey of the comparison centres included questions about perceptions of safety, contact with police, satisfaction with police, and whether they were aware of and supported the concept of beat policing.

Approximately 40 per cent of retailers in shopfront centres returned surveys, providing a total of 155 responses. The response rate for retailers in comparison shopping centres was approximately 31 per cent, providing 54 returned surveys. The majority (74 per cent) of retailers responding to the survey had been operating the business for more than one year in both the shopfront centres and comparison centres.

### **Shoppers surveys**

In each of the four shopping centres, 200 people (a total of 800 shoppers) were approached while they were shopping and asked to fill out a survey on policing and safety issues.

In the shopfront centres the survey included questions assessing respondents' perceptions of safety while shopping, their awareness of the shopfront, whether they had ever used the shopfront, and their satisfaction with the service they received from the officer. In the comparison shopping centres the survey included questions assessing respondents' perceptions of safety while shopping, whether they had contact with the police in the last 12 months, and whether they were satisfied with the service they received.

The Metropolitan survey was conducted on 9 and 14 September 2002, and its comparison centre on 17 and 18 September 2002.

The Regional survey was conducted on 23 and 24 September 2002, and its comparison centre on 24 and 25 September 2002.

The data collection at the Metropolitan shopfront centre was conducted over one weekday and one weekend day to ensure representativeness of the type of respondents. Preliminary analysis of the data revealed no difference between respondents on the weekday and weekend day. Consequently, it was considered acceptable to conduct the survey on weekdays for the other three sites.

Approximately 60 per cent of shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre were female and approximately 75 per cent shopped at the centre regularly. A similar proportion of shoppers at shopfront centres (4.3 per cent) and comparison shopping centres (3.3 per cent) indicated that they had been a victim of crime while shopping at that particular shopping centre.

### **2.5.3 Calls-for-service data**

Calls from the public for police assistance are routed through Police Communications and police are then dispatched to jobs using a computer dispatch system. The calls-for-service data used in this evaluation were collected from 1 January to 30 June in 2001 and 2002, which allowed for an analysis across multiple periods. About 140 000 calls were available for analysis across beats and comparison locations.

Because the QPS has two distinct systems for storing calls-for-service information, we could not compare areas directly. However, regardless of the system, it is possible to extract the type of job (both how it is reported by the complainant and how it is verified by the officer), the officers or unit attending the job, and the time spent by the unit on the scene.

### **2.5.4 CRISP data**

The QPS supplied 420 000 records from the Crime Reporting Information System for Police (CRISP). A CRISP report provides official information regarding reported crime. A CRISP report often, but not exclusively, results from a call for service. The data supplied cover the first six months of both 2001 and 2002, for both the beats and comparison areas.

**Table 2.3. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

| Demographic variables               | Metropolitan Beat |       | Comparison Area |       |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
|                                     | %                 | (n)   | %               | (n)   |
| <b>Age</b>                          |                   |       |                 |       |
| 18–34 years                         | 26                | (55)  | 22              | (45)  |
| 35–54 years                         | 50                | (106) | 51              | (102) |
| > 55 years                          | 24                | (52)  | 27              | (54)  |
| <b>Gender</b>                       |                   |       |                 |       |
| Male                                | 43                | (92)  | 43              | (87)  |
| Female                              | 57                | (121) | 57              | (114) |
| <b>Indigenous</b>                   | 2                 | (4)   | 1               | (2)   |
| <b>Years lived in neighbourhood</b> |                   |       |                 |       |
| < 1 year                            | 3                 | (6)   | 3               | (5)   |
| 1–2 years                           | 12                | (26)  | 10              | (20)  |
| 3–5 years                           | 16                | (33)  | 17              | (35)  |
| 6–10 years                          | 19                | (41)  | 20              | (40)  |
| > 10 years                          | 50                | (107) | 50              | (101) |
| <b>Type of dwelling</b>             |                   |       |                 |       |
| Detached house                      | 98                | (208) | 99              | (200) |
| Semi-detached/unit/townhouse        | 2                 | (5)   | 1               | (1)   |
| <b>Dwelling tenure</b>              |                   |       |                 |       |
| Own/mortgage                        | 82                | (175) | 85              | (170) |
| Rented/other                        | 18                | (38)  | 15              | (31)  |
| <b>Employment</b>                   |                   |       |                 |       |
| Full-time work                      | 37                | (78)  | 42              | (85)  |
| Part-time work                      | 13                | (27)  | 13              | (27)  |
| Casual work                         | 6                 | (12)  | 6               | (11)  |
| Self-employed                       | 7                 | (15)  | 5               | (9)   |
| Unemployed                          | 1                 | (1)   | 2               | (3)   |
| Student                             | 4                 | (8)   | 3               | (6)   |
| Home duties                         | 13                | (28)  | 13              | (27)  |
| Retired                             | 19                | (40)  | 13              | (26)  |
| Sick/disability pension             | 1                 | (2)   | 2               | (4)   |
| Other                               | 1                 | (2)   | 2               | (3)   |
| <b>Education</b>                    |                   |       |                 |       |
| No formal education                 | 0                 | (0)   | 1               | (1)   |
| Primary                             | 7                 | (15)  | 8               | (15)  |
| Junior secondary                    | 27                | (57)  | 27              | (54)  |
| Senior secondary                    | 24                | (52)  | 20              | (40)  |
| Certificate/trade                   | 36                | (77)  | 31              | (62)  |
| Degree or higher degree             | 6                 | (12)  | 14              | (29)  |
| <b>Marital status</b>               |                   |       |                 |       |
| Married/de facto                    | 65                | (139) | 72              | (144) |
| Separated/divorced                  | 9                 | (20)  | 14              | (28)  |
| Widowed                             | 6                 | (12)  | 4               | (8)   |
| Never married                       | 20                | (42)  | 10              | (21)  |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

**Table 2.4. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Regional Beat and comparison area**

| Demographic variables               | Regional Beat |       | Comparison Area |       |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
|                                     | %             | (n)   | %               | (n)   |
| <b>Age</b>                          |               |       |                 |       |
| 18–34 years                         | 21            | (43)  | 11              | (22)  |
| 35–54 years                         | 52            | (105) | 54              | (108) |
| > 55 years                          | 26            | (53)  | 35              | (69)  |
| <b>Gender</b>                       |               |       |                 |       |
| Male                                | 43            | (87)  | 47              | (94)  |
| Female                              | 57            | (114) | 53              | (105) |
| <b>Indigenous</b>                   | 2             | (4)   | 1               | (1)   |
| <b>Years lived in neighbourhood</b> |               |       |                 |       |
| < 1 year                            | 6             | (11)  | 7               | (14)  |
| 1–2 years                           | 13            | (27)  | 12              | (24)  |
| 3–5 years                           | 21            | (43)  | 21              | (41)  |
| 6–10 years                          | 22            | (44)  | 24              | (48)  |
| > 10 years                          | 38            | (76)  | 36              | (72)  |
| <b>Type of dwelling</b>             |               |       |                 |       |
| Detached house                      | 85            | (170) | 90              | (179) |
| Semi-detached/unit/townhouse        | 16            | (31)  | 10              | (20)  |
| <b>Dwelling tenure</b>              |               |       |                 |       |
| Own/mortgage                        | 76            | (152) | 76              | (152) |
| Rented/other                        | 24            | (49)  | 23              | (46)  |
| <b>Employment</b>                   |               |       |                 |       |
| Full-time work                      | 36            | (73)  | 35              | (70)  |
| Part-time work                      | 15            | (30)  | 12              | (24)  |
| Casual work                         | 8             | (16)  | 9               | (17)  |
| Self-employed                       | 9             | (18)  | 9               | (18)  |
| Unemployed                          | 2             | (3)   | 2               | (4)   |
| Student                             | 5             | (10)  | 2               | (4)   |
| Home duties                         | 7             | (14)  | 6               | (12)  |
| Retired                             | 17            | (34)  | 24              | (47)  |
| Sick/disability pension             | 2             | (3)   | 1               | (2)   |
| Other                               | 0             | (0)   | 2               | (3)   |
| <b>Education</b>                    |               |       |                 |       |
| No formal education                 | 0             | (0)   | 1               | (1)   |
| Primary                             | 4             | (7)   | 4               | (8)   |
| Junior secondary                    | 18            | (37)  | 13              | (25)  |
| Senior secondary                    | 24            | (48)  | 14              | (27)  |
| Certificate/trade                   | 34            | (69)  | 38              | (75)  |
| Degree or higher degree             | 20            | (40)  | 32              | (63)  |
| <b>Marital status</b>               |               |       |                 |       |
| Married/de facto                    | 59            | (118) | 65              | (129) |
| Separated/divorced                  | 17            | (34)  | 13              | (26)  |
| Widowed                             | 8             | (16)  | 7               | (13)  |
| Never married                       | 16            | (33)  | 16              | (31)  |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

**Table 2.5. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

| Demographic variables               | Toowoomba Beat |       | Comparison Area |       |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
|                                     | %              | (n)   | %               | (n)   |
| <b>Age</b>                          |                |       |                 |       |
| 18–34 years                         | 16             | (32)  | 21              | (45)  |
| 35–54 years                         | 36             | (72)  | 33              | (71)  |
| > 55 years                          | 48             | (96)  | 46              | (98)  |
| <b>Gender</b>                       |                |       |                 |       |
| Male                                | 37             | (74)  | 34              | (73)  |
| Female                              | 63             | (126) | 66              | (141) |
| <b>Indigenous</b>                   | 1              | (1)   | 2               | (4)   |
| <b>Years lived in neighbourhood</b> |                |       |                 |       |
| < 1 year                            | 3              | (5)   | 5               | (11)  |
| 1–2 years                           | 10             | (20)  | 13              | (27)  |
| 3–5 years                           | 25             | (49)  | 19              | (40)  |
| 6–10 years                          | 15             | (30)  | 15              | (32)  |
| > 10 years                          | 48             | (96)  | 49              | (104) |
| <b>Type of dwelling</b>             |                |       |                 |       |
| Detached house                      | 84             | (168) | 87              | (185) |
| Semi-detached/unit/townhouse        | 16             | (32)  | 14              | (29)  |
| <b>Dwelling tenure</b>              |                |       |                 |       |
| Own/mortgage                        | 76             | (151) | 76              | (163) |
| Rented/other                        | 25             | (49)  | 24              | (51)  |
| <b>Employment</b>                   |                |       |                 |       |
| Full-time work                      | 29             | (58)  | 22              | (47)  |
| Part-time work                      | 8              | (15)  | 12              | (26)  |
| Casual work                         | 4              | (8)   | 8               | (17)  |
| Self-employed                       | 4              | (8)   | 5               | (11)  |
| Unemployed                          | 1              | (1)   | 1               | (1)   |
| Student                             | 1              | (2)   | 3               | (7)   |
| Home duties                         | 9              | (18)  | 12              | (26)  |
| Retired                             | 36             | (71)  | 34              | (72)  |
| Sick/disability pension             | 8              | (16)  | 2               | (5)   |
| Other                               | 2              | (3)   | 1               | (1)   |
| <b>Education</b>                    |                |       |                 |       |
| No formal education                 | 1              | (2)   | 0               | (0)   |
| Primary                             | 24             | (48)  | 21              | (45)  |
| Junior secondary                    | 27             | (54)  | 35              | (74)  |
| Senior secondary                    | 13             | (25)  | 15              | (31)  |
| Certificate/trade                   | 24             | (48)  | 19              | (40)  |
| Degree or higher degree             | 12             | (23)  | 11              | (24)  |
| <b>Marital status</b>               |                |       |                 |       |
| Married/de facto                    | 52             | (104) | 55              | (117) |
| Separated/divorced                  | 13             | (26)  | 17              | (36)  |
| Widowed                             | 17             | (33)  | 15              | (32)  |
| Never married                       | 19             | (37)  | 14              | (29)  |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

**Table 2.6. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Outer Urban Beat**

| Demographic variables               | Outer Urban Beat |       |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------|
|                                     | %                | (n)   |
| <b>Age</b>                          |                  |       |
| 18–34 years                         | 24               | (53)  |
| 35–54 years                         | 41               | (89)  |
| > 55 years                          | 35               | (77)  |
| <b>Gender</b>                       |                  |       |
| Male                                | 44               | (97)  |
| Female                              | 56               | (122) |
| <b>Indigenous</b>                   | 1                | (2)   |
| <b>Years lived in neighbourhood</b> |                  |       |
| < 1 year                            | 2                | (5)   |
| 1–2 years                           | 17               | (37)  |
| 3–5 years                           | 21               | (45)  |
| 6–10 years                          | 27               | (60)  |
| > 10 years                          | 33               | (72)  |
| <b>Type of dwelling</b>             |                  |       |
| Detached house                      | 83               | (182) |
| Semi-detached/unit/townhouse        | 17               | (37)  |
| <b>Dwelling tenure</b>              |                  |       |
| Own/mortgage                        | 62               | (136) |
| Rented/other                        | 38               | (83)  |
| <b>Employment</b>                   |                  |       |
| Full-time work                      | 28               | (60)  |
| Part-time work                      | 11               | (25)  |
| Casual work                         | 6                | (13)  |
| Self-employed                       | 5                | (11)  |
| Unemployed                          | 3                | (6)   |
| Student                             | 1                | (3)   |
| Home duties                         | 13               | (29)  |
| Retired                             | 25               | (54)  |
| Sick/disability pension             | 7                | (15)  |
| Other                               | 1                | (3)   |
| <b>Education</b>                    |                  |       |
| No formal education                 | 1                | (3)   |
| Primary                             | 14               | (31)  |
| Junior secondary                    | 26               | (56)  |
| Senior secondary                    | 16               | (36)  |
| Certificate/trade                   | 31               | (67)  |
| Degree or higher degree             | 12               | (26)  |
| <b>Marital status</b>               |                  |       |
| Married/de facto                    | 53               | (115) |
| Separated/divorced                  | 19               | (42)  |
| Widowed                             | 8                | (17)  |
| Never married                       | 21               | (45)  |

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

Crime-report counting rules used throughout this report are based on the Australian National Classification of Offences (ANCO). However, for officer workloads (see Chapter 6), the total number of CRISPs has been used rather than the ANCO counting rules.

### 2.5.5 Surveys of police activity

We conducted a series of surveys designed to gauge aspects of beat policing, including officer attitudes and the time devoted to specific work activities.

#### *Work activity reports and occurrence sheets*

Some jobs an officer attends are not recorded as a CRISP report, as the job may be generated from direct community contact or self-generated by the officer. Therefore, it is important to use another source of information to ensure that all of the beat officer's workload is accounted for.

The first source for this type of information is occurrence sheets, which are completed by all operational police officers and record significant events that the officers engage in. Each of the beat officers from the six sample sites was asked to provide their occurrence sheets for June 2002. A comparison between a beat officer's occurrence sheets and calls-for-service data should capture some of those activities that are not identified within the usual police-recording system.

An additional source of information was the Work Activity Report (WAR), a measure we developed to gather information about the number and type of community contacts by beat officers. All the officers from the six sample beats were required to complete a WAR over five shifts during October 2002.

#### *Statewide Activity Survey*

Another source of workload data used was the Statewide Activity Survey, or SWAS. The SWAS is a regular assessment of the amount of policing time directed to 35 core policing activities. The data included in the analysis were collected by the QPS between 27 May and 2 June 2002.

SWAS provides an indication of the length of time officers spend on particular tasks, enabling us to evaluate how a typical beat officer's day differs from that of a general duties officer. SWAS data were also used to obtain the actual numbers (as opposed to model staffing numbers) of officers at constable and



senior constable rank at divisional stations. This information was used to calculate workload levels in terms of CRISP reports and calls for service for these general duties officers.

The response rate for SWAS was 95 per cent. About 20 per cent of beats were not represented and so the analysis was based on data from 90 constables and senior constables from beats, along with about 2000 general duties officers of similar ranks. SWAS data include information on rank, officer type (i.e. general duties, Criminal Investigation Branch etc.) and location of the employee. Unless otherwise specified, all analyses performed on SWAS data were for sworn officers at constable and senior constable rank.

### **Statewide Beat Officer Survey**

In October 2002, we surveyed all officers in charge of shopfronts and neighbourhood beats across Queensland (see Appendix 8), asking them to report:

- ▶ their reasons for becoming a beat officer
- ▶ their main roles and functions
- ▶ their job satisfaction
- ▶ their equipment/facility needs
- ▶ any suggestions they might have for improving beat policing in Queensland.

Sixty surveys were returned from the 68 beats. Two of the returned surveys were not included in the analysis because both officers had been at the beat for one month or less. The response rate was: 68 per cent for neighbourhood beats (17 of 25) and 95 per cent for shopfronts (41 of 43). Seventy-two per cent of the respondents were senior constables, 23 per cent were constables, and 5 per cent were sergeants. The average time served in the QPS was 9.5 years.

### **2.5.6 Documents**

We also examined the Standing Operating Procedures and Guidelines for Police Beat Proposals.

## **2.6 Data constraints**

### **2.6.1 Calls-for-service data**

Calls-for-service data are an extremely valuable source of information; however, reliability remains a major challenge. Generally, a call must be entered by the communications room of the relevant area in order to appear on the calls-for-service database

(sometimes referred to as the CFS database). Activities initiated by the officer, or ‘flag downs’ initiated by the complainant, often do not appear on the system. While this may be a problem for general duties police, it is a bigger problem for beat officers because of the higher levels of autonomy. To correct for this potential problem, occurrence sheets and work activity reports were used to provide a more complete picture of workloads.

A further limitation of calls-for-service data is the accuracy of geographical analysis. However, mapped information is considered to be 95 per cent accurate.<sup>9</sup>

### **2.6.2 CRISP data**

A problem with CRISP data is that the reporting rate for offences can vary according to both the type of the offence and the victim’s characteristics. Also, having a highly visible and approachable police officer can increase the reporting rate. Officers with high levels of autonomy and ownership of problems may choose to use informal resolution for discretionary offences. Such use of discretion could decrease the number of CRISP reports within the beat. Similarly, it is possible that increased proactivity may decrease the number of CRISP reports — particularly for repeat addresses or victims.

Hence, we took particular care during the geographical analysis of data to ensure that all CRISP reports with a valid address were mapped. CRISP reports without information on an address or precise location could not be identified and mapped. However, as with data on calls for service, the mapped information was considered to be 95 per cent accurate.

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9 The mapped information used in this report was mapped using standard street network base maps, which means information can only be considered accurate to the individual street segment. In some cases, addresses in the database are considered complete enough to fix a point only *somewhere* on the street. In all cases, mapped information has been examined for inaccuracies and corrections have been made. About 3.5 per cent of the information was not able to be mapped due to deficiencies in the data. A high proportion of this information was probably not within the beat or comparison area, as these records usually refer to unusual addresses, such as a beach or head-land. In sum, all records with sufficient geographical information to approximately identify a location within the beat or comparison area were mapped.

**The official crime data used in this evaluation are based on crime reported to, or discovered by, the police. Reported crime represents a subset of the total number of crimes occurring in an area.**

**It is important to acknowledge that increases in reported crime in an area may reflect positive aspects of police activity. For example, citizens may have easier access to police or may have more confidence in reporting an incident to police.**

## 2.7 Data analysis

For all quantitative data, each selected beat was compared to its respective comparison site. Descriptive statistics were used to examine the frequency of responses to survey questions. Statistical comparisons between beats and comparison locations were made to assess possible differences across locations on measures of central significance. Statistical procedures employed included chi square

tests and independent sample t-tests, depending on the type of data examined (e.g. nominal, interval).

Crime and calls-for-service data were converted to rate per 100 000 population and comparisons made between each selected beat and its respective comparison location. Crime data were separated into two categories: *all crime* and *property crime*. To assist in statistical analyses, crime and calls-for-service data collected for six-monthly periods were converted for part of the analysis into monthly averages. For the longitudinal analysis, data from the Toowoomba Beat were compared to data from the original Toowoomba Beat evaluation in order to identify significant changes in community perceptions of safety and calls for service over time.

Qualitative data collected through taped interviews were transcribed and entered into NUD\*IST software for analysis. Other qualitative data collected from surveys were summarised to allow the identification of the main themes being expressed by respondents.

See Table 2.7 for a summary of the main elements of the evaluation.

**Table 2.7. Key evaluation questions**

**Question 1: Is beat policing effective?**

*Impact evaluation*

- The rate of crimes reported in beat and non-beat areas
- The number of crimes reported in beat and non-beat areas
- The number of personal, property or other crime in beat and non-beat areas
- The rate of personal, property or other crime in beat and non-beat areas
- Perceptions of crime in beat and non-beat areas
- Perceptions of safety in beat and non-beat areas

*Process evaluation*

- Site selection
- Role and rostering of beat officers
- Proactive problem-solving
- Organisational support for beat policing
- Overall beat officer job satisfaction

**Sources of data**

- CRISP
- Interviews with beat officers and supervisors
- Community survey
- Shoppers survey
- Retailers survey
- Interviews with key stakeholders

**Sources of data**

- Interviews with beat officers and supervisors
- Interviews with key stakeholders
- QPS policies and procedures

**Question 2: Is beat policing cost-effective?**

- Average number of calls for service for beat officers and general duties officers
- Average number of CRISPs for beat officers and general duties officers
- Time spent undertaking problem-oriented policing activities by beat officers and general duties officers
- Cost per call for service by a beat officer and general duties officer

**Sources of data**

- Calls for service
- Interviews with key stakeholders
- QPS policies and procedures
- CRISP
- Weekly activity report
- SWAS
- Occurrence sheets

**Question 3: Are community members satisfied with, and/or supportive of, the beat-policing program?**

- Satisfaction with neighbourhood beat policing
- Satisfaction with shopfront beat policing
- Awareness of beat policing
- Recognition of, and contact with, beat officers

**Sources of data**

- Community survey
- Interviews with key stakeholders
- Shoppers survey
- CRISP
- Retailers survey

# Chapter 3: Impact on crime and calls for service

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**The central question examined in this chapter is: *does beat policing reduce crime across communities and in shopping centres?***

While beat policing is certainly about reducing repeat calls for service and improving police–community interaction, at its core it is about reducing crime. Beat policing is expected to have an impact on crime, in part because officers embark on proactive, preventive strategies, and in part because officers provide a visible police presence in the community or shopping centre. In this chapter, we:

- 1 report on the average monthly rate of overall reported crime and reported property crime in each neighbourhood beat and comparison area — we did not conduct a separate analysis of crimes against the person, because of the low number of this type of crime occurring within the areas under study
- 2 examine the average monthly rate of overall reported crime and reported property crime in shopfronts and comparison sites — once again, we did not examine crimes against the person because of their relatively low rate of occurrence
- 3 examine the rate of calls for service — not all calls for service relate to crime, and, therefore, do not result in a CRISP report; thus, measuring calls for service provides additional information on police activity that is not captured by measuring reported crime. An analysis of calls-for-service data is provided only for neighbourhood beats and comparison areas. An analysis of calls for service at shopfronts was not conducted because an initial analysis of data revealed that a significant number of calls for service to shopfronts were not appearing on the QPS

## Main findings:

- reported crime fell across all neighbourhood beats
  - shopfronts had no apparent impact on the rate of reported crime
  - calls for service and the number of chronic repeat addresses at Toowoomba Beat decreased.
- 

database. Accordingly, it was not possible to perform meaningful analyses of calls for service at shopfronts for the periods under examination.<sup>10</sup>

- 4 examine and compare the average monthly rate of calls for service in Toowoomba in the periods January–June 1994 and January–June 2002, and present results from an examination of changes in the number of crime hot spots over time.

The majority of the analyses presented in this chapter assesses change across two periods, separated by 12 months. The inclusion of one of the original Toowoomba beat-policing pilot sites allowed us to examine changes in calls for service across a much longer period.

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<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 6 for an examination of the workload of beat officers over the month of June 2002.

It should be noted at this point that various factors can affect trends in reported crime rates, such as police initiatives that may increase crime reporting, increased offender activity, school holiday periods, and peak tourist times. The selection of comparison sites limits to a large extent the impact of those influences on reported crime rates.

### 3.1 Rate of reported crime: neighbourhood beats and comparison areas

We gathered CRISP data on the type and place of offence for each police district that contained the selected beat or comparison area. These data were then mapped, and offences that fell within the beat or comparison area were analysed to determine the impact of beat policing on reported crime across two six-month periods. The analysis was broken into two components: *all crime* and *property crime*.

#### 3.1.1 Neighbourhood beats: overall reported crime

The first series of analyses was of all CRISP reports taken by officers, excluding those that were largely discretionary or generated by the officer.<sup>11</sup> The actual number of crime reports was converted to mean rates per 100 000 population so that comparisons could be made between neighbourhood beats and their comparison areas. The average monthly rate of CRISP reports at each neighbourhood beat for January to June 2001 was compared to the average monthly rate of CRISP reports for January to June 2002. The same periods were used for each comparison area.

##### **Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

As can be seen in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, the Metropolitan Beat had a higher rate of reported crime than its comparison area. Additionally, a reduction in reported crime was observed in the beat area, but not in the comparison area. Although these changes are not statistically significant, they are substantially interesting. For example, between 2001 and 2002, the average monthly rate of reported crime declined in the Metropolitan Beat by 5 per cent, whereas it increased by 40 per cent in the comparison area. In raw figures, they equate to a decrease of 7 crime reports in the Metropolitan Beat and an increase of 26 reports in the comparison area.


**Table 3.1. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|              | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Metropolitan | 379 (157.13)      | 361 (57.79)       | - 5         | 0.27   |
| Comparison   | 176 (82.03)       | 247 (102.71)      | 40          | 1.32   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.1. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

##### **Regional Beat and comparison area**

Results reported in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show that over the study period, the average monthly rate of reported crime fell in the Regional Beat by 43 per cent, which equates to 50 fewer crime reports in the first six months of 2002 compared to the first six months of 2001. In contrast, the comparison area experienced a statistically significant increase of 79 per cent in the average monthly rate of reported crime, which equates to 48 more crime reports in the six-month period.

11 Discretionary or officer-generated CRISP reports were not included because they could have skewed the overall picture of crime rates. For example, an officer may set up several roadside RBTs (random breath tests) over the course of a week and generate a large number of CRISP reports for drink-driving.


**Table 3.2. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Regional   | 451 (129.12)      | 259 (152.47)      | - 43        | 2.37*  |
| Comparison | 200 (83.97)       | 358 (95.23)       | 79          | 3.04*  |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.2. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for Regional Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

### **Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

As can be seen in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3, the overall reported crime trends for the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area decreased over the study period.

Despite the large reductions, only the decline in Toowoomba was statistically significant. In terms of actual crime reports, the Toowoomba Beat experienced a decline of 85 crime reports over the two periods while its comparison area dropped by 46 crime reports.


**Table 3.3 Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Toowoomba  | 647 (209.15)      | 377 (87.96)       | - 42        | 2.91*  |
| Comparison | 662 (200.05)      | 467 (137.36)      | - 29        | 1.96   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.3. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

### **Outer Urban Beat**

As previously mentioned, a comparison area was not selected for the Outer Urban Beat. Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4 (next page) show that there was a slight decrease (3 per cent) in reported crime over the study period for this beat, equating to a decrease of 12 crime reports between the 2001 and 2002 January to June periods.


**Table 3.4 Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|             | <b>2001<br/>mean (SD)</b> | <b>2002<br/>mean (SD)</b> | <b>%<br/>change</b> | <b>t-test</b> |
|-------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Outer Urban | 839 (275.79)              | 815 (94.45)               | - 3                 | 0.20          |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.4. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**In short ...**

Reductions in reported crime were observed across all neighbourhood beats, ranging from 3 to 43 per cent. Only in Regional and Toowoomba beats were the reductions statistically significant. In contrast, a reduction in reported crime was observed in only one of the comparison areas (which was not as marked as in the neighbourhood beats and was not statistically significant), while increases in crime were observed in two of the comparison areas.

Factors that could have reduced reported crime in the study areas were:

- the introduction of proactive policing strategies (e.g. targeted problem-solving)
- changing neighbourhood demographics (e.g. age)
- the addition of extra policing services (beat officers and general duties officers), which raised the visibility of police.

Collectively, some of these processes reflect important aspects of beat policing. The consistent trend across all beats suggests that the presence of a neighbourhood beat may reduce reported crime.

**3.1.2 Neighbourhood beats: reported property offences**

The following analyses used CRISP reports for offences against property. Property crime represents approximately 70 per cent of reported crime.

**Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

In both periods under study, the Metropolitan Beat experienced greater levels of reported property crime than its comparison area (see Table 3.5 and Figure 3.5). However, the Metropolitan Beat experienced a decrease of 11 per cent in property crime, which equates to 14 fewer reported property offences in 2002 compared to 2001.

By contrast, the average monthly reported property crime rate in the comparison area increased by 47 per cent, which equates to an increase in 27 reported property offences. However, the changes over time were not statistically significant.


**Table 3.5. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|              | <b>2001<br/>mean (SD)</b> | <b>2002<br/>mean (SD)</b> | <b>%<br/>change</b> | <b>t-test</b> |
|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Metropolitan | 332 (129.20)              | 295 (44.35)               | - 11                | 0.66          |
| Comparison   | 157 (74.04)               | 231 (110.18)              | 47                  | 1.35          |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001


Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.5. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.6. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

### **Regional Beat and comparison area**

Results reported in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.6 reveal quite different trends in reported property crime in the Regional Beat and its comparison area. The average monthly reported property crime rate at the Regional Beat was higher in 2001. However, this had changed dramatically by 2002 with reported property crime down by 38 per cent in the Regional Beat and up by 86 per cent in its comparison area. It should be noted that only the change in the comparison area is statistically significant.

**Table 3.6. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Regional   | 332 (114.06)      | 205 (140.01)      | - 38        | 1.73   |
| Comparison | 164 (77.48)       | 305 (94.69)       | 86          | 2.83*  |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

### **Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

Similar to the results for all crime, reported property crime declined in the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area over the study period (see Table 3.7 and Figure 3.7). Between 2001 and 2002, it fell in the Toowoomba Beat by 53 per cent and in the comparison area by 34 per cent, equating in raw figures to 97 fewer property crime reports in the Toowoomba Beat and 45 fewer in the comparison area. These decreases were statistically significant.

**Table 3.7. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**


|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Toowoomba  | 577 (210.76)      | 270 (51.65)       | - 53        | 3.47** |
| Comparison | 560 (177.70)      | 371 (81.04)       | - 34        | 2.38*  |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.




**Figure 3.7. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.8. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

### Outer Urban Beat

The Outer Urban Beat experienced a 13 per cent increase in reported property crime over the period, equating to an increase of 36 reported property offences. This increase was not statistically significant. See Table 3.8 and Figure 3.8.

**Table 3.8. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|             | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Outer Urban | 559 (189.02)      | 630 (83.15)       | 13          | 0.85   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

#### In short ...

There were decreases in reported property crime in all neighbourhood beats (except Outer Urban Beat) during the study period. In two beats, the decrease occurred against substantial increases in reported property crime in comparison areas. One comparison area demonstrated a fall in reported property crime; however, this was not as marked as the reduction in the respective neighbourhood beat. On the whole, results from the analysis suggest that neighbourhood beats were effective in reducing the rate of reported property offences over the study period.

## 3.2 Rate of reported crime: shopfronts and comparison centres

The next series of analyses examines CRISP data in shopfronts and comparison centres. We compared the average monthly rate of CRISP reports at each shopfront for the period January to June 2001 to the average monthly rate of CRISP reports during January to June 2002, and did the same for the comparison centres.

### 3.2.1 Shopfronts: overall crime

This section reports on all CRISP reports taken in shopping centres (excluding those that were largely discretionary or officer-generated). Average monthly crime report rates were calculated on the flow of shoppers per month.

#### **Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre**

Figure 3.9 shows that the Metropolitan shopfront centre had a higher rate of overall reported crime during both periods than did its comparison shopping centre. However, there were slight differences in the trend over time between the two sites (see Table 3.9). At the Metropolitan Shopfront, there was a small increase in reported crime of 5 per cent, while the comparison centre experienced a 10 per cent decrease. The changes experienced by each shopping centre were not statistically significant and in raw figures equate to 25 more crime reports at the Metropolitan Shopfront and 11 fewer at the comparison centre during the study period.

#### **Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre**

From January to June 2001 there was very little difference in the rate of reported crime in the Regional Shopfront and comparison centre. However, by 2002 this situation had changed. See Figure 3.10 and Table 3.10. For example, between 2001 and 2002 the average monthly rate of reported crime at the Regional Shopfront increased by 45 per cent, whereas the average monthly rate of reported


**Table 3.9. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|              | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Metropolitan | 8.00 (1.40)       | 8.44 (1.80)       | 5           | 0.47   |
| Comparison   | 4.86 (1.29)       | 4.35 (0.96)       | - 10        | 0.78   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.10. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.9. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

**Table 3.10. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Regional   | 5.79 (1.07)       | 8.42 (3.67)       | 45          | 1.68   |
| Comparison | 4.86 (1.01)       | 5.07 (1.45)       | 4           | 0.29   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

crime at the comparison shopping centre had increased by 4 per cent. Although the change at the Regional Shopfront was quite large and represents an increase of 63 actual crime reports, it was not statistically significant. The increase was due to increased criminal activity in the shopping centre during one month of the period of study.

*In short ...*

Changes in reported crime at these shopping centres were quite small, with the exception of one shopfront centre where there was a large increase due to a disproportionate amount of criminal activity during one month of the 2002 study period. None of the changes in reported crime rates was statistically significant.

There was no evidence that shopfronts had a statistically significant impact on reducing the rate of reported crime.

### 3.2.2 Shopfronts: property offences

The following analyses were conducted on CRISP reports for offences against property. Property crime represents about 80 per cent of crime reported to shopfronts.


#### **Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre**

As can be seen in Figure 3.11 and Table 3.11, there is proportionally a higher number of reported property offences occurring at the Metropolitan Shopfront than at the comparison shopping centre. From 2001 to 2002 a small increase of 6 per cent was observed at the Metropolitan Shopfront with a corresponding 6 per cent reduction at the comparison shopping centre. These changes were not statistically significant. In raw figures, they equate to 26 more property crime reports at the Metropolitan Shopfront and 6 fewer property crime reports at the comparison shopping centre.

#### **Regional Shopfront and comparison centre**

The Regional Shopfront and its comparison centre experienced increases in reported property crime over the study period. See Figure 3.12 and Table 3.12. The results were marginal at the comparison shopping centre (4 per cent) while, from 2001 to

**Figure 3.11. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre**



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002. QPS.

**Table 3.11. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|              | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Metropolitan | 7.76 (1.47)       | 8.21 (1.83)       | 6           | 0.47   |
| Comparison   | 4.49 (1.20)       | 4.21 (0.90)       | - 6         | 0.45   |


Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002. QPS.

2002, the Regional Shopfront experienced an increase of 43 per cent, which in raw figures equates to 59 more reports of property crime. However, this difference was not statistically significant. As with the overall reported crime analysis, the increased rate was due to one month of high crime activity in the centre.

Increases in the average monthly rate of reported property crime were observed in both shopfront sites, though neither of these increases was statistically significant. One of the comparison sites also experienced a slight increase in reported property crime, whereas, in contrast, the other comparison site experienced a slight decrease.

Figure 3.12. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre



Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

Table 3.12. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002

|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Regional   | 5.75 (1.11)       | 8.21 (3.72)       | 43          | 1.55   |
| Comparison | 4.72 (0.86)       | 4.93 (1.40)       | 4           | 0.31   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

*In short ...*

There was no evidence that shopfronts reduced the level of property crime in shopping centres. One reason for this might be that the shopfronts selected for this evaluation were in very large shopping centres with many 'crime attracting' features, such as a large cinema complex, a public bar, and a bus terminal through which about 1000 juveniles pass through each afternoon. These features are situated near each other and next to a food court providing a gathering place frequented by groups of young people. Also, shoppers in centres that have police shopfronts may have more confidence in reporting crime. By their very design, shopfronts may facilitate reporting of crime.

### 3.3 Rate of calls for service: neighbourhood beats and comparison areas

For these analyses we used data extracted from either the IMS (Incident Management System) or ESCORT CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch system) calls-for-service databases. The analyses are based on all calls for service within the beat and comparison areas, regardless of the officer attending.

Further analysis of this dataset revealed that most calls for service taken by beat officers had not been entered into the police database. Therefore, the actual rate of calls for service within beat areas is likely to be greater than that shown below. Despite this, an assessment of calls for service is still of great benefit as, unlike CRISP records, officers have little room for discretion in attending a call for service.

#### Metropolitan Beat and comparison area

During the 2001 and 2002 study periods, the Metropolitan Beat received more calls for service than did the the comparison area. However, both experienced a slight reduction in the average monthly rate of calls for service. Neither of the changes was significant and equated to 10 fewer calls in the Metropolitan Beat and 19 fewer calls in the comparison area. See Table 3.13 (below) and Figure 3.13 (next page).


Table 3.13. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002

|              | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | %<br>change | t-test |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| Metropolitan | 1001 (120.25)     | 975 (169.27)      | - 3         | 0.31   |
| Comparison   | 812 (220.78)      | 760 (69.61)       | - 6         | 0.55   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001


Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.13. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.14. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

### **Regional Beat and comparison area**

Results in Table 3.14 and Figure 3.14 reveal that the average monthly rate of calls for service was higher in the Regional Beat than in the comparison area in 2001 and 2002. However, the trend appears to differ. Between 2001 and 2002, the calls-for-service rate in the Regional Beat increased by 19 per cent, and in the comparison area by 62 per cent. The change in the comparison area is statistically significant. The trend across sites equates to an increase of 63 calls at the Regional Beat and 115 calls at the comparison area.

**Table 3.14. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001 mean (SD) | 2002 mean (SD) | % change | t-test |
|------------|----------------|----------------|----------|--------|
| Regional   | 1270 (132.13)  | 1513 (291.28)  | 19       | 1.86   |
| Comparison | 607 (122.98)   | 985 (230.08)   | 62       | 3.55** |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

### **Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

The Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area experienced slight decreases in the average monthly rate of calls for service from 2001 to 2002. The 4 per cent reduction of calls at the Toowoomba Beat equates to 20 fewer calls for service received by police and the 7 per cent decrease at the comparison area equates to 39 fewer calls for service. Neither of these changes was statistically significant. See Table 3.15 and Figure 3.15.


**Table 3.15. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001 mean (SD) | 2002 mean (SD) | % change | t-test |
|------------|----------------|----------------|----------|--------|
| Toowoomba  | 1678 (372.01)  | 1614 (215.10)  | - 4      | 0.36   |
| Comparison | 2285 (705.73)  | 2120 (491.04)  | - 7      | 0.47   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001


Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

Figure 3.15. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area



Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002. QPS.

Figure 3.16. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat



Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002. QPS.

### Outer Urban Beat

The rate of calls for service at the Outer Urban Beat increased by 14 per cent over the study period, equating to an additional 161 calls for service to police in 2002 compared to the same period during 2002. Despite the increase, the changes over time were not statistically significant. See Table 3.16 and Figure 3.16.

While a comparison of calls for service between beats and comparison areas provides an interesting description of change over a relatively short period, it may be more valuable to identify the impact that neighbourhood police beats have on chronic repeat addresses. This is particularly important as one of the primary aims of neighbourhood police beats is to reduce repeat calls for service.

Table 3.16. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat, January to June 2001 and 2002

|             | 2001 mean (SD) | 2002 mean (SD) | % change | t-test |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|----------|--------|
| Outer Urban | 2263 (437.34)  | 2583 (394.56)  | 14       | 1.33   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002. QPS.

#### In short ...

Two of the neighbourhood beats and their comparison areas exhibited a similar trend of small reductions in calls for service over the study period. In contrast, an increase in the rate of calls for service was observed at the Regional Beat, its comparison area and the Outer Urban Beat. However, only at the comparison area were these increases statistically significant, which indicates that there was a substantial increase in crime and police activity in the area. The comparison area in question is a rapidly developing suburb with marked growth in residential development as well as tourist facilities. The Regional Beat has a small level of residential development, which may be causing the slight, yet non-significant, increase in calls for service. In comparison, all other locations in the study are in relatively stable suburbs with little or no development.

### 3.4 Analysis of rates of calls for service at the Toowoomba Beat: 1994, 2002

This section focuses on changes in calls for service since 1994 at one neighbourhood beat. In particular, the impact of the neighbourhood beat on chronic repeat calls is examined.

We conducted a longitudinal assessment of calls-for-service data for the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area. Calls-for-service data were originally obtained during the CJC evaluation of the Toowoomba Beat in 1994 (CJC 1995a). These data for a six-month period (January to June) in 1994 were compared to data taken from the current IMS system for the six-month period (January to June) in 2002.

Calls for service were made comparable between the beat area and the comparison area by converting to rates per 100 000 population. Census information for the two areas was used to establish approximate populations in 1994 (1991 census) and 2002 (2001 census). The calls-for-service data analysed here are based upon either a job-card system entered during the 1995 project or the current version of the IMS database. While data from these two systems have remained largely compatible, we do not know whether local police procedures have remained stable over the period under observation (1994, 2002).<sup>12</sup> It is important to note, however, that any procedural changes similarly affect both areas. Overall, the main issue of concern with these data is calls for service taken by the beat officer that are not recorded on the IMS system.<sup>13</sup>

The strength of the longitudinal analysis rests on the assumption that beat-policing practices are expected to have a long-term positive impact on demands for police services. The longitudinal analysis is strengthened considerably by including the same comparison area across both periods. In doing this, differences in calls for service across areas may more reasonably be attributed to differing aspects of police service-delivery practices across the different areas.

Given that being proactive is one of the requirements of beat policing, it is reasonable to assume that neighbourhood beat police officers should work effectively at targeting and responding proactively to problematic crime locations within the beat. They should be able to embrace a series of strategies — proactive and reactive — to target locations within the beat that present persistent crime and disorder problems.

Thus, in the current analysis, we expected that each neighbourhood police beat would have fewer crime hot spots and repeat-crime locations in comparison to its control area. We also expected that the beat area would have a diminishing number of crime hot spots and repeat-crime locations over time, as evidence of ongoing, effective neighbourhood beat policing activities.

The analysis below is organised into three sections.

- 1 A comparison of rates of calls for service for the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area. This analysis assesses changes over time in the average monthly rate of calls for service between January and July 1994 and January and July 2002.
- 2 A descriptive and geographical analysis of crime hot spots across the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area over time.
- 3 A descriptive analysis of repeat calls for service across locations in the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area. The section examines a sub-set of calls for service whereby specific addresses can be identified to assess possible changes in the number of repeat crime addresses over time.

#### 3.4.1 Rate of calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat: 1994, 2002

Results in Table 3.17 and Figure 3.17 reveal changes over time in the average rate of calls for service per 100 000 population for the Toowoomba Beat and the comparison area. The findings reveal a reduction by 17 per cent in the average monthly rate of calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat between 1994 and 2002.

By contrast, the comparison area experienced a minor reduction of 5 per cent over the same period. Although the comparisons are not statistically significant, the change equates to a reduction in calls in the Toowoomba Beat of 87 calls for service.

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12 For example, the 1995 calls-for-service data reveal approximately 150 calls emanating from the police beat itself (e.g. 'attending to officer duties'), while no similar calls for service can be found in the 2002 data. For this assessment, these 150 calls were removed from the analysis.

13 For example, an analysis of the beat officers 2002 occurrence sheets for the month of July 2002 reveals in excess of 60 calls for service, while fewer than five of these were present on the IMS database.


**Table 3.17. Longitudinal comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002**

|            | 2001<br>mean (SD) | 2002<br>mean (SD) | % change | t-test |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|--------|
| Toowoomba  | 1942 (347.24)     | 1614 (215.10)     | - 17     | 1.97   |
| Comparison | 2227 (456.73)     | 2120 (491.04)     | - 5      | 0.39   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

**Figure 3.17. Longitudinal comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**



Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS

### 3.4.2 Analysis of hot spots in the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area: 1994, 2002

Information reported in Figure 3.18 (next page) compares the number of calls-for-service hot spots in the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area in 1994 and in 2002. The calculation of a hot spot depends on both the number of repeat calls to an address and the density of calls in the surrounding area. Therefore, a hot spot may be due to one address receiving a large number of calls, a grouping of calls over a small area, or a combination of the two. For this analysis, a hot spot is defined as an area generating five or more calls for service over the observation period (i.e. six months).

The largest and most obvious hot spot includes an area with several educational institutions (marked on Figure 3.18 as Area A). Most calls to this location

related to reporting trespassers, suspects loitering and like activities.

In Area B, change in the intensity of hot spots between the two periods is evident. In the first six months of 1994, there were a number of addresses in Area B identified as hot spots. The majority of calls to this location related to noise abatement, mentally disturbed people and some repeat domestic-violence incidents. These problem areas are no longer present in the 2002 data, which may indicate that police activities — either proactive or reactive — have reduced the problems in that area. It may also be possible that the people who caused the problems have since moved to a different location outside the beat area.

Some new hot spots appeared in 2002 that were not present in 1994. Overall, the results of this descriptive analysis reveal that the number of hot spots increased in both the neighbourhood beat and comparison area, although the increase was more marked in the comparison area.

### 3.4.3 Analysis of repeat calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area: 1994, 2002

Information used for the analysis of hot spots in the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area was also used for an analysis of repeat calls for service. Addresses generating repeat calls for service may be indicative of an emerging hot spot and so should warrant police attention. At the same time, many locations that generate repeat calls for service are not necessarily chronic locations for crime and disorder. In the current analysis, repeat, but non-chronic, call addresses represent locations generating between three and five calls for service during the study period. Addresses generating six or more calls are defined as chronic repeat addresses.

The analysis reported here examines and compares the distribution of repeat-call locations in 1994 and 2002 for the Toowoomba Beat and the comparison area. This analysis required very precise locations for calls-for-service addresses. Thus, due to some limitations in the data, the analysis was restricted to accurate information for locations generating three or more calls for service in each six-month period.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Preliminary analysis of the data revealed that the precise position of about 40 per cent of mapped calls for service could not be determined. These addresses were not used for this portion of the analysis.



Figure 3.18. Comparative hot-spot analysis for calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, 1994 and 2002

yellow: hot spots for 1994

black: hot spots for 2002

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.

Differences between the numbers of addresses with repeat calls between the two periods (January to June 1994 and 2002) are displayed in Figure 3.19. The results show some decreases in the numbers of repeat addresses between the two periods, at least for those addresses generating three, four and five calls for service. These reductions were largely similar across beat and comparison areas. For example, in both beat and comparison areas, a reduction by seven addresses generating three calls for service was observed over time.


Some differences between the neighbourhood beat and comparison area were also observed. For example, addresses within the beat generating six or seven repeat calls for service reduced between the periods, while addresses generating six or seven repeat calls within the comparison area rose across the period. This finding represents support for the neighbourhood police beat and suggests that it might be effective at targeting chronic repeat addresses. While other external conditions cannot necessarily be ruled out, the evidence is consistent with the view that neighbourhood police beats are effective at reducing chronic crime and disorder locations.

*In short ...*

After examining changes over time in calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat and the comparison area, we found support for the effectiveness of neighbourhood beats, although the findings do vary:

- 1 An analysis of changes in average monthly calls for service over time across both locations indicated stronger reductions for the neighbourhood police beat when compared to the comparison area; however, the differences were not statistically significant.
- 2 The hot-spots analysis revealed increases in the number of hot spots over time across both locations, although the increases were larger in the comparison area. These results are somewhat inconsistent with earlier expectations.
- 3 The analysis of changes over time in repeat calls-for-service addresses revealed that chronic repeat locations diminished in the beat but not in the comparison area. We view this as evidence in favour of neighbourhood beat policing.

**Figure 3.19. Differences in the number of repeat addresses, January to June 1994 and 2002**



At first sight, this figure may seem difficult to understand; however, it illustrates the impact that beats have on reducing chronic repeat calls for service.

As a guide to interpreting the figure, it is important to know that when a number in a column falls below the '0' line it means that there are fewer addresses generating a particular number of repeat calls for service (i.e. addresses generating 3, 4, 5 to 13 calls for service).

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002. QPS.

## *Summary of findings*

### **Neighbourhood beats**

- ▶ Reductions in overall reported crime rates ranging from 3 to 43 per cent were observed across all neighbourhood beats.
- ▶ Reductions in reported property crime rates ranging from 11 to 53 per cent were observed in three neighbourhood beats. One beat experienced a 13 per cent increase in property crime rates.
- ▶ Increases of 40 and 79 per cent in the rate of reported crime were observed in two of the comparison areas.
- ▶ Increases of 47 and 86 per cent in reported property crime rates were observed in two of the comparison areas
- ▶ Two neighbourhood beats and one comparison area experienced a small reduction in calls for service over a 12-month period.
- ▶ Two neighbourhood beats and one comparison area experienced an increase in calls for service over a 12-month period.
- ▶ The average monthly rate of calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat decreased by 17 per cent between 1994 and 2002.
- ▶ The number of crime hot spots increased at the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area between 1994 and 2002.
- ▶ Over this same period, the number of calls to chronic repeat addresses decreased in the neighbourhood beat but not in the comparison area.

### **Shopfronts**

- ▶ There were increases in overall reported crime rates at both of the shopfront sites.
- ▶ There were increases in reported property crime at both shopfront sites.
- ▶ One comparison shopping centre experienced a decrease in overall reported crime and reported property crime, while the other comparison shopping centre experienced small increases in overall reported crime and reported property crime.

# Chapter 4: Perceptions of crime and personal safety

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**This chapter looks at citizens' *perceptions* of safety, both at the personal level and at the broader community level, as opposed to actual reported crime. It examines their willingness to report crime and their feelings of personal safety within the neighbourhood beats and comparison areas. It also examines reported levels of personal safety among shoppers and retailers at shopping centres that have a police shopfront and comparison centres that do not.**

The level of crime reported in an area can influence citizens' perceptions of safety. The visibility of police and their activity within an area can also affect perceptions. Beat policing aims to build community partnerships and improve the relationship between police and the public. Recognition and familiarity with beat officers, in combination with perceptions that police are committed to dealing with local crime and disorder problems, may increase the public's willingness to report crime.

## 4.1 Perceptions of crime and personal safety in neighbourhood beats

The following section is based on an analysis of data from a telephone survey of residents in beat areas and comparison areas.

### 4.1.1 Perceptions of crime in neighbourhood beats

Residents were asked how common they believed eight categories of disorder problems were in their neighbourhood. The response options were:

- 1 = very common      2 = fairly common  
3 = not very common    4 = not at all common.

An independent sample t-test was conducted between each neighbourhood beat and its respective comparison area. (*Note:* lower mean scores indicate that residents believe crime and disorder problems are more common in their neighbourhood.)

### Main findings:

- Residents in neighbourhood beats perceive disorder problems to be more common in their community than do residents in comparison areas.
  - Beats do not necessarily make residents feel safer; nor do shopfronts necessarily make shoppers and retailers feel more safe.
- 

### **Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

As can be observed in Table 4.1 (next page), residents of the Metropolitan Beat and its comparison area believed that most categories of disorder problems were not very common. Residents in the two areas differed in their opinion of only two types of disorder: graffiti and vandalism.<sup>15</sup> In both instances, residents of the Metropolitan Beat reported that these problems were more common in their community than did residents of the comparison area.

These findings are consistent with information collected through interviews with the Metropolitan Beat officers and local stakeholders. Graffiti was nominated as a major problem in the area and had received dedicated attention from the beat officers, who had previously received a POPP award for their initiatives targeting graffiti. The local council had also employed the services of a full-time graffiti

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<sup>15</sup>  $t = 3.72, p < .001$  and  $t = 3.87, p < .001$  respectively.

**Table 4.1. Perceived disorder problems at the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

| <b>Crime and disorder</b>                 | <b>Metropolitan mean (SD)</b> | <b>Comparison mean (SD)</b> | <b>t-test</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| How common is ____ in your neighbourhood? |                               |                             |               |
| Graffiti on walls and buildings           | 2.43 (0.93)                   | 2.77 (0.89)                 | 3.72***       |
| Drunks and vagrants                       | 3.03 (0.82)                   | 3.18 (0.77)                 | 1.87          |
| Rubbish and litter                        | 3.00 (0.78)                   | 3.01 (0.78)                 | 0.13          |
| Home/gardens in bad condition             | 3.22 (0.66)                   | 3.14 (0.70)                 | 1.17          |
| Noisy neighbours/loud parties             | 3.13 (0.66)                   | 3.09 (0.68)                 | 0.49          |
| Vandalism/damage to property              | 2.93 (0.76)                   | 3.21 (0.69)                 | 3.87***       |
| Drug dealing                              | 3.22 (0.82)                   | 3.29 (0.83)                 | 0.72          |
| Discarded needles                         | 3.63 (0.61)                   | 3.62 (0.61)                 | 0.18          |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

removalist. While there appeared to be agreement that graffiti was a major problem, residents surveyed were perhaps not aware of the initiatives already implemented to deal with it.

#### **Regional Beat and comparison area**

The results of the analyses comparing the Regional Beat and its comparison area revealed a very different picture (see Table 4.2, below). Residents of each area differed in their opinion in all but one category of disorder. In all cases, residents of the Regional Beat reported that disorder problems were more common in their area compared to residents of the comparison area.

#### **Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

The results of the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area revealed that residents had very similar perceptions of crime and disorder problems in their communities. Additionally, the findings revealed that residents did not believe the examples of crime and disorder problems listed were very common in their neighbourhoods (see Table 4.3).

#### **Outer Urban Beat**

Results examining the perceived levels of disorder in the Outer Urban Beat are reported in Table 4.4. They show that on several indicators of community disorder, residents of the Outer Urban Beat reported

**Table 4.2. Perceived disorder problems at the Regional Beat and comparison area**

| <b>Crime and disorder</b>                 | <b>Regional mean (SD)</b> | <b>Comparison mean (SD)</b> | <b>t-test</b> |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| How common is ____ in your neighbourhood? |                           |                             |               |
| Graffiti on walls and buildings           | 3.24 (0.65)               | 3.65 (0.50)                 | 7.07***       |
| Drunks and vagrants                       | 3.01 (0.90)               | 3.42 (0.73)                 | 5.04***       |
| Rubbish and litter                        | 3.12 (0.76)               | 3.42 (0.65)                 | 4.19***       |
| Home/gardens in bad condition             | 3.26 (0.63)               | 3.52 (0.59)                 | 4.24***       |
| Noisy neighbours/loud parties             | 3.00 (0.69)               | 3.23 (0.78)                 | 3.20**        |
| Vandalism/damage to property              | 2.99 (0.83)               | 3.37 (0.69)                 | 4.98***       |
| Drug dealing                              | 3.17 (0.87)               | 3.39 (0.78)                 | 2.23*         |
| Discarded needles                         | 3.67 (0.53)               | 3.75 (0.46)                 | 1.52          |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

**Table 4.3. Perceived disorder problems at the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

| Crime and disorder                        | Toowoomba mean (SD) | Comparison mean (SD) | t-test |
|---|---------------------|----------------------|--------|
| How common is ____ in your neighbourhood? |                     |                      |        |
| Graffiti on walls and buildings           | 3.15 (0.85)         | 3.23 (0.81)          | 1.03   |
| Drunks and vagrants                       | 3.15 (0.82)         | 3.22 (0.80)          | 0.75   |
| Rubbish and litter                        | 3.15 (0.76)         | 3.08 (0.82)          | 0.85   |
| Home/gardens in bad condition             | 3.28 (0.67)         | 3.30 (0.69)          | 0.40   |
| Noisy neighbours/loud parties             | 3.40 (0.67)         | 3.30 (0.80)          | 1.46   |
| Vandalism/damage to property              | 3.16 (0.81)         | 3.04 (0.79)          | 1.45   |
| Drug dealing                              | 3.43 (0.80)         | 3.32 (0.85)          | 1.16   |
| Discarded needles                         | 3.73 (0.53)         | 3.69 (0.59)          | 0.53   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

**Table 4.4. Perceived disorder problems at the Outer Urban Beat**

| Crime and disorder                        | mean (SD)   |
|---|-------------|
| How common is ____ in your neighbourhood? |             |
| Graffiti on walls and buildings           | 2.75 (0.89) |
| Drunks and vagrants                       | 3.01 (0.84) |
| Rubbish and litter                        | 2.84 (0.89) |
| Home/gardens in bad condition             | 2.87 (0.86) |
| Noisy neighbours/loud parties             | 3.14 (0.89) |
| Vandalism/damage to property              | 3.02 (0.84) |
| Drug dealing                              | 2.65 (1.19) |
| Discarded needles                         | 3.43 (0.79) |

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

**Table 4.5. Perceptions of changes in crime and disorder**

| Area         | Inc. % (n) | Dec. % (n) | No change % (n) | Don't know % (n) |
|--------------|------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Metropolitan | 28.6 (61)  | 16.4 (35)  | 49.8 (106)      | 5.1 (11)         |
| Comparison   | 24.9 (50)  | 9.5 (19)   | 60.2 (121)      | 5.5 (11)         |
| Regional     | 18.4 (37)  | 16.4 (33)  | 52.2 (105)      | 12.9 (26)        |
| Comparison   | 24.6 (49)  | 4.5 (9)    | 65.3 (130)      | 5.5 (11)         |
| Toowoomba    | 24.5 (49)  | 19.5 (39)  | 49.5 (99)       | 6.5 (13)         |
| Comparison   | 30.8 (66)  | 13.1 (28)  | 49.1 (105)      | 7.0 (15)         |
| Outer Urban  | 13.2 (29)  | 34.7 (76)  | 42.9 (94)       | 9.1 (20)         |

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

similar levels to residents in other beats. However, for conditions such as rubbish and litter, home/gardens in bad condition, and drug-dealing, residents in the Outer Urban Beat reported higher mean levels of disorder.

#### **Perceptions of changes in crime and disorder**

To further explore perceptions, respondents were asked whether they believed crime and disorder was increasing, decreasing, or staying the same in their community. Each beat was compared to its comparison area, with the exception of the Outer Urban Beat (see Table 4.5).

The analyses revealed no significant difference between residents in the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area or between residents in the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area. However, a significant difference was observed between the Regional Beat and its comparison area ( $\chi^2 = 24.47$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Three times as many Regional Beat residents believed that crime was decreasing compared to comparison area residents (16 versus 5 per cent). In contrast, 25 per cent of comparison area residents believed that crime was on the increase, compared to 18 per cent in the Regional Beat.

One of the more interesting results of this analysis was the high proportion (one-third) of Outer Urban Beat residents who reported that crime was on the decrease. The Outer Urban Beat is traditionally an area of social disadvantage with a high percentage of residents from low socioeconomic backgrounds.

However, it is currently a community renewal area and so is undergoing dramatic change aimed at reducing problems such as crime. The information reported in Table 4.5 indicates that residents perceive there to be a reduction in crime and disorder, which may be a result of the community renewal program.

***In short ...***

Residents in neighbourhood beats perceive disorder problems to be more common in their community than residents in comparison areas. It is important to note that residents' perceptions of crime in all neighbourhood beats and comparison areas were fairly low, with the majority of responses falling into the 'not very common' and 'not at all common' categories. The extent of these different perceptions varies across each selected beat, with Regional Beat displaying the highest level of perceived disorder. However, residents in Regional Neighbourhood Beat also perceived that crime was decreasing.

As Regional Beat was established primarily in response to problems with public drunkenness, under-age drinking and wilful damage in the area, it comes as no surprise that residents are aware of these problems. In some ways the findings reinforce the selection of Regional Beat as a suitable candidate for beat policing. The fact that residents now believe that crime and disorder problems are decreasing is evidence of the effectiveness of the beat officer in addressing these problems. Similarly, Outer Urban Beat is an area with relatively high levels of crime and disorder, but residents also report that these problems are declining.

**4.1.2 Impact of neighbourhood beats on crime reporting**

To measure whether the presence of a neighbourhood beat encourages people to report crime, residents were asked whether they had been a victim of crime in the last 12 months and, if so, whether they had reported the incident to police.

**Table 4.6. Percentage of residents reporting criminal victimisation and reporting the incident to police**

| Area         | Victims of crime |            | Reported to police |           |
|--------------|------------------|------------|--------------------|-----------|
|              | Yes % (n)        | No % (n)   | Yes % (n)          | No % (n)  |
| Metropolitan | 12.7 (27)        | 87.3 (186) | 81.5 (22)          | 18.5 (5)  |
| Comparison   | 8.5 (17)         | 91.5 (184) | 82.4 (14)          | 17.6 (3)  |
| Regional     | 11.9 (24)        | 88.1 (177) | 50.0 (12)          | 50.0 (12) |
| Comparison   | 10.6 (21)        | 89.4 (178) | 66.7 (14)          | 33.3 (7)  |
| Toowoomba    | 11.0 (22)        | 89.0 (178) | 95.5 (21)          | 4.5 (1)   |
| Comparison   | 15.0 (32)        | 85.0 (182) | 84.4 (27)          | 15.6 (5)  |

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

The results of this analysis, shown in Table 4.6, reveal that the willingness of victims of crime to report the incident to police varied across locations, although statistically significant differences in reported rates between each neighbourhood beat and its comparison area were not observed. Over 80 per cent of victims in the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area reported the crime to police. Similarly, 84 per cent of victims at the Toowoomba Beat and 95 per cent of victims at its comparison area reported the crime to police. In contrast, only 50 per cent of victims in the Regional Beat and 67 per cent of victims in its comparison area did so.

The reasons for the low reporting rate in these areas are unknown, but may reflect a high tourist/transient population together with an increased level of development in these neighbourhoods, with newly arriving residents/tourists having limited opportunity to develop linkages with local police. *At the same time, caution should be used in interpreting the results because of low cell frequencies.*

***In short ...***

Results from the analysis of victimisation and reporting rates showed no statistically significant differences between neighbourhood beats and their respective comparison areas. Neighbourhood beat policing does not appear to have any effect on people's willingness to report crime.

### 4.1.3 Perceptions of personal safety in neighbourhood beats

Citizens' perceptions of personal safety were explored in the survey of residents. Residents in beats and comparison areas were asked how safe they felt walking alone after dark and being alone at home at night. These questions also gauge the perceived victimisation risks among residents. Response options were:

- 1 = very safe                      2 = fairly safe  
3 = not very safe                4 = not at all safe.

(Higher mean scores indicate lower levels of perceived safety.)

#### **Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

Residents in the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area felt safer while in their homes than they did while walking alone after dark. Although feelings of safety in the home were similar between residents at both locations, residents in the Metropolitan Beat felt significantly less safe while walking alone after dark than did residents in the comparison area. The results indicate a higher level of perceived victimisation risk among residents in the beat area. See Table 4.7.

**Table 4.7. Perceived safety between the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**

|   | Metropolitan Mean (SD) | Comparison Mean (SD) | t-test |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|--------|
| Perceived safety walking alone after dark | 2.38 (0.88)            | 2.15 (0.89)          | 2.55*  |
| Perceived safety alone in home at night   | 1.49 (0.53)            | 1.46 (0.57)          | 0.57   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001  
Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

#### **Regional Beat and comparison area**

Independent sample t-tests reveal that residents of the Regional Beat felt significantly less safe walking alone after dark and while alone at home at night than did residents from the comparison area. Residents in the Regional Beat reported higher levels of perceived victimisation risks than did residents in the comparison area. See Table 4.8.

**Table 4.8. Perceived safety between the Regional Beat and comparison area**

|   | Regional Mean (SD) | Comparison Mean (SD) | t-test |
|---|--------------------|----------------------|--------|
| Perceived safety walking alone after dark | 1.80 (0.76)        | 1.61 (0.79)          | 2.46*  |
| Perceived safety alone in home at night   | 1.46 (0.55)        | 1.35 (0.50)          | 2.12*  |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001  
Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

#### **Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

Results comparing citizens' perceptions of perceived victimisation risks are reported in Table 4.9. The findings reveal no statistically significant differences in reported perceptions of safety walking alone after dark or being alone at home at night.

**Table 4.9. Perceived safety between the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**

|   | Toowoomba Mean (SD) | Comparison Mean (SD) | t-test |
|---|---------------------|----------------------|--------|
| Perceived safety walking alone after dark | 2.72 (0.99)         | 2.63 (0.99)          | 0.82   |
| Perceived safety alone in home at night   | 1.57 (0.68)         | 1.64 (0.68)          | 1.20   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001  
Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

#### **Outer Urban Beat**

The mean ratings of perceived safety reported by Outer Urban Beat residents (see Table 4.10) demonstrate a similar pattern to that observed in the other neighbourhood beats. The findings indicate moderate levels of perceived safety among residents in the Outer Urban Beat.

**Table 4.10. Perceived safety at the Outer Urban Beat**

|   | Mean (SD)   |
|---|-------------|
| Perceived safety walking alone after dark | 2.55 (0.95) |
| Perceived safety alone in home at night   | 1.55 (0.69) |

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.



**In short ...**

The results revealed no evidence that beats were associated with higher levels of perceived personal safety and lower victimisation risks among residents. Statistically significant lower levels of perceived personal safety were observed in two of the beats. While these findings may be related to an increased level of police activity in the beat, which may increase citizen awareness and fear of crime, the results are not consistent with expectations that neighbourhood beat policing reduces the sense of victimisation among residents living in beat areas.


## 4.2 Perceptions of personal safety in shopping centres

Increased visibility of police in shopping centres could also be expected to increase the public’s perceptions of safety while in the shopping centre. We explored this concept from the perspective of both shoppers and retailers.

### 4.2.1 Shoppers

People shopping in centres that have police shopfronts and people shopping in centres that do not have police shopfronts were asked if they felt safe while shopping. Analyses were conducted comparing each shopfront site with its comparison shopping centre (see Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1. Percentage of shoppers who feel safe while shopping: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre, Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre**



Source: Shoppers Survey, 2002, CMC.

Results reveal that nearly all shoppers (90 per cent) felt safe while shopping. There were no significant differences between shopfront locations and comparison sites. The very high proportion of shoppers who reported feeling safe indicates that it would be difficult for a shopfront to substantially increase the perceptions of safety among shoppers.

### 4.2.2 Retailers

Retailers were asked how safe they felt while:

- working in their shop
- walking around the mall
- walking to their car or public transport.

Response options were:

- 1 = very safe
- 2 = fairly safe
- 3 = not very safe
- 4 = not at all safe.

(Lower mean scores represent higher levels of perceived safety.)

#### **Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre**

From the mean scores shown in Table 4.11, it can be seen that retailers at Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centres reported similar feelings of safety while working in their shop or while walking around the mall. Retailers at both centres felt less safe while walking to their car. This analysis revealed a significant difference between Metropolitan shopfront centre and its comparison centre. Retailers in the shopfront reported feeling significantly safer walking to their cars or to public transport than did retailers in the comparison centre.

**Table 4.11. Perceived safety at the Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre**

|   | Metropolitan Mean (SD) | Comparison Mean (SD) | t-test |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|--------|
| Safety working in shop                    | 1.47 (0.52)            | 1.66 (0.55)          | 1.61   |
| Safety walking around mall                | 1.45 (0.52)            | 1.66 (0.48)          | 1.86   |
| Safety walking to car or public transport | 2.07 (0.71)            | 2.41 (0.68)          | 2.31*  |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

### Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre

Retailers at the Regional shopfront centre and the comparison centre reported moderate levels of feeling safe across all three situations (see Table 4.12). There were no statistically significant differences observed between the two shopping centres.

**Table 4.12. Perceived safety at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre**

|   | Regional Mean (SD) | Comparison Mean (SD) | t-test |
|---|--------------------|----------------------|--------|
| Safety working in shop                    | 1.47 (0.66)        | 1.52 (0.59)          | 1.31   |
| Safety walking around mall                | 1.64 (0.70)        | 1.48 (0.59)          | 1.97   |
| Safety walking to car or public transport | 2.17 (0.82)        | 1.96 (0.61)          | 1.12   |

Note: \* p < .05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

#### *In short ...*

The findings showed that retailers felt quite safe while going about their daily business in their shopping centre. Despite some evidence that retailers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre felt safer than those at the comparison centre while walking to their car or to public transport, there was no consistent evidence that shopfronts had a positive effect on retailers' perceptions of personal safety.

All shopping centres in the study employed private security guards and had taken steps, such as improved car-park lighting and awareness-raising, to ensure staff safety. In addition, shopfronts are staffed only during core business hours and it is reasonable to assume that fear of crime while walking in the car-park or areas exterior to the centre would be exacerbated after dark. Consequently, it may be unreasonable to expect the presence of a police shopfront to reduce fear among retailers across multiple contexts.

## Summary of findings

### Neighbourhood beats

- ▶ Residents in neighbourhood beats believed that a range of crime and disorder problems were more common in their community.
- ▶ Residents in areas with higher perceived levels of crime and disorder believed that these problems were improving. This suggests that beat officers are responsive and effective in addressing crime and disorder problems in their neighbourhood.
- ▶ There was no difference between residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas in terms of their willingness to report a crime.
- ▶ Residents in two of the neighbourhood beats reported lower levels of perceived personal safety than did residents in comparison areas.

### Shopfronts

- ▶ Most people said they felt safe while shopping at shopping centres with or without a police shopfront.
- ▶ The presence of a shopfront was not associated with increased feelings of personal safety among shoppers.
- ▶ In general, retailers in shopping centres with a shopfront and those in centres without a shopfront had similar perceptions of safety while in their shop or other areas within the centre. However, retailers in centres that had a shopfront reported feeling safer when walking to their cars or public transport than did retailers in shopping centres without a police shopfront.

# Chapter 5: Client satisfaction with police services

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In this chapter, we:

- 1 **examine data collected from neighbourhood beats to find out how aware residents are of the beat, their reasons for contact with beat officers, and what they think of the service received**
- 2 **assess data collected from residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas to compare community satisfaction with general police performance and with how police handled a particular reported incident**
- 3 **compare shopfronts and comparison sites in terms of visibility and awareness of police, reason for contact with police, and satisfaction with policing services.**

The primary source of information we used to assess community satisfaction with beat policing was a telephone survey conducted by the OESR in beats and comparison locations.

## 5.1 Neighbourhood beats: visibility, contact and satisfaction

This section reports on the visibility of beats, reasons for contact with the beat officers, and satisfaction with the beat officers.

### 5.1.1 Visibility: residents

Residents in the Metropolitan, Outer Urban, Toowoomba and Regional Beats were asked four questions:

- 1) Have you heard of beat policing?
- 2) Is your residence in a beat-policing area?
- 3) Do you know where your local beat officer is?
- 4) Could you recognise your local beat officer?

Main findings:


- More beat residents believe that police are doing a 'good' or 'very good' job than do residents in comparison areas.
- Awareness of shopfronts is very high among shoppers and retailers.
- There is substantial support and satisfaction with neighbourhood beats and shopfronts.

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Figure 5.1 (next page) shows that awareness of beat policing as a concept is quite high in all four beats, ranging from 80 per cent of residents in the Outer Urban Beat to 90 per cent in the Metropolitan Beat. About three-quarters of residents in the Metropolitan, Outer Urban and Regional Beats were also aware that they lived in a beat area, whereas only 65 per cent of residents in the Toowoomba Beat knew they lived in a beat area.

More than 80 per cent of residents knew where their local beat office was situated, with almost all respondents at the Outer Urban Beat (95 per cent) knowing it. This is probably because the Outer Urban Beat is situated in a shopping centre, and thereby has a higher profile in the community. About half (43 to 57 per cent) of the residents were able to recognise their local beat officer, with between 21 and 28 per cent having been personally assisted by the officer. Most people had been assisted once or twice during the previous 12 months.

**Figure 5.1. Awareness of the beat area: comparison of selected areas**



Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

Similar questions were asked of residents during the 1995 evaluation of Toowoomba beat policing. As a result, we can compare the current findings in the Toowoomba Beat to the results of the previous evaluation (see Figure 5.2, below).


This comparison of awareness of beat policing over time shows that awareness of the concept of beat policing and knowledge of living in a beat area is the same as in 1995. However, current responses reveal that more residents know where the beat office is located, and can recognise the beat officer than was the case seven years ago.

### 5.1.2 Reason for contact: residents

Residents were asked the reason for their last contact with a beat officer. They were given nine response options: assault, break and enter, stealing, unlawful use of a motor vehicle, disturbance, crime prevention advice, community activities, neighbourhood dispute, and other.


The most common reason for contact was the ‘other’ category (see Figure 5.3, next page). This was further analysed and revealed that the responses were mainly wilful damage or related to vandalism.

**Figure 5.2. Awareness of the beat area: comparison of the Toowoomba Beat, 2002 and 1995**



Sources: Community Survey 2002. OESR; CJC 1995a.

**Figure 5.3. Reasons for contact with the beat officer: comparison of selected areas**



Note: UUMV — unlawful use of a motor vehicle  
 Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

**5.1.3 Satisfaction with the beat officer**

Residents in the four neighbourhood beats who had had contact with the beat officer were also asked specifically about the service provided by their beat officer. Residents were asked to think of their last interaction with the beat officer and indicate how helpful the officer was (see Table 5.1, below).

Residents overwhelmingly reported that their beat officer was helpful. They were then asked how satisfied they were with how the beat officer handled their problem (see Table 5.2, next page). Once again, nearly all respondents were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with the way the beat officer handled the matter.

Finally, residents were asked to indicate their overall satisfaction with the beat-policing program in their

area (see Table 5.3, next page). Satisfaction was very high in all selected areas. In the Metropolitan and Toowoomba Beats, almost all (97 per cent) were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’. About 91 per cent of Outer Urban Beat residents and 88 per cent of Regional Beat residents were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’.

We obtained the opinions of other key stakeholders in the beat through interviews. Overwhelmingly, they saw beat policing as an asset to the neighbourhood or shopping centre:

The [beat] officers go beyond doing their job, they are willing to come to all meetings and work together with the community.

... it’s like getting back to old country policing ... They work really well and the community takes pride in their police officer.

**Table 5.1. Helpfulness of the beat officer: residents in beat areas**

|              | Very helpful % (n) | Helpful % (n) | Not at all helpful % (n) | Don't know % (n) |
|--------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| Metropolitan | 90.6 (29)          | 9.4 (3)       | –                        | –                |
| Outer Urban  | 76.5 (26)          | 20.6 (7)      | 2.9 (1)                  | –                |
| Toowoomba    | 83.9 (26)          | 16.1 (5)      | –                        | –                |
| Regional     | 81.3 (26)          | 15.6 (5)      | –                        | 3.1 (1)          |

Source: Community Survey 2002. OESR.

***In short ...***

Awareness of beat policing in neighbourhood beats ranged from 65 to 90 per cent. Among respondents who were aware of the beat, more than 80 per cent said they knew where their local beat office was located. However, only about half (43 to 57 per cent) said that they could recognise their local beat officer. Residents were most likely to contact the beat officer for vandalism or wilful damage problems. In nearly all interactions with community members, the beat officer was considered helpful and residents were ‘very satisfied’ with how their problem was handled.

**Table 5.2. Satisfaction with how the beat officer handled the matter: residents in beat areas**

|              | <b>Very satisfied</b> | <b>Satisfied</b> | <b>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</b> | <b>Dissatisfied</b> | <b>Very dissatisfied</b> |
|--------------|-----------------------|------------------|---|---------------------|--------------------------|
|              | <b>% (n)</b>          | <b>% (n)</b>     | <b>% (n)</b>                              | <b>% (n)</b>        | <b>% (n)</b>             |
| Metropolitan | 75.0 (24)             | 25.0 (8)         | –   | –                   | –                        |
| Outer Urban  | 70.6 (24)             | 23.5 (8)         | 2.9 (1)                                   | –                   | 2.9 (1)                  |
| Toowoomba    | 80.6 (25)             | 19.4 (6)         | –   | –                   | –                        |
| Regional     | 71.9 (23)             | 21.9 (7)         | 3.1 (1)                                   | 3.1 (1)             | –                        |

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

**Table 5.3. Overall satisfaction with beat-policing program: residents in beat areas**

|              | <b>Very satisfied</b> | <b>Satisfied</b> | <b>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</b> | <b>Dissatisfied</b> | <b>Very dissatisfied</b> |
|--------------|-----------------------|------------------|---|---------------------|--------------------------|
|              | <b>% (n)</b>          | <b>% (n)</b>     | <b>% (n)</b>                              | <b>% (n)</b>        | <b>% (n)</b>             |
| Metropolitan | 68.8 (22)             | 28.1 (9)         | –   | 3.1 (1)             | –                        |
| Outer Urban  | 64.7 (22)             | 26.5 (9)         | 5.9 (2)                                   | –                   | 2.9 (1)                  |
| Toowoomba    | 67.7 (21)             | 29.0 (9)         | 3.2 (1)                                   | –                   | –                        |
| Regional     | 68.8 (22)             | 18.8 (6)         | 3.1 (1)                                   | 6.2 (2)             | 3.1 (1)                  |

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

## 5.2 Residents' perceptions of police performance

Residents were asked their opinion of how good a job police were doing in relation to six categories of police performance:

- 1 working together with residents to solve local problems
- 2 dealing with the problems that really concern people
- 3 preventing crime
- 4 helping people out after they have been victims of crime
- 5 keeping order on the streets
- 6 treating people politely.

For some of the items there were a large number of 'don't know' responses, which may indicate that most residents do not have much contact with police.

The percentages of residents indicating that police were doing a 'very good' or 'good' job are displayed

in Figure 5.4 for the Metropolitan Beat and its comparison area, in Figure 5.5 (page 52) for the Regional Beat and its comparison area, and in Figure 5.6 (page 53) for the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area. Information for the Outer Urban Beat is reported in Figure 5.7 (page 54).

It can be seen from these figures that, in general, more residents in neighbourhood beats believe that police are doing a 'good' or 'very good' job than do residents in comparison areas. The pattern of results is consistently in the direction of neighbourhood beats having a positive impact on citizens' perceptions of police effectiveness.


Statistically significant results were observed in some locations for some measures. For example, residents in the Metropolitan Beat and its comparison area differed significantly in their responses to one item: 'how good a job are police doing in working together with residents to solve local problems?' ( $\chi^2 = 13.52$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Almost twice as many residents at the comparison area indicated that they did not know how police were performing, possibly indicating that

**Figure 5.4. Residents' perceptions of police performance: Metropolitan Beat and comparison area**


*(Responses represent combined percentage of 'very good' and 'good' for each area.)*

How good a job are police doing:


a) in working together with residents of this neighbourhood to solve local problems?




b) with the problems that really concern people in this neighbourhood?




c) to prevent crime?




d) in helping people out after they have been victims of crime?



e) in keeping order on the streets of this neighbourhood?



f) at treating people politely in this neighbourhood?



Source: OESR Community Survey 2002, OESR.

they did not interact with police as often as residents of the Metropolitan Beat.

Residents of the Regional Beat differed with residents of its comparison area in their opinion of three performance indicators:

- ▶ working together with residents to solve local problems ( $\chi^2 = 18.49, p < .01$ )
- ▶ addressing residents' concerns ( $\chi^2 = 11.86, p < .05$ )
- ▶ keeping order in the streets ( $\chi^2 = 13.22, p < .05$ ).

In all instances, residents of the comparison area indicated least awareness of how police were performing.

There were no significant differences between the responses of the Toowoomba Beat residents and its comparison area. Additionally, a lower proportion of Outer Urban Beat residents reported that police were performing well compared to the other three beats.


Statistically significant differences across locations were largely due to the high number of residents in the comparison areas not knowing how police were

**Figure 5.5. Residents' perceptions of police performance: Regional Beat and comparison area**


*(Responses represent combined percentage of 'very good' and 'good' for each area.)*

How good a job are police doing:


a) in working together with residents of this neighbourhood to solve local problems?




b) with the problems that really concern people in this neighbourhood?




c) to prevent crime?




d) in helping people out after they have been victims of crime?



e) in keeping order on the streets of this neighbourhood?



f) at treating people politely in this neighbourhood?



Source: OESR Community Survey 2002. OESR.

performing in their community. This suggests that while the presence of a beat may not change how people view police performance, the increased contact and interaction with a police officer that can result from the presence of a neighbourhood beat improves people's knowledge of police activity.

### 5.3 Satisfaction with how police handle a reported incident

As part of the community telephone survey, residents

indicated whether they had been a victim of crime in the past 12 months and whether they had reported the matter to police. Residents who answered in the affirmative to these two questions were then asked whether they were satisfied with the way police handled the matter (see Table 5.4, page 54) and, if they were not satisfied, why they were not satisfied. Each selected site was compared to its respective comparison area.

The majority of residents in all areas except the Outer Urban Beat were 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied'




**Figure 5.6. Residents' perceptions of police performance: Toowoomba Beat and comparison area**


*(Responses represent combined percentage of 'very good' and 'good' for each area.)*

How good a job are police doing:


a) in working together with residents of this neighbourhood to solve local problems?




b) with the problems that really concern people in this neighbourhood?




c) to prevent crime?




d) in helping people out after they have been victims of crime?



e) in keeping order on the streets of this neighbourhood?



f) at treating people politely in this neighbourhood?



Source: OESR Community Survey 2002, OESR.

with how police handled their problem. Satisfaction was highest at the Metropolitan Beat and its comparison area, with approximately 85 per cent of residents being 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with their dealings with police.<sup>16</sup>


Approximately 60 per cent of residents at the Regional Beat and its comparison area, and 70 per cent of residents in the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area were 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with how police handled a reported incident. In contrast to the other six areas, residents at the Outer

Urban Beat reported a different pattern of responses, with less than half of residents indicating that they were 'satisfied' with the service provided by police, and one-third indicating that they were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied' with how their problem was handled.

<sup>16</sup> Specific tests for statistically significant differences were not conducted due to the small cell frequencies in this analysis.

**Figure 5.7. Residents' perceptions of police performance at the Outer Urban Beat**

*(Responses represent combined percentage of 'very good' and 'good')*



Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

**Table 5.4. Satisfaction with handling a reported incident: residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas**

|                   | <b>Very satisfied</b> | <b>Satisfied</b> | <b>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</b> | <b>Dissatisfied</b> | <b>Very dissatisfied</b> |
|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------|---|---------------------|--------------------------|
|                   | <b>% (n)</b>          | <b>% (n)</b>     | <b>% (n)</b>                              | <b>% (n)</b>        | <b>% (n)</b>             |
| Metropolitan Beat | 50.0 (11)             | 31.8 (7)         | 9.1 (2)                                   | 9.1 (2)             | –                        |
| Comparison area   | 50.0 (7)              | 28.6 (4)         | –   | 14.3 (2)            | 7.1 (1)                  |
| Regional Beat     | 33.3 (4)              | 25.0 (3)         | 16.7 (2)                                  | 8.3 (1)             | 16.7 (2)                 |
| Comparison area   | 42.9 (6)              | 21.4 (3)         | 7.1 (1)                                   | 7.1 (1)             | 21.4 (3)                 |
| Toowoomba Beat    | 42.9 (9)              | 28.6 (6)         | 9.5 (2)                                   | 14.3 (3)            | 4.8 (1)                  |
| Comparison area   | 33.3 (9)              | 37 (10)          | 7.4 (2)                                   | 14.8 (4)            | 7.4 (2)                  |
| Outer Urban Beat  | 17.9 (5)              | 28.6 (8)         | 17.9 (5)                                  | 10.7 (3)            | 25.0 (7)                 |

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.

***In short ...***

The results indicate that beat policing has no effect on increasing the level of satisfaction among community members with how police handle reported incidents. The fact that there are no differences between each neighbourhood beat and its respective comparison area may be due, in part, to the large number of calls for service and policing services in the area (see Chapter 6 for further discussion of the workload of beat officers).

**5.4 Shopfronts: visibility and contact**

Data for this section of the evaluation were obtained through surveying shoppers and retailers at each of the shopfronts and comparison sites. The visibility and awareness of shopfronts were evaluated from the perspective of shoppers and retailers, followed by an assessment of the reasons for contact with police.

**5.4.1 Visibility and awareness: shoppers**

Shoppers were asked whether they had ever seen a police officer at the shopping centre. Analysis was

conducted comparing the Metropolitan shopfront centre to its comparison centre, and comparing the Regional shopfront centre to its comparison centre.

Examination of Figure 5.8 shows that shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre were more likely to have seen a police officer in the centre than were shoppers at the comparison centre (70 per cent compared to 45 per cent).<sup>17</sup> Similarly, shoppers at the Regional shopfront centre were more likely to have seen a police officer in the centre than were shoppers at the comparison centre (64 per cent compared to 31 per cent (see Figure 5.9).<sup>18</sup> The results of these analyses suggest that the visibility of police is significantly increased in shopping centres by the presence of a shopfront.

Shoppers in the Metropolitan and Regional shopfront centres were then asked about their awareness of the shopfront and whether they had used it (see Figure 5.10). About 47 per cent of shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre were aware of the beat, and of those, only 10 per cent had actually been to the shopfront or spoken to a beat officer about an issue. In the Regional shopfront centre, 62 per cent of shoppers were aware of the shopfront, and, of those, only 20 per cent had used the services of the shopfront.

***In short ...***  
 These findings indicate that while the visibility of police is increased by the presence of a shopfront, most shoppers do not use the services of the shopfront. While it could be that shoppers simply do not require police services during most of their visits to shopping centres, the police may still need to market the shopfront and the services that can be accessed by shoppers when a particular need arises.


#### 5.4.2 Visibility and awareness: retailers

Retailers in the selected shopfront and comparison sites were surveyed for their opinions of policing in the shopping centre. Retailers at Metropolitan and Regional shopfront centres were asked specific questions about the visibility of beat officers and their awareness and use of shopfronts. Retailers at

17  $\chi^2 = 26.63, p < .01$


18  $\chi^2 = 41.48, p < .01$

**Figure 5.8. Percentage of shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre who had seen a police officer in the centre**




Source: Shoppers Survey 2002. CMC.

**Figure 5.9. Percentage of shoppers at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre who had seen a police officer in the centre**



Source: Shoppers Survey 2002. CMC.

**Figure 5.10. Percentage of shoppers at the Metropolitan and Regional shopfront centres who were aware of the shopfront operating in their centre**



Source: Shoppers Survey 2002. CMC.

the comparison centres were asked questions about the visibility of police and the services provided by general duties police.

Retailers in shopfronts were asked the number of times they had seen a beat officer in the last month. The question used in comparison sites focused on the number of times retailers had seen *any* police officer in the shopping centre in the last month.


It can be seen in Figures 5.11 and 5.12 that retailers in shopfront sites were more likely to have seen a police officer more than once than retailers in comparison centres. These differences were statistically significant for both the Metropolitan and Regional comparison centres:  $\chi^2 = 29.76, p < .01$  (Metropolitan) and  $\chi^2 = 37.41, p < .01$  (Regional).

Awareness of shopfronts was very high, with all retailers at the Regional shopfront centre and 82 per cent of retailers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre being aware of the shopfront (see Figure 5.13). Only half (51 per cent) of the Metropolitan shopfront centre retailers who were aware of the shopfront knew the beat officer and 69 per cent had used the services of the beat. Approximately three-quarters (76 per cent) of the Regional shopfront centre retailers said they knew the beat officer and had used the services of the shopfront. The evidence suggests that awareness of the shopfront is very high among retailers, as is the use of shopfront services.


### 5.4.3 Reason for contact: shoppers

Shoppers at the Metropolitan and Regional shopfront centres were asked to report their reason for contacting the beat officer, and shoppers at the comparison centres were asked their reason for contacting general duties police. The analysis reveals that shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre were more likely to contact the beat officer to seek advice, while shoppers at the comparison centre (see Figure 5.14, next page) were more likely to contact police to report a crime.


**Figure 5.11. Number of times retailers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre had seen their beat officer in the last month**



**Figure 5.12. Number of times retailers at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre had seen a police officer in the last month**



**Figure 5.13. Awareness of the shopfront: comparison of selected sites**



At the Regional shopfront centre, the most common reason shoppers contacted the beat officer was to report a crime or to find lost property (see Figure 5.15). Similarly, shoppers at the comparison area were more likely to contact police to report a crime or some other problem.

#### 5.4.4 Reason for contact: retailers

Retailers in shopfront centres were asked their reason for contact with beat officers, and retailers in comparison centres were asked their reason for contact with general duties officers. The response options were: reporting of crime, reporting suspicious activity, seeking advice, some other problem, and police-initiated contact.


Although the number of retailers who had used the services of police was low, it can be generally seen that reporting a crime was the main reason for contacting police at the Metropolitan and Regional shopfront centres (see Figure 5.16). The proportion of crime-related contact with police was much higher in the Metropolitan shopfront centre than at the Regional shopfront centre (50 per cent compared to 25 per cent).<sup>19</sup>

The most common reasons for retailers at the Regional shopfront centre contacting the beat officer were to report a crime, report suspicious activity or seek advice (see Figure 5.17, next page). The situation at the comparison centre was substantially different, with retailers most commonly contacting police to report a crime and were very unlikely to contact police to seek advice.

***In short ...***  
**The reporting of crime was the most common reason for retailers contacting police at shopping centres without a shopfront beat. However, the presence of a shopfront seems to increase the propensity of shoppers to contact police for advice and thereby allow more proactive steps to be taken to prevent crime.**


<sup>19</sup> It was not possible to conduct statistical tests on these data due to the small number of respondents who had actually had contact with police.

**Figure 5.14. Reasons for shopper contact with police: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre**




Source: Shoppers Survey 2002. CMC

**Figure 5.15. Reasons for shopper contact with police: Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre**




Source: Shoppers Survey 2002. CMC.

**Figure 5.16. Reasons for retailer contact with police: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre**




Source: Retailers Survey 2002. CMC.

**Figure 5.17. Reasons for retailer contact with police: Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre**




Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

**Figure 5.18. Percentage of shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre satisfied with police services**



Source: Shoppers Survey 2002, CMC.

**Figure 5.19. Percentage of shoppers at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre satisfied with police services**



Source: Shoppers Survey 2002, CMC.

## 5.5 Satisfaction with shopfront services

The following discussion is divided into three parts, each of which is based on data collected from one of the three main information sources: survey of shoppers, survey of retailers, and interviews with shopping centre managers.

### 5.5.1 Satisfaction: shoppers

Shoppers in the shopfront centres who were aware of the shopfront and who had been in contact with the beat officer were asked if they were satisfied with the service provided by the officer. For the comparison shopping centres, shoppers who had been in contact with police in the last 12 months were asked if they were satisfied with the service provided. The responses from shoppers at each shopfront centre were compared to the responses of shoppers in the respective comparison centre. See Figures 5.18 and 5.19 for details about the percentage of shoppers who indicated that they were satisfied with the service that they had received.

In general, shoppers at all four shopping centres expressed satisfaction with policing services, but satisfaction was higher in centres that had a shopfront. Despite this, not all shoppers thought that shopfronts were a good idea. Some of their comments were:

Are there enough police resources to spend on minor crime that might happen in shopping centres? Focusing on more serious crime might be more useful use of police resources.

It's no good for police to be sitting around in a shop — they need to be out and about.

The beat isn't necessary. The constant police presence is over the top.

### 5.5.2 Satisfaction: retailers

Retailers in the shopfront centres who were aware of the shopfront and had used it were asked about their level of satisfaction with the service provided. *Some care should be taken in interpreting the results because of the small number of eligible respondents.* For the comparison shopping centres, retailers who had been in contact with police in the last 12 months were also asked about their satisfaction with the service provided.

It can be seen in Figures 5.20 and 5.21 that none of the retailers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre or its comparison centre was dissatisfied at all with the

service that they had received from police. Only a small proportion were dissatisfied with police services at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre. Although the results appear to show marked differences between each shopfront and its respective comparison centre, the very low number of retailers that had actually used police services meant that tests of statistical significance could not be conducted.

Retailers in shopfront centres were also asked about their overall satisfaction with the shopfront program operating in their centre (Figure 5.22). Satisfaction was high with virtually no retailers saying they were dissatisfied. Nearly 100 per cent of the Metropolitan shopfront centre retailers were 'very satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' with the shopfront; 95 per cent of comparison centre retailers were 'very satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied'.

Finally, retailers were asked an open-ended question as to what they believed were the main benefits of having a shopfront in their shopping centre. The main theme that emerged was that shopfronts provided a strong deterrent for crime, primarily due to the increased presence and visibility of police in the centre. Retailers also appreciated the good relationship they had with the shopfront officer, the convenience and the quick response time in comparison to the local police station. Some of their comments are provided below:

Without the high visibility of the shopfront police beat I know we would be looking at a higher crime/theft rate within our business. Their assistance is greatly appreciated.


Makes people feel safe — makes criminals think twice. Gives police a much needed relationship with ordinary citizens that can't be had by having a police station handy. These officers you have here are really personable.

A police presence increases the safety just knowing they're there. Knowing the police personally enables myself to put forward queries that I would not necessarily ring a station for.

Having the police in close proximity to the shop is the greatest benefit. We are able to quickly report crimes. Their constant presence does deter criminals to some extent.


Better security with a seen police presence. Quicker response time when required. Better PR for police and their image. Has not stopped juvenile crime in the area, but has helped reduce it.

**Figure 5.20. Retailers' level of satisfaction with police service: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre**




Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

**Figure 5.21. Retailers' level of satisfaction with police service: Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre**



Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

**Figure 5.22. Percentage of retailers at selected sites 'somewhat satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the shopfront program**



Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

### 5.5.3 Satisfaction: shopping centre managers

We interviewed the manager of each shopping centre with a shopfront and the managers of comparison centres. The former spoke highly of the shopfront and believed that it was instrumental in deterring crime. At the Metropolitan shopfront centre in particular there has been a substantial reduction in juvenile crime problems since the shopfront opened.

A critical aspect to the success of both shopfronts was considered to be the high standard of officer currently working in the beats. Officers were motivated and worked well with private security personnel. The only improvement in service provision that managers would like to see is the ability of beat officers to cover all shopping-centre opening hours. The recent

introduction of Sunday trading in South-Eastern Queensland will affect all shopfronts in the area and will mean that in most cases shopfront officers will not be able to cover all allowable trading hours.

The managers of both comparison centres were satisfied with the service that they were receiving from their local police station. They indicated that response times were sometimes poor, but acknowledged the high workload of general duties police in their area. Managers at both centres had knowledge and understanding of shopfront policing, having managed shopping centres with shopfronts in the past. They strongly supported the concept and would participate in the beat-policing program if they were given the opportunity to have a shopfront in their centres.

## Summary of findings

### Neighbourhood beats

- ▶ Awareness of beat policing in neighbourhood beats is quite high, ranging from 65 to 90 per cent. Of those who were aware of the beat, more than 80 per cent said that they knew where the local beat office was situated. However, only about half (43 to 57 per cent) of beat-area residents said that they would be able to recognise their local beat officer.
- ▶ Residents most often contacted their beat officer about wilful damage or vandalism.
- ▶ Residents in neighbourhood beats overwhelmingly reported that their beat officer was helpful and that they were satisfied with the beat program in their area.
- ▶ On the whole, more residents in neighbourhood beats believed that police were doing a good job on a range of performance measures. This is largely due to residents in beat areas being more aware of police activity and therefore able to comment on their performance.
- ▶ Residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas were generally satisfied with how police handled a reported incident.
- ▶ Almost all of the community stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation supported neighbourhood beat policing.

### Shopfronts

- ▶ Awareness of the police shopfront among shoppers was moderate with about 50 per cent saying that they were aware that the shopping centre had a shopfront.
- ▶ Shopfronts appeared to increase the visibility of police in centres.
- ▶ No differences were observed between the satisfaction of shoppers with police services at shopfronts or comparison sites.
- ▶ Awareness of the shopfront was extremely high among retailers (82 per cent and 100 per cent); 51 to 76 per cent of retailers knew the officers and between 69 and 79 per cent of retailers had used the services of the shopfront.
- ▶ Shopfronts appeared to increase the likelihood of retailers contacting the police for advice rather than to report a crime, which was the case in comparison sites.
- ▶ Retailers in shopping centres with a shopfront were more satisfied with police services than retailers in comparison shopping centres.
- ▶ There was a high level of support for the concept of a police beat shopfront by shopping centre managers from both shopfronts and comparison centres.



# Chapter 6: Workload performance and costs of police beats

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**The focus of this chapter is on the performance of beat officers and on the cost-effectiveness of this style of policing.**

Since the establishment of the original beats in the early 1990s, beat policing has been subject to several evaluations (CJC 1995a, 1996; QPS 2001d, 2001e, 2001f and 2002). However, for the most part these evaluations focused on the implementation of beats, assessing their impact in terms of community satisfaction rather than cost and efficiency.

To assess the workload performance and cost of police beats we used several data sources, in particular, CRISP data and data from ESCORT (CAD) or the IMS.

Information on the amount of policing time (in minutes) directed toward particular types of policing activities was also collected by the QPS during a SWAS (Statewide Activity Survey) conducted between 27 May and 2 June 2002. In addition, we obtained occurrence sheets from the beats for the month of June 2002. These detail the daily workload of beat officers and identify a range of tasks ordinarily not recorded in electronic systems. Finally, the project team developed a WAR (Work Activity Report) to be completed by beat officers. The report records the types of contacts beat officers had with the community. We also refer to comments made by beat officers and other police during a series of interviews conducted for the evaluation.

## 6.1 Workload performance of police beats

This section describes the workload of beat officers in terms of the number of crime reports taken by the officer and the number of calls for service attended by the officer. It then compares the workload of the beat officer to an 'average' general duties officer stationed in the division encompassing the beat.

### Main findings:

- Beat officers attend slightly more calls for service than general duties police, although there is variation across sites.
  - The response by beat officers to calls for service is more cost-effective than the response by general duties officers.
- 

### 6.1.1 CRISP reports taken by beat officers

The number of CRISP reports taken by an officer depends on several factors, including the seriousness of the problem, the age of the offender and officer discretion. This analysis identifies the average number of CRISP reports taken per 28-day roster period by beat officers from the Regional and Toowoomba Beats and the Regional Shopfront over two six-month periods (January to June 2001 and 2002). This CRISP workload is then compared with the workload of the 'average' general duties officer stationed in the same division as the beat officer. Unfortunately, an analysis of crime reports taken by general duties officers could not be undertaken for the Metropolitan Shopfront or the Metropolitan Beat due to changes in the police district boundaries at Metropolitan North Region during the study periods.

Table 6.1 (next page) shows that the number of CRISP reports taken by beat officers varies greatly according to location, with the beat officer in Regional Beat taking only five over the period. In contrast, the beat officers at the Regional Shopfront were averaging 15 each over the same period.

Some of the comments made by police regarding their 'crime' workload are:

We've been making a real effort to take a lot more CRISP reports lately. (Beat officer)

I would say that they (generals) do more CRISPs than we do because they are going all over the place. We only take the ones here that need to be taken, so obviously they take a lot more. (Beat officer)

*Question:* Would you do four or five CRISPS a week? *Answer:* It varies; I put 45 CRISP reports on the other night when I charged a guy with graffiti. (Beat officer)

Beat officers in the three beats took essentially the same number of CRISP reports as general duties officers. As a result, we conclude that there appears to be no difference in the number of CRISP reports taken by beat officers and general duties police.

The next section identifies the number of calls for service attended by beat officers and compares it with the number attended by general duties police.

### 6.1.2 Calls for service attended by beat officers

The analysis that follows compares the number of calls for service attended by the beat officers with the number attended by the average general duties police from the Police Division encompassing the beat.

For this analysis, the number of calls for service for beat officers was taken from information contained in occurrence sheets for the roster period in June 2002. In most cases, these were requests for police assistance made directly to the beat officer and, as such, were rarely recorded by electronic means. On the other hand, due to reliance by general duties police on mobile patrols, estimates of the number of calls for service are derived solely from information contained in the IMS or ESCORT CAD systems.

Table 6.2 presents the number of calls for service taken by beat officers in June 2002 and compares it with the average number taken by general duties police from the division encompassing the beat.

The numbers are highly variable depending on the area and type of beat. For example, the analysis shows that beat officers in the Regional and Toowoomba Beats were attending more calls than their general duties counterparts. In contrast, the beat officers at the Regional Shopfront averaged 10

**Table 6.1. Average number of CRISP reports: beat officers v. general duties police (average 28-day roster period)<sup>1</sup>**

|                    | Beat officer | General duties officer <sup>2</sup> |
|--------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|
| Regional Beat      | 5            | 7                                   |
| Toowoomba Beat     | 12           | 11                                  |
| Regional Shopfront | 15           | 13                                  |

Notes:

- 1 Estimate of the number of CRISP reports was calculated using 'officer details' information rather than the organisational unit over the two periods.
- 2 General duties officer information is based on the number of officers as indicated by SWAS. Where available, the model staffing level has been used to verify the information obtained by SWAS.

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002. QPS.

**Table 6.2. Average number of calls for service: beat officers v. general duties police (average 28-day roster period)<sup>1</sup>**

|                        | Beat officer | General duties officer <sup>2</sup> |
|------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|
| Regional Beat          | 33           | 20                                  |
| Toowoomba Beat         | 65           | 22                                  |
| Metropolitan Beat      | 12           | n/a <sup>3</sup>                    |
| Regional Shopfront     | 42           | 57                                  |
| Metropolitan Shopfront | 37           | n/a <sup>3</sup>                    |

Notes:

- 1 Twenty-eight days has been chosen as the standard period for this analysis as it encompasses four week days and four weekends. In addition, 28 days is the standard rostering period in the Service.
- 2 General duties officer information is based on the number of officers as indicated by SWAS. Where available, the model staffing level has been used to verify the information obtained by SWAS.
- 3 The analysis of CFS attended by general duties police in metropolitan sites could not be conducted due to the 'clustering' structure in the Metropolitan North Region. In particular, it was unclear as to the 'organisational unit' some of the police were assigned to at the time of the evaluation.

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002. QPS.

fewer calls per month than their general duties counterparts.

Some of the comments made by police regarding the calls-for-service workload include:

Often COMS [Police Communications Centre] don't call us about jobs in the beat area ... the other crews [generals] usually get the job ... if we are available we would like to get it (the job) ... if there is a problem with an intersection or whatever the job is, we would like to go and sort it out. (Beat officer)

I could show you a whole heap of stats when we started here showing that there was a 110 to 120 calls for service per month here (in the beat) ... Now look at them. What can you attribute it (the decline) to? I know, the police beat! (Beat officer)

*Question:* On a scale from one to ten, how busy are you? *Answer:* That's a difficult one. As far as responding to jobs [calls for service] go, I would have to say six, but I've always got [other things to do] Neighbourhood Watch stats. (Beat officer)

**In short ...**

**Beat officers attend slightly more calls for service than do general duties police, with some variation across the sites.**

The next section identifies the types of activities (e.g. incident-related or other duty) performed by beat officers and compares them with the types of activities undertaken by general duties police.

**6.1.3 Nature of duties performed by beat officers**


The analysis that follows uses SWAS data to identify and compare the time spent on various work activities by neighbourhood and shopfront beat officers. These activities are divided by the QPS into two broad categories: 'incident activities' and 'other duties'. Incident activities are core policing tasks, such as attending/investigating homicides, robberies, assaults etc. The 'other duty' category includes ancillary policing tasks, such as operational administration, custodial duties, community liaison and non-tasked general patrols.

**Incident activities**

Figure 6.1 compares the types of policing incidents undertaken by general duties police with those attended to by officers from neighbourhood beats and shopfronts.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the analysis reveals that officers working in shopfronts spend the largest

**Figure 6.1. Types of incidents undertaken: beat officers and general duties police**



Source: QPS SWAS 2002.

proportion of their time dealing with stealing (13 per cent) and good order incidents, such as having to deal with unruly individuals (5 per cent). On the other hand, general duties police report spending more time responding to break and enter, traffic, alcohol and domestic violence matters. The types of incidents dealt with by neighbourhood beat officers are similar to general duties police. However, neighbourhood beat officers seem to be slightly more involved in neighbourhood concerns, such as break and enter (4 per cent), drugs (4 per cent), speeding vehicles (3 per cent) and wilful damage incidents (2 per cent).

Differences in the role and function of the officers are illustrated in comments made during the interviews with police. Some of these comments include:

The generals, they will send a crew out to a problem in a particular street and may even take a CRISP. Our approach is different. As beat officers we might go to the community and try to establish a youth boredom project. (Beat officer)

They [beat officers] have much larger workloads than other police — it seems that the beat officers are expected to perform the duties of a general duties officer [taking calls for service] as well as performing community work. (Beat supervisor)

Overall, the types of policing incidents differ in a number of ways depending on contextual circumstances, such as the type of area the officer works in and the types of calls that the officer routinely deals with. In the main, beat officers seem to be more involved in typical neighbourhood concerns than are general duties police.


### Other duties

Figure 6.2 compares the types of ‘other duties’ undertaken by general duties police with those undertaken by officers from neighbourhood beats and shopfronts. ‘Other duties’ include a range of ancillary functions, such as administration tasks, training, escorting prisoners and general (i.e. non-tasked) patrolling.

In terms of the nature of duties performed by beat officers, the analysis revealed that the most common categories of other duties performed by general duties police and beat officers have to do with general patrolling, administration (e.g. correspondence) and training.

Beat officers working in shopfronts were also found to spend substantially more time on general patrol (22 per cent) than general duties police (14 per cent)

Figure 6.2. Types of other duties undertaken: beat officers and general duties police



Source: SWAS 2002, QPS.

and neighbourhood beat officers (13 per cent). This may be due, in large part, to the importance that the Service places on beat officers being highly visible in the shopping centre. In addition, the percentage of time spent by general duties police in the area of 'community' was less than beat officers (8 per cent for neighbourhood and 7 per cent for shopfront beat officers versus 2 per cent for general duties police).

The emphasis beat officers place on performing general patrols is well represented by the following comment made by one of the beat officers during interviews:

*Question:* If you could spend more time doing anything, what would that be? *Answer:* Patrolling and letting them know that we're out there. That would be my primary focus. At the end of the day, you're going to get your butt kicked if you don't get correspondence done but, what's the motto of Shopfronts? It's basically to get us back out there and with the community isn't it — get us operating inside the community so, that's what we should be doing. By getting out there, walking around being seen and making a point of calling in and letting them know you're there.  
(Beat officer)

#### ***In short ...***

The types of policing incidents attended to by beat officers and general duties police differ in a number of ways depending on contextual circumstances, such as the type of area the officer works in and the types of calls that the officer routinely deals with. However, the analysis revealed that beat officers working in shopfronts spent substantially more time dealing with stealing and general patrol than did general duties police or neighbourhood beat officers. In addition, the amount of time spent by general duties police in the area of 'community' was found to be less than the time that beat officers spent and is consistent with the emphasis placed by the Service on beat officers working in partnership with the community.

It can be seen that beat officers place a great deal of emphasis on general patrolling and working with the community, which is consistent with the role that was envisaged for them by the CJC and the QPS (CJC 1995a).

## **6.2 Costs of police beats**

This section focuses on the cost of beat policing with an emphasis on comparing the cost of a beat officer response with the cost of a general duties response to a similar call for service. In addition, the costs associated with establishing and maintaining police beats are discussed.

Police organisations, like other units of public administration, are under increasing pressure by governments to deliver services in the most effective and efficient manner (i.e. provide best value for money). This poses a challenge for police, in part because of the shortage of suitable measures of efficiency and the lack of information about the true cost or benefit of providing policing services to the community.

There are two parts to this section.

- 1 The first section focuses on the relative cost-effectiveness of police beats by identifying the cost of a beat officer responding to a call for service using a costing model developed by the CJC (1997, 1998). Using this formula, the cost of sending a beat officer is estimated and then compared to the cost of sending a general duties officer to the same type of call. Although this type of analysis falls short of being a true indicator of the cost-effectiveness of beats, it does allow for a basic cost comparison of the two styles of service delivery.
- 2 The second section identifies the cost of establishing and maintaining neighbourhood beats and shopfronts. The data used in this section were provided by the QPS.

### **6.2.1 Cost of responding to calls for service**

This analysis compares the Toowoomba Beat only with Toowoomba Division. However, it is likely that the estimate of the cost of sending a beat officer compared with the cost of sending a general duties officer to the same call will be similar for other beat areas (CJC 1998).

The costing model developed by the CJC in 1998 to estimate the cost of first response policing service had two main components:

- 1 estimate of the per minute cost of a police officer's time, and
- 2 estimate of the time that officers spent attending different types of calls for service.

The first part of the analysis identifies the cost per minute of a police officer's time. Table 6.3 (above) shows an estimate of the cost of police response published by the CJC in 1998. The estimate of the cost of police attending a call for service has been adjusted to reflect changes in the rate of inflation and other labour costs over the four-year period since the model was developed.

As is evident from Table 6.3 (below), the cost per minute of a single officer (the beat officer) responding to a call for service is \$0.98, whereas the traditional response by a general duties crew is estimated to be \$2.00 per minute (two general duties officers and a vehicle). The difference in the costs between the two types of responses is due entirely to the fact that the typical general duties response involves two officers travelling in a police vehicle.

The second part of the analysis identifies the time the officer(s) spent dealing with the average call for service. Given that beat policing emphasises problem-solving and community liaison, the 'time at scene' is used to estimate the time taken to 'complete' the job. It should be noted that the 'time at scene' does not include an estimate of the time taken to travel to the job address or the time the officer(s) spend processing prisoners or doing any of the paperwork associated with the job. However, 'time at scene' does give a good estimate of the time the officer actually spends with complainants or suspects.

**Table 6.3. Estimated cost per minute of first response by police**

|  | 1998   | 2002<br>'Adjusted' |
|--|--------|--------------------|
| Single officer on foot                   | \$0.82 | \$0.98             |
| Single officer in a police motor vehicle | \$0.85 | \$1.02             |
| Two officers in a police motor vehicle   | \$1.67 | \$2.00             |

Note: The estimate of the cost of police time for 2002 has been adjusted for inflation and the growth of labour costs (i.e. growth in the hourly rate paid to police officers). The new 'adjusted' estimate (+20%) does not take changes in the cost of vehicle or operating and capital costs into account, which are based on 1998 estimates.

Source: CJC 1998.

It should be stated that not all jobs within the beat area are taken by the beat officer, nor are all calls for service attended by the beat officer necessarily within the beat. While the costing model developed below does not take this into account, it is necessary to take into account the proportion of calls for service taken by single or two-officer crews.

For the Toowoomba Beat, the vast majority (96 per cent) of calls for service that the beat officer attended were taken by a single officer, and the average call for service taken by a beat officer takes 45.6 minutes. See table 6.4, next page.

The average time at scene for a call for service taken by a typical general duties officer within Toowoomba Division is 36.1 minutes, but only 16 per cent of these calls were taken by a single officer.

It has been assumed that a single general duties officer who attends a call for service will be in a vehicle, adding four cents to the cost per minute. It has also been assumed that two officers who attend a call will have a vehicle.

As the results in Table 6.4 reveal, the average time taken to attend a call for service in the beat area was approximately 46 minutes. Based on the CJC's 1998 costing formula, which has been adjusted for increases in labour costs for police, this equates to a cost of about \$47 for the average call for service in the beat area. In contrast, the average time taken to attend a call for service outside of the beat area by a general duties response crew was only 36 minutes. The fact that a general duties response was normally two officers also means that the cost per call for service for a general duties response was approximately 40 per cent higher at \$67 per call.

Although the beat officer took longer to deal with the average call for service, the key finding of this analysis is that the response provided by the beat officer was more 'cost-effective' than the response provided by a general duties crew to the same type of call. In the main, this is due to the absence of the second officer. However, it should be pointed out that while many calls for service could be handled by a single officer, some calls involve certain physical risks to the officer and would necessarily require the attendance of more than one officer.

The next section identifies the estimated costs of establishing and maintaining police beats.

**Table 6.4. Total cost of first response by police**

| Toowoomba beat officer         | % of call for service | Av. time at scene | Cost per minute | Adj. cost |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| Single officer                 | 96%                   | 45.6 min.         | \$0.98          | 42.90     |
| Two officers                   | 4%                    | 45.6 min.         | \$2.00          | \$3.65    |
| <b>Total cost: \$46.55</b>     |                       |                   |                 |           |
| Typical general duties officer | % of call for service | Av. time at scene | Cost per minute | Adj. cost |
| Single officer                 | 16%                   | 36.1 min.         | \$1.02          | \$5.89    |
| Two officers                   | 84%                   | 36.1 min.         | \$2.00          | \$60.65   |
| <b>Total cost: \$66.54</b>     |                       |                   |                 |           |

Note: This analysis is based on IMS data and includes 9743 valid calls for service attended to by general duties police from the Toowoomba Division and 52 valid calls for service attended to by the Toowoomba Beat Officer. The 'adjusted cost' is calculated by: proportion of calls for service [0.96] x Average time at scene [45.6 min.] x Cost per minute [\$0.98]. The addition of the adjusted costs for the single-officer and two-officer components will give the total cost. The complete formula is as follows:

Beat officer: the average time at job [45.6 min.] x the cost per minute (single officer) [\$0.98] x proportion of jobs attended by single officer [96%] + average time at job [45.6 min.] x cost per minute (two officers) [\$2.00] x proportion of jobs attended by two officers [4%].

General duties officer: the average time at job [36.1 min.] x the cost per minute (single officer) [\$1.02] x the proportion of jobs attended by single officer [16%] + (the average time at job [36.1 min.] x the cost per minute (2 officers) [\$2.00] x the proportion of jobs attended by two officers [84%])

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS and CJC 1998, CJC.

### 6.2.2 Cost of establishing a police beat

In the nine years since the first beat was established in Queensland, there have been many changes in costs associated with the provision of beat services. Changing technology and work practices have significantly altered the equipment an officer is expected to have access to, which has had a consequential impact on the cost of establishing and maintaining beats.

Funding for the initial set-up of the beats is managed centrally by the State Coordinator. After the beat is

established, additional funding representing the ongoing cost of the beat is provided to QPS Regional management to spend appropriately.

### Neighbourhood beat

The initial costs of establishing a neighbourhood beat vary greatly. For instance, it may be appropriate in one area to lease a residence while in another there may be no option but to purchase premises. Similarly, the cost of office fit-out (e.g. computer cabling necessary for secure access to QPS information systems) may fluctuate depending on the area or distance to the communication carrier. Accordingly, it is difficult to provide precise costs. However, the QPS has provided a conservative estimate of the cost of establishing a typical beat. For this analysis, the estimate is presented in two categories: development costs and fit-out costs. Development costs include items such as furniture, vehicle and stationery. The fit-out costs include the costs of dividing walls, air conditioning, signage and so on.

Table 6.5 (below) shows that the estimated cost of establishing a neighbourhood beat was \$90 500.

Obviously, factors such as whether a premises is rented or purchased, and the type of vehicle purchased are factors that greatly affect the cost of establishing a neighbourhood beat. The following comment made during interviews of police provides a good example of the variable nature of the costs required to establish a neighbourhood beat:

... we [QPS] got \$75 000 from community renewal last year. Now that covers the building and office ... to fit out everything else cost us another \$75 000 and then there are the ongoing costs. The annual recurrent costs are somewhere around \$22 000 and that's on top of salary ... that was a costly and expensive place to establish one because we really had to build something.

**Table 6.5. Estimated costs of establishing a neighbourhood beat**

|                   |          |
|-------------------|----------|
| Development costs | \$75 500 |
| Fit-out cost      | \$15 000 |
| Total             | \$90 500 |

Source: Unpublished QPS data 2002.

Given the substantial variations in funding requirements for establishing a neighbourhood beat, it should be noted that the projected funding requirements for any additional beats cannot be determined by a base schedule of average costs per location.

### Shopfront

Like neighbourhood beats, there are clear reasons why the establishment cost of a shopfront may differ from the 'typical' example, including the size of the premises, the position in the centre and the requirements of the shopping centre managers.

Table 6.6 presents the estimate of the establishment costs for a shopfront provided by the QPS.

The cost of establishing a shopfront beat is substantially higher than the cost of establishing a neighbourhood beat and is estimated to be about \$155 000. Given the substantial variables in funding requirements for establishing shopfronts, it should be noted that the projected funding requirements for any additional shopfronts cannot be determined by a base schedule of average costs per location.

### 6.2.3 Cost of maintaining a police beat

For this analysis, maintenance consists of outgoing costs (i.e. rent), labour costs and motor vehicle costs. As was the case with the previous chapter, the data used to identify the ongoing costs of neighbourhood beats were provided by the QPS.

#### Neighbourhood beat

The following information represents an estimate of the annual cost to maintain a neighbourhood beat. The estimate includes 'outgoing costs' (e.g. costs associated with rent, utilities, stationery etc.) and 'labour costs' excluding the officer's usual salary, but including the 18 per cent beat allowance, penalty payments for work on some weekends and public holidays, and payroll tax. In addition, the estimate also includes the annual cost of a police motor vehicle.

Table 6.7 presents the estimate of the annual costs to maintain a neighbourhood beat and assumes that the beat is staffed by a single officer, although there are at least seven beats with more than one officer.<sup>18</sup> Results in Table 6.7 reveal that the estimated annual cost to maintain a neighbourhood beat is around

**Table 6.6. Estimated costs of establishing a shopfront**

|                   |           |
|-------------------|-----------|
| Development costs | \$55 000  |
| Fit-out cost      | \$100 000 |
| Total             | \$155 000 |

Source: Unpublished QPS data 2002.

**Table 6.7. Estimated maintenance costs of a neighbourhood beat**

|                |          |
|----------------|----------|
| Outgoing costs | \$20 340 |
| Labour         | \$14 460 |
| Motor vehicle  | \$9 000  |
| Total          | \$43 800 |

Source: Unpublished QPS data 2002.

\$44 000. Including beat officer salaries, the actual expenditure on neighbourhood beats was \$1 562 000 in the 2001–02 financial year. The salary component on this expenditure was \$1 351 000 with \$211 128 allocated for other costs.

Ongoing recurrent costs vary significantly between individual locations and therefore these estimates should not be used for future funding allocations.

#### Shopfront

The following is an estimate of the annual cost to maintain a shopfront. The estimate includes 'outgoing costs' (e.g. costs associated with rent, utilities, stationery, etc.) and the 'labour costs' associated with two officers excluding their salaries, but including their allowances. The estimate in relation to shopfronts does not make provision for a police motor vehicle.

Table 6.8 reveals that the estimated annual cost to maintain a shopfront as \$58 000. Including beat-officer salaries and the salary of an administrative assistant (usually AO2), the actual expenditure on shopfronts was \$3 110 000 in the 2001–02 financial

<sup>18</sup> For example, the Outer Urban Beat, which has four officers.



**Table 6.8. Estimated maintenance costs of a shopfront**

|                     |          |
|---------------------|----------|
| Outgoing costs      | \$25 500 |
| Labour (2 officers) | \$32 500 |
| Total               | \$58 000 |

Source: Unpublished QPS data 2002.

year. The salary component was approximately \$2 500 000 with \$628 000 allocated for other costs. Ongoing recurrent costs vary between individual locations and therefore these estimates should not be used for future funding allocations.

*In short ...*

The workload performance of beat officers is at least equal to, and in some cases better than, their general duties counterparts. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that the response provided by the beat officer was more cost-effective than the response provided by a general duties crew to the same type of call for service. However, for the most part, this cost saving was simply due to the difference between the cost of a single-officer versus a two-officer response to a call for service. The annual recurring cost to maintain beats in Queensland is approximately \$5 million, which equates to approximately 0.6 per cent of the total QPS operational budget.

### *Summary of findings*

- ▶ On average, beat officers complete a similar number of CRISPs per month as their general duties counterparts.
- ▶ The number of calls for service taken by officers varied across sites, although beat officers tended to attend slightly more calls for service than did general duties police.
- ▶ Shopfront officers spend most of their time dealing with stealing offences and good order incidents.
- ▶ Neighbourhood beat officers attend to similar types of incidents as general duties officers and these primarily concern break and enter offences, traffic offences, alcohol-related matters, and domestic violence incidents.
- ▶ Neighbourhood beat officers spent more time on community work and addressing neighbourhood concerns.
- ▶ The average cost of a beat officer attending to a call for service is \$47.
- ▶ The average cost of a general duties crew attending to a call for service is \$67.
- ▶ A neighbourhood beat costs approximately \$90 500 to establish and \$44 000 a year to maintain (excluding officer salaries).
- ▶ A shopfront costs approximately \$155 000 to establish and \$58 000 in annual maintenance costs (excluding officer salaries).

# Chapter 7: Delivery of services and job satisfaction

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**Beat policing aims to improve the quality of policing in the community by changing the style and orientation of service delivery. In particular, beat policing seeks to narrow the distinction between reactive and proactive policing by establishing procedures and strategies that enable police to undertake both types of policing as part of their day-to-day duties. Beat policing also encourages beat officers to work with the community to reduce crime and community problems, which may have the added benefit for police of improving their job satisfaction.**

This chapter:

- 1 assesses how beats are selected by drawing on QPS policies and procedures, as well as information collected during interviews with key personnel and stakeholders
- 2 identifies the main role and functions of beat officers by analysing data collected by the QPS during the most recent SWAS
- 3 discusses the involvement of beat officers in proactive problem-solving, which is a major component of beat policing
- 4 assesses organisational support for beat policing
- 5 examines the job satisfaction of beat officers.

The main sources of data used to assess the delivery of services and measure job satisfaction among beat officers are:

- ▶ SWAS 2002
- ▶ CMC Survey of Officers in Charge of Police Beats 2002
- ▶ Interviews with officers and stakeholders
- ▶ QPS policies and procedures (e.g. Standing Orders)
- ▶ Previous evaluations, such as of the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot and the West End Police Beat (CJC 1995a & 1996).

**Main findings:**

- New beats should be selected and established on the basis of defined criteria that balance community needs with operational police requirements.
  - Flexible work arrangements are critical to the success of beat policing.
  - Beat officers have a strong commitment to proactive problem-solving.
- 

## 7.1 Site selection and establishment of beats

### 7.1.1 Neighbourhood beats

The criteria for establishing a neighbourhood beat are listed in the Service Operational Procedures. (See Neighbourhood Police Beat: Standing Orders, next page.) However, the neighbourhood beats examined in this evaluation were established *before* the development of these Standing Orders.

The Toowoomba Neighbourhood Police Beat was established during the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project in 1993. The criteria used to establish the Toowoomba Beat were:

- 1) The area should impose a high demand on police as demonstrated by an analysis of calls for service. However, to enable the beat officer to be seen by residents as the major provider of policing services in the area, the volume of calls for service should not exceed the number of calls that one officer can routinely accommodate.

## NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICE BEAT (NPB)

### Standing Orders

7 December 2001

- |         |  |          |   |
|---------|--|----------|---|
| 4.1     | Nomination of an NPB for inclusion in the program  | 4.1.2.7  | workplace health and safety, likelihood of suitable police applicants and other human resource issues;  |
| 4.1.1   | The nomination of an NPB for inclusion in the program is through application to the Officer in Charge of the Region for consideration having regard to the proposed location of the NPB in their area of responsibility. The Commissioner of Police must approve all potential applications. | 4.1.2.8  | where demands on police services indicate a possible site, the availability of sites already owned or leased by the QPS, particularly those that lend themselves to conversion;                         |
| 4.1.2   | The Officer in Charge of the Region should consider the following criteria in the short listing process:   | 4.1.2.9  | whether the proposed site will be residential or non-residential;   |
| 4.1.2.1 | whether an area poses a high demand on police, as demonstrated by an analysis of calls for service and crime data. Additionally, the type of calls for service and reported crime is to be analysed;   | 4.1.2.10 | the number of officers to be allocated to each location;  |
| 4.1.2.2 | whether an area imposes a high demand on various welfare agencies and how this demand relates to policing;   | 4.1.2.11 | regional and local police management demands, plans, priorities and policing methods;   |
| 4.1.2.3 | community attitudes, including the level of support and expressed need for a beat area officer;  | 4.1.2.12 | expected capital and recurring costs for establishing a beat in the area;   |
| 4.1.2.4 | the demographics of each location including the mixture of social groups, proportion of youth, elderly and unemployed;   | 4.1.2.13 | the ability to collect data and evaluate the program; and   |
| 4.1.2.5 | the mix of residential/commercial areas at each proposed site;   | 4.1.2.14 | when determining the geographical area of a NPB, consultation with the Senior Geographic Information Officer, Information Management Division is required to ensure Service Policy is complied with.    |
| 4.1.2.6 | the range of other police/multi-agency programs/facilities in place or likely to be funded in  | 4.1.3    | The Officer in Charge of a Region should consult with the State Coordinator in relation to the identification and operation of sites for implementation of the program in their area of responsibility. |

Source: QPS Service Operational Procedures — Standing Orders — 7 December 2001.

- 2) Ideally, the beat area should exist within the confines of an existing police divisional boundary and contain a stable mix of residential and business properties.
- 3) The beat area should be no larger than an officer can patrol by foot or bicycle as there is evidence to suggest that this style of patrolling encourages residents to share information, which gives the officer a better understanding of local issues and makes it easier to target localised crime and disorder problems.
- 4) Preference should be given to areas that contain a number of 'repeat calls for service' so that the beat officer will have ample opportunity to apply problem-solving skills.
- 5) The beat should be located in an area that allows the officer to have easy access to calls-for-service information.

It is not known what specific criteria were used to nominate and establish the Outer Urban, Metropolitan and Regional Beats used in this study.<sup>19</sup> Beat officers interviewed for the evaluation seemed reasonably satisfied with the set-up and location of these three beats. However, a senior police officer interviewed for the evaluation expressed concern about the process for selecting beats. In fact, police concerns about the selection process was one of the recurring themes of this evaluation. For example:

I am concerned that the selection of the beat sites is a politically driven process that has been taken out of the hands of the Service, which may not be appropriate. Once established, police

<sup>19</sup> Telephone conversation with QPS Beat Policing State Coordinator on 8 November 2002.

| <b>POLICE BEAT SHOPFRONT</b>   |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Standing Orders</b>   |   |
| 9 January 2002   |   |
| 4.1  | Nomination of a Police Beat Shopfront for inclusion in the program  |
| 4.1.1  | The nomination of a Police Beat Shopfront for inclusion in the program is through application to the Officer in Charge of the Region for consideration having regard to the proposed location of the Police Beat Shopfront in their area of responsibility. The Commissioner of Police must approve all potential applications. |
| 4.1.2  | The Officer in Charge of the Region should consider the following criteria in the short listing process:  |
| 4.1.2.1  | whether an area poses a high demand on police, as demonstrated by an analysis of calls for service and crime data. Additionally, the type of calls for service and reported crime is to be analysed;  |
| 4.1.2.2  | consultation with the community and retailing/business industries, including levels of support and expressed need;  |
| 4.1.2.3  | demographics of each location including the mixture of social groups, proportion of youth, elderly and unemployed;  |
| 4.1.2.4  | canvass the existence of environment scans conducted by external agencies, i.e. shopping centre analysis;   |
| 4.1.2.5  | site availability, the profile of the site position (include parking bay/s) and cost to the Service;  |
| 4.1.2.6  | size of the space offered equals or exceeds 50 square metres with a 5 metre frontage (inc. draft floor plans);  |
| 4.1.2.7  | definition of the area to be policed;   |
| 4.1.2.8  | restrictions/limitations imposed by centre management;  |
| 4.1.2.9  | hours of operation;   |
| 4.1.2.10   | location with respect to other policing establishments, shopfronts etc;   |
| 4.1.2.11   | overview of existing public transportation systems and parking facilities;  |
| 4.1.2.12   | access for disabled persons;  |
| 4.1.2.13   | involvement and support from external agencies;   |
| 4.1.2.14   | level of compliance with Workplace Health and Safety requirements; and  |
| 4.1.2.15   | availability of regional/district personnel to staff the shopfront.   |
| 4.1.3  | The Officer in Charge of a Region should consult with the State Coordinator in relation to the identification and operation of sites for implementation of the program in their area of responsibility.   |
| Source: QPS Service Operational Procedures — Standing Orders — 9 January 2002. |   |

beats are near impossible to shut-down. In the case of poorly sited beats this may mean that the Region ends up getting stuck with the considerable financial and human resource cost of maintaining the beat in perpetuity. (Senior manager)

I think that the problem is that once a beat is in place it can't be moved because of the political and public outcry that would come. (Supervisor)

I think that police should be given a greater say in the placement of the beat. Political issues, including fear of crime, often drive decisions about where to place beats. (Senior manager)

Some police suggested that new beats should only be established after an area met certain set criteria:

I feel that a police beat should only be established when certain criteria are met ... most decisions to establish beats are political ones not operational ones. I for one am not happy with the fact that the Service gets saddled with beats in areas where they shouldn't be. (Senior manager)

I think it is critical to set up a beat according to some set criteria and not simply because somebody thinks it is a good idea. (Senior manager)

***In short ...***

**The themes embedded in these comments are:**

- the perceived need to use evidence-based processes for establishing police beats
- the desire on the part of police to have more say in operational decisions affecting beats
- the need for police beats to be established according to set criteria.

**7.1.2 Shopfronts**

The process for establishing shopfronts is similar to the process used for neighbourhood beats. (See Police Beat Shopfront: Standing Orders, above.)

The shopfronts examined in this evaluation were established before the development of Standing Orders for Police Beat Shopfronts in January 2002. Police officers and community stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation did not raise any concerns about how the two shopfronts examined were nominated or selected.

## 7.2 Role and rostering of beat officers

The following section examines the activities of beat officers and considers whether the work currently being performed by these officers is consistent with the role envisaged for them by the CJC and the QPS. We also look at the rostering of beat officers and how they are paid.

During the establishment of the original Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project, the CJC and QPS saw the role and function of the beat officers as encompassing:

- ▶ attending to all allocated calls for service in the beat area when on duty and available
- ▶ patrolling the beat area in a proactive and reactive manner
- ▶ initiating direct contact with the community

- ▶ gathering criminal intelligence
- ▶ maintaining a highly visible presence in the beat area (CJC 1996).


The activities of beat officers are divided by the QPS into two broad categories: ‘incident activities’ and ‘other duties’. Incident activities are core policing tasks, such as attending/investigating homicides, robberies, assaults etc. The ‘other duties’ category includes ancillary policing tasks, such as operational administration, custodial duties, community liaison and non-tasked general patrols. See Figure 7.1 for a comparison across these two broad categories.

Our analysis found that:

- ▶ neighbourhood beat officers spend the greatest amount of their day conducting inquiries (23 per cent), attending to administration matters (16 per cent)
- ▶ beat officers working in shopfronts appear to spend much more time on general patrols than do neighbourhood beat officers (shopfront 23 per cent v. neighbourhood 13 per cent).

The large amount of time devoted to administration is probably because the paperwork required to operate a beat is similar to that required to run a small police station (CJC 1995a).

**Figure 7.1. Percentage of time spent on nature of duties: neighbourhood beat officers and shopfront beat officers**



Source: SWAS 2002, QPS

*In short ...*

The key themes emerging out of this analysis are:

- there are few major differences in the types of policing activities undertaken by neighbourhood beat officers and shopfront officers, and
- beat officers are engaged in activities similar to those originally envisaged, and
- beat officers spend large amounts of time on administrative tasks (i.e. paperwork).

### 7.2.2 Rostering of beat officers

One of the key features of beat policing is for the beat officer to have ownership of the policing problems in a defined area. One of the ways that police beats promote that ownership is to give the officer responsibility for setting their own roster. In that way, the officer is free to decide when and where to patrol and to employ proactive strategies designed to address the underlying problems of their beats.

In the neighbourhood beats examined for the evaluation, beat officers managed their own rosters to ensure that they were able to meet the needs of their particular beat. The evaluation also found that beat officers working in shopfronts also looked after their own rosters, but there was less flexibility as the operating hours of the shopfront had to correspond with the shopping centre's core business hours.

In practice, officers in both types of beats tend to work during daylight hours on week days and later hours on the weekends or during special events. The importance of flexible working arrangements for beat officers is demonstrated by the following comments:

If we have any crime trends in the area we try to roster for those crime trends, so if we have a lot of break and enter offences occurring at the start of the week, or at night, or during the day that is when we try to roster ourselves. (Beat officer)

You've got to be flexible and you've got to be prepared to work a few nights. I had a spat [number] of wilful damages here about 18 months ago happening in the wee hours of the morning, so I did a week of night work. You can't just rely on your outside guys to come in and do all your work ... The roster is very much driven by what's happening at the time. (Beat officer)

The view expressed by beat officers that flexible work arrangements are critical to the success of the police beat concept is also well supported by previous research (Bayley 1998; CJC 1995a).

Changes to Sunday trading laws also appear to have had a financial impact on the Service with most Brisbane-area shopfronts now expected to be open seven days a week. It is evident in the comment made by the manager of the Metropolitan Shopping Centre that the shopfront has already adjusted its rosters to provide policing services on Sunday.

I was impressed with the beat so quickly responding to the issue of Sunday trading as we now have the services of a beat officer on a Sunday. (Retailer)

### 7.2.3 Pay and allowances for beat officers

Closely associated with the rostering of beat officers is the issue of pay and special allowances (e.g. Operational Shift Allowance, Beat Officer Allowance). For example, over the course of the evaluation, a number of beat officers and other police claimed that beat officers are being financially disadvantaged simply by being a beat officer. On the other hand, a couple of the officers said that the current system actually works in their favour.

Whether or not beat officers should have access to operational shift allowances or other allowances is an issue that most beat officers cannot seem to agree on.<sup>20</sup> However, every officer spoken to during the evaluation expressed the view that whatever system the Service used to remunerate beat officers for working evenings and on weekends should not, in any way, financially disadvantage one type of beat officer over another beat officer or a general duties officer.

The following comments represent the statements made by police on this matter:

The fact that some beat officers do not get the OSA [Operational Shift Allowance] is not fair and should be rectified as soon as possible. (Senior manager)

<sup>20</sup> An operational shift allowance of 19 per cent of an officer's base salary is paid to 'operational police' in lieu of shift and weekend penalty rates, public holiday rates and annual leave loading.

For some beat officers to go to work and get less money [than a general duties officer] is something that the Service has got to look at ... it's a big Union issue you know! (Supervisor)

We don't work many shifts, so that gets us out of the OSA, but we get penalties for working weekends and afternoons. (Beat officer)

If we were on OSA I would not have the flexibility and the autonomy to change the roster the way we do because of the equity business. If something comes up and we are required to be there ... the staff here knows that the roster can be changed at very short notice. We have obligations from the schools, neighbourhood watch meetings and things like that ... the officers here usually get a weekend a fortnight. (Supervisor)

We get about six hours of penalty units ... it actually works out to be about a 26 per cent allowance when you take into account all of the weekends ... I have [made] more money than the average general duties officer on OSA. (Beat officer)

**In short ...**

The key themes relating to the rostering and pay of beat officers are:

- flexible work arrangements, such as beat officers managing their own rosters, are critical to the success of the police beat concept
- changes to Sunday trading laws have had a financial impact on the Service with most Brisbane-area shopfronts now expected to be open seven days a week, and
- allowances used to remunerate beat officers for working evenings and on weekends should be equitable.

This chapter now considers whether the current model of beat policing retains an emphasis on beat-officer involvement in proactive problem-solving.

### 7.3 Proactive problem-solving

In the late 1970s, Professor Herman Goldstein suggested that police should embrace a 'problem-oriented' (POP) approach to policing. Using this approach, the police would collaborate with the community to attack some of the underlying causes of crime and community problems (Goldstein 1979).

One of the main aims of the original Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project was to incorporate POP into the normal duties of a beat officer by asking the officers to be proactive and engage in problem-solving (CJC 1995a). Consequently, an important objective of the Toowoomba pilot, and all beats established since then, was to identify and solve community problems.

The analysis that follows identifies the amount of time that beat officers spend on problem-solving and provides examples of the kind of problem-solving activities that the officers are involved in.

#### 7.3.1 Amount of time beat officers spend on proactive problem-solving

Results shown in Table 7.1 reveal that neighbourhood beat officers are only slightly more involved in proactive policing (17 per cent) than their counterparts in shopfronts (15 per cent). In either case, however, proactive problem-solving encompasses a major part of their day, which is consistent with the role that was originally envisaged for beat officers.

**Table 7.1. Percentage of time spent by beat officers on proactive problem-solving**

|                     | POP<br>% | Community<br>liaison<br>% | Total<br>% |
|---------------------|----------|---------------------------|------------|
| Neighbourhood beats | 8.2      | 9.0                       | 17.2       |
| Shopfronts          | 7.7      | 6.9                       | 14.6       |

Source: SWAS 2002. QPS.

### 7.3.2 Examples of proactive problem-solving

The following examples provided by the Metropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat illustrate the types of POP-related activities being undertaken by beat officers.

#### **Example 1 — Graffiti Prevention Project**

The Graffiti Prevention Project, which was funded by the QPS and the local council, focused on four main areas:

- 1 establishing effective systems to report and record graffiti (e.g. digital camera)
- 2 creating a strategy for the rapid removal of graffiti
- 3 providing the community with education about ways to minimise graffiti
- 4 supporting the Legal Arts Program (Holiday Aerosol Art Program).

The project commenced on 1 January 2000. During the first six months, there was an 87 per cent reduction in the amount of graffiti tags in the beat area.

The project was awarded a Silver Commissioner's Lantern award in 2000 for excellence in the area of community policing.

*Source: Metropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat 2002.*

#### **Example 2 — Classical Music at Local Railway Station**

Officers at the Metropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat asked their local Community Consultative Committee (CCC) for suggestions about how to deal with ongoing problems (graffiti, assaults, drug trafficking, etc.) at a local railway station. The CCC subsequently recommended that classical music be 'piped-in' to deter offenders from loitering.

Following consultations with residents near the railway station, the beat officers submitted a proposal to Queensland Rail for a six-month trial of classical music being played in an effort to deter offending. The request was approved with the trial commencing in December 2001.

During the first six months of the project, crime at the railway station decreased by 39 per cent and calls for service reduced by 44 per cent. In addition, 81 per cent of residents in the area considered the initiative to be a success with all of the residents saying that they would be in favour of the project continuing.

*Source: Metropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat 2002.*

Some other examples of proactive problem-solving in the beat areas include:

- ▶ working with retailers to secure canisters of spray paint in an effort to reduce theft and minimise graffiti in and around the shopping centre
- ▶ working with the local council to establish a Skate Park to give young people in the beat area somewhere to go
- ▶ providing free martial arts classes in an effort to teach self-discipline to young people in the beat area
- ▶ sponsoring a community forum and a drug forum for parents aimed at reducing crime and drug abuse in the beat area, and
- ▶ working with beat residents to digitally record valuable property so that beat area residents would be able to identify it if it should ever be stolen.

Besides these creative and original examples of proactive policing, comments from interviews of police and key stakeholders also highlight the importance of beat officers using problem-solving approaches in their day-to-day work:

It really all just gets back to POP. It's POP in action ... that should be the focus of beats. (Supervisor)

I see that the Service has grown up considerably since 1993. The number one output for the Service is problem-oriented policing, which has been taken on board by the QPS to a large extent ... I look back now and I see the beats were a very important catalyst to market the concept of problem-oriented policing. (Supervisor)

We do a lot of problem stuff here. We have been running lots of different projects. We look at problems and we try and fix them using all sorts of different ways. (Beat officer)

Overall, beat officers have a strong commitment to proactive problem-solving and consider beat policing to be particularly effective in delivering services.



### 7.3.3 Barriers to effective proactive problem-solving

Two concerns expressed by police interviewed for the evaluation related to the lack of suitable information systems for identifying local policing problems and the lack of training for beat officers in POP. Some comments were:

The QPS has come a long way in recognising the importance of problem-solving. However, we're not giving our managers the resources and information management systems where they can easily obtain that data. (Supervisor)

We need the ability to look at the CAD systems ourselves without having to go and annoy Police Communications. (Beat officer)

I've never been on the beat course ... I've never been formally trained in problem-solving, but I've read the POPP guide. (Beat officer)

I've never had any formal training (in problem-solving), but I have a lot of experience in community policing. (Beat officer)

There was broad agreement among police interviewed for the evaluation that it was important for beat officers to receive formal training in proactive policing and to have user-friendly access to timely and accurate data for the purposes of problem-solving. The reported lack of training for beat officers in POP and the need to provide such consistent training may have a substantial impact in terms of costs and would need to be further considered from a police resource availability perspective.

The need for well-structured and focused training is an essential requirement for all beat officers. In recognition of this, the QPS has developed a training package for beat officers and has declared itself committed to its implementation.

## 7.4 Organisational support for beat policing

One factor critical to the operation of beat policing over the years has been the high level of support provided by the QPS (CJC 1995a). This section of the report examines the impact of three types of organisational support: managerial support, support for beat policing by other police and material support.

### 7.4.1 Managerial support for beats

Some supervisors and senior managers (e.g. District Officers and Regional Assistant Commissioners) expressed strong support for beat policing:

Initially, I did not favour beats and believed that they were an unreasonable drain on resources and not the most efficient use of police officers. However my viewpoint has changed in recent years. I now firmly believe that we have to do policing differently because the traditional reactive model is not working. (Senior manager)

The work that the beat officers do is invaluable. They provide the community and others with a sense of safety and security. They have made some remarkable achievements. (Senior manager)

I know we need more of them [beats]. Every suburb would love one because they do such a fantastic job and it's not all just reactive policing. As I said before, it's getting back to like the old country policing. You're taking an interest in your community and a lot of it is proactive where you might be getting out there and doing protective behaviour training or mixing with the kids at school and it's breaking down those barriers between the police and the community and the community love it so they work really well. I just can't say it enough. They work really well and the community takes pride in their police officer ... I just can't say enough about how well they work. (Senior manager)

In contrast, there were those who did not support the concept:

If I had a choice, I would absorb the beat officers back into general duties because from where I sit, I see my primary role is to provide an operational response 24-hours a day, seven days a week. (Senior manager)

I would rather have more general duties police than beat officers as I feel that general duties officers are far more productive. (Senior manager)

To be honest with you, I would rather have the six officers and their three cars in as a reactive resource in the District. (Senior manager)

Generally, the beat officers interviewed for the evaluation said that they were happy with the level of managerial support given to them. For example:

Yeah, we're getting good support ... [on a scale of one to ten] the level of support that we get from Region would be up around eight or nine. (Beat officer)

In terms of management support, on a scale of one to ten I would probably give it an eight and a half or maybe a nine. (Beat officer)

One of the reasons beat officers were so positive in their assessment of the level of managerial support for beat policing was because they felt that they were being strongly encouraged to try new ways of doing things. In addition, beat officers reported that they appreciated the fact that the Service seemed to trust them to manage their own rosters and activities.

***In short ...***

**We found the level of support for the concept of police beats by supervisors and senior managers to be mixed, with some officers strongly supporting beats and others much less enthusiastic about the concept. Beat officers themselves, however, appeared to believe they were getting very good managerial support.**

#### **7.4.2 Support for beats by other police**

Having the support of ‘mainstream’ police is also very important if innovative or non-traditional policing strategies, such as beat policing, are to be widely accepted as a viable method of delivering policing services.

Most of the beat officers interviewed for this evaluation felt that to increase the level of support by other police they (the beat officers) would need to take on more of the reactive work or have greater presence in the beat areas. For example:

The relationship between us and our general duties counterparts is very good as long as they can see that we’re actually doing jobs ... a lot of calls come via the mobile phone ... so the others [general duties officers] didn’t really know what we were doing ... over the last couple of months we’ve really been getting on to the radio and helping out with a lot of jobs and we’ve really been sort of hammering home to the guys that we don’t just go to meetings. (Beat officer)

We’ve been making an effort to do a whole lot more [calls for service] lately ... not to try and justify what we do, but just because in the past we hadn’t really been letting people know as much as we should about what we do ... Others [general duties police] think that all they do is just job to job to job to job. When they see us not doing any [jobs] they think we’re not working, but it’s just a different type of working that’s all. (Beat officer)

On the other hand, the view by beat supervisors was that other police, particularly general duties officers, already had a positive view of beat officers:

General duties and other officers know the beat officers are approachable ... the standard of these beat officers is very high. (Supervisor)

The interaction between the generals and beat officers is great ... the generals probably don’t understand what the beat officers do, but the respect is still there. (Supervisor)

***In short ...***

**Beat officers felt that other police generally supported their efforts, particularly if the beat officers were perceived by other police to be pulling their own weight.**

#### **7.4.3 Material support**

The beat officers and beat supervisors interviewed for the evaluation raised minimal concerns about the adequacy or lack of materials or facilities:

We’ve got everything we need ... other than we would like to get another computer. (Beat officer)

There has been no extra need for extra resources ... these beats are set up with everything that they need. (Supervisor)

However, one of the police officers interviewed raised the concern that some of the older beats were disadvantaged in comparison to more recently established beats. Comments in that regard were:

We have a set schedule of equipment that covers absolutely everything from tables to chairs. We ensure that we resource them all the same, but we do have problems with the pre-July 2001 beats. (Supervisor)

*Question:* Do you think it would be a desirable outcome to actually bring those other beats up to at least the minimum standard? *Answer:* It would be ideal, but the issue we have is budget ... we are only provided with enough money to establish additional locations, but not for the purposes of addressing any previous inequities. (Supervisor)

During the recent statewide survey of beat officers, Officers in Charge were asked if they had the necessary equipment or facilities to complete their role.

Table 7.2 shows their responses to this question.

**Table 7.2. Percentage of beat officers responding who did not have the necessary equipment or facilities**

|                     | % (n)   |
|---------------------|---------|
| Neighbourhood beats | 41 (7)  |
| Shopfronts          | 70 (28) |

Source: CMC statewide survey of officers in charge of police beats 2002.

Approximately 70 per cent of officers working in shopfronts and 40 per cent of officers working in neighbourhood beats believed that they did not have the necessary equipment. In contrast, during interviews, officers in the six selected beats expressed satisfaction with the equipment and facilities that they had. Many of the items beat officers did request had not been provided by the QPS due to legislative restrictions on the beat model or restrictions imposed by the commercial nature of lease arrangement (i.e. secure holding area, toilet facilities, triple-deck tape recorder). Other resource needs have, in fact, been already addressed by the QPS, including about \$250 000 spent over 2001–02 and 2002–03 upgrading security at shopfronts.

***In short ...***

**Few concerns were raised about materials or facilities at the beats by beat officers from the sites selected for the evaluation. However, one of the officers interviewed suggested that some of the older beats were disadvantaged in terms of facilities and equipment when compared to the newer beats. In addition, information from beat officers surveyed for the evaluation revealed that several officers in charge of beats did not feel that they had the necessary equipment to do the job.**

## 7.5 Beat officer job satisfaction

One of the objectives for the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project was to provide the police with a more satisfying work environment and the opportunity to develop and use a variety of new skills (CJC 1995a). The following analysis identifies the level of job satisfaction among beat officers using

data obtained from the CMC’s 2002 statewide survey of officers in charge of police beats. Comments made by the beat officers from the six sites selected for the evaluation are also included in the discussion.

During a recent survey of officers in charge of beats, respondents were asked if they were satisfied in their position as a beat officer. Figure 7.2 shows the results of this analysis. More than 70 per cent of officers in charge of neighbourhood beats and 78 per cent of officers in charge of shopfronts said that they were either ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with their role as beat officers. The finding that officers in charge are generally satisfied in their role is consistent with comments made by beat officers during interviews conducted for the evaluation.

I like the community aspect of beats. I like the idea that we can instigate and implement things and see them through to fruition. On a scale of one to ten in terms of my happiness here at the beat, I would have to say nine. (Beat officer)

Of course there is the offer of a house as well. So it was, you know, a perfect opportunity to do with the type of job that I like, which is community policing, in an area that I like to do it. (Beat officer)

Interestingly, some beat officers felt that working at a beat actually enhanced their résumé and improved their opportunity for promotion:


I’ve only been around [the beats] for a short while, but what I have found is that whenever I have put an application for a job and I’ve been addressing those KSCs [key selection criteria] I can find something to fill that hole ... It’s amazing, but when I was out there trying to get sergeant positions I wasn’t getting anywhere ... now I’m getting short listed and getting offered positions. (Beat officer)

Despite the overall positive finding, approximately 30 per cent of officers in charge of beats surveyed for the evaluation said that they were planning to leave their positions over the next 12 months (neighbourhood beats 24 per cent and shopfronts 33 per cent). The main reasons for wanting to leave were the lack of promotional opportunities and the need for new challenges and experiences.

***In short ...***

**Beat officers surveyed or interviewed for the evaluation expressed high levels of job satisfaction.**

**Figure 7.2. Officers' satisfaction with position as beat officer**



Source: CMC statewide survey of officers in charge of police beats 2002.

### *Summary of findings*

- ▶ Concerns were raised about the selection of new neighbourhood beats and the need to balance community needs with the operational requirements of police.
- ▶ There were no concerns with the selection and establishment of shopfronts.
- ▶ Neighbourhood beat officers spend a high proportion of their time conducting inquiries and attending to administrative matters.
- ▶ Shopfront officers spend a large part of their shift engaged in general patrolling.
- ▶ It is important for beat officers to have responsibility for managing their own time in order to respond to the needs of their beat area.
- ▶ Beat officers should be equitably compensated for weekend and night work.
- ▶ Neighbourhood beat officers are slightly more involved in proactive policing than are shopfront officers.
- ▶ There was concern raised by beat officers that insufficient training and inability to access timely data were barriers to effective problem-solving.
- ▶ Beat officers feel supported by management and general duties officers.
- ▶ Approximately 70 per cent of beat officers are satisfied or very satisfied with their job.
- ▶ Approximately 30 per cent of beat officers are planning to leave the position in the next 12 months.

# Chapter 8: Conclusion

## 8.1 Key findings

This section summarises the key findings for each of the measures of beat policing, namely:

- ▶ impact on crime and calls for service
- ▶ perceptions of crime and personal safety
- ▶ client satisfaction with police services
- ▶ workload performance and costs of beats
- ▶ delivery of services and job satisfaction.

### 8.1.1 Impact on crime and calls for service

One of the objectives of the evaluation was to assess the overall impact of beat policing on crime. In general, we observed a reduction in reported crime in all neighbourhood beats. In contrast, crime increased in two of the three comparison sites. Similarly, property crime fell in all neighbourhood beats, compared to a substantial rise observed in two of the comparison areas. These results suggest that neighbourhood beats are effective in reducing reported crime.

Neighbourhood beats did not have an impact on the rate of calls for service over the short term. However, we then compared the rate of calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area during the January to June 1994 period to the rate of calls during the January to June 2002 period.

Comparatively large reductions in calls for service were observed in Toowoomba Beat, as well as a fall in the number of chronic repeat locations. In contrast, the number of hot spots increased over time in both Toowoomba Beat and its comparison area. The findings suggest that proactive policing initiatives by beat officers are able to affect positively the rate of calls for service and locations generating chronic repeat calls for service.

In contrast to these findings, there appears to be no persuasive evidence that shopfronts have a positive impact on the rate of reported crime. Three of the shopping centres recorded slight changes in overall crime and property crime during the study period, while one centre recorded significant increases.

#### *In short ...*

**Neighbourhood beats appear effective in reducing overall crime and property crime, but not calls for service, at least in the short term. Over the longer term, they do seem to be effective in reducing calls for service and in reducing chronic repeat calls. In contrast, shopfronts do not appear to be effective in reducing reported crime in shopping centres.**

### 8.1.2 Perceptions of crime and personal safety

We expected that the presence of a neighbourhood beat or shopfront would reduce citizens' perceptions of crime and increase perceptions of personal safety and willingness to report an offence to police. In general, the results from surveys of residents, shoppers and retailers did not support this expectation. Residents in neighbourhood beats perceived disorder problems to be more common in their community than did residents in comparison areas. Neighbourhood beats were also not associated with increases in citizens' feelings of personal safety, with residents in two beat areas experiencing significantly lower levels of perceived safety than residents in comparison areas. Additionally, statistically significant differences were not observed between each neighbourhood beat and its respective comparison area in terms of the public's willingness to report crime.

The proportion of shoppers and retailers reporting feeling safe while in the shopping centre was very high for all sites. There is no consistent evidence that shopfronts increase perceptions of safety of shoppers or retailers. However, given the high levels of safety expressed by these groups, it would be unrealistic to expect that one or two beat officers could have a substantial impact on perceptions of personal safety.

#### *In short ...*

**There is no evidence that neighbourhood beats or shopfronts reduce citizens' perceptions of crime or increase perceptions of personal safety.**

### 8.1.3 Client satisfaction with police services

Awareness of beat policing and the location of the neighbourhood beat office was found to be quite high among community members. However, only about half of the residents could recognise their local beat officer. Residents who did report contact with their beat officer expressed satisfaction with the service they received.

More residents in neighbourhood beats reported that police were doing a good or very good job in dealing with a range of community crime and disorder problems. Residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas were very happy with the service that they were receiving from police. Residents and various community stakeholders were positive about and supportive of beat policing and very happy with the service that they received from their beat officer. But this did not translate into increased community satisfaction with policing services more generally.

Possible reasons for this finding are:

- 1 Community members indicated they were already satisfied with police and therefore changes in service provision would have to be dramatic to have any impact on their level of satisfaction.
- 2 The workload analysis of beat officers showed that a high proportion of calls for service in the beat area was attended by general duties officers from the local station, and not the beat officer. If the beat officer was to become the primary service provider in the beat there may be an increase in community satisfaction.

#### *In short ...*

The presence of a shopfront increases the visibility of police and provides opportunity for shoppers and retailers to contact police for advice, as opposed to simply reporting an offence. However, shopfronts are not associated with increased client satisfaction with police services.

### 8.1.4 Workload performance and costs of police beats

In general, beat officers take a similar number of crime reports as do general duties officers. In contrast, beat officers attend slightly more calls for service than do general duties officers. However, the types of policing incidents that beat officers deal with

differ in a number of ways to incidents dealt with by general duties officers. This depended on circumstances such as the type of area the officer works in and the types of call the officer routinely deals with. In the main, beat officers appear to be more involved in typical neighbourhood concerns.

In terms of the cost of providing police responses, the response provided by the beat officer appears to be more cost-effective than that provided by a general duties crew. The cost of establishing a shopfront is estimated at \$155 000, with maintenance costs about \$58 000 a year. The estimated cost of establishing a neighbourhood beat is \$90 500, with annual maintenance costs of about \$43 800. The annual recurring cost to maintain beats in Queensland is approximately \$5 million, which equates to approximately 0.6 per cent of the total QPS operational budget.

#### *In short ...*

The workload performance of beat officers is at least equal to, and in some cases better than, their general duties counterparts. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that the response provided by the beat officer is more cost-effective than the response provided by a general duties crew to the same type of call for service — although, for the most part, this 'cost saving' may be due to the difference between the cost of a single-officer versus a two-officer response to a call for service.

### 8.1.5 Delivery of services and job satisfaction

There are few differences in the types of activities undertaken by neighbourhood beat officers and shopfront officers. Both spend the greatest amount of their day conducting inquiries and attending to correspondence or administration matters, although shopfront officers also spend a large proportion of their time engaged in general patrolling.

Beat officers need to have flexible working arrangements over which they have autonomy and it is therefore important that an equitable allowance scheme is used to compensate them for working evening and weekend shifts. The QPS also should to respond to the changing contextual needs of beats, such as recent changes to Sunday trading laws, and provide the necessary overtime or penalty allowances for shopfront officers.

Beat officers spend a major part of the day on proactive problem-solving. For officers to engage effectively in proactive policing activities they need to receive formal training and access to timely and accurate data for the purposes of identifying local policing problems.

Beat officers feel supported by managers and encouraged to address problems through building community partnerships and engaging in proactive policing. Overall, beat officers are very satisfied with their role.

Most beats are well resourced; however, some of the older beats were not established under the new guidelines and have not been provided with the same level of resources in comparison to more recently established beats.

***In short ...***

**The types of activities undertaken by beat officers are similar to those originally envisaged by the Service and the CJC. This includes general patrolling, problem-solving and working with the community. The analysis also reveals that beat officers enjoy considerable job satisfaction and believe that they are well supported by the Service. However, one concern expressed by some police related to the site-selection process. They suggested that any decision to establish new neighbourhood beats should have police input and use evidence-based selection processes.**

***Is beat policing effective?***

The evidence for the general effectiveness of beat policing is mixed. Neighbourhood beats are associated with decreases in all crime and property offences; however, shopfronts were not found to have any impact on reported crime.

Neighbourhood beats did not have an impact on the rate of calls for service over the short term, although in the longer term there was a substantial decrease in calls for service in Toowoomba Beat. Results revealed that the beat was particularly effective in reducing the number of chronic repeat-call addresses.

Neither neighbourhood beats nor shopfronts reduced perceptions of crime or increased perceptions of personal safety. Neighbourhood beats were not associated with increases in citizens' willingness to report crime.

***Is beat policing cost-effective?***

The performance of beat officers is at least equal to and in some cases better than their general duties counterparts. There is also some evidence

that the response provided by a beat officer is more cost-effective than provided by a general duties crew to the same type of call; however, this cost saving was largely due to the difference between the cost of a single-officer versus a two-officer response.

***Are community members satisfied with, and do they support, beat policing?***

Residents of beat areas expressed very high levels of support for, and satisfaction with, beat policing. Residents in neighbourhood beats had a greater awareness of police activity than residents in comparison areas and were very happy with the services they received from their beat officer.

The presence of a police shopfront increased police visibility and provided opportunity for shoppers and retailers to contact police for advice. Retailers and shoppers alike reported satisfaction with police services and support for the shopfront.

## 8.2 Issues that had an impact on the findings

### 8.2.1 Duplication of police services

It could be argued that neighbourhood beat policing simply reflects a duplication or double servicing of police services to specific neighbourhood locations. Consistent with this line of thinking, it could be argued that resources might be more efficiently allocated if neighbourhood beat officers were simply transferred to general duties rostering for an area. In essence, adding neighbourhood police beat officers to the pool of general duties officers would provide the same level of coverage, presence and overall service to an area at a lower cost. For the following reasons, we strongly assert that such a viewpoint is not accurate:

- 1 Neighbourhood beat policing provides a police response in specific locations that is distinct from general duties policing. Beat officers are encouraged to undertake direct community engagement and liaison, and problem-oriented policing initiatives as part of their core business. While such initiatives are also important to general duties policing, it is clearly the case that rapid response to calls for service, as well as general patrolling, remain core business for general duties policing. Results reported in Chapter 6 reveal that neighbourhood beat officers generally spend less time undertaking general patrol activities and responding to crime incidents, and much more time on community liaison activities than do general duties police officers. Additionally, results indicate that beat officers spend more time on specific calls for service in their neighbourhoods than do general duties police, which reflects the capacity of beat officers to provide additional service and assistance to citizens requesting police services without the need to rush off to another call. These findings reflect the fact that neighbourhood beat officers undertake different functions from general duties policing, which would not be adequately addressed if beat officers were diverted to general duties service.
- 2 Diverting neighbourhood beat officers to general duties policing would lead to a reduction in policing services to a previously identified area of need (i.e. the beat). Officers diverted from their beat duty would have responsibility for a much larger geographic area. Their general patrolling

activities, as well as responses to calls for service, would divert them from beat areas. In short, the response to crime and disorder problems in the neighbourhood beat, as well as the opportunities for community liaison and community-based crime prevention efforts, would be minimised.

- 3 There is evidence that diverting one or two officers from neighbourhood beats to general duties policing would have no impact on police presence and capacity for service provision in the area. Simply adding a few more officers to general duties policing would do little to enhance overall police presence in an area. In fact, available evidence suggests that as many as ten officers would need to be hired to increase police presence by one officer over a 24-hour period, seven days a week, 365 days a year (Bayley 1994). Bayley's (1994) analysis of police organisations in Canada, America, Britain, Japan, and Australia revealed that increasing police presence on the street by even one officer is difficult because of various issues including the number of working days available per officer on an annual basis, the mix of general duties police versus police assigned to administrative tasks, and the amount of recreation and holiday leave taken among other issues. Taking into consideration the level of administrative burdens placed upon contemporary police officers, Bayley asserts that the ten for one rule is 'generous to the police' (p. 53).

#### *In short ...*

**There are good reasons to believe that diverting neighbourhood beat officers to general duties policing would lead to a reduction of policing services in an area of previously identified need, as well as a reduced opportunity to provide proactive, community-based crime prevention activities. For these reasons, it is our contention that neighbourhoods with police beats would not be similarly served by the police if officers were diverted toward general duties.**

### 8.2.2 Displacement and diffusion effects of beat policing

It might be argued that the activities of neighbourhood beat officers do not effectively reduce crime overall, but rather displace crime or certain forms of crime to adjacent locations. In essence, when such effects are occurring, observed reductions in crime in



a study location mask a larger transference or displacement process. The overall net effect is that the intervention may not reduce crime across the larger geographic area.

Empirical evidence on this issue suggests that while it is important to consider crime displacement when assessing targeted policing activities, it is far from an inevitable occurrence. For example, studies of crime hot spots have increasingly supported the view that crime displacement effects are overstated (Braga, Weisburd, Waring, Mazerolle, Spelman & Gajewski 1999; Braga 2001; Green 1995; Weisburd & Green 1995) and a review by Hessling (1994) suggests that crime displacement effects are inconsequential.

Moreover, the most comprehensive and systematic review conducted to date on this issue also identifies that focused crime prevention activities of the police do not inevitably lead to displacement. The review by Braga et al. (1999) of available randomised experiments and quasi-experiments that have examined police responses to crime hot spots and crime displacement reveals that spatial crime displacement effects were limited and, in some cases, crime prevention spill-over benefits to adjacent locations were observed. In short, the diffusion of crime prevention gains, as opposed to crime displacement effects, appears related to targeted police actions in high crime locations.

In light of the available evidence on spatial crime displacement, it is expected that the reductions in reported crime observed in the various neighbourhood beat locations are real and do not reflect displacement effects.

### 8.3 Issues for the future

On the basis of evidence collected through the course of this evaluation, the following suggestions are presented as being important to the development of beat policing. They relate to:

- ▶ the process for selecting police beats
- ▶ tenure arrangements for new beats
- ▶ performance management
- ▶ marketing
- ▶ training
- ▶ access to information
- ▶ alternative models of beat policing.

#### 8.3.1 The process for selecting police beats

One of the major concerns expressed by some police during the evaluation was the process of selecting new beat sites. In particular, some of the officers felt that there was little consultation between key stakeholders and the QPS regarding the selection of potential beat sites. The result of this is that there is a possibility of beats being placed in areas of low demand for police services or in areas where there is already adequate police coverage. Key stakeholders such as local councillors and Members of Parliament have a different view of this situation and report that it is the government's responsibility to respond to the community's demand for beats by establishing beats in as many areas as possible that require them.

Both of these points of view may well be correct. It is entirely proper for the government to respond to community demand for beats, while at the same time it is equally correct for the Service to be concerned about possible inefficient methods of service delivery. Some of the ways to better manage these competing interests would be to consider:

- ▶ giving police greater involvement and say in the identification of potential beat sites
- ▶ developing and adhering to evidence-based criteria for establishing new police beats.

#### 8.3.2 Tenure arrangements for new beats

Police and key stakeholders raised the concern that once a beat has been established it is nearly impossible to close, due to the difficulty of removing services from a community. This issue poses a particular challenge for the police in situations where there are large-scale demographic shifts or changes in the level of crime or disorder in the beat area. For example, in a beat area where the crime rate has fallen over the years, the beat officer may lose motivation due to the low demand for policing services, which may then reduce community satisfaction with the beat.

Although this is a difficult issue to resolve in existing beats, especially in areas where there is a community expectation that the beat is permanent, it may be possible to modify the terms of establishment for future beats. Consideration should be given to establishing new beats with a renewable fixed term of three to five years. At the end of the term, the beat should be assessed to see if it is achieving its objectives and if the demand for policing services still

exists. This would ensure that the level of policing being provided to a beat area is capable of reflecting changing priorities or community circumstances.

### **8.3.3 Performance management**

#### ***Negotiated response***

One of the key requirements of beat policing is for the beat officer to be seen by beat-area residents as the primary focus of policing activity in the area. For the beat officer, this means assuming responsibility for both the reactive and proactive work in the area. However, an analysis of CRISP reports and calls for service demonstrates that most reactive calls for service in the beat area are dealt with by general duties police rather than the beat officer. According to beat officers, this occurs because Police Communications generally dispatch requests for service to mobile patrols, even if the call originates in the beat area. Ensuring that an effective 'negotiated response strategy' was in place would enable the beat officers to respond to more matters in their area and help them to manage their workloads more effectively.

#### ***Periodic review and evaluation***

One of the findings of the evaluation of the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project was that the goals and strategies of a particular beat need to be re-visited periodically to ensure that they remain focused and relevant (CJC 1995a). This finding holds equally true for this evaluation and continues to be an issue for the future. As beats change or mature over time, it is critical that the beat be reviewed every three to five years to ensure that they continue to meet the needs of beat-area residents. The QPS has advised that evaluation plans and tools are available for beat officers within their training package. Consideration should be given to including an assessment of the workload of the officer in the review in an effort to maintain a balanced and appropriate work environment for the officer.

### **8.3.4 Marketing**

The QPS Crime Prevention Unit is presently developing a marketing kit for neighbourhood beats, which will help police regions market their own beats from the pre-establishment stage through to the launch, and then through the first year of the life of the beat. This kit will include examples of what marketing strategies may be appropriate and media

guidelines. Plans are under way for a similar kit designed for shopfronts.

In addition to marketing beats to the Service's external clients, it is equally important that the Service markets the concept to its own staff. Currently, the QPS Crime Prevention Unit is developing an internal marketing proposal for neighbourhood beats, which is aimed at non-commissioned officers and beat supervisors. This marketing tool aims to highlight why there has been a beat set up in their local area, the statistics supporting the establishment of the beat, and what part community members will play in the beat. Ideally, the Service should develop a similar proposal for shopfronts.

### **8.3.5 Training**

It is essential that all beat officers are provided with training for their role, with particular emphasis on POP. The QPS advises that they have established a five-day training course for beat officers, have offered this course once in 2002 and future courses are planned. Consideration needs to be given to regular training courses for new beat officers and also to provide up-to-date information and networking opportunities for continuing beat officers.

### **8.3.6 Access to information**

To give beat officers the ability to engage in proactive, intelligence-led policing, beat officers need accurate and timely information. For an officer to deal with repeat addresses and identify patterns of crime or calls for service in the community, they should be able to easily interrogate CRISP and calls-for-service databases. At the present time this is not possible, although the QPS has advised that they are addressing this issue by developing the ability for each beat officer to be able to download CRISP data for their individual beat area directly from the mainframe and analyse such data easily. Ideally, it should be possible for beat officers to easily generate up-to-date information, such as the top ten problem addresses in their beat area. Monitoring is required of the needs of beat officers in relation to access to information and information-system tools.

### **8.3.7 Alternative models of beat policing**

Beat policing is based on the philosophy of ownership. The beat officer resides in the community and takes ownership of, and responsibility for,

policing problems within the community. Currently the neighbourhood beat model of policing employed by the QPS uses residency to help instil a sense of ownership in the beat officer. Other elements of beat policing that seem to be important to their effectiveness are the ability of beat officers to be flexible in terms of rostering and in how they apply problem-solving strategies in their community.

Given the inflexibility and the costs associated with the current models of beat policing, it may be useful for the QPS to explore some alternative models that retain the essential elements of beat policing (e.g. follow-up and ownership) without the need to establish the beat on a permanent basis. Some alternative beat-policing models that the QPS might consider trialling are:

### **Mobile police beat**

The idea behind a mobile beat is for the Service to be able to provide additional temporary police resources (i.e. beat officer and mobile facility) aimed at dealing with a specific local crime or community problem. For example, a rash of break and enters in a particular area might result in the QPS using the mobile beat as a base of operations until the offenders are apprehended. The focus of the mobile beat would be on the beat officer owning the 'problem' rather than the officer taking responsibility for an area, as is the case with traditional beats.

### **Zone beat policing**

Zone beat policing is designed to encourage general duties police to take responsibility for the problems occurring in a particular area or zone while, at the same time, providing the traditional division-wide response to crime and community problems. This approach is currently being trialled in the Southern Region. Here, the emphasis is on establishing new management structures aimed at fostering an officer's 'commitment' to solving crime and community problems in their particular zone. To accomplish this, the division has been subdivided into several 'zones' with responsibility for each of the zones given to a supervisor (sergeant). The zones are then further subdivided and assigned to a constable or senior constable who is then assigned various tasks in their

particular zone (e.g. establish a neighbourhood watch or visit students at a local school) or deal with a local crime or community problem. Their efforts are closely monitored and managed by their supervisor as part of the Service's 28-day performance management process.

Although the concept is still in the trial phase, it seems to provide many of the advantages of beat policing, such as encouraging the officer to take ownership of a local problem while, at the same time, attending to the policing needs of the wider community.

### **Non-residential neighbourhood beat**

The non-residential police beat was originally trialled at West End in 1994 and later evaluated by the CJC in 1996. The idea behind a non-residential neighbourhood beat is to establish a beat office in an area without the necessity of locating it in residential premises. In the case of West End, the beat office was located in West End Police Station.

There are two main advantages to this approach.

- 1 It is more cost-effective for the Service because it avoids the need to acquire and maintain a beat.
- 2 Because the officers are not required to reside in the beat residence, relieving staff can be allocated to the beat without the need to displace the officer or their family.

The disadvantage to this model is that the beat officer may not be seen by the community as the main provider of policing services in the beat.

***Police beats are likely to continue as an essential part of police service delivery in Queensland for the foreseeable future. As this study has shown, such innovative policing initiatives need to be comprehensively evaluated to assess their effectiveness.***

***Ultimately, the goal of delivering effective police services to all communities is best achieved by a commitment to police innovation, community satisfaction and program evaluation.***

# Appendix 1

## Police Beat Inventory: Neighbourhood Beats

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**The following is an inventory of neighbourhood police beats.**

**All police beats were sent a survey in August 2002 requiring background information regarding the police beats.**

**Note that information provided by the beat officers has not been verified by the researchers. Follow-up calls have been made to complete missing detail; however, some information has not been available or has not been provided to date.**

**The new Goodna Neighbourhood Police Beat (Southern Region, Ipswich District) and Marsden Neighbourhood Police Beat (South Eastern Region, Logan District) have not been included in this inventory as the beats started during the evaluation report phase.**

| <b>Slade Point Police Beat</b> |  |  | <b>Year started</b> | <b>1999</b> |
|--------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|
|--------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|

|                          |                           |                           |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Central | <b>District</b><br>Mackay | <b>Division</b><br>Mackay |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
7 000



| <b>Holloways Beach Police Beat</b> |  |  | <b>Year started</b> | <b>2002</b> |
|------------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|
|------------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|

|                               |                           |                               |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Far Northern | <b>District</b><br>Cairns | <b>Division</b><br>Smithfield |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
3 000



| <b>Trinity Beach Police Beat</b> |  |  | <b>Year started</b> | <b>1999</b> |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|
|----------------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|

|                               |                           |                               |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Far Northern | <b>District</b><br>Cairns | <b>Division</b><br>Smithfield |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
4 300




| <b>Banyo Police Beat</b> |  |  | <b>Year started</b> | <b>2001</b> |
|--------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|
|--------------------------|--|--|---------------------|-------------|

|                                     |                                   |                           |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Metropolitan North | <b>District</b><br>North Brisbane | <b>Division</b><br>Hendra |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
8 750



**Bray Park Police Beat** **Year started** 1999

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Pine Rivers      **Division** Petrie

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
6 326



**Kallangur Police Beat** **Year started** 1999

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Pine Rivers      **Division** Petrie

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
14 000



**Oxley Police Beat** **Year started** 2002

**Region** Metropolitan South      **District** Oxley      **Division** Mount Ommaney

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
10 000





**West End Police Beat** **Year started** 1994


**Region** Metropolitan South      **District** South Brisbane      **Division** West End


**Location** Police Station


**Estimated residential population**  
5 982



| <b>Urangan Police Beat</b>              |                                |                               | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1999</b> |
|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>North Coast            | <b>District</b><br>Maryborough | <b>Division</b><br>Hervey Bay |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area         |                               |   |             |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 5 000                          |                               |   |             |

| <b>Tullawong Police Beat</b>            |                              |                               | <b>Year started</b>  | <b>2002</b> |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>North Coast            | <b>District</b><br>Redcliffe | <b>Division</b><br>Caboolture |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area       |                               |  |             |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 3 500                        |                               |  |             |

| <b>Margate Police Beat</b>              |                              |                              | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1999</b> |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>North Coast            | <b>District</b><br>Redcliffe | <b>Division</b><br>Redcliffe |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area       |                              |   |             |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 10 000                       |                              |   |             |

| <b>Kelso Police Beat</b>                |                               |                           | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1998</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Northern               | <b>District</b><br>Townsville | <b>Division</b><br>Kirwan |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area        |                           |   |             |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | Not Available                 |                           |   |             |

**Rasmussen Police Beat** **Year started** 1998

**Region** Northern      **District** Townsville      **Division** Kirwan

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
7 000



**South Townsville Police Beat** **Year started** 1999

**Region** Northern      **District** Townsville      **Division** South Townsville

**Location** Police Station

**Estimated residential population**  
5 000–10 000



**Garbutt Police Beat** **Year started** 1999

**Region** Northern      **District** Townsville      **Division** Townsville

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
6 400




**Eagleby Police Beat** **Year started** 1999


**Region** South Eastern      **District** Logan      **Division** Beenleigh


**Location** Shopping Centre


**Estimated residential population**  
8 500






| Loganlea Police Beat                    |                          |                                  | Year started  | 2002 |
|---|--------------------------|----------------------------------|---|------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern          | <b>District</b><br>Logan | <b>Division</b><br>Logan Central |  |      |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area   |                                  |   |      |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 17 000                   |                                  |   |      |

| Rochedale South Police Beat             |                          |                                 | Year started   | 2002 |
|---|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--|------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern          | <b>District</b><br>Logan | <b>Division</b><br>Slacks Creek |  |      |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area   |                                 |  |      |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 4 000                    |                                 |  |      |

| Springwood Police Beat                  |                          |                                 | Year started  | 1999 |
|---|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---|------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern          | <b>District</b><br>Logan | <b>Division</b><br>Slacks Creek |  |      |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Shopping Centre          |                                 |   |      |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | Not Available            |                                 |   |      |


| Riverview Police Beat                   |                            |                           | Year started  | 1999 |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---|------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Southern               | <b>District</b><br>Ipswich | <b>Division</b><br>Goodna |  |      |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area     |                           |   |      |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 12 000                     |                           |   |      |

**Springfield Police Beat** **Year started** 1998

**Region** Southern      **District** Ipswich      **Division** Goodna

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
20 000




**Silkstone Police Beat** **Year started** 1995

**Region** Southern      **District** Ipswich      **Division** Ipswich

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
8 000



**Leichhardt Police Beat** **Year started** 1995

**Region** Southern      **District** Ipswich      **Division** Yamanto (Marburg)

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
5 500





**Harlaxton Police Beat** **Year started** 1997


**Region** Southern      **District** Toowoomba      **Division** Toowoomba

**Location** Residence in beat area

**Estimated residential population**  
Not Available



| <b>Newtown Police Beat</b>              |                              |                              | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1993</b> |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Southern               | <b>District</b><br>Toowoomba | <b>Division</b><br>Toowoomba |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area       |                              |   |             |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 5 200                        |                              |   |             |

| <b>Toowoomba East Police Beat</b>       |                              |                              | <b>Year started</b>  | <b>1993</b> |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Southern               | <b>District</b><br>Toowoomba | <b>Division</b><br>Toowoomba |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                         | Residence in beat area       |                              |  |             |
| <b>Estimated residential population</b> | 4 000                        |                              |  |             |

## Appendix 2

### Police Beat Inventory: Shopfronts

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**The following is an inventory of police beat shopfronts.**

**All police beats were sent a survey in August 2002 requiring background information regarding the police beats.**

**Note that information provided by the beat officers has not been verified by the researchers. Follow-up calls have been made to complete missing details; however, some information has not been available or has not been provided to date.**

**Gladstone Police Beat Shopfront**

Year started 1996

|         |           |           |
|---------|-----------|-----------|
| Region  | District  | Division  |
| Central | Gladstone | Gladstone |

Location Shopping Centre

Estimated number of shops  
80**Mackay Police Beat Shopfront**

Year started 1999

|         |          |          |
|---------|----------|----------|
| Region  | District | Division |
| Central | Mackay   | Mackay   |


Location Shopping Centre

Estimated number of shops  
200**North Rockhampton Police Beat Shopfront**

Year started 2000

|         |             |                   |
|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| Region  | District    | Division          |
| Central | Rockhampton | North Rockhampton |

Location Shopping Centre

Estimated number of shops  
202**Cairns Central Police Beat Shopfront**

Year started 2000

|              |          |          |
|--------------|----------|----------|
| Region       | District | Division |
| Far Northern | Cairns   | Cairns   |

Location Shopping Centre

Estimated number of shops  
180

**Cairns Esplanade Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1995

**Region** Far Northern      **District** Cairns      **Division** Cairns

**Location** CBD

**Estimated number of shops**  
200-300



**Earlville (Stockland) Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1998

**Region** Far Northern      **District** Cairns      **Division** Cairns

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
100



**Raintrees Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1995

**Region** Far Northern      **District** Cairns      **Division** Cairns

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
55-60




**Fortitude Valley Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1994

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Brisbane Central      **Division** Fortitude Valley

**Location** Mall

**Estimated number of shops**  
500




**Brookside Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1994

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Brisbane West      **Division** Ferny Grove

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
140




**Indooroopilly Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 2000

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Brisbane West      **Division** Indooroopilly

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
250




**Brisbane City Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 2000

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Central      **Division** City

**Location** Mall

**Estimated number of shops**  
300-400




**Chermside Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 2001

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** North Brisbane      **Division** Boondall

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
400




**Toombul Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1994

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** North Brisbane      **Division** Hendra

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
137




**Strathpine Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1998

**Region** Metropolitan North      **District** Pine Rivers      **Division** Petrie

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
250




**Forest Lake Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1998

**Region** Metropolitan South      **District** Oxley      **Division** Inala

**Location** Shopping Centre

**Estimated number of shops**  
50




**Inala Police Beat Shopfront** **Year started** 1998


**Region** Metropolitan South      **District** Oxley      **Division** Inala


**Location** Shopping Centre


**Estimated number of shops**  
65








| <b>Carindale Police Beat Shopfront</b>  |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1995</b> |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                           | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| Metropolitan South                      | South Brisbane  | Camp Hill       |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                 |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>263 |                 |                 |   |             |


| <b>Cannon Hill Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>2002</b> |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                            | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| Metropolitan South                       | South Brisbane  | Morningside     |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre          |                 |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>92   |                 |                 |   |             |


| <b>Garden City Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                  | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1999</b> |
|--|-----------------|------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                            | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b>  |  |             |
| Metropolitan South                       | South Brisbane  | Upper Mt Gravatt |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre          |                 |                  |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>200  |                 |                  |   |             |


| <b>Sunnybank Police Beat Shopfront</b>  |                 |                  | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1995</b> |
|---|-----------------|------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                           | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b>  |  |             |
| Metropolitan South                      | South Brisbane  | Upper Mt Gravatt |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                 |                  |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>285 |                 |                  |   |             |


| <b>Capalaba Police Beat Shopfront</b>   |                           |                             | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1999</b> |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Metropolitan South     | <b>District</b><br>Wynnum | <b>Division</b><br>Capalaba |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                           |                             |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>500 |                           |                             |   |             |


| <b>Bundaberg Police Beat Shopfront</b>  |                              |                              | <b>Year started</b>  | <b>1997</b> |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>North Coast            | <b>District</b><br>Bundaberg | <b>Division</b><br>Bundaberg |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> CBD                     |                              |                              |  |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>500 |                              |                              |  |             |


| <b>Morayfield Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                              |                               | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>2002</b> |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>North Coast            | <b>District</b><br>Redcliffe | <b>Division</b><br>Caboolture |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                              |                               |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>115 |                              |                               |   |             |


| <b>Redcliffe Police Beat Shopfront (Kippa Ring)</b> |                              |                              | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1999</b> |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>North Coast                        | <b>District</b><br>Redcliffe | <b>Division</b><br>Redcliffe |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre                     |                              |                              |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>140             |                              |                              |   |             |


| <b>Mooloolaba Police Beat Shopfront</b>                       |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1994</b> |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>   | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| North Coast   | Sunshine Coast  | Maroochydore    |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> At resort for residential and non-residential |                 |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>300                       |                 |                 |   |             |


| <b>Sunshine Plaza Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>  | <b>1995</b> |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|--|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                               | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| North Coast                                 | Sunshine Coast  | Maroochydore    |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre             |                 |                 |  |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>500     |                 |                 |  |             |


| <b>Noosa Heads Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1995</b> |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                            | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| North Coast                              | Sunshine Coast  | Noosa Heads     |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping area            |                 |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>200  |                 |                 |   |             |


| <b>Mount Isa Police Beat Shopfront</b>  |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1995</b> |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                           | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| Northern                                | Mount Isa       | Mount Isa       |   |             |
| <b>Location</b> CBD                     |                 |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>100 |                 |                 |   |             |


| <b>Willows Police Beat Shopfront</b>   |                               |                           | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>2002</b> |
|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Northern              | <b>District</b><br>Townsville | <b>Division</b><br>Kirwan |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre        |                               |                           |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>60 |                               |                           |   |             |

| <b>Stockland Police Beat Shopfront</b>  |                               |                                 | <b>Year started</b>  | <b>1995</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Northern               | <b>District</b><br>Townsville | <b>Division</b><br>Mundingburra |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                               |                                 |  |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>140 |                               |                                 |  |             |


| <b>Townsville Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                               |                               | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1995</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>Northern               | <b>District</b><br>Townsville | <b>Division</b><br>Townsville |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Mall                    |                               |                               |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>200 |                               |                               |   |             |


| <b>Pacific Fair Broadbeach Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                               |                               | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1996</b> |
|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern                       | <b>District</b><br>Gold Coast | <b>Division</b><br>Broadbeach |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre                      |                               |                               |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>320              |                               |                               |   |             |


| <b>Robina Police Beat Shopfront</b>     |                               |                               | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1997</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern          | <b>District</b><br>Gold Coast | <b>Division</b><br>Mudgeeraba |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                               |                               |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>250 |                               |                               |   |             |


| <b>Southport Police Beat Shopfront</b>  |                               |                              | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1994</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern          | <b>District</b><br>Gold Coast | <b>Division</b><br>Southport |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                               |                              |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>425 |                               |                              |   |             |


| <b>Surfers Paradise Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                               |                                     | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1993</b> |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern                | <b>District</b><br>Gold Coast | <b>Division</b><br>Surfers Paradise |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre               |                               |                                     |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>500       |                               |                                     |   |             |


| <b>Browns Plains Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                          |                                  | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>2000</b> |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b><br>South Eastern             | <b>District</b><br>Logan | <b>Division</b><br>Browns Plains |  |             |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre            |                          |                                  |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>110    |                          |                                  |   |             |

| Logan Central Police Beat Shopfront     |                 |                 | Year started  | 1999 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|------|
| <b>Region</b>                           | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |      |
| South Eastern                           | Logan           | Logan Central   |   |      |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                 |                 |   |      |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>180 |                 |                 |   |      |


| Logan Hyperdome Police Beat Shopfront   |                 |                 | Year started   | 1995 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|--|------|
| <b>Region</b>                           | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |      |
| South Eastern                           | Logan           | Slacks Creek    |  |      |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                 |                 |  |      |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>230 |                 |                 |  |      |

| Redbank Police Beat Shopfront           |                 |                 | Year started  | 1997 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|------|
| <b>Region</b>                           | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |      |
| Southern                                | Ipswich         | Goodna          |   |      |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre         |                 |                 |   |      |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>100 |                 |                 |   |      |

| Booval Police Beat Shopfront                                |                 |                 | Year started  | 1999 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|---|------|
| <b>Region</b>   | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |      |
| Southern  | Ipswich         | Ipswich         |   |      |
| <b>Location</b> Shopping Centre                             |                 |                 |   |      |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b><br>77 (+20 bicycle patrol) |                 |                 |   |      |


| <b>Ipswich Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1995</b> |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                        | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| Southern                             | Ipswich         | Ipswich         |   |             |
| <b>Location</b>                      | Shopping Centre |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b>     | 500             |                 |   |             |

| <b>Toowoomba Village Fair Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>  | <b>1993</b> |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|--|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                                       | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| Southern  | Toowoomba       | Toowoomba       |  |             |
| <b>Location</b>                                     | Shopping Centre |                 |  |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b>                    | 800             |                 |  |             |

| <b>Wilsonton Police Beat Shopfront</b> |                 |                 | <b>Year started</b>   | <b>1996</b> |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|
| <b>Region</b>                          | <b>District</b> | <b>Division</b> |  |             |
| Southern                               | Toowoomba       | Toowoomba       |   |             |
| <b>Location</b>                        | Shopping Centre |                 |   |             |
| <b>Estimated number of shops</b>       | 40              |                 |   |             |

# Appendix 3

## Community Survey

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| Crime and Misconduct<br>Commission  | <br><b>Queensland<br/>Government</b> | Office of the<br>Government Statistician |
| <b>Beat Policing Community Survey 2002</b>  |   |  |
| <p>Good morning/afternoon/evening, my name is _____ and I work for the Office of the Government Statistician. We are conducting a survey to gather information about Queensland Police Beats.</p> <p>Your responses will be strictly confidential and will not be linked to you personally or to your telephone number. Your responses are protected by the Queensland Government's Statistical Returns Act which means penalties apply under the laws of Queensland for anyone who released your responses in a way that would identify you. All your responses will be combined with those of other participants and used for research purposes only.</p> |   |  |
| <hr/>   |   |  |
| <b>Q. 1</b>   | Could I please speak to a person aged 18 years or over who usually lives there?                                       |  |
|   | (Yes..... 1   | Go to Q2                                 |
|   | No UR 18+ available eg need callback – <b>CBH</b> ..... 2   | Arrange callback                         |
|   | No UR 18+ available during survey due to being away – <b>UHA</b> ... 3  | End survey                               |
|   | No UR 18+ available during survey because of illness – <b>UHI</b> ..... 4   | End survey                               |
|   | No UR 18+ who can understand English – <b>LPH</b> ..... 5   | End survey                               |
|   | No UR 18+ in household eg holiday home – <b>OSH</b> ..... 6   | End survey                               |
|   | Business telephone number only – <b>OSB</b> ..... 7   | End survey                               |
|   | Refused by person but confirmed as a household – <b>REH</b> ..... 98  | End survey                               |
|   | Refused by person but unknown if number is a household – <b>REO</b> 99  | End survey                               |
| <hr/>   |   |  |
| <b>Q. 2</b>   | Are you, or any member of your household an employee of the Queensland Police Service?                                |  |
|   | (Yes..... 1   | End Survey                               |
|   | No..... 2   | Go to Q3                                 |
|   | Reluscd)..... 99  | End Survey                               |
| <hr/>   |   |  |
| <b>FINAL – Main – 13 September 02</b>   |   |  |



**Q. 3** To ensure that we obtain a representative sample of all people aged 18 years or over, we need to randomly select a person from your household to complete the survey. Could you please tell me the initial of each person aged 18 years or over who usually lives in this household, starting with yourself?

**Initial**

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. \_\_\_\_\_
- 7. \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. \_\_\_\_\_

**Q. 4** *Randomly Select Person*

\_\_\_\_\_ has been randomly selected for the main part of the survey.

*If the selected person is not respondent, thank respondent and arrange to speak to selected person.*

**Q.5** **The following questions seek your opinions about your neighbourhood.**

How many years have you lived in this neighbourhood?

- Less than 1 year..... 1
- 1 to 2 years ..... 2
- 3 to 5 years ..... 3
- 6 to 10 years ..... 4
- More than 10 years ..... 5
- (Don't know/can't remember ..... 98
- Refused)..... 99

|            |  |    |
|------------|--|----|
| <b>Q.6</b> | What type of dwelling do you live in?  |    |
|            | Detached house .....   | 1  |
|            | Semi-detached .....  | 2  |
|            | Townhouse .....  | 3  |
|            | Unit .....   | 4  |
|            | Other ( <i>please specify</i> ) .....  | 5  |
|            | (Refused) .....  | 99 |
| <b>Q.7</b> | Do you own this dwelling or are you renting it?  |    |
|            | (Own/mortgage .....  | 1  |
|            | Rented – from private landlord .....   | 2  |
|            | Rented – from Housing commission .....   | 3  |
|            | Rented – from employer .....   | 4  |
|            | Rented – from other ( <i>please specify</i> ) .....  | 5  |
|            | Other ( <i>please specify</i> ) .....  | 6  |
|            | Don't know .....   | 98 |
|            | Refused) .....   | 99 |
| <b>Q.8</b> | On the whole, how do you feel about this neighbourhood as a place to live? Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied or neither satisfied nor dissatisfied living here? |    |
|            | (Very satisfied .....  | 1  |
|            | Satisfied .....  | 2  |
|            | Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied .....   | 3  |
|            | Dissatisfied .....   | 4  |
|            | Very dissatisfied .....  | 5  |
|            | Refused) .....   | 99 |
| <b>Q.9</b> | In general, in the past year would you say this neighbourhood has become a better place to live, become worse or stayed about the same?  |    |
|            | (Better .....  | 1  |
|            | Same .....   | 2  |
|            | Worse .....  | 3  |
|            | Don't know .....   | 98 |
|            | Refused) .....   | 99 |
| - 3 -      |  |    |

**Q.10** All things considered, what do you think this neighbourhood will be like a year from now?  
Will it be a better place to live, have become worse or stayed about the same?

|                 |    |
|-----------------|----|
| (Better.....    | 1  |
| Same.....       | 2  |
| Worse.....      | 3  |
| Don't know..... | 98 |
| Refused).....   | 99 |

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**Q.11** Would you say that people in this neighbourhood get together to help each other or tend to go their own way?

|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| (Help each other..... | 1  |
| Go own way.....       | 2  |
| Combination.....      | 3  |
| Don't know.....       | 98 |
| Refused).....         | 99 |

**Q. 12** I am going to read you a list of some things that relate to how good a job the police do in this neighbourhood. After I read each one, please tell me whether you think they are doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, a poor job or a very poor job?

|   | Very<br>Good | Good | Fair | Poor | Very<br>Poor | Don't<br>Know | Refused |
|---|--------------|------|------|------|--------------|---------------|---------|
| How good a job are the police doing in working together with residents of this neighbourhood to solve local problems? ..... | 1            | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5            | 98            | 99      |
| How good a job are the police doing with the problems that really concern people in this neighbourhood?.....                | 1            | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5            | 98            | 99      |
| How good a job are they doing to prevent crime? .....   | 1            | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5            | 98            | 99      |
| How good a job are they doing in helping people out after they have been victims of crime? .....                            | 1            | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5            | 98            | 99      |
| How good a job are the police doing in keeping order on the streets of this neighbourhood? ..                               | 1            | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5            | 98            | 99      |
| How good a job are the police doing at treating people politely in this neighbourhood?.....                                 | 1            | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5            | 98            | 99      |

**Q.13** Which of these categories best describes how safe you feel walking alone in this neighbourhood after dark?

|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| Very safe .....       | 1  |
| Fairly safe.....      | 2  |
| Not very safe .....   | 3  |
| Not at all safe ..... | 4  |
| (Don't know .....     | 98 |
| Refused).....         | 99 |

**Q.14** Which of these categories best describes how safe you feel when you are alone in your home at night?

*(If respondent is never alone, ask 'how safe would you feel')*

|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| Very safe .....       | 1  |
| Fairly safe.....      | 2  |
| Not very safe.....    | 3  |
| Not at all safe ..... | 4  |
| (Don't know .....     | 98 |
| Refused).....         | 99 |

**Q.15** Overall, do you think the amount of crime or disorder in your neighbourhood is –  
*(If the respondent provides a combined response ie property crime is going down but it is getting less safe to walk on the street, then circle 'other' and provide details.)*

|                                     |    |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| On the increase .....               | 1  |
| On the decrease.....                | 2  |
| Is not changing.....                | 3  |
| Other <i>(please specify)</i> ..... | 4  |
| (Don't know .....                   | 98 |
| Refused).....                       | 99 |

**Q. 16** Which of the following categories best describes how common each of the following things are in your neighbourhood?

|   | Very<br>Common | Fairly<br>Common | Not Very<br>Common | Not At All<br>Common | Don't<br>Know | Refused |
|---|----------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------|---------|
| Graffiti on walls or buildings .....              | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Drunks and vagrants on the streets.....           | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Rubbish and litter lying around..                 | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Home and gardens in bad condition .....           | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Noisy neighbours or loud parties.....             | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Vandalism and deliberate damage to property ..... | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Drug dealing .....                                | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |
| Discarded needles .....                           | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                    | 98            | 99      |

|  |   |    |
|--|---|----|
| <b>Q. 17</b>   | Have you been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months?  |    |
|  | (Yes.....)  | 1  |
|  | No.....   | 2  |
|  | Refused).....   | 99 |
| <b>If Q17 = 1 goto Q18</b><br><b>Otherwise if Control Area goto Q37</b><br><b>Otherwise if Beat Area goto Q22</b>      |   |    |
| <b>Q.18</b>  | Thinking back to the most recent incident, what type of crime was it?                                       |    |
|  | (Assault.....)  | 1  |
|  | Break and enter.....  | 2  |
|  | Stealing.....   | 3  |
|  | Unauthorised use of a motor vehicle.....  | 4  |
|  | Disturbance.....  | 5  |
|  | Other ( <i>please specify</i> ).....  | 6  |
|  | Don't know/can't remember.....  | 98 |
|  | Refused).....   | 99 |
| <b>Q. 19</b>   | Thinking back to this incident, did you report this crime to the police?                                    |    |
|  | (Yes.....)  | 1  |
|  | No.....   | 2  |
|  | Refused).....   | 99 |
| <b>If Q19 = 1 goto Q20</b><br><b>Otherwise if Control Area goto Q37</b><br><b>Otherwise if Beat Area goto Q22</b>      |   |    |
| <b>Q.20</b>  | Which of these categories best describes how satisfied you were with the way the police handled the matter? |    |
|  | Very satisfied.....   | 1  |
|  | Satisfied.....  | 2  |
|  | Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.....   | 3  |
|  | Dissatisfied.....   | 4  |
|  | Very dissatisfied.....  | 5  |
|  | Refused).....   | 99 |
| <b>If Q20 = 4 or 5 goto Q21</b><br><b>Otherwise if Control Area goto Q37</b><br><b>Otherwise if Beat Area goto Q22</b> |   |    |
| - 7 -  |   |    |

**Q.21** Why weren't you satisfied?  
(Allow more than one)

|   |    |
|---|----|
| (They didn't do enough .....                                    | 1  |
| They were impolite/unpleasant .....                             | 2  |
| They kept me waiting/slow to arrive .....                       | 3  |
| They didn't recover property .....                              | 4  |
| They didn't apprehend offenders .....                           | 5  |
| Failed to keep respondent informed of progress of investigation | 6  |
| They weren't interested.....                                    | 7  |
| Other (please specify).....                                     | 8  |
| Don't know .....  | 98 |
| Refused).....   | 99 |

**If Control Area goto Q37  
If Beat Area goto Q22**

**Q. 22** Have you heard of Beat Policing?

|               |    |           |
|---------------|----|-----------|
| (Yes .....    | 1  | Go to Q23 |
| No.....       | 2  | Go to Q37 |
| Refused)..... | 99 | Go to Q37 |

**Q. 23** Can you tell me if your residence is in a Beat Policing Area?

|               |    |           |
|---------------|----|-----------|
| (Yes .....    | 1  | Go to Q24 |
| No.....       | 2  | Go to Q37 |
| Refused)..... | 99 | Go to Q37 |

**Q. 24** Do you know where your local beat office is?

|                      |    |
|----------------------|----|
| (Yes .....           | 1  |
| No.....              | 2  |
| Maybe/not sure ..... | 98 |
| Refused).....        | 99 |

**Q. 25** Would you recognise your local Beat Area Police Officer?

|               |    |           |
|---------------|----|-----------|
| (Yes.....     | 1  | Go to Q26 |
| No.....       | 2  | Go to Q27 |
| Refused)..... | 99 | Go to Q27 |

**Q. 26** In the last month, how many times have you seen him or her in your local area?  
.....

(Don't know/can't remember ..... 9998  
Refused)..... 9999

---

**Q. 27** Has your local Beat Area Officer provided you personally with any assistance (eg advice on home security, help with an elderly relative or with a crime or incident)?

(Yes ..... 1 Go to Q28  
No ..... 2 Go to Q37  
Refused)..... 99 Go to Q37

---

**Q. 28** In the last 12 months, how many times has the Beat Area Officer assisted you?  
.....

(Don't know/can't remember ..... 9998  
Refused)..... 9999

---

**Q.29** Thinking of the last time, what was it about?

(Assault ..... 1  
Break and enter..... 2  
Stealing ..... 3  
Unauthorised use of a motor vehicle ..... 4  
Disturbance ..... 5  
Crime prevention advice ..... 6  
Community activities ..... 7  
Neighbourhood dispute ..... 8  
Other (*please specify*)..... 9  
Don't know ..... 98  
Refused)..... 99

---

- 9 -



|              |  |    |           |
|--------------|--|----|-----------|
| <b>Q.30</b>  | How did you get in touch with the Beat Area Officer on that last occasion?         |    |           |
|              | (Went to beat office .....   | 1  | Go to Q31 |
|              | Telephoned the beat office .....   | 2  | Go to Q31 |
|              | Met at a community meeting .....   | 3  | Go to Q31 |
|              | Met informally on the street.....  | 4  | Go to Q31 |
|              | Beat Area Officer contacted me .....   | 5  | Go to Q33 |
|              | Other (please specify).....  | 6  | Go to Q31 |
|              | Don't know .....   | 98 | Go to Q33 |
|              | Refused).....  | 99 | Go to Q33 |
| <hr/>        |  |    |           |
| <b>Q. 31</b> | Was it difficult to contact the Beat Officer?                                      |    |           |
|              | (Yes .....   | 1  | Go to Q32 |
|              | No.....  | 2  | Go to Q33 |
|              | Refused).....  | 99 | Go to Q33 |
| <hr/>        |  |    |           |
| <b>Q.32</b>  | Why was it difficult to contact the Beat Officer?<br>(Allow more than one)         |    |           |
|              | (No one answered the phone.....  | 1  |           |
|              | No one answered the door at the beat office .....                                  | 2  |           |
|              | I didn't like leaving messages on the answering machine at<br>the beat office..... | 3  |           |
|              | Other (please specify).....  | 4  |           |
|              | Don't know/can't remember .....  | 98 |           |
|              | Refused).....  | 99 |           |
| <hr/>        |  |    |           |
| <b>Q.33</b>  | Overall, how helpful was the Beat Officer?   |    |           |
|              | Very helpful .....   | 1  |           |
|              | Helpful .....  | 2  |           |
|              | Not very helpful .....   | 3  |           |
|              | Not at all helpful .....   | 4  |           |
|              | (Don't know .....  | 98 |           |
|              | Refused).....  | 99 |           |
| <hr/>        |  |    |           |
| - 10 -       |  |    |           |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| <b>Q.34</b> | How satisfied were you with the way the Beat Area Officer handled the matter? |
|             | Very satisfied..... 1 Go to Q36   |
|             | Satisfied..... 2 Go to Q36  |
|             | Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied ..... 3 Go to Q36                          |
|             | Dissatisfied ..... 4 Go to Q35  |
|             | Very dissatisfied ..... 5 Go to Q35   |
|             | (Refused) ..... 99 Go to Q36  |
| <hr/>       |   |
| <b>Q.35</b> | Why weren't you satisfied?<br>(Allow more than one)                           |
|             | (They didn't do enough ..... 1  |
|             | They were impolite/unpleasant ..... 2   |
|             | They kept me waiting/slow to arrive..... 3                                    |
|             | They didn't recover property ..... 4  |
|             | They didn't apprehend offenders ..... 5                                       |
|             | Failed to keep respondent informed of progress of investigation 6             |
|             | They weren't interested ..... 7   |
|             | Other (please specify)..... 8   |
|             | Don't know ..... 98   |
|             | Refused)..... 99  |
| <hr/>       |   |
| <b>Q.36</b> | Overall, how satisfied are you with the Beat Policing Program in your area?   |
|             | Very satisfied..... 1   |
|             | Satisfied..... 2  |
|             | Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied ..... 3                                    |
|             | Dissatisfied ..... 4  |
|             | Very dissatisfied ..... 5   |
|             | (Refused) ..... 99  |
| <hr/>       |   |
| - 11 -      |   |

**Q.37** The last few questions are for statistical purposes only.  
In which age group are you -

|                          |    |
|--------------------------|----|
| Less than 25 years ..... | 1  |
| 25 – 34 .....            | 2  |
| 35 – 44 .....            | 3  |
| 45 – 54 .....            | 4  |
| 55 – 64 .....            | 5  |
| 65 or more .....         | 6  |
| (Refused) .....          | 99 |

**Q.38** What is your marital status?

|                          |    |
|--------------------------|----|
| Married/de facto .....   | 1  |
| Separated/divorced ..... | 2  |
| Widowed.....             | 3  |
| Never married .....      | 4  |
| (Refused) .....          | 99 |

**Q. 39** Do you consider yourself to be of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent?

|               |    |
|---------------|----|
| (Yes .....    | 1  |
| No.....       | 2  |
| Refused)..... | 99 |

**Q.40** Which of the following best describes the highest educational level you have completed?

|  |    |
|--|----|
| No formal education .....                        | 1  |
| Primary only .....                               | 2  |
| Junior secondary (Year 10).....                  | 3  |
| Senior secondary (Year 12).....                  | 4  |
| Certificate, diploma or trade qualification..... | 5  |
| Degree or higher degree .....                    | 6  |
| Other ( <i>please specify</i> ) .....            | 7  |
| (Refused) .....                                  | 99 |

**Q.41** Which of the following best describes what you currently do?

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Work full-time .....                       | 1  |
| Work part-time.....                        | 2  |
| Work on a casual basis .....               | 3  |
| Self-employed .....                        | 4  |
| Unemployed and looking for work.....       | 5  |
| Full-time student.....                     | 6  |
| Full-time home duties.....                 | 7  |
| Retired .....                              | 8  |
| Not employed and not looking for work..... | 9  |
| Sick or disability pension.....            | 10 |
| Other ( <i>please specify</i> ) _____      | 11 |
| (Refused) .....                            | 99 |

**Q. 42** (Record if known, otherwise ask): Are you male or female?


|               |    |
|---------------|----|
| (Male .....   | 1  |
| Female .....  | 2  |
| Refused)..... | 99 |

**That concludes the survey. Thank you very much for your assistance.**

# Appendix 4

## Retailers Survey: Beat Centre

**CMC – SHOP OWNERS/MANAGERS  
SURVEY 2002**



---

**1. How long have you operated/managed a business in this shopping centre?** *Please circle the appropriate number*

|   |                    |
|---|--------------------|
| 1 | Less than 1 year   |
| 2 | 1 – 2 years        |
| 3 | 3 – 5 years        |
| 4 | 6 – 10 years       |
| 5 | more than 10 years |

**2. How safe do you feel working in your shop?** *Please circle the appropriate number*

|   |                 |
|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Very safe       |
| 2 | Fairly safe     |
| 3 | Not very safe   |
| 4 | Not at all safe |

**3. How safe do you feel walking around the mall?** *Please circle the appropriate number*

|   |                 |
|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Very safe       |
| 2 | Fairly safe     |
| 3 | Not very safe   |
| 4 | Not at all safe |

**4. How safe do you feel walking to your car or public transport after work?** *Please circle the appropriate number*

|   |                 |
|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Very safe       |
| 2 | Fairly safe     |
| 3 | Not very safe   |
| 4 | Not at all safe |

**5. Is this shopping centre patrolled by private security guards?** *Please circle the appropriate answer*

|     |    |
|-----|----|
| Yes | No |
|-----|----|

**6. In the past, has this shopping centre been patrolled by private security guards?** *Please circle the appropriate answer*

|     |    |            |
|-----|----|------------|
| Yes | No | Don't know |
|-----|----|------------|

**7. Are you aware of the Shopfront Police Beat operating in this shopping centre?** *Please circle the appropriate answer*

|     |    |               |
|-----|----|---------------|
| Yes | No | End of survey |
|-----|----|---------------|

**8. Do you know any of the Beat Officers currently working in this centre?** Please circle the appropriate answer

Yes                      No    *If no, go to Q 11*

**9. In the last month, how many times have you seen that Beat Officer, or another Beat Officer that you know, in the shopping centre?**

*Please circle the appropriate number*

- |   |              |
|---|--------------|
| 1 | Not at all   |
| 2 | 1 – 2 times  |
| 3 | 3 – 5 times  |
| 4 | 6 – 10 times |
| 5 | > 10 times   |

**10. Have you ever used the services of this Police Beat Shopfront?** Please circle the appropriate answer

Yes                      No    *If no, go to Q 14*

**11. In the last 12 months, how many times have you used the services of the Police Beat Shopfront?** Please circle the appropriate number

- |   |              |
|---|--------------|
| 1 | Once         |
| 2 | 2 times      |
| 3 | 3 – 5 times  |
| 4 | 6 – 10 times |
| 5 | > 10 times   |

**12. Thinking of the last time you contacted a Beat Officer, what was it about?** Circle as many items as necessary

1. Reporting a crime
2. Reporting suspicious activity
3. Seeking advice
4. Reporting some other problem
5. The officers approached you

**13. Thinking of the last time you sought assistance from the Officers, how satisfied were you with the service you received? Please circle the appropriate number**

- 1 Very satisfied
- 2 Somewhat satisfied
- 3 Somewhat dissatisfied
- 4 Very dissatisfied

If you weren't satisfied, please explain why not

|  |
|--|
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |

**14. Overall, how satisfied are you with the Police Beat Shopfront program operating in this shopping centre? Please circle the appropriate number**

- 1 Very satisfied
- 2 Fairly satisfied
- 3 Fairly unsatisfied
- 4 Very dissatisfied

**15. What do you think are the main benefits of having a Shopfront Police Beat in this shopping centre**

|  |
|--|
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |

Please place your survey in the reply-paid envelope and return it to the CMC by  
16<sup>th</sup> September 2002

**Thank you for your assistance.**

# Appendix 5

## Retailers Survey: Comparison Centre

**CMC – SHOP OWNERS/MANAGERS  
SURVEY 2002**



**1. How long have you operated/managed a business in this shopping centre? Please circle the appropriate number**

- 1 Less than 1 year
- 2 1 – 2 years
- 3 3 – 5 years
- 4 6 – 10 years
- 5 more than 10 years

**2. How safe do you feel working in your shop? Please circle the appropriate number**

- 1 Very safe
- 2 Fairly safe
- 3 Not very safe
- 4 Not at all safe

**3. How safe do you feel walking around the mall? Please circle the appropriate number**

- 1 Very safe
- 2 Fairly safe
- 3 Not very safe
- 4 Not at all safe

**4. How safe do you feel walking to your car or public transport after work? Please circle the appropriate number**

- 1 Very safe
- 2 Fairly safe
- 3 Not very safe
- 4 Not at all safe

**5. Is this shopping centre patrolled by private security guards? Please circle the appropriate answer**

- Yes                      No

**6. In the past, has this shopping centre been patrolled by private security guards? Please circle the appropriate answer**

- Yes                      No                      Don't know



**7. In the last month, how many times have you seen a police officer in this shopping centre?** Please circle the appropriate number

- 1 Not at all
- 2 1 – 2 times
- 3 3 – 5 times
- 4 6 – 10 times
- 5 > 10 times

**8. Whilst owning or managing this shop, have you contacted police about a matter in the past 12 months?** Please circle the appropriate answer

- Yes                      No    *If no, go to Q 12*

**9. In the last 12 months, how many times have you had contact with the police about any matter?** Please circle the appropriate number

- 1 Once
- 2 twice
- 3 3 – 5 times
- 4 6 – 10 times
- 5 > 10 times

**10. Thinking about the last time you contacted a police officer, what was it about?** Please circle the answer that most closely describes the contact

- 1 Reporting a crime
- 2 Reporting suspicious activity
- 3 Seeking advice
- 4 Reporting some other problem
- 5 They contacted you

**11. Thinking about the last time you sought assistance from the police, how satisfied were you with the service you received?** Please circle the appropriate number

- 1 Very satisfied
- 2 Somewhat satisfied
- 3 Somewhat dissatisfied
- 4 Very dissatisfied

**12. Are you aware of the concept of having police work out of an office located in a shopping centre?** Please circle the appropriate answer

- Yes                      No

**13. Do you think this way of providing police services is a good idea?**

*Please circle the appropriate answer*

Yes

No

if NO, why not?




Please place your survey in the reply-paid envelope and return it to the CMC by  
30<sup>th</sup> September 2002

***Thank you for your assistance.***

# Appendix 6

## Shoppers Survey: Beat Centre

|  |                                     |   |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| <b>OFFICE USE ONLY (BA)</b><br>CENTRE: _____<br>DATE: _____<br>TIME: _____ | <b>CMC - SHOPPING CENTRE SURVEY</b> |  |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|

This survey is being conducted by the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission.

The survey asks you about policing services in this shopping centre.

Your answers to these questions will help us to understand crime and safety issues that are important to you and your family.

---

**1. Gender:**  
Male  Female

**2. Do you regularly shop at this shopping centre?**  
Yes  No

**3. Have you ever been a victim of crime while shopping at this shopping centre?**  
Yes  No

**4. Do you feel safe while shopping in this centre?**  
Yes  No

**5. Have you ever seen a police officer in this shopping centre?**  
Yes  No

**6. Are you aware of the Police Beat Shopfront operating in this shopping centre?**  
Yes  No  Go to Q12

**7. Have you ever been to the Police Beat Shopfront?**  
Yes  No   
If no – Have you had contact with the police in the last 12 months?  
Yes  No   
Go to Q12

8. **How many times have you been to the Police Beat Shopfront or spoken with a Beat Officer about an issue?** Circle one answer.

Once                  Twice                  More than twice

9. **Thinking back to the last time you went to the Police Beat Shopfront or spoke with a Beat Officer, were you satisfied with the service you received?**

Yes                     No  

if NO, why not?

|  |
|--|
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |

10. **Thinking back to the last time you went to the Police Beat Shopfront or spoke with a Beat Officer, what was it about:**

- Reporting a crime
- Reporting suspicious activity
- Seeking advice
- Handing in found property
- Seeking lost property
- Reporting some other problem

11. **Is it more convenient for you to use a Police Beat Shopfront than to attend your local police station?**

Yes                     No  

|  |
|--|
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |

if NO, why not?

**12. Are you aware of the concept of having police work out of an office located in a shopping centre?**

Yes  No

**13. Do you think this way of providing police services is a good idea?**

Yes  No


if NO, why not?



**Thank you for your time.**

# Appendix 7

## Shoppers Survey: Comparison Centre

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>OFFICE USE ONLY (NBA)</b><br>CENTRE: _____<br>DATE: _____<br>TIME: _____  | <b>CMC - SHOPPING CENTRE SURVEY</b>  |
| <p>This survey is being conducted by the <i>Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission</i>.</p> <p>The survey asks you about policing services in this shopping centre.</p> <p>Your answers to these questions will help us to understand crime and safety issues that are important to you and your family.</p>   |   |
| <p><b>1. Gender:</b></p> <p>Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>2. Do you regularly shop at this shopping centre?</b></p> <p>Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>3. Have you ever been a victim of crime while shopping at this shopping centre?</b></p> <p>Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>4. If you experienced or witnessed a minor crime (e.g. shoplifting, lost your wallet) whilst shopping in this centre, what do you think you would do? (Please tick one option)</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Call the police</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Contact the shopping centre security</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Go to the shopping centre management office</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other</p> <p><b>5. Do you feel safe while shopping in this centre?</b></p> <p>Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>6. Have you ever seen a police officer in this shopping centre?</b></p> <p>Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>7. Have you had contact with the police in the last 12 months?</b></p> <p>Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> if NO, go to Question 10</p> |   |

**8. Thinking back to the last time you contacted the police, were you satisfied with the service you received?**

Yes  No

**9. Thinking back to the last time you contacted the police, what was it about?**

- Reporting a crime
- Reporting suspicious activity
- Seeking advice
- Handing in found property
- Seeking lost property
- Reporting some other problem

**10. Are you aware of the concept of having police work out of an office located in a shopping centre?**

Yes  No

**11. Do you think this way of providing police services is a good idea?**

Yes  No

if NO, why not?

|                               |
|-------------------------------|
| <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> |
|-------------------------------|

**12. Would it be more convenient for you to use a police office located in this shopping centre than to attend your local police station?**

Yes  No

if NO, why not?

|                               |
|-------------------------------|
| <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> |
|-------------------------------|

**Thank you for your time.**

# Appendix 8

## Beat Officers Statewide Survey

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### CRIME AND MISCONDUCT COMMISSION QPS Beat Officers' Survey 2002



The Crime and Misconduct Commission, on behalf of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, is currently conducting an evaluation of the police beat program in Queensland. As part of this review, we are conducting a survey to find out how beat officers view the current program, as well as asking for suggestions to enhance the program state wide.

This survey is confidential and your name is not required.

Could you please complete and return this completed questionnaire by 22 October 2002 to:

---

**1. What is your current rank?**

*Please circle the appropriate number*

- 1 Constable
- 2 Senior Constable
- 3 Sergeant
- 4 Other \_\_\_\_\_

**2. How many years and months of service with the QPS do you have?**

Years \_\_\_\_\_ Months \_\_\_\_\_

**3. What Region is your police beat located in?**

*Please circle the appropriate number*

- 1 Metropolitan North Region
- 2 Metropolitan South Region
- 3 Southern Region
- 4 North Coast Region
- 5 South Eastern Region
- 6 Far Northern Region
- 7 Central Region
- 8 Northern Region

**4. What kind of police beat is it?**

*Please circle the appropriate number*

- 1 Neighbourhood Beat
- 2 Police Beat Shopfront
- 3 Other \_\_\_\_\_

---

*Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland*





**10. Do you plan on remaining in this position for the foreseeable future? (e.g. 12 months time)**

*Please circle the appropriate answer*

- 1 Yes *If yes, please explain why you would like to stay*  
 2 No *If no, please explain why you would like to leave?*

---



---



---



---

**11. If you were to leave the beat, where would you like to go?**

*Please circle the appropriate number*

- 1 General Duties  
 3 CIB/JAB  
 4 Other specialist units  
 5 Other \_\_\_\_\_

**12. Below is a list of characteristics of beat policing. Please indicate how positive or negative you feel about these characteristics of your work?**

|                                   | Very Positive | Positive | Neutral | Negative | Very negative |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|----------|---------|----------|---------------|
| Working with the community        | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Problem solving/POPP activities   | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Independence                      | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Less night work                   | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Promotional opportunities         | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Working alone                     | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Administrative responsibilities   | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Pay/financial benefits            | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Recognition of work amongst peers | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Recognition of work by management | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |
| Being accessible to the community | 1             | 2        | 3       | 4        | 5             |



**17. Below are six aims of beat policing. Please indicate how effective you believe you are in achieving these aims?**

*Please circle the appropriate answer*

|   | Very effective | Effective | Neutral | Ineffective | Very ineffective |
|---|----------------|-----------|---------|-------------|------------------|
| Working with the community                              | 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |
| Reducing crime  | 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |
| Building partnerships                                   | 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |
| Reducing fear of crime in your community                | 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |
| Improving community satisfaction with policing services | 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |
| Problem solving/POPP activities                         | 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |

**18. Overall, how effective do you believe beat policing is as a method of delivering policing services?**

*Please circle the appropriate answer*

| 1              | 2         | 3       | 4           | 5                |
|----------------|-----------|---------|-------------|------------------|
| Very effective | Effective | Neutral | Ineffective | Very ineffective |

**19. What do you think will be the major challenges for beat policing in the future?**

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_

**20. Do you have any suggestions for improving beat policing in Queensland?**

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_

**PLEASE RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE BY  
22 OCTOBER 2002**

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE**

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*Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland*



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