



CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION

**IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM
WITHIN
THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE**

**THE RESPONSE OF THE
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
TO THE
FITZGERALD INQUIRY
RECOMMENDATIONS**

AUGUST 1994

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Dear Sirs

In accordance with section 26 of the *Criminal Justice Act 1989*, the Commission hereby furnishes to each of you its report on 'Implementation of Reform Within the Queensland Police Service: The Response of the Queensland Police Service to the Fitzgerald Inquiry Recommendations'.

Yours faithfully

R. S. O'Regan
R S O'REGAN QC
Chairman


FOREWORD

In late 1991, the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee recommended that the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) 'conduct a review of the implementation of the recommendations of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry so far as they relate to the Police Service, and a review of all other reforms in the Police Service' (1991, recommendation 21, p. ix). This report, in conjunction with the CJC's report on recruitment and education in the Queensland Police Service (QPS) released in December 1993, presents the major findings of this review.

The report is based on extensive research and consultation by the Research and Co-ordination Division extending over nearly two years. It describes the progress which the QPS has made towards the "Fitzgerald model"; indicates where the CJC considers that a departure from this model has been justified; and identifies those areas where, in the CJC's view, further change is required. The report does not contain a specific check-list of recommendations, as it is the view of the CJC that the QPS itself should determine the timing, and precise form, of the actions required to address the various issues identified in this review. However, the report does indicate those areas where the CJC believes the QPS should concentrate its future reform efforts.

The QPS is a large, complex and dynamic organisation, and the last few years have been a particularly turbulent time. It is difficult in a report such as this to do full justice to the range of activities carried out by the QPS and to describe all of the changes which have occurred. However, the CJC is confident that, within these constraints, this report presents a balanced and constructive picture of the current state of reform in the QPS. The CJC hopes that the QPS will see the report in a similar light and that the document will be used to assist in the development of future reform strategies. The QPS has made considerable gains in recent years, often under very trying circumstances. The challenge now is to ensure that these gains are consolidated and extended.

The only recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry relevant to the QPS which remain to be considered are those relating to internal discipline and complaints against police. These recommendations raise significantly different issues, particularly as the CJC itself is involved in them. For this reason it has been decided to postpone consideration of these matters to a later report.



R S O'REGAN QC

Chairman

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project could not have been undertaken without the co-operation and assistance of the Queensland Police Service (QPS). The Commission is grateful to the large number of police and civilian members of the QPS who agreed to be interviewed for the study, and to the many other QPS personnel who provided information and advice on a more informal basis. In addition, the QPS provided Commission researchers with free access to a wide range of internal documents.

Several people were involved in the researching and writing of the report: Christine Bond, Clare Smith and Avril Alley of the Research and Co-ordination Division; Anton Maher, an external consultant; and Dr David Gow, Dr David Chant and Dr Patty Renfrow of the University of Queensland. The Commission is particularly grateful to Christine Bond who took charge of the project in its latter stages. Christine's professionalism and dedication was crucial to the successful completion of the report and she deserves much of the credit for the final content.

Various people also provided valuable comments on drafts of the report. Individual draft chapters were provided on a confidential basis to members of the QPS with expertise in the relevant areas. All of our QPS 'readers' provided frank and constructive feedback. Peter Forster and Marjorie Weber of the Consultancy Bureau read an early draft of the report and offered many helpful comments. The Commission also acknowledges the co-operation and advice of Superintendent Bob Atkinson, who co-ordinated the QPS response to the penultimate draft of the report.

Finally, thanks are due to Megan Atterton, Denyse Willimott and Tracey Stenzel of the Research and Co-ordination Division, who were responsible for word processing and preparing the report for publication.

David Brereton
Director
Research and Co-ordination

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ABBREVIATIONS

ATSI	Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
AWA	Amalgamated Wireless Australia
BCIQ	Bureau of Criminal Intelligence Queensland
CAD	Computer Aided Despatch
CAP	Competency Acquisition Program
CIB	Criminal Investigation Branch
CJC	Criminal Justice Commission
CPSB	Community Policing Support Branch
CRISP	Crime Reporting Information System for Police
EARC	Electoral and Administrative Review Commission
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
Fitzgerald Inquiry	Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct
Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit	Implementation Unit for the Report of the Commission of Inquiry
HRM	Human Resource Management
JOCTF	Joint Organised Crime Task Force
LAN	Local Area Network

PCJC	Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee
PPA	Performance Planning and Assessment
PSMC	Public Sector Management Commission
QPS	Queensland Police Service
QUID	Queensland Intelligence Database
Review Committee	Committee for the Review of the Promotion, Transfer and Review Procedures
SARAS	Study and Research Assistance Scheme
Weber review	Task Force (Crime Operations) Review

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This report examines the Queensland Police Service (QPS) response to the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (Fitzgerald Inquiry). In particular, the report provides the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee and the Parliament with an assessment of the current status of these recommendations and identifies issues to be addressed in developing future policies and practices within the QPS.

The primary aim of the report is to evaluate the extent to which the QPS has moved towards the organisational model envisaged by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. The key characteristics of this "model" police service are outlined in this introductory chapter.

The report covers the period up to April 1994, although more recent information has been included where available.

CHAPTER TWO: IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

The Fitzgerald Inquiry proposed a three-year transitional period during which time the major reforms recommended by the Inquiry were to be put in place. This chapter examines the overall management of reform within the QPS during this transitional period and provides a brief history of the process of implementation.

The key observations are:

- While the QPS in some respects was ready for reform, there were several factors that made it difficult to implement the Inquiry's recommendations, such as the size and paramilitary nature of the organisation, continuing daily policing demands, the magnitude and diversity of reform, the pace of implementation and budgetary constraints.
- The process of implementation started out with the development of comprehensive plans, the establishment of consultative mechanisms and an active attempt to monitor changes. However, as is often the case when organisations embark on large-scale change, this level of planning, co-ordination and monitoring was not maintained later in the implementation process.

- Despite the efforts of staff involved in implementation, many reforms were not effectively "sold" to QPS members. Given the inevitability of the implementation of the Inquiry's recommendations, it was perhaps not surprising that the "selling" of reform was viewed cynically by many officers.

Although in retrospect the process of implementing reform could have been better managed, much has been achieved in the last five years by the QPS.

CHAPTER THREE: REGIONALISATION

Regionalisation of the QPS was one of the key structural reforms recommended by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. However, regionalisation has not at this stage achieved the benefits for the QPS that were envisaged by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Due to the speed with which regionalisation had to be implemented, the respective roles and responsibilities of the regions were not clearly defined and the full implications of the new arrangements were not adequately worked out. Subsequently, several problems have arisen: for instance, regionalisation brought with it substantial financial costs, difficulties have occurred in the area of financial management, and effective co-ordination has been a continuing problem.

The Criminal Justice Commission's (CJC) view is that, despite the problems which have arisen in relation to regionalisation, the basic regional model should be retained, subject to periodic reviews to ensure that procedures and structures are working effectively. Given the size and diversity of the State, some delegation of responsibility to deliver services to the community is necessary. Moreover, reversion to a centralised structure would cause further unwarranted organisational dislocation. The challenge now is to make regionalisation work effectively. This can best be done by:

- taking steps to ensure regional priorities are kept subordinate to the interests of the organisation as a whole
- clearly documenting the delineation of functions and responsibilities between regions and central Headquarters
- within regions, providing districts and divisions with greater control over the allocation of personnel and resources, subject to the development of proper guidelines and oversight mechanisms
- reviewing the location and staffing of regional headquarters.

CHAPTER FOUR: COMMUNITY POLICING

The Fitzgerald Inquiry was very critical of the traditional 'reactive' style of policing employed by the QPS. As an alternative, the Inquiry proposed that the primary policing strategy of the QPS should be 'based on the notion that community involvement is essential to successful police work' (1989, p. 231). Community policing has three key elements:

- *Police-community interaction.* The QPS has implemented a range of structures and processes aimed at promoting police-community consultation. However, not all of these mechanisms have worked well. In particular, only a limited number of community consultative committees have been established and relatively few appear to be operating effectively.
- *Innovation and problem-solving.* A variety of innovative programs have been introduced within the QPS under the broad heading of 'community policing', but problem-solving is not yet a standard police response within the QPS. In general, community policing projects have been short-term exercises, with only limited application of problem-solving approaches.
- *Changing patrol practices.* Apart from a small number of high profile projects, there appears to have been little change to police patrol practices, and in particular, to the number of police "walking the beat".

The limited progress made by the QPS in these areas has led many within and outside the organisation to conclude that the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations in relation to community policing were unrealistic. In retrospect the Inquiry was overly optimistic about the speed with which changes of this magnitude could be made. However, while there may be a need to reconsider implementation strategies, the obstacles which the QPS has encountered do not justify a retreat from the long-term objectives defined by the Inquiry. The main issues which need to be addressed by the QPS in relation to community policing are as follows:

- the concept of community policing must be carefully explained to officers so that the underlying philosophy is clearly understood
- promotion of better communication and liaison with local communities must be a priority
- there needs to be more done to encourage innovation and the use of problem-solving strategies in dealing with local policing issues

- over the longer term, police divisions need to be given sufficient resources and autonomy to facilitate the development of local community policing initiatives
- alternative patrol strategies should be developed and trialed in a variety of settings.

Most importantly, the QPS must endeavour to develop an effective overall strategy for promoting the concept of community policing within the QPS and, in particular, for ensuring that it is integrated into operational policing practices.

CHAPTER FIVE: MANAGING THE ALLOCATION OF POLICE

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry the number of police has increased by about 18 per cent. The QPS has also made progress in managing more effectively the allocation of police. The most significant changes have been the development and adoption of a model to assist in determining the distribution of police throughout the State, the use of guidelines to evaluate the appropriate level of positions and the introduction of more orderly decision-making processes for the determination of allocation issues.

The main unresolved issues relating to the allocation of police are as follows:

- Although police numbers are ultimately the responsibility of the Government, a planning process is required so that the QPS can also plan the support needed for extra officers, such as more training, cars and other facilities.
- Insufficient attention has been given to how officers may be more effectively *used* and to the development of alternative staffing options to increase coverage and improve service to the community. Because of the industrial implications inherent in these types of strategies, progress is likely to be slow.
- Allocation decisions are not yet systematically linked to other human resource policies and practices, such as civilianisation strategies and transfer and promotion procedures. This should be addressed by the QPS in its development of a Human Resource Strategic Plan.

CHAPTER SIX: CIVILIANISATION

The Fitzgerald Inquiry concluded that many police officers were performing duties that did not relate to their training, skills, expertise or powers. Consequently, the Inquiry recommended that the QPS adopt a policy of civilianisation.

Over the last few years, the QPS has taken some steps to increase its level of civilianisation. Between mid-1989 and mid-1994 the number of civilians in the QPS increased by 353, and civilians as a proportion of the total QPS workforce increased from around 14 per cent to 16 per cent. With the recent growth fund allocations, there is now a funding basis to support further civilianisation initiatives.

However, progress in relation to civilianisation has been hampered by factors such as: unresolved industrial issues; the inability of the QPS to create civilian positions due to Government policy; budgetary implications; and problems in integrating civilians into the QPS.

This chapter concludes that:

- further improvement of the status of civilians within the QPS is required
- further human resource strategies to support the civilianisation initiative should be implemented
- civilianisation should remain a priority for the organisation, even if obstacles remain in the short term.

CHAPTER SEVEN: TRANSFERS AND PROMOTIONS

The Fitzgerald Inquiry made a series of recommendations aimed at introducing promotion procedures based on merit and a formalised mechanism for deciding transfers.

The key findings of this chapter are:

- Since the Inquiry, the QPS has introduced merit-based promotion procedures and a formal mechanism for determining transfers.

- In most respects, the procedures implemented are consistent with the Inquiry's recommendations, although aspects of these procedures need to be refined. The QPS has also initiated reviews of its transfer, promotion and review procedures.
- A future overhaul of the promotion process, involving key stakeholders within and outside the QPS, is being proposed by the QPS.

Overall, a serious effort has been made to reform and improve transfers and promotions within the organisation. However, there are some broader issues in the general operation of the system that need to be addressed. These relate primarily to:

- the management of selection panels
- the development of selection criteria which give more weight to innovativeness, creativity and, where appropriate, the officer's commitment to community-based policing
- the development of better mechanisms for the identification and resolution of problems within the transfer, promotion and review procedures
- the integration of systematic career planning into the QPS's management of its human resources
- the development of alternative career structures
- loosening the connection of rank with status and pay.

It is anticipated that several of these issues will be addressed as part of the promotions reform to be initiated by the QPS.

CHAPTER EIGHT: STATE CRIME OPERATIONS COMMAND

The Fitzgerald Inquiry criticised the effectiveness of specialist squads within the Metropolitan Criminal Investigation Bureau and proposed a reorganisation of central criminal investigation functions through the establishment of a 'task force' arrangement.

The task force arrangements currently existing in the QPS differ considerably in structure and operation to the arrangements proposed in the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Notwithstanding these differences, the existing arrangements have enhanced accountability and professionalism, improved intelligence and resources, limited the opportunities for the development of systematic corruption, and developed a strong training role. Provided a training role is continued and a rotation policy of detectives through the specialist teams is maintained, the CJC endorses the current structure of specialist investigative teams within State Crime Operations.

The chapter observes that:

- In contrast to the Inquiry's emphasis on the importance of local uniformed police, the current arrangements tend to maintain the prestige of the detective role.
- Although training packages in investigative training for uniformed officers are gradually being developed, insufficient opportunities for uniformed officers to use these skills have been provided by the regions.
- There is not yet any acceptable method for assessing the work of detectives in particular and State Crime Operations in general. This difficulty has been experienced in other policing organisations. The QPS is aware of the need to develop more appropriate performance measures and has initiated a long-term project, in which the CJC will participate, which is intended to address this problem.
- Although the relations between State Crime Operations and the regions have improved, further clarification of functions is required.

CHAPTER NINE: MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SERVICES

The Fitzgerald Inquiry found 'deficiencies in present information and support systems within the Police Department which seriously diminish overall performance' (1989, p. 268). It recommended a review of information systems, emphasising reorganisation and the development of systems to control access.

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry the QPS has undertaken a major overhaul and reorientation of its information management practices. As a consequence, there has been a significant improvement in the quality and range of information services.

Outstanding issues include:

- the lack of networking, although progress on addressing this problem is expected
- limited access to computing facilities
- fragmented policies on information management issues, although the QPS is currently in the process of reviewing various aspects of its information policies
- difficulties in the provision of co-ordinated computing support (this is also expected to be addressed by the QPS in the near future)
- most importantly, difficulties in providing accurate, recent local information at the divisional level.

CHAPTER TEN: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Many of the issues addressed in this report have implications for management structures and processes within the QPS. The development of more modern and professional management practices within the QPS requires:

- adopting a strategic orientation
- ensuring more effective measuring and monitoring of organisational performance
- improving the management and development of human resources and, in particular, ensuring the provision of quality management and supervisory training to police and civilian staff
- improving internal management processes and styles.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION

In the five years since the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry was published, the QPS has become a substantially more accountable, open and professional organisation. These gains were achieved under very difficult conditions. Overall, progress has been satisfactory given the state of the organisation before the Fitzgerald Inquiry. However, it should not be assumed that the process of reform has now been completed. The QPS needs to consolidate the changes which have been implemented, and there are several outstanding issues to be resolved, particularly in respect to community policing and associated personnel and management issues.

Most importantly, reform must be seen as a process of continually exploring how to better police the community. The CJC is confident that the need for ongoing reform is recognised by the senior management of the QPS and hopes that over the next few years there will be further progress towards the Fitzgerald Inquiry model.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 provides information about the sample of QPS members interviewed in late 1992.

Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 contain organisational charts of the QPS for the years 1988 and 1994.

Appendix 4 shows the changes to the rank structure since the Fitzgerald Inquiry.

Appendix 5 outlines the initial timetable for civilianisation.

Appendix 6 briefly describes the main specialist squads before and after the Fitzgerald Inquiry.

Appendix 7 provides a glossary of information management terms.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On 3 July 1989, following two years of investigation, the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (Fitzgerald Inquiry) was tabled in the Queensland Parliament. The Inquiry proposed wide ranging reforms to policing and public administration in Queensland, including the establishment of the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) and the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). These recommendations were adopted without qualification by the then Government.

This report is concerned with those recommendations of the Inquiry which related specifically to the Queensland Police Service (QPS).¹ The report provides the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC) and the Parliament with an assessment of the current status of these recommendations and identifies issues to be addressed in developing future policies and practices within the QPS.

This report and the CJC's previously released report on recruitment and training cover all the major policing issues dealt with by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, except for disciplinary and complaints procedures. These procedures will be examined in a separate report to be released at a later date.²

BACKGROUND TO REPORT

This report has been prepared pursuant to the *Criminal Justice Act 1989* which provides that the CJC:

- shall report to the PCJC, the body which oversees the CJC, 'when instructed by the Parliamentary Committee to do so with respect to that matter, in relation to any matter that concerns the administration of criminal justice' [section 21(3)(b)]

1 The QPS has had a number of name changes. For ease of reference, 'QPS' will be used throughout this report (except in direct quotations or references).

2 For information on the operation of the post-Fitzgerald complaints procedures, see the CJC's annual reports and CJC 1993d.

- is responsible for 'reporting, with a view to advising the Legislative Assembly, on the implementation of the recommendations in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry relating to the administration of criminal justice, and to the Police Service' [section 23(k)].

In December 1991 the PCJC requested the CJC to initiate a review of the implementation of the Inquiry recommendations, 'so far as they relate to the Police Service' (1991, recommendation 21, p. ix). The PCJC recommended that the review cover the period up until December 1992. According to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, December 1992 was the date by which the major initiatives recommended in its report should have been put in place (1989, pp. 367, 387). The time frame for this review was subsequently extended by the PCJC to April 1993 (1992, recommendation 7, p. 33).

Due to the pressure of other projects, it was not possible for the CJC to complete this report within the timetable defined by the PCJC. However, deferral of the report has enabled a more accurate assessment to be made of the status of reform in the QPS. This is because:

- The initial three-year transition period involved extensive, rapid and often disruptive organisational change. The reforms of this period have now had a reasonable time to "settle in".
- While research was still being undertaken for this report, the Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) conducted a review of the QPS, resulting in the release of a report in April 1993. The PSMC report, *Review of the Queensland Police Service*, contained 160 discrete recommendations, many of which have now been, or are in the process of being, adopted by the QPS. By delaying this report, it has been possible to take account of these changes and consider how they relate to the Fitzgerald Inquiry reforms.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Fitzgerald Inquiry made over 125 discrete recommendations directed specifically at the QPS, the majority of which were to be implemented by December 1992 (1989, pp. 367, 387). In broad terms, the type of police service envisaged by the Inquiry was one where:

- police resources and personnel would be used efficiently and deployed according to rational criteria

- information systems would be up-to-date, flexible and suited to the needs of the organisation and the community as a whole
- civilians would be accepted and regarded as an important part of the organisation
- generalist policing would be held in high esteem, with the generalist police officer being regarded as the crucial "front-line" of the organisation
- there would be less emphasis on rank, hierarchy and specialisation
- the workforce would be well trained and equipped with appropriate skills
- talent would be nurtured and rewarded, with promotion being based strictly on merit
- crime prevention would be a high priority
- the organisation would be responsive to the needs and problems of local communities
- problem-solving and innovation would be encouraged at all levels
- there would be a high level of professionalism in management, including better supervision of operational policing
- the organisation would be "corruption-free".

In short, the reforms proposed by the Inquiry were intended to create a more effective, efficient and accountable organisation that would be responsive to the needs of the community. This underlying organisational model, rather than the individual Inquiry recommendations, provides the primary focus for this review.

SCOPE OF REPORT

This report examines eight broad areas: regionalisation; allocation of staff and resources; civilianisation; community policing and crime prevention; promotions and transfers; computerisation and information systems; Task Force Command and criminal investigation functions; and corporate management. These areas encompass the bulk of the Inquiry's recommendations relating to the QPS, apart from recruitment and training (see CJC 1993b) and complaints and discipline procedures.

For each of the areas examined, the following questions are addressed:

- What did the Inquiry recommend?
- Why was the recommendation made – that is, what was the underlying problem or issue being addressed?
- What has the QPS done to give effect to the Inquiry's recommendations?
- Has the QPS response been adequate and appropriate? In particular, has a serious attempt been made to tackle the underlying problems identified by the Inquiry?
- Where change has not resulted, or efforts at reform have had only limited success, why has this occurred?
- How practical were the Inquiry's recommendations and do they need to be reconsidered?
- What other issues, if any, need to be addressed by the QPS?

As indicated, the primary aim of the report is to evaluate the extent to which the QPS has moved towards the organisational model envisaged by the Inquiry. However, it is not always possible to give a definitive assessment of the impact of the reforms, because several recommendations have not yet been fully implemented, and the impact of some reforms (for example, to recruitment and training practices) will only become apparent over the longer term.

This report covers the period up to April 1994, although more recent information has been included where available. As the QPS is a large and dynamic organisation, the CJC acknowledges that since the drafting of this report further progress may have been made in addressing some of the problems identified in the following chapters.

RELATIONSHIP TO PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REVIEW

In November 1992 the Commissioner of Police and the Minister for Police and Emergency Services (Minister for Police) invited the PSMC to undertake 'a review of the structures, operations and management of the Queensland Police Service' (PSMC 1993, p. 33). The recommendations that resulted from this review are currently being implemented by the QPS. The CJC has had some involvement in this review and implementation process. Shortly after the release of the PSMC report in April 1993, the CJC provided the QPS with a detailed submission. Since then, CJC staff have participated in, or consulted with, various teams responsible for implementing specific recommendations. In addition, the CJC has been represented on the Steering Committee which oversees the implementation of the PSMC report.

The major areas addressed by the PSMC recommendations are:

- strategic planning and organisational structures
- police numbers
- regionalisation
- Task Force
- human resources, especially civilianisation, training and promotions
- information management
- finance.

Inevitably, the areas covered by the PSMC review overlapped to some extent with the issues raised by the Fitzgerald Inquiry (PSMC 1993, p. 34). Consequently, there is also some overlap between this report and that prepared by the PSMC. However, there are also some significant differences between the two reports:

- The PSMC report focused on structures and procedures within the context of current public sector administrative practice. This report is primarily concerned with determining the extent to which the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations have been implemented and with assessing the progress of the QPS in addressing the underlying issues identified by the Inquiry.

- This report aims to provide an historical account of the Fitzgerald Inquiry implementation process, both the achievements and the difficulties. This was not a major concern of the PSMC report.
- The PSMC report made a large number of specific recommendations, whereas this report focuses on describing processes and identifying issues. This report identifies key areas which require attention, but deliberately avoids providing another long check-list of changes to be implemented by the QPS.

INFORMATION SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This report is the product of extensive research and consultation by the Research and Co-ordination Division, extending over nearly two years.

The report draws on a wide range of QPS and CJC files and documents, material collected by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, documents relating to the implementation of the PSMC recommendations, discussion papers from QPS Management Conferences, other internal QPS reports, and published reports, books and academic papers on policing in Australian and overseas jurisdictions. External consultants were also used where the necessary expertise was not available within the CJC.

This information has been supplemented by interviews with QPS personnel conducted in late 1992, and extensive continuing informal discussions with a range of police and civilian members of the QPS. Between September and December 1992, over 300 confidential interviews were conducted with police officers, civilian employees of the QPS, and others who were involved in the implementation process. Those interviewed were drawn from all ranks, regions and functional areas of the QPS (see Appendix 1).³ In most cases, confidential interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, but on occasions group discussions were held. Where this was done, senior officers normally did not attend, so that staff would feel able to speak freely. The interviews were used to find out what staff in different sections of the QPS thought at the time about the changes that had occurred and to identify perceived problems.

3 Interviews with members of the CJC police group were held in early 1993. As well, a small number of further interviews relating to information management issues were conducted in late 1993.

The QPS has fully co-operated in the preparation of this report. At the outset of the research, the CJC notified the Commissioner of Police of the purpose and scope of the report and asked the QPS to nominate a liaison officer to assist CJC staff in the evaluation. Without exception, officers were made available to speak to the CJC. The QPS also provided access to relevant files and documents. At the report writing stage, most chapters were made available in draft form to various QPS personnel in order to check the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information contained therein. In addition, drafts of the report were made available to the QPS in June and July 1994. The advice provided by the QPS in response to these drafts has been taken into account where relevant, although the CJC is solely responsible for the interpretations and conclusions contained in the report.

STRUCTURE OF REPORT

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two examines the process of implementing the Fitzgerald Inquiry reforms within the QPS. This chapter places the discussion of specific areas of reform in a wider context and identifies some of the difficulties which the QPS encountered in implementing the Inquiry's recommendations. The following eight chapters look at the specific subject areas referred to above:

- Chapter Three – Regionalisation
- Chapter Four – Community Policing
- Chapter Five – Managing the Allocation of Police
- Chapter Six – Civilianisation
- Chapter Seven – Transfers and Promotions
- Chapter Eight – State Crime Operations Command⁴

4 Since June 1993 Task Force Command has been reorganised into State Crime Operations Command and Operations Support Command.

- **Chapter Nine – Management of Information Services**
- **Chapter Ten – Management Structures and Processes.**

The final chapter provides an overview of the progress which the QPS has made towards implementing the Fitzgerald Inquiry model and identifies key issues arising from the review.

CHAPTER TWO

IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

The Fitzgerald Inquiry recommended various transitional arrangements to assist the implementation of reform, including the establishment of an implementation unit to oversee reforms and report to the Premier. The Inquiry proposed a three-year transitional period during which time the major reforms were to be put in place (1989, pp. 368, 378).

This chapter examines the overall management of the implementation of the Fitzgerald Inquiry reforms within the QPS during this transitional process. It:

- describes the way in which reform was implemented
- identifies constraints affecting the process of implementation
- assesses the management of reform.

A brief chronology of significant events in the implementation process is provided in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2.1: KEY EVENTS IN THE FITZGERALD INQUIRY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

July 1989	Report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry tabled in Parliament. Establishment of an independent implementation unit reporting to the Premier and the Minister for Police, and an internal Departmental Implementation Task Force within the QPS.
October 1989	New Commissioner of Police appointed. Departmental Implementation Task Force ceased operation. The Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit relocated to central Headquarters to assist the new Commissioner.
April 1990	The CJC sufficiently established to begin performing its functions.
July/August 1990	Officers of the CJC briefed about the implementation process to assist the CJC in taking up its monitoring role. The Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit ceased operation.
November 1990	Assistant Commissioners and civilian directors, as appointed, delegated the responsibility of implementing the remaining Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations. Creation of an internal unit by the QPS for co-ordination purposes. Implementation Sub-Committee established by the CJC.
February 1992	Internal unit ceased to function.
September 1992	CJC Implementation Sub-Committee ceased to meet.
November 1992	Minister for Police and Commissioner of Police invited the PSMC to review the QPS.
April 1993	Report of the PSMC Review released.

Sources: QPS and CJC implementation files; interviews.

Note: The 'Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit' refers to the Implementation Unit for the Report of the Commission of Inquiry.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

Reform Agenda

Following the release of the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry in July 1989, a formal implementation plan was quickly prepared for ministerial approval. This plan outlined a timetable and identified the key persons involved. By August 1990 a further plan had been formulated for the next 18 months of reform.

The implementation plans divided the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations into 10 discrete areas, as outlined in Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.2: FITZGERALD INQUIRY IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT AREAS

●	Legislation, Procedures and Authorities
●	Establishment of New Leadership in the QPS
●	Police Department Structures (Regionalisation, Headquarters and Support Services Restructuring)
●	Police Service Integrity, Professionalism/Performance
●	Resources
●	Crime Prevention/Community-based Policing
●	Administration, Information and Support Systems
●	Civilianisation
●	Establishment of the Personnel (Human Resource Management) Function
●	Alternative Enforcement and Funding Strategies

Source: QPS implementation files.

These specific areas were further devolved into project areas and assigned to project teams created within the QPS.

Establishment of Implementation Units

On 6 July 1989 two implementation units were established to oversee the introduction of the Fitzgerald Inquiry reforms.

The first, the Implementation Unit for the Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit), was an independent body established by the then Government to implement the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations. This Unit reported to the Premier, as well as to the Minister for Police. It comprised various outside consultants and three seconded police officers. The Unit was involved not only with QPS reforms, but also with the establishment of the CJC and EARC.

The second implementation unit, the Departmental Implementation Task Force, was established within the QPS by the Acting Commissioner of Police. It was staffed solely by serving police officers. The Departmental Implementation Task Force had two stated purposes: to advise the Acting Commissioner of Police; and to assist the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit. The Departmental Implementation Task Force also contained an Industrial Relations Unit to liaise with the unions during the reform process.

Wherever practicable, QPS personnel were used to introduce changes and provide input.⁵ During 1989 50 positions known as Implementation Co-ordinators were established throughout the State. The role of the co-ordinators was to assist the implementation of the reforms by:

- being responsible for regional action plans
- providing input on the introduction of specific reforms
- conducting briefings and workshops on the reforms for regional staff.

In October 1989 a new Commissioner of Police was appointed to the QPS. On taking up duty, he was provided with a comprehensive status report on the projects which were underway or planned. At this stage, the Departmental Implementation Task Force had been abolished. The Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit continued to operate, although it relocated to central Headquarters in order to assist the new Commissioner. The Unit still reported directly to the Premier and the Minister for Police.

5 According to implementation files, it was the view of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit that all police officers, especially those in lower ranks, should be given the opportunity to contribute to the reform process.

The future role of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit was evaluated by the Commissioner in mid-1990. At that time, the Premier's Department advised the Commissioner that the Unit would become a QPS expense, as the CJC and EARC had by then been established. There was also a strong view within the QPS that the reform process needed to be internally managed in order to gain wider acceptance in the organisation. As a result, the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit ceased operation on 31 August 1990. However, the unit left an implementation plan to help guide the next 18 months of reform.

Thereafter, primary responsibility for implementing the reforms was delegated to the Assistant Commissioners and senior civilian staff, most of whom had been appointed by mid-1991. Project Officers, whose functions included the implementation of reforms, were also appointed to regional headquarters. The QPS then created a small internal implementation unit to co-ordinate and oversee the reforms now being implemented by the regions and directorates. The unit was also assigned specific projects by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioners. By February 1992 this unit had ceased to function, as the QPS considered that there was no longer a need for internal oversight or co-ordination of the reform process. Any outstanding recommendations were then to be the sole responsibility of the appropriate Assistant Commissioner or Director.

Funding for Implementation of Reforms

The expenses associated with the work of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit were paid by the Premier's Department and classified as Fitzgerald Inquiry expenses. Substantial funding was provided for this stage of implementation. For instance, in 1990/1991 \$5 million was allocated specifically for the police reform process, in addition to the running costs of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit.

Later, all police implementation activity was accounted for through the QPS budgetary process. This meant that where the introduction of reforms involved the employment of additional staff and/or necessitated recurring expenditure, the QPS would request an increase in its base allocation from Treasury.

Role of Criminal Justice Commission

The CJC has played an ongoing role in monitoring reform in the QPS in accordance with its statutory duties under section 23 of the *Criminal Justice Act 1989*. After the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit ceased operation in August 1990, the CJC became the primary external body performing an overseeing role.

This monitoring function has been undertaken in a variety of ways, including through:

- The establishment of an Implementation Sub-Committee, comprising predominantly representatives of the QPS and CJC. This Sub-Committee served as a forum for discussing the progress of reform. It has not met since September 1992.
- Ongoing oversight of the operation of the complaints procedures, including the development and evaluation of the informal complaint resolution process.
- The issuing of procedural recommendations and the provision of informal feedback concerning police practices and procedures.
- Membership on the Police Education Advisory Council and continual monitoring of recruit education and training. The CJC commenced assessing recruit training in November 1991. To date it has produced a major review of recruitment and training (CJC 1993b) and three reports summarising the results of its recruit surveys.
- Ongoing involvement in community policing issues, through joint implementation with the QPS of the Toowoomba Beat Policing Project and the Inala Police-Community Network.

Public Sector Management Commission Review

The first major review of the QPS since the Fitzgerald Inquiry occurred in late 1992, when the PSMC was invited to review the QPS to identify 'priorities for improving management', and to assess the progress of the QPS in the post-Fitzgerald Inquiry period (1993, p. 1). The primary function of this review was not to monitor implementation of the Inquiry's recommendations. However, as acknowledged by the PSMC (1993, p. 34) due to the scope of the Fitzgerald Inquiry it was inevitable that the review would overlap to some extent with the areas covered by the Inquiry.

In its report released in April 1993, the PSMC found that there had been significant positive change within the QPS since the Fitzgerald Inquiry (p. 9). Various problem areas were also identified and 160 recommendations made (see Chapter Two, pp. 10-31). Progress has been made on implementing many of these recommendations, although the time frames set by the PSMC have proved to be unrealistic in many cases.

MANAGING IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

Constraints on Implementation

In assessing the management of the implementation process, it is important to recognise the conditions under which reform took place.

In some respects, the QPS was ripe for reform:

- after two years of disclosures of misconduct and corruption within the organisation, there was strong public and governmental support for the reform package proposed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry
- in the period after the Fitzgerald Inquiry, there was a fairly substantial change in the senior management of the QPS
- many serving members of the QPS acknowledged the need for major organisational change, even if not necessarily along the lines proposed by the Inquiry.⁶

However, there were also several factors that made it difficult to implement the Inquiry's reform proposals. The most important of these were:

- organisational resistance to external influences
- the magnitude and diversity of the reforms
- the widespread perception within the QPS that the reforms were punitive
- the speed with which the reforms were implemented
- budgetary constraints.

⁶ See, for example, the submission of the Queensland Police Officers Union of Employees to the Fitzgerald Inquiry.

Organisational Factors

It is difficult to bring about comprehensive change in any organisation. In the case of the QPS, additional complications resulted from:

- *The paramilitary nature of the QPS.* Traditional policing emphasises conformity to routine, rather than flexibility and innovation. The QPS, like many other police organisations, tended to be a "closed system" in which any changes imposed from "outside" were viewed with considerable suspicion and often opposition (see Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 201).
- *The size and scale of the organisation.* Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the number of permanent staff employed by the QPS has increased by 1,656 to 7,732 (as at 1 July 1994).⁷ These staff are spread over large distances throughout the State. The very size of the organisation presented communication difficulties for those involved in the implementation process.
- *Poor morale.* The Fitzgerald Inquiry resulted from allegations of corruption which led to the removal of a number of senior officers. In addition, other senior officers retired during or soon after the Inquiry. Implementation of change occurred in an alienated and destabilised organisation. In such circumstances, it was difficult to ensure effective communication, and to maintain momentum and enthusiasm.
- *Continuing daily demands.* Throughout the implementation period, the QPS had to continue to deliver an operational service to the community, responding to calls and investigating crimes.

Magnitude of Reforms

As mentioned in Chapter One, over 125 recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry were directed specifically at the QPS. These covered a diverse range of issues relating to almost every aspect of the QPS – police corruption and the handling of police complaints, human resource practices, organisational structures, management, information and administrative systems, and the style of policing.

The scale and diversity of these reforms, and the speed with which they had to be implemented (see below), meant that the implementation process was difficult to manage and potentially overwhelming for the organisation and its members.

⁷ Sources: QPS Annual Report 1988/1989; QPS records.

Reforms Seen as Punitive

A substantial number of police interviewed in late 1992 perceived the reforms as being punitive. Although there was initial widespread acceptance amongst police that change was necessary, the nature of the change required was not universally accepted. Three factors intensified this problem:

- As highlighted in interviews, many officers felt unable to criticise any aspect of the reform process without being seen to be against change.
- The Fitzgerald Inquiry arose out of allegations of corruption, although it quickly expanded into a general organisational review. In interviews, police officers frequently complained that '... we are being blamed for the corrupt actions of a handful of officers'.
- The reforms were seen as having been imposed from outside the organisation, even though records indicate a substantial input by the QPS in the implementation of reforms.⁸

The correctness of these perceptions is not the crucial issue – what matters is the fact that they were held. These perceptions were indicative of a lack of internal support for many of the reforms.

Pace of Implementation

Police from all ranks have complained about the rapid pace of implementation. A senior executive, who was asked in late 1992 to reflect on the implementation process, commented in the following terms:

I do not believe there has been any evaluation of the changes that have happened too quickly; they have not been marketed or explained ... all of which has brought about a lot of stress for police officers and a lot of misinformation. I believe the Service has been forced to be seen to rush to change without having the quality of people to make the changes ... The Service is now in a very vulnerable position where some of the changes could be seen as failures just as well as being successes.

⁸ For instance, police officers were seconded to the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit and police within the QPS were assigned to Project Teams or as Implementation Co-ordinators.

There is no doubt that rapid wholesale change helped create a lack of understanding of the reforms and contributed to resentment and resistance. Changes were introduced without having been fully thought out or sufficiently planned. However, it is debatable whether the process of reform could, or should, have been slower. This is because:

- There was a political imperative for the Government and the QPS to be seen to be implementing change as soon as possible. In particular, the Government was absolutely committed to implementing the reforms as a package.
- If there had been a delay, there was a risk that the momentum for reform would have been lost. With time, the public tends to lose interest and forget why reform was required. Furthermore, Governments have other priorities which claim their attention and compete for funds.
- Delay might have allowed time for opponents of change to regroup and for resistance and inertia to set in. As one senior officer stated, 'the critics who say that we moved too fast are correct, but they are not right. The Service had to move too fast; it couldn't afford the luxury of incremental change'.

Budgetary Constraints

When interviewed in late 1992, some police felt that insufficient funds had been provided to fully implement the reforms. For instance, some workshops and training programs were discontinued due to costs. The use of external consultants to assist in the implementation of certain recommendations was also limited for the same reason. Once the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit was disbanded, funding for implementation occurred through the QPS budgetary process. The discretionary component of the QPS budget was, and remains, small. Although the global QPS budget increased, much of this was tied up in salary costs⁹. Consequently, the QPS had to rely on special allocations from Treasury for further large-scale initiatives.

While there may have been budgetary problems, this factor should not be overrated. In retrospect, some of the priorities for expenditure made by the QPS at the time may be questioned.

⁹ For example, around 87 per cent of the 1991/1992 QPS budget was for salaries and related costs.

Management of Implementation Process: an Assessment

This section considers how well the QPS managed the implementation of reform, given the constraints discussed above. It is not intended to examine what reforms were implemented, nor how effective these changes have been, as these issues are covered in the following chapters.

The focus of this discussion is on five key areas:

- the marketing of the reforms
- support for staff
- consultation with staff
- the co-ordination of the reform process
- measuring the effectiveness of the reforms.

Marketing of Reforms

During the early stages of the implementation process, workshops were held in most regions. These workshops took two forms:

- those designed to encourage input into the reform process, at which officers were asked to put forward suggestions for change
- those organised to explain particular reforms as they were introduced – for example, Performance Planning and Assessment (PPA); corporate and strategic planning; community policing; and merit-based promotion procedures.

Other steps were also taken to inform staff about proposed changes and to involve them in the implementation process. Measures taken included:

- computer messages sent by the Minister for Police to all police establishments to provide information on the status of reforms

- visits to police stations in July 1989 by the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit to discuss the implementation process with staff and their spouses
- information bulletins circulated by the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit to advise police of reform developments
- District Officer conferences to consider the role of the District Office
- articles in the QPS journal, the *Vedette*, reporting the progress of the implementation of various reforms.

In retrospect, the communication and marketing of changes was often not effective. For instance many officers believed, rightly or wrongly, that the efforts to gain their involvement were a "token gesture". The general lack of feedback provided to officers may have contributed to this perception. It is also apparent that QPS members were not always adequately informed of the rationale for the various changes being introduced.

One of the main mechanisms by which information is generally distributed in the QPS is via Commissioner's Circulars. The circulars were used to document the new procedures and guidelines resulting from the changes. An examination of all relevant circulars issued between June 1989 and December 1992 revealed that the rationale for a new process or structure was usually not provided – the procedures were simply detailed. For example, no circular has yet been issued explaining community-based policing.

It was clear from the interviews conducted in late 1992 that the level of knowledge about, and attitudes towards, particular reforms varied substantially across divisions and districts. In fact senior staff themselves were sometimes unaware of some policies and stated popular, but erroneous, views such as '... if you call in Task Force, the region has to pay', or 'you will rarely get transferred or promoted to another region because the region has to pay your costs'.¹⁰

For whatever reason, a situation developed in which rumours were rife and it was relatively easy for officers to believe the worst about the reform process.

10 It may be that, since these interviews were completed, information has been more widely disseminated to the regions. However, as recently as this year, some senior police in one region were still claiming (to a CJC researcher) that the regions had to pay for Task Force (now restructured into State Crime Operations Command).

Staff Support

Understandably, the changes introduced following the Fitzgerald Inquiry generated anxiety about future career prospects, particularly amongst longer serving staff. Many feared that they did not have the skills or abilities now required by the QPS as a result of these changes. For example, some middle-ranking officers with 15 to 20 years experience believed that their career prospects in the QPS were halted because they did not have tertiary qualifications or management expertise. They felt that they were at a stage of their careers where it was 'too late for them'.

In practice, these concerns may have been exaggerated, as many officers promoted under the new merit-based system have not possessed tertiary qualifications. However, merit-based promotion undoubtedly introduced a significant degree of uncertainty. The QPS does not appear to have provided sufficient support to officers concerned about their career prospects, although counselling services have been available since the introduction of Human Services Officers. Training programs, particularly refresher and retraining programs, and career planning, have been limited or, in some cases, non-existent.

Clearly, the QPS was, and is, in no position to provide any officer with a guarantee of promotion. Nonetheless had there been more recognition of the concerns of officers disadvantaged by the new procedures, there might have been less resistance to change.

Consultation

In the interviews conducted in late 1992, many officers complained that their views had not been sought and that anyone who criticised the reform process, no matter how well founded his or her criticism, risked being dismissed as an obstructionist. Some reported being told: 'if you don't like it, get out'. The QPS was criticised for appearing to consult, but of having no intention of giving the "rank and file" a genuine role in the design and implementation of change.

An examination of documentation relating to the implementation process shows that a serious attempt was made, at least initially, to consult with QPS personnel. Participation and involvement were sought at the planning stage as well as during the implementation phase. Many serving police had the opportunity to provide input and police were seconded to assist in the introduction of particular reforms. Nonetheless, it is clear that many serving police now have little sense of ownership of the reforms. This may be attributable in part to a lack of feedback in the consultative process. Also, as noted by the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit, the rank-based command structure of the QPS often inhibited effective consultation by making it easy for senior officers to dismiss suggestions from lower ranks.

The QPS, in its response to an earlier draft of this report, has observed that:

[t]he concepts of consultation and selling of reforms have an accompanying tenet, namely, the capacity of the target group to have some measure of influence in the process. The reality of the Fitzgerald reforms was that the recommendations were going to be implemented. Police had no opportunity of rejecting them. [Consequently, in such circumstances, it] . . . is arguable that efforts to consult and sell the recommendations would inevitably have met with a degree of cynicism . . . (Correspondence, 1 August 1994)

Co-ordination of Reform

The QPS was keen to take over responsibility for managing the implementation process because it was felt that changes would be more readily accepted if they were seen as being implemented from within the organisation. The cost of outside consultants was also substantial. However, there were disadvantages attached to this strategy. By placing the QPS in control of the reform process, opportunities for contact with external influences were much reduced. In addition, the operational police who were given responsibility for developing projects did not always have the expertise required to properly consider and design a plan for the implementation of specific recommendations. Moreover, on occasions they were drawn away to deal with operational demands.

From September 1990 onwards, when regional commands were established, much of the responsibility for implementing the remaining reforms was assumed by regional Assistant Commissioners and civilian Directors. When the internal implementation unit was disbanded in February 1992, there was no body within the QPS to oversee these reforms. The regions were basically left to determine the best manner in which to implement changes. As a result, there was little interaction between project groups and considerable duplication of effort. Many officers indicated that they became tired of sending the same or similar information to project staff and Headquarters without receiving feedback, or seeing outcomes. The implementation process apparently became fragmented. Many of the police interviewed in late 1992 argued that, by this stage, the QPS had 'lost the plot'.

Monitoring Reforms

The QPS has tended to assess the effectiveness of the reform process by the number of recommendations implemented. Performance has been measured by a check-list approach to the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations. The CJC bears some responsibility for this, as the approach was in part supported by the types of progress reports provided by the CJC to the Implementation Sub-Committee.

In retrospect, although the check-list may have provided a quick indication of the type of structural and procedural changes introduced, it did not ensure that there was sufficient consideration of whether the underlying problems identified by the Inquiry had been addressed.

CONCLUSION

The task of implementing the Fitzgerald Inquiry reforms within the QPS was never going to be easy, quick or without controversy. Factors such as the magnitude and pace of the reforms, instability within the organisation and funding constraints, have all made it difficult to manage the implementation of reform. In addition, as discussed later in this report, some of the Inquiry's recommendations lacked specificity, or were based on questionable assumptions which did not work well in practice.

The process of implementation started out with the development of comprehensive plans, the establishment of consultative mechanisms and an active attempt to monitor changes. However, as is often the case when organisations embark on large-scale change, this level of planning, co-ordination and monitoring was not maintained later in the implementation process.

- Despite the efforts of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit in the early stages, many of the reforms were not effectively "sold" to QPS members. Hence, considerable misunderstanding and suspicion developed, and rumours flourished. Given the inevitability of the implementation of the Inquiry recommendations, it is not surprising that perhaps the "selling" of the reforms was viewed cynically by many officers.
- Over time, the daily management of reform became less effective. This was partly due to the range of reforms and the speed with which they were implemented, but the situation was exacerbated by co-ordination difficulties. Especially after the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit ceased operating in 1990, the implementation process became fragmented.
- There was a general lack of internal monitoring by the QPS. The tendency was to use a check-list approach, rather than to assess whether the underlying problems identified by the Fitzgerald Inquiry had been tackled.

The last few years have been a difficult and disruptive period for the QPS. The problems of implementing reform have been aggravated by the heavy demands placed on the QPS and the need to continue providing a service to the community. In retrospect the process could have been better managed, but as detailed in the following chapters of this report, significant gains have been achieved. The criticisms of the process advanced in this chapter are not intended to detract from these gains.

CHAPTER THREE

REGIONALISATION

Regionalisation of the QPS was one of the key structural reforms recommended by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. This chapter:

- outlines the Fitzgerald Inquiry concerns with the previous structure and its reasons for recommending that the QPS move to a regional model
- describes how the Inquiry's recommendations were implemented
- identifies problems which have arisen in relation to regionalisation
- assesses whether regionalisation has had the beneficial effects anticipated by the Fitzgerald Inquiry
- identifies issues relating to regionalisation that remain to be addressed by the QPS.

STRUCTURE OF QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE PRIOR TO FITZGERALD INQUIRY

Prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the Queensland Police Department had two administrative structures, with the Commissioner of Police at the apex of both structures. This division reflected the practice of keeping the activities of sworn police and public servants separate.¹¹

The Police Department was a centralised, hierarchical organisation with the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and six Assistant Commissioners based at central Headquarters exercising supervisory control over all ranks (see Appendix 2 for the organisational chart). The Assistant Commissioners were allocated responsibilities along functional lines: for example, one was responsible for personnel, another for crime and services, a third for traffic and buildings, and so on. Geographically, the

11 The *Police Service Administration Act 1990* does not maintain a distinction between sworn police and public servant structures.

Police Department was organised into eight police regions, each under the control of a regional Superintendent. Each region was divided into districts which in turn were divided into divisions or stations. However, the regions had little autonomy, as all significant decisions relating to matters such as resource allocation, transfer and promotion, training and general policing policy were made centrally.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF FITZGERALD INQUIRY

The Fitzgerald Inquiry's concern with corruption and misconduct led it to consider deficiencies in the overall management and organisation of the QPS. The Inquiry concluded that 'the organisation of the Queensland Police Force [was] characterised by complexities which mask inefficiencies, misconduct and corrupt practices' (1989, p. 224). The number of units and functions had grown without any rational, integrated plan (p. 224). Management systems were hierarchical, authoritarian, inflexible and paper-intensive (pp. 265-266). According to the Inquiry, a total overhaul of the organisation was required. The prevailing centralised command needed to be restructured into a regionally-based organisation run along modern corporate management lines.

The Inquiry's specific recommendations in relation to regionalisation are set out in Table 3.1. In broad terms, the proposed changes were designed to promote organisational efficiency and effectiveness by:

- redistributing a range of powers and responsibilities from the Commissioner of Police to the regional Assistant Commissioners
- making the organisation more responsive and accountable to local communities, by devolving authority and control over resources closer to the service delivery point
- clarifying lines of command and divisions between operational, administrative and support functions.

Due to a lack of suitable information, the Inquiry did not recommend any change to the number of regions, nor to regional boundaries. However, it noted that:

[r]e-organisation of regions, districts and divisions will undoubtedly be necessary in the future, especially as performance measures, crime research results and the comparisons they permit become available and influence the management of the Force. (p. 233)

The report emphasised that, in making long-term decisions about regional arrangements, the aim should be 'to ensure the greatest impact from community policing' (p. 233).¹²

**TABLE 3.1: MAJOR FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS
ON REGIONALISATION**

Recommendation C.I.1

with assistance as required from external consultants, and under the supervision of the Criminal Justice Commission, the Police Department restructure its organisation along regional lines with increased levels of authority and responsibility, matched with commensurate accountability for commanding officers at the regional, district and divisional levels. The recommended structure provides for:

- (a) as few organisational levels as practicable between the Commissioner and operational police officers to facilitate communication, expedite decision making, and ensure that policies are relevant . . .
- (b) a regional basis for operational activities with regions composed of districts and divisions (stations)
- (c) formalised delegations of authority, areas of responsibility and control to avoid overlap and duplication, strengthen accountability, and improve efficiency
- (d) a clear division between operational, task force and administration/support functions

12 Community Policing is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

Recommendation C.I.2

... immediate future restructure of the Police Force ... which provides for:

- (a) retention of the present number of police regions
- (b) three commands, viz., Region, Task Force, and Support Services
- (c) the Commissioner of Police to remain head of the Police Force assisted by ten Commanders
- (d) eight Regional Commanders with full authority and accountability for managing police regions
- (e) Regional Commanders to be entitled to call upon the administrative, operational, and Task Force support from Head Office and to be in command of any such units located in their regions
- (f) the position of Commander of the Task Force Division to be established in Head Office at a level equivalent to Regional Commanders
- (g) another Commander (Support Services) to co-ordinate the provision of administrative, personnel, financial and operational support
- (h) the Commander (Support Services) to be a police officer equivalent in status to the other Commanders. The bulk of the units and Directors of major divisions under this Commander should comprise civilian personnel
- (i) an Inspectorate with broad review responsibility to report directly to the Commissioner

Recommendation C.I.3

as part of the restructuring process:

- (a) Regional Commanders be given responsibility and authority for allocating staff within their regions including control of intra-regional transfers
- (b) a thorough review of staff numbers and disposition in all divisions, districts and regions be undertaken to determine appropriate establishments, with regional and district officers playing an active role in the process
- (c) development of major Police complexes at Mt Gravatt and Boondall proceed as the basis for the North and South Brisbane regional structures
- (d) Regional Commanders assume responsibility for:
 - (i) supply of law enforcement and all operational policing services on a regional basis
 - (ii) supply of community based police services at a local level
 - (iii) initiation of criminal investigations at a local level
 - (iv) direction of specialist support by Task Force personnel at regional level

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, pp. 380-381.

Note: Regional Commanders are now called Assistant Commissioners.

IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

The change to a regional structure was accomplished with considerable urgency. By June 1990 the eight regional Assistant Commissioners had been appointed, along with the Assistant Commissioner (Task Force) and the Assistant Commissioner based at the CJC. An Executive Direction at that time defined the responsibilities of the Regional Assistant Commissioners in the following terms:

Each . . . [Assistant Commissioner] has the autonomy and responsibility to plan, organise, administer, co-ordinate, supervise and control all police activities within that command and to provide effective law enforcement and police services within the Region, consistent with the objectives of the Service.

By the end of October 1990, the internal implementation unit reported that the regionalisation of policing activity had been completed to the stage where almost all necessary staff and basic systems were in place.¹³ The devolution of budgetary responsibilities was completed by July 1991.

The speed with which these structural changes were introduced inevitably created problems. The reforms were implemented in a destabilised organisational environment with little opportunity for forward planning. Insufficient transitional arrangements were outlined in the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations. Moreover, throughout the implementation period the QPS had to continue providing policing services to the community. Day-to-day operational imperatives often made it difficult for the organisation to focus on the longer term. As a consequence:

- Regional and central roles and responsibilities were not adequately defined and it was often left to individual regions to work out operational details.
- Insufficient control and guidance were provided at the local level. This, in turn, sometimes led to local concerns displacing service-wide priorities.

The PSMC review found that the regionalised structure:

- was characterised by unclear definitions of responsibilities, both between regions and central Headquarters, and between the directorates within central Headquarters
- lacked suitable standards and guidelines

13 Source: QPS files.

- had resulted in inappropriate delegations
- lacked mechanisms of accountability (1993, pp. 52-54, 81-82).

The PSMC recommended the development of a devolution process for the delegation of further responsibilities to regions (recommendation 23, p. 83). However, the implementation of this recommendation has been deferred pending the outcome of a general PSMC review of regionalisation in the Queensland public sector.

In addition, the PSMC recommended that the organisational structure be revised to ensure clearly defined functions between Operations, Operations Support, and Corporate Services (recommendation 9, p. 53). Almost all of this restructuring was completed on 25 November 1993, by virtue of QPS Executive Direction 18 (see Appendix 3 for the revised structure).

REGIONALISATION: CURRENT PROBLEMS

The regional arrangements proposed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry have now been in place for over three years. During this period, a number of the initial problems which arose with regionalisation have been resolved and organisational arrangements within and between the regions have become more settled. However some problem areas remain, relating particularly to:

- the cost of regionalisation
- the allocation of responsibilities between central Headquarters and the regions
- co-ordination across and within regions
- financial management.

Cost of Regionalisation

Substantial time and resources were required to implement regionalisation. Staff involved in administrative work relating to regionalisation were drawn away from the performance of operational police duties. These costs were not factored into the implementation process and as a consequence, were an added burden on the regions.

More importantly, the new arrangements have generated some long-term, recurring costs for the QPS, particularly in the areas of buildings and staff. These were in addition to the cost of the new central Headquarters. According to the PSMC, in 1992/1993 the overhead costs associated with the operation of the eight regions and Task Force was an estimated \$12.7 million (1993, p. 83). Many administrative costs would have been incurred even if the old centralised arrangements had been retained, but others are directly attributable to regionalisation.

Much of the concern over the cost of regionalisation is associated with two factors:

- the costs incurred by establishing regional headquarters in buildings separate from existing police facilities
- the size of the staff located within regional headquarters.

Separate Regional Headquarters

The Fitzgerald Inquiry argued that:

[p]resent accommodation arrangements which result in regional, district and divisional commanders being located in the same premises tend to undermine the exercise of authority and the determination of responsibility at the appropriate levels. (p. 274)

The concept of separate regional headquarters was designed to emphasise regional management and to clearly indicate that the regional office was not to have a direct operational focus. In hindsight, alterations to physical arrangements have had little impact on lines of authority and responsibility within the QPS. For little gain, very considerable costs have been incurred in some cases. For example, the annual cost of leasing one regional headquarters during 1992/1993 was \$299,000. Overall, rental of regional headquarters cost the QPS \$1,728,000 during 1992/1993.¹⁴ In light of these costs, the QPS has already initiated co-location with local police premises of the Regional Offices at the Metropolitan North and South Eastern Regions.

14. Source: QPS accounts.

Regional Headquarters Staff

Extra personnel have been required to staff the eight separate regional offices. Some of these staff perform functions previously carried out centrally, such as human resources and finance. However, others effectively occupy new positions undertaking tasks that were not previously available to police in regions (for example, Human Services Officers). As at March 1994 the various regional headquarters between them employed 84 police officers and 147 civilian staff (see Table 3.2). Significantly, the establishment of regional headquarters has not resulted in a *reduction* in the proportion of staff involved in providing "central functions". In 1986/1987, 20 per cent of the total staff were defined by the QPS as performing central functions. This had increased to 24 per cent by 1992/1993.¹⁵

The PSMC also expressed concern over the growth of staffing at regional headquarters, recommending the development of a model for staffing of regional headquarters (1993, pp. 83, 84). At this stage, the implementation of this recommendation is linked to the outcome of the PSMC review of regionalisation throughout the Queensland public sector.

**TABLE 3.2: ACTUAL STAFFING OF REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
(AS AT MARCH 1994)**

Region	Sworn Officers	Civilians	Total
Central	10	18	28
Far Northern	9	15	24
Metropolitan North	14	22	36
Metropolitan South	13	15	28
North Coast	8	18	26
Northern	11	17	28
South Eastern	10	22	32
Southern	9	20	29
Total	84	147	231

Source: QPS Human Resource Management (HRM) Branch.

¹⁵ Sources: QPS annual reports and statistical reviews. These percentages are based on the number of staff performing "state functions" as opposed to regional functions. These categories were taken from QPS annual reports and statistical reviews. These figures include those units with statewide responsibilities.

Allocation of Responsibilities

In the new structure, responsibilities are split between the regions and central command. For example:

- regions are responsible for transfer and promotion decisions, but these decisions must be vetted and authorised centrally
- under current discipline regulations, Assistant Commissioners can demote police officers, but the power of dismissal can only be exercised by the Commissioner of Police or the Deputy Commissioner
- Assistant Commissioners have financial authority over expenditure in their regions, but certain purchases such as motor vehicles must be made centrally
- regions have control over operational policing matters, but Headquarters gives directives on the method of policing to be used, such as the introduction of random road watch and random breath testing.

Because of the need to move quickly, the allocation of responsibilities to regions was not carefully planned. What functions *should* have been regionalised and what needed to remain central was not systematically considered and was subject to considerable conflict between central Headquarters and regions. There is still no formal documentation of the split of responsibilities between regional and central Headquarters, and lines of responsibility remain unclear. (For similar conclusions see PSMC 1993, pp. 81–82.)

At times, unclear definitions of regional authority have allowed both regional and central units to disclaim responsibility for particular areas. For example, this is a major reason for the fragmentation of police training (see CJC 1993b, pp. 39–40), and the strained relationship between Regional Computer Support Officers and central Information Services (see Chapter Nine). A major concern here is that, without a clear understanding of *who* is responsible, accountability becomes problematic.

Co-ordination between Regions

At least in the short-term, regionalisation has exacerbated problems of co-ordination within the QPS. There are several reasons for this:

- Under the new arrangements, regions are effectively in competition with each other for funds and resources.
- Regional Assistant Commissioners are understandably inclined to focus on problems and issues specific to their region, rather than adopting a service-wide perspective. Regional objectives and priorities may not always be compatible with other regions, or with service-wide corporate goals.
- To date, there has been insufficient development of mechanisms for liaising and exchanging information between regions. Each region is virtually self-contained in terms of operational matters. Police often have to resort to informal networks to obtain information, with the result that much activity and planning becomes dependent upon "who you know". Informal communication is, of course, vital to the effective functioning of any organisation. However, it should not be the primary means whereby information is transmitted.
- Central Headquarters has had a limited capacity to monitor what goes on in the regions. At times, regions have concealed problems and developments of which executive management should be aware. The problem has been exacerbated because there have been 'few methods in place to measure the performance of regions and bring Assistant Commissioners to account' (PSMC 1993, p. 82). This has made it difficult to achieve effective central oversight. However, the situation is improving with the establishment and enforcement of standardised reporting requirements for regions.¹⁶

Some of the co-ordination difficulties which have arisen over the last few years are attributable to the speed with which the new regional arrangements were implemented. As roles and responsibilities are clarified, and appropriate co-ordinating and overseeing mechanisms developed, the situation should improve. In any event, it must be emphasised that the organisational problems currently experienced by the QPS would not necessarily be solved by reverting to a more centralised organisational

¹⁶ Since March 1993 Assistant Commissioners have been required to present structured performance reports to the quarterly Management Conferences. An examination of the papers from a recent conference indicates that there is still considerable variability in the range and quality of information being provided by the regions.

structure. Co-ordination difficulties, albeit of a somewhat different nature, frequently arise in highly centralised bodies, and in those which are structured along functional rather than geographical lines.

Financial Management

The main difficulties encountered in the area of financial management have been as follows:

- In 1991/1992, the first full year in which regional financial arrangements were in force, an overrun by one directorate meant that money had to be pulled in from other directorates and regions, contrary to their expectations. This understandably caused resentment in those regions which had operated within budget and had made provision to carry over savings to the next financial year (PSMC 1993, p. 226). Police in the regions felt that their efforts to produce savings were wasted as a result of other problems in the QPS. The situation was exacerbated because the nature of the particular overrun was not explained adequately to the regions.
- According to police in a number of regions, more information should have been provided on the service-wide prioritisation of requests. This situation appears to have improved considerably in the last year or so, as the new arrangements have become more settled.
- The change to a regional structure meant that officers further down the organisation had to be empowered with financial delegations. This delegation has not been even across regions, with some Assistant Commissioners allowing substantial delegation of authority, and others preferring to retain real control at regional headquarters. This problem was identified by the PSMC, which recommended that delegations be standardised by July 1993 (1993, p. 225). The CJC understands that the QPS proposes to have broadly uniform standards in place during the 1994/1995 financial year.
- The initial allocation by the QPS of funds and personnel to the regions was determined largely by historical factors, rather than being based on a careful analysis of the resource requirements of regions. Once the new arrangements were in place it was difficult to alter this pattern of allocations because the regions were actively competing for scarce funds. Consequently, the efficiencies envisaged by the Fitzgerald Inquiry have not yet been achieved.

- Under current budgetary arrangements, regional expenditure is largely committed to routine and recurrent matters. Natural disasters, prolonged investigations, or a run of serious crimes can deplete a region's operating surplus for the whole year. Regions have only a limited capacity to augment their discretionary funds by carrying savings across from one year to the next – the current maximum permissible amount is \$100,000. Moreover, in the past, regions have had to surrender their savings to cover shortfalls in other regions and directorates (see PSMC 1993, p. 226). As a consequence, very limited discretionary funds have been available to support regional, district and divisional initiatives. However, it should be noted that this is not a new problem. Under the previous centralised system, there was also very little discretionary expenditure allowed and divisions had the lowest funding priority.

On the positive side, the move to regional financial management has made clear the differential cost of providing police services throughout the State. Factors such as population dispersion and concentration, isolation, geography, weather, socio-economic levels and other demographics all impact on the scope and cost of providing adequate police services. The budget submissions of regions attempt to take account of these factors and so provide a more comprehensive picture of the costs of policing in Queensland.

REGIONALISATION: AN EVALUATION

In recommending that the QPS shift to a regional model, the Fitzgerald Inquiry envisaged that regionalisation would:

- bring the QPS closer to the community and make it more responsive to community concerns
- encourage innovation and a more flexible approach to policing
- contribute to organisational efficiency and effectiveness.

This section assesses the extent to which regionalisation has contributed to the achievement of these objectives. In undertaking this assessment, it needs to be recognised that regionalisation is still in its early stages and that some allowance therefore should be made for "settling in" difficulties.

Community Responsiveness

The Fitzgerald Inquiry saw regionalisation as a prerequisite for the establishment of effective community policing. This view was based on the assumption that smaller organisational units would be closer to the community and thus more responsive to local problems.

The QPS's activities in the area of community policing are discussed in detail in Chapter Four. The broad conclusion of that chapter is that, despite gains in some areas, overall the QPS has had difficulty in developing and implementing community policing strategies. Regionalisation, of itself, has not brought the organisation significantly closer to "the community". This is because:

- The regions are too large and diverse to be effective mechanisms for responding to community concerns. For example, Southern Region extends from Ipswich to the South Australian border, includes the metropolitan fringe, a large provincial city (Toowoomba), many smaller country towns and a number of remote outback communities.
- The organisational units of the QPS which are most likely to align with discrete communities are divisions (stations) and, in some cases, districts. By and large, these units have no more autonomy than was the case under the pre-Fitzgerald Inquiry arrangements. The QPS continues to rely on a "top-down" hierarchical management style. Most matters affecting the service delivery points of the organisation are still negotiated between Brisbane and regional headquarters.
- In many respects the regional headquarters are isolated from their own districts and divisions. In accordance with the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations, regional offices are generally situated away from operational divisions, mostly in unidentified buildings. Headquarters personnel have relatively little interaction with the public, or with operational police within the region.
- Due to fiscal constraints, the regions have very limited discretionary funds at their disposal. Even if more authority was devolved to districts and divisions, there would be limited scope for tailoring policing initiatives to the needs of particular areas within the region.

Innovativeness

The Fitzgerald Inquiry argued that a healthy competitive ethos between the regions would encourage innovation. Particular regions would be able to trial initiatives without first needing to obtain central approval. If these initiatives proved successful, they could then be picked up by other regions. Through this process of experimentation, imitation and adaptation, the organisation as a whole would benefit.

A good example of organisational innovation being facilitated by regionalisation is the development and spread of local computer aided despatch systems (known as Mini-CAD). Mini-CAD was first developed in early 1993 by a Regional Computer Support Officer in the North Coast Region to deal with perceived local needs. Once the system was in place, and found to be working well, it attracted the interest of other regions. Mini-CAD has now been installed in several other sites and is likely to spread throughout the State in the next few years. It is open to question whether this initiative would have progressed as far under a more centralised structure. The development of beat policing initiatives (see Chapter Four) may in the future provide another example of a local innovation "travelling" across regions.

Although some examples can be cited, substantial barriers to organisational innovation remain. The basic problem is that regionalisation of the QPS has not been accompanied by a change in management style. As indicated, the QPS as a whole is still a hierarchical organisation in which the emphasis is on top-down communication and formal, structured processes and procedures. Many officers still find it easier, and safer, to follow standard operating procedures without having to apply active management skills to situations.¹⁷ Regionalisation will be unlikely to lead to significantly more innovation within the QPS unless these characteristics of the organisation are also changed.

17 It is recognised that a "command and control" management style will be necessary to deal with many operational matters (such as large investigations, sieges and searches). However, within these constraints, a more flexible and responsive decision-making structure should be possible.

Efficiency and Effectiveness

It is very difficult to determine whether regionalisation has enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of the QPS, given that clear performance indicators have not been established and there is insufficient information to compare the operation of the old and new structure. On the positive side, regions now have responsibility for the prevention and detection of crime within their boundaries. This may encourage a more rational deployment of resources in the longer term. However, the restructuring has obviously entailed some considerable costs. For example: regionalisation has contributed to the duplication of facilities and resources; difficulties have occurred in the areas of budgeting and financial control; substantial co-ordination problems have arisen; and there are considerable transaction costs involved in dealing with eight semi-autonomous entities.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the QPS was compelled to move quickly to embrace a regional structure. Due to the speed with which this change had to be implemented, the respective roles and responsibilities of the regions were not clearly defined and the full implications of the new arrangements were not adequately worked out. Subsequently, a number of problems have arisen. For instance, regionalisation brought with it substantial financial costs, difficulties have occurred in the area of financial management and co-ordination has been difficult to achieve. Overall, regionalisation has not yet produced the major benefits predicted by the Fitzgerald Inquiry.

Despite the problems that have been associated with regionalisation, the CJC considers that the basic regional model now in place should be retained, subject to periodic reviews to ensure that structures and procedures are working effectively. Given the size and diversity of Queensland, some delegation of responsibility to deliver services to the community is a necessity. Moreover, the QPS has been through a highly disruptive period of organisational change. If the QPS was to revert to a centralised system, this would cause further dislocation. There is little to be gained from replacing the problems which arise in relation to regionalisation with another set of management problems – arguably of equal or greater magnitude – associated with a centralised command structure.

The QPS is aware of the shortcomings of the existing regional arrangements and is taking steps to address them. Areas which, in the CJC's view, will require particular attention are as follows:

- *The importance of a service-wide perspective.* Under existing arrangements Assistant Commissioners tend to focus on problems and issues specific to their regions, rather than taking a service-wide perspective. Of itself this is not necessarily a problem – as indicated above, one of the main justifications for regionalisation is to make organisations more responsive to local needs and concerns. However, the QPS must ensure that, where necessary, regional priorities are kept subordinate to the interests of the organisation as a whole. There are several ways in which this issue can be addressed, including by:
 - ensuring that organisational goals are clearly understood and applied by senior management, through the corporate planning and performance auditing process
 - involving Assistant Commissioners more in the overall management of the organisation, for instance through the use of regular teleconferences and periodic "team planning" sessions¹⁸
 - providing Assistant Commissioners and other senior officers with more training in corporate management techniques.
- *Lack of clarity about regional functions and responsibilities.* There is still no clearly documented delineation of functions and responsibilities between regions and central Headquarters. The PSMC, in its April 1993 report, proposed that the Board of Management of the QPS develop an implementation strategy for the delegation of further responsibilities to regions (p. 83). The CJC understands that this and related recommendations will be addressed following the completion of a general PSMC review of regionalisation. It is important that once the PSMC report is released, the QPS moves quickly to resolve this issue.

18 Currently, Assistant Commissioners usually only meet as a group on a quarterly basis.

- *Greater devolution of authority within regions.* The introduction of regionalisation has made relatively little difference to relations and structures *within* regions. Generally, attention has focussed on delegation of authority from central command to regional commands. Subject to the development of proper guidelines and oversight mechanisms, divisions and districts should be given more control over the allocation of personnel and resources. In particular, additional discretionary funds should be made available to these units to undertake local initiatives. As argued elsewhere in this report (see Chapter Four) it will be very difficult for the QPS to make further progress in implementing the philosophy of community policing unless greater autonomy and flexibility can be built into the organisation at the local level.

- *Reconsideration of the location and staffing of regional headquarters.* Justifiable concerns have been expressed about the costs of maintaining regional headquarters separate from other police establishments, and the level of staffing of these headquarters. The CJC supports moves by the QPS to re-examine the issue of locating regional headquarters in separate buildings. The CJC also considers that the staffing of regional headquarters, and particularly the growth of non-functional positions, should be monitored closely by the QPS, perhaps by means of an annual review.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMMUNITY POLICING

The Fitzgerald Inquiry was very critical of the traditional 'reactive' style of policing employed by the QPS. As an alternative, the Inquiry proposed that the primary policing strategy of the QPS should be 'based on the notion that community involvement is essential to successful police work' (1989 p. 231). In advocating this approach, the Inquiry was heavily influenced by the success of community policing initiatives in a number of overseas jurisdictions.

This chapter looks in detail at the concept of community policing and the measures undertaken by the QPS to implement this style of policing. Specifically, the chapter:

- summarises the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations on community policing and outlines their underlying rationale
- identifies the key features of community policing
- describes the QPS response to the Inquiry's recommendations
- assesses the progress made by the QPS in implementing community policing objectives
- identifies ways in which the QPS can promote the concept of community policing.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND COMMUNITY POLICING

The Fitzgerald Inquiry described the policing strategies used by the QPS as essentially reactive rather than preventive. There was a heavy reliance on motorised patrol duties in which the police 'patrol randomly or in a predetermined pattern observing citizens, monitoring hazards or risks and responding to calls for help' (p. 230). Patrols were conducted over a wide area by different officers at different times. Police rarely left their cars except to attend specific calls for service. As a consequence, there was relatively little interaction with the community.

According to the Inquiry, the police defined their role narrowly as one of enforcing the law. Responses to problems were largely limited to standardised law enforcement strategies. Detectives – widely perceived as the elite of the QPS – focused on solving

reported crimes and the prosecution of offenders, rather than on developing preventive strategies. This approach allowed very little scope for community involvement – the emphasis was on the police defending the community rather than co-operating with it.

In the opinion of the Inquiry, this approach had proved largely ineffective in the fight against crime:

In the past decade, it has become apparent that these methods have not stemmed the growth of crime, especially violent crime, essentially because they are reactive. Police respond to events rather than pre-empting and preventing them. (p. 230)¹⁹

The Inquiry's critique of the reactive model of policing drew upon a substantial body of international research²⁰ showing that:

- beyond a certain base level, increasing the number of police and the size of police budgets will not necessarily lead to a rise in the number of crimes solved, nor reduce the number of offences committed
- rapid response has relatively little impact upon the incidence or likely recurrence of crime
- mobile vehicle patrols generally do not prevent crime nor increase the public's sense of safety
- although saturation patrolling may bring about a temporary reduction of crime in an area, it usually only succeeds in displacing criminal activity to other areas
- the crimes that people fear most (robbery, burglary, rape and homicide) are rarely encountered by police on mobile patrol
- on the whole, the key factor in determining whether a crime is solved is the quality of the information given by the victims/witnesses about the identity of the offender, rather than that obtained by subsequent detective work

19 The Inquiry's assertion that there had been a growth of crime especially violent crime, was based on QPS statistics. Recent research based on crime victims surveys suggests that police statistics may have significantly exaggerated the extent to which the crime problem worsened during the 1980s (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1994).

20 The Inquiry summarised the findings of this research at p. 229, but did not provide any sources. For detailed literature reviews see Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994, CJC 1992 and Skolnick and Bayley 1986.

- much police work involves attending repeat calls for service, but traditional response strategies erroneously treat such calls as isolated incidents rather than as symptoms of problems to be solved.

Drawing upon policing innovations in several overseas jurisdictions,²¹ the Inquiry proposed that a new community-based, proactive policing strategy be adopted, in which policing would 'again become a neighbourhood affair, where members of the community are familiar with locally based police officers and the officers and their families become part of the community which they serve' (p. 233). This new approach would require:

- the establishment of community crime committees consisting of members of the public, police officers, welfare and other community groups
- a shift to a more "problem-oriented" style of policing
- greater emphasis on foot patrols, to enable members of the public and police officers to interact in normal community settings
- general duties policing to take precedence over specialist activities, such as detective work
- the provision to police and communities of comprehensive and accurate local information on crime patterns and the characteristics of victims and offenders
- the development of more flexible service delivery strategies by the QPS, as opposed to relying on ready made "generic" community programs such as Neighbourhood Watch or Adopt-A-Cop
- the adoption of special measures (for example, recruitment of staff with special language and cultural skills) to ensure that minority ethnic and racial groups were adequately involved in community programs (pp. 230-233).

The Inquiry made five specific recommendations relating to the promotion of community policing within the QPS (see Table 4.1). In addition, the philosophy of community policing underpinned many other recommendations for reform of the QPS, such as those proposals relating to regionalisation, flattening of the rank structure, recruitment strategies, and the roles of detectives and general duties police.

21 The Inquiry did not provide any details as to which overseas jurisdictions had adopted community policing strategies. However, well-known examples include the North American cities of Edmonton, Houston, Flint, Detroit and Newark. In Australia, the New South Wales Police Service has made the most progress in implementing community policing strategies.

TABLE 4.1: FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMMUNITY POLICING

Recommendation C.L6

Community policing be adopted as the primary policing strategy, with policing again becoming a neighbourhood affair. The Police Force must move away from the concept of policing based on reactive defence of the community and towards mobilising the community and its police to prevent crime, maintain order and deliver services dictated by the needs of the community. To this end:

- (a) preventative policing strategies are to be an integral part of the normal activities of every police officer
- (b) the community is to be involved with the police in preventing crime through establishment of community crime committees and community crime prevention programs based on the needs of individual communities
- (c) all police officers on duty, including those on detection and investigative work, and Task Force staff, are to be in uniform in all but exceptional circumstances²²
- (d) staff with language abilities and cultural skills are to be recruited to gain the acceptance and co-operation of ethnic and aboriginal communities
- (e) regional and district officers are to design community projects for trial in those areas which have excess staff levels

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 381.

22

The Inquiry's view was that it would be more difficult for detectives to engage in corrupt or inappropriate activities if they were in uniform (p. 244). Presumably, other benefits would be an increase in police visibility and a reduction in the special status accorded to detectives. In 1991 a Committee, formed at the direction of the Commissioner of Police, determined that officers such as detectives should continue to wear plain clothes because of the nature of their duties (Correspondence, 15 September 1992). The CJC accepts that it is generally appropriate for detectives to wear plain clothes, due to the operational considerations of investigations.

MEANING OF COMMUNITY POLICING

The Fitzgerald Inquiry's discussion of community policing was quite short and pitched at a fairly general level. This has contributed to some uncertainty within the QPS and the community at large about what the concept entails, and to difficulties in implementing the Inquiry's recommendations.

There is now a large body of literature on community policing and, not surprisingly, this literature contains a considerable number of definitions. However, there is broad agreement amongst experts in the area that community policing is *not* a specific tactic or program and involves more than just good public relations. Rather, the term is generally understood as describing an overall approach to delivering police services to the community (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux 1994, p. 6).

This approach to policing entails:

- Developing better links between the police and members of the community (other than just suspects and victims) at both the formal and informal level. The purpose of promoting this interaction is to obtain information and ideas from interested members of the community, and to gain the community's assistance in tackling problems that have been identified.
- Promoting an emphasis on problem-solving. Instead of just reacting to specific calls and reports from the community, police are encouraged to address the causes of these problems (for example, by reducing the number of calls for service relating to a particular address; or lessening the incidence of alcohol-related violence around licensed premises). Police are rewarded for solving problems, rather than just for enforcement-oriented activities such as making arrests or issuing traffic tickets. In addition, police are encouraged to work with other, non-police agencies which might be able to assist in the resolution of a problem (see the discussion below).
- Shifting away from a reliance on motorised, random patrols to a greater emphasis on individual police patrolling designated areas, by foot where appropriate, on a permanent basis. In the community policing model, 'beat policing' is seen as one strategy for delivering general policing services, rather than as a novelty, or a form of "soft" policing.

In the discussion to follow, the current status of community policing in the QPS is assessed by examining the degree of progress that has been made in the three key areas outlined above: police-community interaction, problem-solving, and alternative patrol strategies. The chapter also examines the organisational structures introduced

by the QPS to assist in creating a community policing orientation. Developments in related areas which impact on community policing, such as rank structures, staffing allocations and promotion procedures, will be considered in subsequent chapters.

It needs to be emphasised that full implementation of community policing involves large-scale changes to organisational practices. The translation of this "philosophy" into practical organisational structures and policing initiatives takes time and requires a willingness to experiment on the part of the organisation. For instance, a recent American text on community policing has estimated that 'fully institutionalising community policing may well require 10 to 15 years' although the authors go on to say that:

while this sounds forbidding, the reality is that most departments can usually make the initial transition to community policing within a few months. (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux 1994, p. 16)

It is unrealistic to expect that the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations relating to community policing could have been fully implemented within three years, especially when at the same time other substantial reforms were being introduced and services to the community had to be maintained. Rather, the point of this review is to determine the extent to which change in the desired direction has occurred.

OVERVIEW OF QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE'S COMMUNITY POLICING INITIATIVES

Information Sources

The main source of information about QPS involvement in community policing is the Community Policing Initiative Index. Early in 1992 the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) sought from each region, and the then Task Force Command,²³ full details regarding current and proposed community policing and crime prevention initiatives. Details to be provided included the purpose of each project, the date of completion and the expected date of evaluation. Responses were received around May

23 Since June 1993 Task Force Command has been divided into State Crime Operations Command and Operations Support Command.

1992. Some of the information obtained was subsequently entered into the Community Policing Initiative Index.²⁴ However, this Index does not give an accurate picture of the state of community policing within the QPS. This is because:

- Initial regional responses varied enormously with respect to the amount and quality of information supplied.
- The majority of regional responses gave some indication of project objectives, but in most cases performance measures were not identified.
- There was often no indication of the number of community groups or police involved in the initiative.
- Much of the information contained in the Index is now out of date, as the regions were not required to keep any central unit informed of changes in the status of projects, nor to advise of any new initiatives undertaken. A check of the database early in 1994 revealed that some regions had not made any new entries since 1992.²⁵

The only other readily accessible source of information about QPS involvement in community policing has been two pages of statistics published in the annual QPS statistical review. These statistics provide a very incomplete picture of the state of community policing within the QPS. For instance:

- information is presented about peripheral activities such as the number of Driver Reviver sites, but not about the number of active community consultative committees
- some data are of dubious accuracy (as indicated by the rounding of statistics on community involvement to the nearest 1,000 or 10,000 persons or households)
- no information is provided on the effectiveness of programs
- due to the use of inconsistent definitions in different statistical reviews, it is very difficult to compare trends from one year to the next.

24 The information was not provided in a standard format. To assist in the interpretation of the data, the Research and Co-ordination Division manually collated all of the responses provided. The collated information, which ran to more than 250 pages, was then supplied to the QPS.

25 Since mid-1992 a set of project management guidelines, with an accompanying Project Index, has been formalised. With the greater use of these project management procedures, more community policing projects could in the future be registered on the Project Index.

To supplement these official information sources, the CJC sought information from officers involved in specific projects and from various official QPS publications such as the *Vedette*. In addition, valuable impressionistic data were obtained from the interviews conducted with police in late 1992, and from more recent discussions with operational police. However, it must be acknowledged that because of the size and diversity of the QPS, and the inadequacies of existing information systems, it is very difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of the development and current status of community policing in the QPS.

Organisational Arrangements

Statements of Principle

Following the release of the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry in July 1989, the QPS moved quickly to formally embrace the concept of community policing. In his foreword to the *Annual Report 1989/1990*, the then Commissioner, Mr Noel Newnham, declared that:

the QPS has adopted a community policing philosophy emphasising a problem solving, proactive approach based on meeting the needs of local communities and acknowledging that different communities have different needs. (p. 6)

Subsequently, in the *Annual Report 1990/1991*, the Commissioner referred to 'the adoption of community policing as the *primary* philosophical base for policing in Queensland' ('Commissioner's Foreword' – emphasis added).

This commitment to community policing was reflected in the QPS corporate plan for 1990–1995. Community-based, proactive policing was designated as a strategy for achieving three of the six goals set down in the plan:

- to prevent crime
- to investigate and solve crime
- to restore public confidence in the QPS.

The corporate plan defined community policing in the following terms:

For the purposes of the Queensland Police Service, Community Policing is an approach to police work which recognises and fosters a partnership between the Service and the community. It involves police and the community working together to identify and solve policing problems. (QPS 1990)

The current 1994–1997 QPS corporate plan, formally endorsed in late 1993, also gives considerable emphasis to the concept of community policing²⁶. For instance, one of the two objectives of the Personal Safety Program is that '[m]embers of the Queensland Police Service work with the people of Queensland to reduce the fear and threat of personal violence' (QPS 1994a, p. 13). Similarly, working 'together with the people of Queensland to reduce property offences' is an objective of the new Property Security Program (p. 14). The performance indicators for measuring compliance with the goals of the Personal Safety Program include the 'quality and type of police community initiatives' (p. 13). The indicators for the Property Security Program include 'rate of community/officer involvement in joint police/community initiatives' (p. 14). As yet, the QPS has not developed a methodology, or data gathering techniques, for measuring performance according to these indicators.

Structural Arrangements

The QPS initially endeavoured to implement community policing by creating functional units and positions: the Community Policing Support Branch (CPSB) and Regional Community Liaison Officers (although not always known by that title). This approach was very much in line with the traditional "task force" approach used by the QPS to address issues and implement changes. Community policing was treated as a specialist activity, rather than as part of everyday operational policing for which all officers should take responsibility.

The CPSB was established in August 1990 and given the primary responsibility for implementing community policing within the QPS. This branch was initially headed by a Superintendent, and later a Chief Superintendent, who reported to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations). Its functions included:

- Promotion and facilitation of community policing within the QPS.
- Education of QPS members and the general community about community policing.
- Development and implementation of evaluation procedures.

26 The ongoing commitment of the QPS to community policing was also apparent in the *Annual Report 1992/1993*, where the Commissioner wrote that:

I see a need to enhance community policing particularly in metropolitan areas where traditional reactive policing methods have a stronger hold than in less populated areas. This is a challenge, but I believe that with community and inter-agency co-operation it can be achieved. ('Commissioner's Statement', p. 3)

- Construction and maintenance of a central database containing up-to-date information about all of the community policing initiatives in progress, or planned, throughout the QPS. It was envisaged that this database would enable the CPSB to monitor the implementation of community policing by the regions, and be a useful resource for police seeking to start up community policing projects in their own areas. As noted above, in practice this database has a number of limitations and is now substantially out-of-date.
- Administration of statewide programs and projects such as Safety Houses, Neighbourhood Watch and Adopt-A-Cop. The CPSB was also required to develop service-wide policies with respect to issues such as private sector sponsorship of police crime prevention initiatives.

As indicated, the establishment of this Branch seems to have reinforced the view of many police that community policing was a specialist activity (PSMC 1993, pp. 126-127). Significantly, the Branch was not located in central Headquarters. Moreover, Regional Community Liaison Officers were answerable to regional Assistant Commissioners, rather than to the head of the CPSB.²⁷ This arrangement contributed to the difficulties which the CPSB experienced in promoting a uniform approach to the implementation of community policing objectives within the QPS.

The role of the CPSB was the subject of considerable adverse comment in the report of the PSMC (1993, pp. 126, 128). In line with the PSMC recommendations, the CPSB has now been abolished as a separate entity and its functions incorporated into a Policing Policy and Strategy Branch. Community policing has been redefined as one of several strategies available to police. This approach is consistent with a recommendation of the PSMC that the head of the Policing Policy and Strategy Branch ensure that:

community policing and its role within the QPS be redefined in clear, unambiguous and realistic terms; and . . . a new philosophy be developed that emphasises the need to constantly strive to improve operational policing generally, incorporating wherever possible preventative and community policing initiatives into mainstream policing methods. (1993, recommendation 50, pp. 128-129)²⁸

27 According to the QPS, whilst there may have been some advantages in having the Community Liaison Officers reporting directly to the Officers-in-Charge in Brisbane, generally it is not regarded as practical to have someone work in an area and not be answerable to the local Assistant Commissioner (Correspondence, 4 August 1994).

28 The QPS has indicated that it is in the process of developing a comprehensive project to address this recommendation. The CJC has been informed that the project outline and timetable are close to completion (Correspondence, 9 June 1994).

Although this change in approach may overcome some of the problems experienced with the CPSB, the QPS will need to ensure that it does not lose sight of the objectives defined by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. In the CJC's view, community policing should not be seen simply as one of a series of policing strategies, but as a key organising principle which helps determine appropriate strategies, structures and processes.

Community Policing Orientation: Key Measures

This section briefly examines the extent to which the QPS has made progress in the three key dimensions of community policing identified earlier in this chapter: police-community interaction, promotion of problem-solving approaches and use of alternative patrol strategies. In doing so, this discussion provides examples of how the QPS has attempted to translate the concept of community policing into practical strategies. Inevitably, there is overlap in the goals of various initiatives implemented by the QPS – for instance a City Mall beat policing program not only is an example of a change to traditional mobile patrol strategies, but also may help foster greater police-community interaction.

Police-Community Interaction

One of the main objectives of community policing is to develop organisational structures and processes through which representatives of the community and the police service can interact constructively. In many rural areas, these processes already operate informally. However, more formal structures are often required for urban communities and for particular targeted groups.

The QPS has established or expanded a number of programs and structures for improving police-community interaction. The more significant of these initiatives are:

- Neighbourhood Watch
- community consultative committees
- initiatives to improve relations with ethnic groups and members of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) communities
- Inala Police-Community Network

- the Women's Safety Project
- Safety House and Adopt-A-Cop programs
- programs focussed on youth, such as Police Youth Clubs and Blue Light discos.

Although this list is not exhaustive, it indicates the range of police-community initiatives that have been formally developed by the QPS. The first four of these initiatives are discussed in more detail below. Aspects of the Women's Safety Project are discussed later in this chapter under the heading of 'Problem-Solving Strategies'.

Neighbourhood Watch

The first Neighbourhood Watch schemes were established in Queensland in the latter half of the 1980s. The Fitzgerald Inquiry expressed doubts about the value of such schemes, arguing that:

The problem with ready made programmes (such as Neighbourhood Watch) is that they may be introduced without modifying them to meet community characteristics. Collecting information, assessing community needs and developing specific programmes to address those needs is likely to be time and resource intensive and has a high risk of failure. As a result, the public are offered "packaged" solutions which have been accepted by police elsewhere. (1989, p. 232)

Notwithstanding the scepticism expressed by the Inquiry, over the last few years there has been a marked increase in the number of Neighbourhood Watch schemes in place. The QPS's declaration that community policing was to be the organisation's primary policing philosophy put considerable pressure on police to "do something" in this area. Many police interviewed in late 1992 said that they were told that they needed involvement in formal community policing programs for performance appraisal purposes. Participation in a Neighbourhood Watch scheme was a relatively easy way of satisfying these requirements, especially as the scheme was widely known and could be established and operated according to a standard formula.

According to the QPS *Annual Report 1989/1990*, the number of Neighbourhood Watch areas increased by 89 per cent during that year. There was a further growth in Neighbourhood Watch areas from 308 in 1990/1991 to 654 in 1991/1992. In 1992/1993 there were reported to be 573 Neighbourhood Watch areas – 507

residential and 66 rural – covering an estimated 253,500 homes.²⁹ Several variations of Neighbourhood Watch have also been adopted, such as Marine Watch, Realty Watch, Taxi Watch, Waterways Watch and Business Community Watch.

The CJC does not wish to detract from this development. Neighbourhood Watch is a worthwhile initiative which enjoys wide community support. It provides a means through which people can take some responsibility for the policing of their local area, and a forum in which local concerns can be conveyed to police. However, the limitations of Neighbourhood Watch also need to be acknowledged. The scheme should be seen as only one aspect of a comprehensive preventive strategy – not, as some would have it, 'a cornerstone of community policing' (PSMC 1993, p. 125). As the Fitzgerald Inquiry observed, Neighbourhood Watch uses a very standard format and has a limited focus. The crime prevention strategies employed are largely restricted to measures such as posting signs, encouraging people to report suspicious activity to the police and engraving property. Successful community policing requires the development of flexible, locally specific approaches to crime prevention.³⁰

Community Consultative Committees

The Fitzgerald Inquiry saw the establishment of community crime committees 'consisting of members of the public, police officers, welfare and other community groups [as] . . . the first step in community-based crime prevention' (1989, p. 231). According to the Inquiry, these committees would:

- assist in articulating community needs and enlisting community support for initiatives
- give the QPS an indication of community concerns and the likely impact of strategies and programs
- generate information which could provide a basis for local, district and regional planning by the QPS (p. 231).

29 Source: QPS statistical reviews and annual reports.

30 A number of successful local crime prevention programs have been introduced in the regions (see the 'Innovation and Problem-Solving' section for more detail).

The CPSB outlined the role of these bodies (redesignated as community consultative committees) in its booklet, *Community Policing in Queensland*, published in June 1991. The Commissioner of Police subsequently released a model charter setting out the appropriate constitution and functions of the committees. The charter indicated that the committees should consist of at least one police officer nominated by the regional Assistant Commissioner, and between four and 10 non-police members. Up to one-third of the non-police members could be nominated by the Assistant Commissioner, with this group to include 'the most outspoken local critics of the police', one-third could be nominated by local government authorities, and the remaining third were to be drawn from 'local volunteers, service clubs, youth groups or other groups of good repute'.³¹

There is no up-to-date central register of committees, nor any requirement for the regions to report on the status of committees or maintain accurate records of their activities.³² Consequently, it is very difficult to determine how many of these bodies have been established, the number which are currently active, how they are constituted, or what they do. However, on the information available it seems that only limited progress has been made in implementing this recommendation. As of January 1994, the Community Policing Initiative Index recorded 78 'currently active' community consultative committees in the State. Of these, over half were concentrated in one region - North Coast. The region with the next highest number of committees was Central Region, where nine committees were recorded as being active. There were only eight committees listed as active in the entire Brisbane Metropolitan area.

A further indication of the limited success of this initiative is the fact that only a small proportion of the public is aware of the existence of the committees. A 1993 survey of public attitudes towards the QPS, undertaken by the CJC, asked respondents to identify schemes which the QPS operated in conjunction with the community. Unprompted, only two per cent of respondents identified community consultative

31 In practice, the charter was fairly loosely interpreted and, in many cases, the committees which were constituted were considerably larger than recommended by the charter. For instance, the minutes of one committee meeting for May 1992 showed that there were 28 people in attendance, including several police and local politicians. A consideration here was that the charter was introduced some time after many of the committees had been established.

32 In the performance reports submitted by the regions to the December 1993 QPS Executive Officers' Management Conference, only one region specified how many committees were active in the region. Some regions simply reported that police met with committees on a regular basis while other regions did not mention the committees at all.

committees as an example of such schemes. Overall, only 10 per cent of those surveyed had ever heard of the committees. By contrast, 98 per cent were aware of Neighbourhood Watch (CJC 1993a, pp. 38-39).

Those committees which have been established have not always been effective. Although it is possible to find examples of committees which have contributed to the development of innovative local crime prevention strategies, the general feeling of many police interviewed in late 1992 was that the committees seldom worked well. Common complaints were that the committees often lacked focus, attracted little community interest, or were dominated by special interest groups.

The QPS's limited success in this area can be attributed to several factors – some within the control of the organisation, others not:

- As this type of interaction with the community has only recently been encouraged within the QPS, officers have had little opportunity or incentive to develop the requisite organisational and interpersonal skills.
- In many cases, the QPS's information systems have been unable to generate the local-level information required by the committees. This has caused frustration amongst police and committee members.
- Due to the limited effectiveness of the CPSB, the high level of autonomy accorded to the regions, and the pressure of "other business", the priority accorded to developing a network of committees has varied significantly between regions.
- Many police interviewed in late 1992 were uncertain about the role of the committees and sceptical as to their worth. These responses indicate that there may have been insufficient "marketing" of the committees to operational police.
- Communities are not easy entities to organise. Particularly in larger population centres, some so-called communities may be little more than lines on maps, in which there is relatively little interaction or sense of common purpose amongst residents. Not surprisingly, greater progress has been made in establishing committees in provincial and rural centres, which tend to be more socially cohesive. It can also be difficult to motivate people to participate in crime prevention activities, especially on a continuous basis, if they themselves do not feel personally threatened by crime.

Whatever the explanation for the problem which the QPS has encountered in promoting the concept of community consultative committees, it appears that this initiative has stalled. The QPS must now decide whether to renew this initiative or to concentrate on developing alternative mechanisms for obtaining input from the community. As a first step, the QPS should consider undertaking a review to:

- determine the number of community consultative committees which are currently active
- document cases where committees have been tried and failed and the reasons for that failure
- identify cases where committees have been effective and the factors which account for their success, with a view to determining whether these conditions of success can be replicated in other areas.

Efforts should also be made to trial alternative or complementary strategies, such as the use of regular community surveys, or the development of more loosely structured consultative networks.

Relations with Ethnic and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities

The Fitzgerald Inquiry emphasised the need for the QPS to build closer relations with ATSI communities and specific ethnic groups to ensure the involvement of these groups in community programs. To date, the QPS's efforts to improve cross-cultural relations have focused primarily on the ATSI community.

The main initiatives which have been undertaken to assist in improving the relationship between the ethnic and ATSI communities are as follows:

- a small Cross-Cultural Support Unit has been established, and Cross-Cultural Officers have been based at each of the Metropolitan Regional Offices
- ATSI representatives now sit on selection panels for Officers-in-Charge of stations in or near ATSI communities
- 45 ATSI Liaison Officers have been appointed to deal particularly with issues relating to drug and alcohol abuse, with the number of such officers to be doubled under the 1994/1995 State budget

- several liaison groups have been formed, including an ATSI Police Advisory Committee and an Ethnic Advisory Group
- six Cell Visitors Programs have been established (QPS 1993b, p. 155)
- bridging courses have been developed at the Johnstone and Kangaroo Point TAFE Colleges to assist ATSI people to enter the QPS, and an ATSI Recruitment Program has been set up by the QPS
- in early 1993 the QPS established the Cherbourg Project which was aimed at exposing First Year Constables to aboriginal issues
- increased emphasis has been given to training police recruits on issues relating to ATSI people and cross-cultural issues generally, although concerns have been expressed within the QPS about the quality and effectiveness of the training provided.³³

Although some important gains have been made in improving relations between the QPS and the ATSI and ethnic communities:

- difficulties have been encountered in the operation of the ATSI Police Advisory Committee (PSMC 1993, p. 67)
- until recently, there has been only limited progress made in recruiting police from ATSI and ethnic communities (see CJC 1993b, pp. 28–30), although this situation appears to be gradually improving³⁴
- more attention needs to be paid to developing police relations with other minority groups, apart from the ATSI community.

33 See QPS 1993b, pp. 31–32. The CJC understands that these shortcomings have been addressed in the redesigned recruit training program.

34 The proportion entering the QPS through the ATSI Recruitment Program for the previous three recruit intakes are: five per cent (May 1994), 10 per cent (January 1994), and four per cent (February 1993). Additional recruits of ATSI origin may have entered the QPS through the general recruiting process (Source: QPS Recruiting).

Inala Police-Community Network

The Inala Police-Community Network is a three-year pilot scheme aimed at promoting police-community interaction. The Network opened in the Inala Plaza/Civic Centre in May 1992. It provides a community information and referral service during shopping hours and plays a role in developing juvenile diversionary programs targeted at school-aged youth in the area. The Network is staffed by two police officers, an administrative assistant and several community volunteers. Overall guidance is provided by a Management Committee which consists of representatives of the QPS, CJC, University of Queensland and the Inala community, although the QPS has responsibility for day-to-day management and most of the funding.

A preliminary assessment of the Network's operation undertaken by the CJC in late 1993 indicated that:

- the community, local retailers and the police have successfully worked together to initiate a substantial number of projects to address identified problems
- generally the community and local retailers wanted the Network to continue (CJC 1993e, p. 22).

This assessment also identified several ongoing issues, including a limited understanding by the community of the proper role of the Network, and funding and organisational difficulties (p. 22). A comprehensive evaluation of this initiative will be undertaken in the near future.

Police-Community Relations: Summary

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the QPS has implemented a range of structures and processes aimed at improving police-community consultation. For example, Neighbourhood Watch has been expanded, community consultative committees have been introduced, and ATSI and ethnic communities liaison groups have been set up. However, not all these mechanisms have worked well. In particular, only a limited number of community consultative committees have been established and relatively few appear to be operating effectively. Moreover, most of the police officers interviewed at the end of 1992 indicated that their involvement in community-oriented activities was restricted to standardised programs such as Adopt-A-Cop and Neighbourhood Watch.

Innovation and Problem-Solving

A key feature of community policing is the application of innovative, problem-solving strategies to local policing problems. Problem-solving involves identifying, analysing and responding to the underlying circumstances that create incidents, rather than responding to the incidents as isolated occurrences.

This section briefly reviews some of the main steps initiated by the QPS to promote a more problem-solving and innovative approach to tackling problems that have been identified by the police and the community. (Other examples of problem-solving can be found in the 'Changing Operational Policing Strategies' section.)

Regional Initiatives

At the regional level, one of the main ways in which the QPS has sought to encourage innovation and experimentation in solving local policing problems has been through the introduction of the Commissioner's Lantern Award in 1991. This award is designed to promote the concept of community policing by encouraging healthy competition between regions. The prize is sponsored by Suncorp and judged by a panel of representatives from government, industry and the academic community.

A review of the nominations for the award gives some indication of the range of projects initiated. Table 4.2 provides examples of the projects nominated in 1993 and 1994.

Without questioning the value of any of these projects, the following points can be noted:

- A considerable number of projects have lacked suitable performance indicators and evaluation criteria for measuring success or failure.
- The projects have been developed in an ad hoc manner. They do not appear to form part of a wider strategy for encouraging and guiding innovation at the local level.
- More generally, many of the projects which have been nominated do not appear to have had a problem-solving focus. Some have been little more than well-intentioned public relations exercises (for example, police station open days, development of a children's crime prevention calendar).

TABLE 4.2: EXAMPLES OF NOMINATIONS FOR THE COMMISSIONER'S LANTERN AWARD IN 1993 AND 1994

1993:

- a scheme for police to visit elderly people on a regular basis
- establishment of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme for commercial enterprises
- development of a Policing Association in a remote outback police division
- a program to reduce truancy and juvenile crime in a provincial city
- joint patrols between the QPS and aboriginal community police in an aboriginal community
- a police station Open Day
- preparation of a Cattle Brands Booklet
- establishment of a gym and fitness centre in a rural town

1994:

- formation of a fire brigade in a rural community
- a program to reduce crime at a major shopping centre
- a program aimed at reducing theft and vandalism at local schools
- a program to address domestic violence issues in a remote community
- a youth diversion program known as Wunjubair Goolerra
- an initiative aimed at reducing the problems associated with "Schoolies Week"
- development of a children's crime prevention calendar
- establishment of a nightclub for teenagers between 15 and 18 years
- expansion of an annual drug awareness education program
- a program aimed at preventing illegal drag racing

Sources: QPS 1993f, pp. 5-28; QPS 1994c, pp. 5-29.

Women's Safety Project and Safety Audits

Safety audits were originally an initiative of the Women's Safety Project set up by the QPS. The Project established a Safety Audit Pilot Program in the Morningside Police Division in Brisbane in 1992. This pilot involved small community teams undertaking a safety audit of their local neighbourhood, in conjunction with local government, police, business organisations, and public utilities such as Telecom.³⁵

In response to the apparent success of the Morningside Pilot, the State Government established a Neighbourhood Safety Audit Unit within the Department of Administrative Services in March 1993. The Unit is responsible for providing small grants to community groups to help defray the costs of conducting the audits. The Unit makes Safety Audit kits available, monitors the audits and co-ordinates responses to problems identified in the audit process. By the beginning of 1994, 36 groups had registered for audits and six audits had been completed. An audit covers an area similar in size to a Neighbourhood Watch zone (around 500 households).

There is scope for the audit program to be used more extensively by the QPS. In some regions, police have been active in encouraging community groups to become involved in the audit process, but in other regions there seems to be little awareness of the program. As only a relatively small number of audits have so far been completed, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this new initiative in reducing crime and increasing the community's sense of safety.

Dealing with Repeat Addresses

One of the best ways of illustrating the differences between 'reactive' and 'problem-solving' approaches to policing is by comparing how these two approaches deal with the problem of repeat calls for service. A considerable amount of police time is taken up with attending the same address time and time again. For example, in Toowoomba, one address alone has generated 75 calls to the police in a six-month period (CJC unpublished data). Although this is an exceptional case, it is important not to understate the significance of repeat calls. Over a nine-month period, around 170 Toowoomba addresses generated nearly 2000 calls between them. These calls often did not concern crimes in the narrow sense of the term: they were triggered by factors as diverse as frequent loud parties, neighbours who were in conflict with each other, domestic disturbances, or citizens who suspected hearing prowlers at night.

35 For a detailed description of the pilot program see Rosier & Jeans 1993.

Under the reactive approach to policing, each repeat call is treated as a discrete, unrelated event – a patrol car is despatched, details are taken by the officers in attendance and, sometimes, some immediate remedial action is taken (for example, members of a household are requested to reduce their noise levels, parties to a domestic or neighbourhood dispute are cautioned, or the person is reassured that no one is trying to enter their house). However little or no attempt is made to address the underlying cause of the problem. Indeed, there is often little awareness that a problem exists. Police who attend the same address the next time a call is received often may not know details about what has transpired on a previous occasion.³⁶

By contrast, a problem-solving approach would entail the active management of repeat addresses. Information on repeat calls for service would be routinely collected and analysed to identify locations where some form of proactive response was required. One or more officers would then be assigned to find out why so many calls relate to these addresses and to identify strategies for reducing the number of calls. Where appropriate, the officers might call upon the assistance of other agencies, such as housing authorities, local government bodies, health services, schools and local retailers. For instance, it might be decided that the best way to reduce the number of calls from a public housing estate would be to relocate a family of tenants who are in constant conflict with others on the estate. The problem of the person who calls the police on a regular basis reporting suspected prowlers might be solved by installing security sensor lights, or by arranging with a neighbour to call in from time to time to provide that person with some reassurance. If the solution did not work, something else would be tried. At all times, the aim would be to reduce the number of calls relating to that address in the future, not simply to "clear" the particular job at hand.

The application of strategies for dealing with the problem of repeat addresses is a feature of the Toowoomba Beat Area Policing Pilot Project (see below), but there is little indication that such strategies are being utilised elsewhere in the QPS. Part of the problem here is that, until recently, the QPS has lacked the information systems needed to provide accurate, up-to-date data on repeat addresses. This situation is likely to improve in the future, with the increasing use of computer-aided despatch (CAD) systems by the QPS. However, in order for the capabilities of these systems to be fully utilised, there needs to be:

- a recognition by police that many of the most time-consuming problems which they deal with do not involve crime in the narrow sense of the term

36 In Brisbane, the Police Communications Centre (due to the computer aided despatch system) has access to the history of previous "jobs" at an address. Currently, only some information (such as a history of violence, weapons on the premises) is "flagged" and provided to the police responding to the call.

- a willingness to devote resources and work with other agencies to address these problems.

Problem-Solving Initiatives: Summary

A variety of innovative programs have been introduced within the QPS under the broad heading 'community policing'. For example, the Commissioner's Lantern Award provides an incentive for the development of local community policing projects; the Safety Audit Project provides a response to community safety issues; and the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project (see below) emphasises problem-solving as a key policing strategy. As well, in the new recruit training program, the Academy is using problem-based teaching practices. However, many specific community policing projects have been short-term exercises which have not had a problem-solving focus. Although not without value, these projects have sometimes been little more than well-intentioned public relations exercises.

Overall, problem-solving is not yet a standard police response. During interviews in late 1992, many police officers did not consider that their policing style had changed at all in the preceding three years. The officers said that they often felt constrained from more innovative approaches to policing issues by staffing and resourcing. It *may* be that the organisational climate has altered since 1992, but on the basis of recent informal observation and anecdotal information from police officers, this seems unlikely.

Changing Operational Policing Practices

The third key element of community policing is a change in basic patrol strategies to bring police into greater contact with local communities. This element overlaps with the other key features of community policing. For example, a change in patrol strategies can assist in better police-community interaction and can facilitate the use of problem-solving approaches.

The two major QPS initiatives that have addressed patrol practices are the:

- Toowoomba Beat Area Policing Pilot Project
- Police Beat Shopfront Program.

Beat Policing in Toowoomba

In May 1993 the CJC and the QPS initiated the Toowoomba Beat Area Policing Pilot Project, following 18 months of planning and consultation. The project is to run for two years. During the pilot, two senior constables live and work exclusively within beat areas for which they have been assigned responsibility. Each officer patrols his beat on foot or motorbike, and works from an office that is attached to his residence in the beat area. The officers are assisted, where necessary, by mobile patrols from the Toowoomba Division. By being located in, and working in, the one area, the Beat Area Officers get to know their local communities well and, in turn, become known within these communities. The officers are expected to use problem-solving strategies to identify and resolve issues of community concern within their beat area, and to work with the community to tackle crime, fear of crime, and other local, public-order problems.

The pilot project has two major purposes:

- to "operationalise" the philosophy of community policing better than has been the case in Queensland in the past
- to provide a working model of community-based, problem-oriented policing to encourage other police districts and regions to implement similar initiatives.

A comprehensive evaluation of the pilot project is being undertaken by the CJC. Initial research findings indicate that the beat officers are viewed very positively by the local community (see CJC 1994a, p. 17), and have successfully applied problem-solving strategies to recurring problems within the beat areas. It is too early to determine if the adoption of this style of policing has had an impact on the overall level or fear of crime in the beat areas, or whether it represents a more cost effective use of police resources.³⁷ However, research from other jurisdictions indicates that beat policing initiatives, properly designed to meet the needs of an individual community, can help reduce the incidence of crime and increase the community's sense of safety (see especially Skolnick & Bayley 1986).

No comparable pilot projects have yet been implemented by the QPS, although the CJC is aware of several proposals being planned in some regions and has had detailed consultation with two regions.³⁸ The 1994/1995 State budget has provided \$300,000 to support the implementation of further beat policing initiatives broadly modelled on Toowoomba lines (Queensland, Parliament 1994b, p. 66). Such trials will be very important for determining the extent to which the Toowoomba initiative can and should be replicated.

Police Beat Shopfront Program

The Fitzgerald Inquiry identified shopfront stations in local shopping centres as one way of making police more accessible to the general community (1989, p. 233). The State Government initially allocated \$1.4 million annually to introduce 16 permanent police shopfronts in centres throughout Queensland over the next few years. The 1994/1995 State budget provides funding to expand the number of police shopfronts to 45 (Queensland, Parliament 1994b, p. 45). In addition, portable modular units will be provided to each region for use amongst centres on a rotational basis.

The stated objectives of the program are to:

improve the community feeling about personal safety, to reduce the community fear of crime, to satisfy the need for people to communicate more easily with police, and to raise the perception about the risk of detection for committing offences. (QPS 1993c)

The shopfronts are intended to perform an operational role, and not just be 'a public relations exercise' (QPS 1993c). Police will use the shopfronts as a base for patrols through the shopping centres and on occasion will make arrests. The initiative is sometimes characterised as a form of beat policing, but there are several significant differences between this style of policing and that being trialed in the Toowoomba Project. Most importantly, the emphasis of the shopfront program is on providing a visible police presence, rather than promoting a problem-solving approach to policing.

38 The QPS submission to the CJC investigation into the arrest and death of Daniel Yock included a proposal to implement beat policing through the West End Police Division (CJC 1994b, pp. 100-101). As at the end of July 1994, the future of this proposal was unclear.

The shopfronts are being evaluated by the QPS and staff from the Queensland University of Technology. Initial assessments have been very positive and indicate strong support amongst shoppers for the concept.³⁹

Patrol Strategies: Summary

Apart from the Police Beat Shopfront Program and the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project, there appears to have been relatively little change to police patrolling practices and, in particular, to the number of police "walking the beat". Particularly in the larger population centres, motorised patrols are still the standard means of delivering policing services to the community. It is to be hoped that recent budget allocations from the State Government will help stimulate further initiatives in this area.

SUMMARY: COMMUNITY POLICING IN QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

The QPS has undertaken a variety of initiatives in the area of community policing since the release of the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry.⁴⁰ These include:

- a significant expansion of Neighbourhood Watch, along with other statewide programs not discussed here, such as the Safety House and Adopt-A-Cop programs
- improved liaison with the ATSI community and, to a lesser extent, other minority groups
- successful initiatives such as the establishment of the Women's Safety Project, the Safety Audit Program and the Police Beat Shopfront Program
- at the district and divisional level, development of a variety of specific projects with a community policing or crime prevention emphasis
- in co-operation with the CJC, establishment of the Beat Policing Pilot Project in Toowoomba and the Police-Community Network in Inala.

39 See QPS & Queensland University of Technology 1993 and QPS 1993a.

40 As indicated earlier in this chapter, it has been difficult to determine the number and range of initiatives introduced because this information is not recorded by the QPS.

Despite these valuable initiatives, the QPS has not yet achieved its stated goal of putting into practice the philosophy of community policing:

- Steps to improve police-community liaison have concentrated on generic programs, such as Adopt-a-Cop, Neighbourhood Watch and community consultative committees, without sufficient regard to the needs of individual communities.
- Problem-solving is not yet a standard police response. In general, innovative community policing projects have been short-term exercises, with only limited application of problem-solving approaches.
- Apart from two high profile projects, there has been little change to police patrol practices, and little increase in the numbers of police "walking the beat".

Four major factors have restricted the development of community policing within the QPS:

- At the "grass roots" level of the QPS there has been only limited support for, and understanding of, the concept of community policing, partly due to confusion about what the application of such a philosophy entails for operational police officers. In many instances, involvement in community policing activities has been regarded as peripheral to the "real business" of policing, and as "something to be done" on top of an officer's normal duties. For example, many police in interviews conducted in late 1992 complained that they were expected to become involved in programs such as Neighbourhood Watch and community consultative committees in their own time. Similar issues were identified by the CJC in a review of the Adopt-A-Cop Program undertaken in 1993.⁴¹
- The longer term changes needed to create promotion and reward systems conducive to community policing have yet to be implemented. In the community policing model, the general duties police officer is supposed to take precedence over the specialist. In practice, the vast majority of the police officers who patrol and respond to calls from the public are junior officers. The work of the general duties officer is still widely seen as involving low-level duties and as lacking prestige. Officers who perform well in this type of work are frequently promoted "off the streets", to supervisory and administrative positions (see Chapter Seven).

41 See CJC 1993c.

- There has been little change to the basic hierarchical authority structure of the QPS. As noted elsewhere in this report, within each region authority largely continues to be centralised. Full-scale implementation of a community policing approach requires a devolution of authority (subject to legal requirements and suitable policy guidelines), so that local police can be more responsive to their local communities and exercise some discretion and initiative in dealing with local problems. As one American police researcher has observed:

The creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative that community policing demands, cannot easily be combined with the paramilitary hierarchy and often draconian management style common to traditional departments. (Kennedy 1993, p. 6)⁴²

- Until recently, the QPS has not had in place the information systems necessary to support the application of problem-solving approaches at the local level (see Chapter Nine). However, this situation may improve as computerised crime recording (CRISP) is implemented on a statewide basis and greater use is made of computer aided despatch systems.

CONCLUSION

The QPS has made gains in the area of community policing over the last few years, but there has been relatively little change to the basic operational policing strategies employed in the organisation. In the words of one police officer, to a certain extent 'community policing has involved putting an acceptable face on existing police practices', rather than changing those practices.

The limited progress made by the QPS has led many within and outside the organisation to conclude that the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations in relation to community policing were unrealistic. The implementation of the Inquiry's recommendations was always going to be a difficult task, as the Inquiry's discussion was fairly general, and the model, as a whole, required large-scale changes to structures, procedures and overall policing style. In retrospect, the Inquiry was overly optimistic about the speed with which changes of this magnitude could be made, especially given the large number of other reforms which had to be implemented at

42 The QPS has expressed the view that:

There are few (if any) situations encountered by police where there will not be a requirement to act within a framework of legislation, policy or procedure. Within the framework police are encouraged, and do, display initiative and problem solving skills on a daily basis as they address the numerous and various public demands for police services. (Correspondence, 4 August 1994)

the same time. However, as briefly noted earlier in this chapter, police services in other jurisdictions have shown that it is possible to achieve reforms of the type envisaged by the Inquiry – provided that there is sufficient organisational commitment and the process of change is properly managed. Obviously, programs, processes and structures will have to be adapted to the Queensland policing environment, but there is no reason to believe that the *philosophy* of community policing cannot be applied in Queensland. The obstacles which have been encountered by the QPS indicate the need for the QPS to reconsider its approach to implementation of community policing and the concepts which it entails, but they do not justify a retreat from the long-term objectives defined by the Inquiry.

Particular issues that will need to be addressed in the future are as follows:

- The term community policing does not seem to be widely understood or accepted within the QPS. In many instances, it has come to be associated with "soft", public relations-oriented, activities which are peripheral to the "real" business of policing. For this reason, there may be merit in introducing a different terminology such as "problem-oriented policing" or "proactive policing", which emphasises the connection with operational policing. Whatever label is used, it is important that the concept is carefully explained to police officers and that the underlying philosophy is clearly understood.
- Promotion of better communication and liaison with local communities should be a priority. Where there are good informal lines of communication between the police and the local community – as is often the case in small towns and rural communities – there may be no need to set up more formal structures. However, many areas still lack mechanisms through which the police and the community can work together to identify and address local policing problems. With a few exceptions, the community consultative committee structure has not worked well. The QPS should consider conducting a review of these committees to determine if the characteristics of successful committees can be replicated in areas where committees have not been tried, or have previously been tried and failed. In addition, more flexible and innovative approaches to developing structures and processes for working with local communities should be considered. Possible strategies include collecting information through regular community surveys, and linking into existing community networks. It is particularly important that efforts are made to address these issues in "difficult" communities. As pointed out by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, 'the worst areas for crime and hence the most appropriate for the development of community-based strategies are likely to have "problem" characteristics' (1989, p. 231).

- There needs to be a greater encouragement of innovation and the use of problem-solving strategies. A community policing orientation means assisting local communities to address their policing problems. The QPS can foster the development and application of problem-solving skills by officers at the local level, and facilitate co-operation with other agencies, through strategies such as:
 - providing organisation-wide training in problem-solving skills
 - ensuring the availability of accurate, recent local information so that officers are able to identify problems and deploy resources appropriately
 - developing other human resource practices that reflect and reinforce the importance of problem-solving skills (for instance, suitable promotional selection criteria and performance appraisal measures).
- Over the longer term, police divisions need to be given sufficient resources and autonomy to facilitate the development of local community policing initiatives. In general, the aim should be to encourage innovation and experimentation at the local level. One way of doing this would be to provide divisional commanders with a specific discretionary budget to spend on approved projects. In order to obtain access to these funds, divisions would be required to identify local problems, define project objectives, and develop performance measures for evaluating the impact of projects. They should also be required to report periodically on the operation and impact of these projects. In turn, effective design and evaluation of projects will require accurate, recent, and local information (see Chapter Nine).
- Alternative patrol strategies should be developed and trialed in a variety of settings. The CJC accepts that the Beat Area Policing Pilot Project currently in operation in Toowoomba is only one of several possible models for delivering policing services and will not be suitable for all areas. However, it is a useful *starting point* for designing initiatives in other areas. The key requirement is a willingness to experiment and adapt.

Most importantly, the QPS needs to develop an effective overall strategy for promoting the concept of community policing and, in particular, for ensuring that it is integrated into operational policing practices. At present, the organisation has embraced a long-term objective without an accompanying "road map" for reaching that goal, or mechanisms for monitoring the progress which has been made. For community policing to be fully implemented, resources will have to be re-allocated

and significant changes will have to be made to training, incentive structures, performance measures, information systems, management styles and authority relationships within the QPS. Structural reform of this magnitude cannot be achieved quickly and will require a long-term implementation strategy. However, the CJC is confident that, in the long run, the effort will prove worthwhile.

CHAPTER FIVE

MANAGING THE ALLOCATION OF POLICE

The Fitzgerald Inquiry did not examine extensively the issue of staff allocation within the QPS, but it did highlight issues such as police numbers, rank structures and the deployment of resources. In particular, the Inquiry recognised the need for better management of the primary resource of the QPS: its personnel (see for example 1989, pp. 184–185).⁴³ A recurring theme of the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry was that 'personnel and resources must be allocated on the basis of need' (p. 224).

This chapter focuses on the allocation, or deployment, of sworn police officers in the QPS.⁴⁴ It examines the way the QPS has addressed the allocation of police officers since the Fitzgerald Inquiry and identifies factors affecting personnel deployment.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND POLICE DEPLOYMENT

The Fitzgerald Inquiry dealt briefly with four issues relating to the allocation of staff. These were:

- *Autonomy in decision-making on staffing matters.* In the context of regionalisation, the Inquiry recommended that Regional Commanders have the power to allocate staff according to local needs (1989, recommendation 3(a), p. 380).

43 A general discussion of HRM in the QPS can be found in CJC 1993b.

44 The employment of civilians is discussed in Chapter Six.

- *Police numbers.* The Inquiry found that Queensland had 'failed to maintain its police' (p. 225) and that, when compared with other States, the QPS had the lowest police to population ratio. The Eric St Johnston ratio⁴⁵ for determining police to population numbers was discussed by the Inquiry as an alternative to the previous ad hoc means of deciding on total police numbers. Although 'somewhat subjective' with its 'relevance untested', this ratio was seen as a useful tool for identifying anomalies in the distribution of officers throughout the State, and as providing a guide to overall numbers (p. 227).
- *Rank structures.* The Inquiry described the rank structure within the QPS as complex and rigid. In total, there were 17 ranks for police and a further 10 ranks for technical and scientific officers (p. 221). This structure was ineffective, inefficient and inflexible, frequently resulting in a 'lack of motivation in many officers' (p. 256). As an alternative, the Inquiry recommended a less hierarchical and 'flatter' structure of five broad bands: Constable, Sergeant, Inspector, Superintendent and Commander (p. 380). The new structure, it was argued, would 'aid communication, expedite decision-making, and ensure that policies . . . [were] relevant' (p. 273).
- *Distribution and use of police officers.* According to the Inquiry, the 'allocation of officers and the emphasis placed from time to time on specific police activities largely determines the adequacy of the total number of police' (p. 224). Two main recommendations addressed this issue. These were for:
 - a thorough review of numbers and disposition in all divisions, districts and regions in order to determine appropriate establishments (recommendation C.I.3(b), p. 380)
 - the redesign of positions that contain an inappropriate mixture of skills (recommendation C.I.8(b), p. 382), to ensure that police personnel will 'only be used where their training and powers are necessary' (p. 364).

The major Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations impacting upon the allocation of police are summarised in Table 5.1.

⁴⁵ An inspection of the Victorian Police Force was carried out by Colonel Sir Eric St Johnston during 1970-1971. In his report, he indicated that in Britain it was generally considered that a ratio of 1:350 in urban areas and 1:1000 in rural areas was an appropriate yardstick for determining police numbers (1971, p. 39). Using this as a basis, St Johnston produced a ratio of 1:430 as meeting the specific needs of the Victorian Police Force (p. 40).

TABLE 5.1: FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE ALLOCATION OF STAFF

Recommendation C.I.1

- (a) as few organisational levels as practicable between the Commissioner and operational police officers to facilitate communication, expedite decision-making, and ensure that policies are relevant. Five broad bands of responsibility with several grades of salary within each band equating to constables, sergeants, inspectors, superintendents, and commanders are proposed

Recommendation C.I.3

- (a) Regional Commanders be given responsibility and authority for allocating staff within their regions including control of intra-regional transfers

Recommendation C.I.3

- (b) a thorough review of staff numbers and disposition in all divisions, districts and regions be undertaken to determine appropriate establishments, with regional and district officers playing an active role in the process

Recommendation C.I.8

- (b) redesign of positions which contain inappropriate mixtures of duties

Recommendation C.I.21

external consultants be engaged to determine a new Police Award and review police salary structure in consultation with Police Unions to incorporate penalty rates and allowances into base salary and bring salary structure into accord with the new flattened rank structure

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, pp. 380, 382-383.

Note: Transfers are discussed in Chapter Seven.

PROCESSES FOR DETERMINING POLICE DEPLOYMENT

After the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the QPS began to examine the issue of police allocation. The ways in which this issue was dealt with are discussed below under two headings:

- who makes the decisions about staff allocation
- how the different types of allocation decisions are made.

Decision-Makers

Although various human resource functions were delegated to the regions, staff allocation continues to be regulated centrally. Regional Assistant Commissioners have limited responsibility for allocating staff: they are basically restricted to intra-regional transfers of Constables and secondments of regional staff. For more significant staff allocation decisions, an application is made centrally.

Initially, the QPS created an Establishment and Allocation Committee to decide on police staffing and positions. Regions which wished to increase their staffing levels, create new positions, or redefine the rank/duties of positions, were required to make an application to this Committee. Overall, this Committee did not operate satisfactorily. There were no formal and objective guidelines or principles for decisions and the majority of the Committee members did not have any particular expertise in HRM. Interviews highlighted inconsistent decisions, long delays and insufficient feedback.

The PSMC reached similar conclusions about the performance of this Committee. Consistent with the PSMC's recommendations, the Committee has been abolished and its functions delegated to the Human Resource Management Branch (previously called the Personnel Branch) and the Board of Management (1993, recommendation 69, p. 154).⁴⁶

Allocation Decisions

There are four types of decisions relevant to managing the allocation of staff within the QPS. These decisions, all of which are inter-related, concern the:

- total number of police
- geographical distribution of police
- rank structure and classification of positions
- tasks allocated to police.

The approaches taken to each of these issues are examined below.

⁴⁶ The Board of Management consists of the Commissioner of Police, the Deputy Commissioner (Operations), the Executive Director (Corporate Services) and a representative Assistant Commissioner.

Determining Total Number of Police

The QPS has been unable to adequately plan its short and long-term human resource requirements, due to a variety of internal and external pressures. This is not to imply that there is an optimum level of police numbers that can be discovered by some "magic formula", but a process should be in place so that decisions on police numbers can be made sufficiently in advance for planning purposes.

In 1990 the QPS initiated a project known as 'Policing 2000' to forecast the number of police officers required for the year 2001. However, a number of assumptions underlying the calculations were questionable (for example, that there would be no major changes in police operations or structures for the rest of the 1990s). In addition, factors such as the level and extent of civilianisation were not taken into consideration. Not surprisingly, given these limitations, the results of this project have not been used to develop a long-term resource strategy for the QPS.

Police numbers continue to be short-term, unplanned responses to budgetary factors and various internal and external pressures. Ultimately, decisions on police numbers are the responsibility of the Government, as these positions are funded through the budgetary process. However the QPS, in conjunction with the Government, should develop a strategy which would enable the organisation, *at least* one year in advance, to identify staffing levels for that coming year. This would ensure that there was sufficient time for the requisite resources, such as computers, training and other facilities, to be made available to support any increase.⁴⁷

Until the QPS implements a policy of lateral entry,⁴⁸ increases in police numbers will be through recruit intakes. The information required to manage recruit numbers, and at least maintain establishment strength, is readily available. Certainly, recruit numbers are driven by a variety of internal and external factors. However, it should be possible to reach agreement on numbers well in advance of the start of the intake. This issue was discussed in the CJC's review of police recruitment and training (1993b, pp. 21-23). In this review, the CJC recommended that the QPS develop a rolling annual recruitment and selection management plan as part of its larger strategic planning process (recommendation 3, p. 80).

47 The State budget for 1994/1995 provides for 265 new personnel (Queensland, Parliament 1994a, p. 14), consisting of a mix of police, civilians, Police Support Officers and Aboriginal Liaison Officers. The number of extra police being funded cannot be readily determined from the budget documents.

48 The QPS's response to the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendation about lateral entry is discussed in CJC 1993b.

There are indications that the QPS has begun to plan for police numbers and to anticipate likely increases. For instance:

- The QPS has indicated that it is examining the modelling of the numbers in recruit intakes. Currently, a figure of 93 in three intakes has been calculated to maintain the *current establishment level* (Correspondence, 10 August 1994), although this does not appear to have been documented in a formal plan. However, due to other factors, each of the next three intakes (October 1994, February 1995, May 1995) are planned to be of 140 recruits (Correspondence, 10 August 1994).
- A three-year staffing plan (1993-1996) was endorsed late last year by Cabinet. This initiative demonstrates a step towards better planning of "numbers".

Determining Distribution of Police

Prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, allocations of police to establishments were based primarily on historical factors. To address this problem, the Inquiry proposed a review of staff numbers and their distribution (1989, recommendation C.I.3(b), p. 380) and listed some possible factors to be considered (pp. 224, 229).

The QPS, through a series of projects, has attempted to introduce an equitable method for deciding on where to deploy its police officers. These attempts have not been successful due to the lack of data and research, inadequate resources, insufficient expertise, and an absence of co-ordination. The history of these projects shows a cycle of identifying allocation problems and establishing project teams, without any outcomes being achieved.

To date, the main approaches to the allocation problem have been as follows:⁴⁹

- *Implementation unit reviews.* Early reviews conducted at the beginning of the implementation period examined the resourcing of the QPS, including its staffing needs. In particular, all regions conducted resource studies to identify their individual resourcing requirements. Because these studies did not employ a consistent set of criteria or a common methodology, it was very difficult to compare and interpret the results.

49 This overview is based on QPS documentation and interviews with relevant officers.

- *Appropriate Staffing Model (or Graves/Madden Model).* In 1991 a project team developed a model to determine the appropriate police strength and ranks (below commissioned officers) for each station in the State. The factors incorporated into the model were:
 - population (in particular, the proportion of youth, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in each division)
 - crime rates for offences against the person and offences against property
 - level of traffic accidents
 - distance to be covered by the police
 - extraneous duties
 - minimum service delivery requirements (such as the hours of operation of the station, watchhouse and communications duties)
 - the amount of relief needed (that is, coverage for recreation leave, sick leave and the 38-hour week).

Although these factors provided a sound basis for a model, the project team suggested that other factors (such as the number of migrants and single parent families, industry characteristics, proactive duties, workload measures and the role of civilians) should be included in any further development.

- *Human Resource Allocation and Forecasting Model.* This model resulted from a special meeting between regional representatives in November 1992 to discuss the equitable statewide allocation of Constables. At this meeting, an urgent need for a formula for the allocation of the QPS's total human resources was identified. Following the meeting, a project task force was established to consider the issue. This project used data collected by the numerous regional reviews, the job workplace redesign project (see later discussion), civilianisation strategies and existing staffing allocation proposals. The final recommendation was that a modified version of the 'Graves/Madden Model' should be the basis for developing an appropriate formula.

From this project, a model has been developed to calculate the most equitable distribution of police throughout the State, given current numbers and policies. The model takes into account the following factors:

- reported crime
- traffic accidents
- extraneous duties
- population demographics (including proportion of youths, Aboriginal persons and tourists)
- isolation
- urbanisation
- amount of time spent in relieving duties.⁵⁰

The model is periodically adjusted as more types of information and updated figures, such as future civilianisation data, are incorporated into the model.

The human resource allocation model has been approved by the Board of Management as the main planning tool for determining allocation decisions. The approach is to use the model to divide the total number of police on a regional basis. At this stage, allocation within regions according to need will remain at the discretion of the Assistant Commissioner. However, data from the model about appropriate district and divisional numbers will be provided to the Assistant Commissioners. Any serious overstaffing will be addressed through attrition.

These developments are promising, especially when combined with the establishment of workforce planning and analysis functions within the HRM Branch aimed at co-ordinating all projects dealing with staffing matters. Hopefully, these recent steps by the QPS will provide a more integrated approach to staffing issues.

50 Source: QPS Human Resources Division.

Rank Structure

Substantial changes were made to the rank structure of the QPS as a result of the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations. The QPS used consultants to review police ranks, conditions of employment and salaries. This process involved close liaison with the relevant unions. The result of these negotiations was a new rank structure and award that was approved by the Industrial Commission in 1992. The old and new rank structures are set out in Appendix 4.

The new nine-rank structure differs from the five bands of responsibility (excluding the Deputy Commissioner rank) recommended by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Nonetheless, it represents a significant "flattening" by comparison with the old rank structure.

Two important issues about the rank structure which are relevant to the allocation of staff within the QPS concern how to determine:

- the appropriate numbers at each rank
- the rank of particular positions.

A Rank Model

The QPS is working towards a more equitable distribution of ranks throughout the State. Rank structure models have been developed, setting out the appropriate ratios of ranks in various units such as CIB, general duties and traffic. The special needs of country areas and ATSI communities are also reflected in these models. This redistribution is being achieved as positions fall vacant. When a vacancy occurs, the Assistant Commissioner and the Regional Personnel Officer will assess the position in terms of the rank structure models and, if appropriate, request its reclassification.

Determining Classification of Positions

In the last 12 months, the QPS has adopted a job evaluation methodology to assist in assessing submissions to create or reclassify positions. This methodology is employed to evaluate the rank at which a particular position should be classified. As part of this exercise, the "benchmarking" information collected for education and training purposes is used. "Benchmarking" refers to the responsibilities and tasks that characterise a rank. This evaluation task is undertaken within the HRM Branch, which then makes a recommendation to the Board of Management.

Tasks of Police Officers: Examining and Redesigning Positions

To date, the QPS has relied primarily on a 'job workplace redesign' project to examine the way in which work is performed within the QPS. One of the project's aims is to rearrange work and staffing to maximise efficiency and productivity.⁵¹ The scope of this review is extremely broad – issues examined include the number of positions required, position duties and responsibilities, equipment needs and the level of civilianisation.

As part of this review, information has been collected by a series of working parties set up throughout the State, comprising both union and management representatives. These working parties have forwarded about 4,000 recommendations to the overseeing Joint Consultative Committee. The recommendations have covered a diversity of issues such as technology, skills and training, personnel and housing, and occupational health and safety.

It is doubtful whether the review will generate the information necessary to redesign working conditions and responsibilities. No systematic method has been used to collect information for the project and there have not been any common or standard issues addressed across the State. It was a frequent view expressed in the interviews conducted in late 1992 that the recommendations of the working groups were primarily "wish lists".

51 From correspondence.

CURRENT ALLOCATION OF POLICE: AN ASSESSMENT

Police Numbers

As at 1 July 1994, there were 6,182 sworn officers in the QPS – 963 more than before the Fitzgerald Inquiry (see Figure 5.1).⁵²




FIGURE 5.1: POLICE NUMBERS (1983/1984 TO 1993/1994)

Sources: QPS annual reports and statistical reviews; QPS HRM Branch.

⁵² The figures used in this chapter refer to the *actual* number of officers and exclude recruits. The actual number of police can differ from the number of police officers that are funded (also known as the approved strength). Funded police positions are those that Treasury agrees to include in the budget allocations. The QPS can employ more police than the funded level out of the remainder of its budget. The variation between funded and actual numbers are mainly due to the flow of recruitment, resignation and retirement of officers.

The Fitzgerald Inquiry used the police to population ratio to assess the sufficiency of the number of police. On this basis, Queensland had the worst ratio of police to population (1:527) of any Australian State. Since the Inquiry, there has been a substantial improvement in the ratio of police personnel to population. As Table 5.2 indicates, the extent of the gap between Queensland and the other major jurisdictions has diminished markedly, although the ratio for Queensland was still the highest for the mainland States in 1992/1993. The ratio of total QPS staff – civilian and police – to population also remained the highest in Australia (1:400). With the addition of the 265 extra staff foreshadowed in the 1994/1995 State budget, the total staff to population ratio will be approximately 1:387 (based on the June 1993 figure).

TABLE 5.2: RATIO OF PERSONNEL TO POPULATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN STATES .(AS AT JUNE 1989 AND JUNE 1993)

State	Police to Population		Total Staff to Population
	1989	1993	1993
Queensland	1:527	1:476	1:400
New South Wales	1:466	1:461	1:384
Victoria	1:446	1:465	1:393
Western Australia	1:439	1:398	1:345
Tasmania	1:418	1:478	1:370
South Australia	1:413	1:385	1:323
Northern Territory	1:207	1:255	1:194

Sources: QPS *Annual Report 1988/1989*, p. 81; QPS *Statistical Review 1992/1993*, p. 169; ABS *Year Book 1994*, p. 118 for latest estimated population figures (as at 30 June 1992).

Note: The total staff figures include both sworn and unsworn staff.

These figures indicate that the QPS is now not particularly under-staffed when compared to other major Australian police services. Even if the QPS was increased to be in line with the other major mainland States, the impact on the quality and level of service delivery would be minimal if spread throughout the State, although a greater effect might be apparent if these additional resources were concentrated in specific high need areas. For instance, to bring the police to population ratio up to 1:463 – the mid-point between Victoria and New South Wales in 1993 – 183 additional police would be required. Allowing for the need to cover three shifts, leave, sick days, and so on, this would equate to approximately 67 extra police per shift throughout Queensland.⁵³

In any event, there is no agreement as to the optimum police to population ratio, and considerable doubt about the utility of this ratio for determining policing requirements. The ratio fails to take into account various factors that affect the distribution of officers, such as the geographical constraints of policing in Queensland compared to other States, future population growth areas, the workload of officers, and the level of service being provided to the community. It also should be stressed that the adequacy of police coverage depends not only on the number of police, but also on the way in which available police officers are *used*. This point is frequently misunderstood or ignored in public debate on the issue of police numbers.

Geographical Distribution of Police

An important aspect of the allocation of police is the geographical distribution of the total number of police throughout the State. Ideally, this distribution of police should reflect the workload demands of different parts of the State and take account of population and crime trends.

There are various measures for assessing the geographical distribution of police. The two particular measures used in this review are the police to population ratio by region and the ratio of reported offences per officer by region. These two ratios are frequently cited by regions to support claims for staff increases.

53

This calculation:

- assumes all additional police would be employed at the base level
- adjusts for the proportion of officers on leave at any one time as derived from an Inspectorate report
- assumes equal numbers per shift and an average of two shifts a day.

Ratio of Police to Population by Region

At a regional level (see Table 5.3), the police to population ratio is the highest in Metro-South (1:715) and the lowest in Metro-North (1:434) and Far Northern (1:439). According to this ratio, there is considerable variation between the regions.

TABLE 5.3: RATIOS OF POLICE PERSONNEL BY POLICE REGION (AS AT JUNE 1993)

Region	Number of Police	Population per Officer
Far Northern	436	439
Northern	418	507
Central	529	591
North Coast	725	667
Southern	610	653
South Eastern	836	612
Metro-North	939	434
Metro-South	696	715

Source: QPS *Statistical Review 1992/1993*, p. 172.

- Notes:
1. This table is based on the regions only. Staff in central Headquarters have been excluded.
 2. North Coast figures were adjusted to account for a statistical error in the *Statistical Review 1992/1993*.
 3. Metro-North figures include the Brisbane Water Police.

Ratio of Reported Offences per Officer by Region

The ratio of reported offences per officer is another rough guide for comparing the workload handled by officers in the different regions, although this measure:

- does not take account of the fact that responding to reported crime is only one aspect of officers' work
- is calculated as a ratio of all officers and not simply those available to respond operationally
- does not differentiate between different types of crime, or possible variations across regions in the willingness of people to report crime
- does not take into account other factors that impact on workload, such as distance.

Table 5.4 shows that the ratio of reported offences per officer ranges from one officer for every 39 offences in Far Northern to one for every 63 offences in Metro-South region. When this measure is combined with the ratio of population per officer for each region (see Table 5.3), it is apparent that Metro-South region has the worst ratio on both measures.

Northern and Southern Regions have the same reported offences per officer ratio, but substantially different police to population ratios (1:507 in Northern compared to 1:653 in Southern).

TABLE 5.4: REPORTED OFFENCE PER OFFICER (AS AT JUNE 1993)

Region	Reported Offences per Officer
Far Northern	39
Northern	41
Central	34
North Coast	43
Southern	41
South Eastern	59
Metro-North	50
Metro-South	63

Source: QPS *Statistical Review 1992/1993*, p. 172.

- Notes:
1. The 'reported offences' used in this table were those against the person and against property. Traffic accidents were not included as they do not necessarily involve offences.
 2. Metro-North personnel figures include the Brisbane Water Police.

These two measures point to some anomalies in the regional distribution of police. These measures cannot alone be used to determine an appropriate distribution, due to the limitations outlined above, but they do show that the QPS needs to continually monitor and, where possible, adjust its staffing levels in the regions. The recent approval of a staffing model to guide regional allocations should start to address this issue.

Rank Distribution

At 1 June 1994 there were 253 officers of the rank of Inspector and above, 5,758 other officers, and 352 First Year Constables in the QPS (QPS Human Resource records).

The rank distribution by region is illustrated in Table 5.5. This table shows that the deployment of ranks varies considerably between regions. Briefly, the proportion of Constables in the regions (excluding State Crime Operations, Operations Support and central Headquarters) ranges from 34 per cent to 49 per cent of total police in the region, while the spread of Senior Sergeants and Sergeants varies from 24 per cent to 32 per cent. The highest percentage of Constables (49 per cent) is in the South Eastern region. Non-metropolitan regions generally have higher proportions of Sergeants and Senior Sergeants. As to be expected, State Crime Operations and Operations Support have a higher proportion of senior staff than do the regions.

The uneven distribution of ranks across the regions can be attributed to the following factors:

- Until recently, the QPS has not had clear criteria for determining the appropriate numbers of each rank required in each region. A model is now being established.
- Certain centres have traditionally attracted and retained more staff. Consequently, staff in these centres tend to be more senior.
- To some extent, rank profiles have been affected by the way in which previous allocations of First Year Constables were made. For example, the South Eastern region was assigned the most First Year Constables (23 per cent) from the February 1991 intake.
- A substantial number of smaller establishments within a region will mean more supervisory positions. For instance, the type of work and the smaller units in State Crime Operations and Operations Support contribute to the higher proportions of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. In the Southern, Northern and Far Northern regions, the greater number of one and two officer stations also affects the distribution.

As noted earlier, the QPS is gradually moving towards a more equitable distribution of ranks across regions and is establishing a model for the distribution of the ranks. Progress will be slow because anomalies in the rank distribution are generally being addressed through attrition.

**TABLE 5.5: DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE BY RANK AND REGION
(AS AT 1 JUNE 1994)**

Region	Constable	Senior Const	Sar Sgt/Sgt	Comm'd/ Exec Officers	Total
Metro-North	391 (46%)	223 (26%)	218 (25%)	25 (3%)	857
Metro-South	262 (41%)	182 (29%)	171 (27%)	21 (3%)	636
South Eastern	372 (49%)	188 (25%)	184 (24%)	19 (2%)	763
Southern	191 (34%)	179 (32%)	178 (31%)	18 (3%)	566
North Coast	251 (36%)	237 (34%)	196 (28%)	16 (2%)	700
Central	173 (35%)	152 (31%)	157 (32%)	12 (2%)	494
Northern	145 (36%)	116 (29%)	128 (32%)	11 (3%)	400
Far Northern	197 (46%)	100 (24%)	120 (28%)	7 (2%)	424
Operations Support	128 (25%)	90 (18%)	248 (49%)	45 (9%)	511
State Crime Operations	86 (23%)	115 (31%)	149 (40%)	19 (5%)	369
Other	16 (8%)	33 (17%)	112 (57%)	37 (19%)	198
Total	2212 (37%)	1615 (27%)	1861 (31%)	230 (4%)	5918

Source: QPS Human Resources records.

- Notes: 1. These figures exclude 160 recruits, 352 First Year Constables and 93 officers located or seconded to the CJC. The 'Other' category consists of all remaining officers located at central Headquarters.
2. Percentages given are of the row totals and are rounded.

Allocation of Tasks to Police Officers

The effective management of police allocation entails managing available officers to maximise coverage and service to the community. In particular, this involves assessing the types of tasks that police are performing and the way in which police are rostered.

Number of Police in Service Delivery Role

The number of police actually available to respond to the community is considerably less than the total number employed. There are a number of ways to calculate the proportion of police providing direct service delivery. The rough calculations provided in Table 5.6 indicate that, of the total number of police, around 73 per cent are delivering a direct service to the community.⁵⁴ For the purposes of these calculations, 'direct service delivery' excludes officers in administrative and managerial positions (for example, all commissioned officers were defined as performing managerial functions). However, this category does include detectives and officers-in-charge of establishments that are providing a direct service to the community. This is still a very broad definition of 'direct service delivery' as many police in this category would not be on the streets or likely to come into contact with the public.

These data show that 27 per cent of officers are not available for service delivery to the community, using this broad definition of a service delivery role. The CJC recognises that certain management, administrative and support positions are necessary for the operation of the QPS. However, these figures point to the need to reassess administrative and supervisory staffing structures to determine if more officers could be released for operational duties.

⁵⁴ The limited availability of police to provide a direct service to the community was also highlighted in the review by the PSMC (1993, pp. 73–74). The review found that the ratio of direct service delivery staff to indirect service delivery staff had 'fallen in recent years' (p. 77).

TABLE 5.6: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF POLICE PROVIDING DIRECT SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (AS AT FEBRUARY 1993)

<i>Total number of police</i>	6208	
<i>Less</i>		
<i>Number in non-service delivery roles</i>		
commissioned officers	241	(4%)
police in operational support/administrative units	1459	(24%)
Sub-Total	1700	(27%)
<i>Number in direct service delivery roles</i>	4508	(73%)

- Notes:
1. Numbers of police from QPS records as at February 1993.
 2. The figures shown for the total number of police exclude 158 recruits and 86 officers assigned to the CJC. Part-time officers and officers in surplus positions were included.
 3. Commissioned officers are officers of the rank of Inspector or above.
 4. Vacancies were not counted.
 5. Examples of operational support units include: Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, officers assigned to District Offices and Queensland Police Academy staff.
 6. Leave, rostered days off, and other activities (such as training and court duties) that "take an officer off the road" were not taken into account.

The QPS uses a substantially higher estimate of the percentage of the total number of police in a direct service delivery role. As at May 1994, 90 per cent (5,600 out of 6,239 sworn officers) were considered by the QPS as operational (Correspondence, 9 June 1994). The QPS defines operational positions as including:

- regional, district and divisional positions other than Staff Officer, Regional Projects Officer, Regional Education and Training Co-ordinator, District Education and Training Officer, Radio and Electronics and Support Functions
- State Crime Operations Command positions other than those attached to the Command Office
- positions attached to the CJC
- positions in the Police Prosecutions Corps and specialist services units within the Services Division (Operations Support Command), such as Railway Squad, Accident Investigation Squad, Special Emergency Response Team, Water Police, Dog Squad, Explosive Ordnance Squad and the Mounted Unit.

The definition of 'operational' positions employed by the QPS differs from the 'direct service delivery' criteria used by the CJC. Positions counted as 'operational' by the QPS, but excluded in the CJC estimate, include:

- Regional and district positions other than Staff Officer, Projects Officer, Regional Education and Training Co-ordinator, District Education and Training Officer, Radio and Electronics, and Support Functions. In general, the CJC estimate considers all Regional Office and most District Office positions as providing support to police rather than a direct service to the community. Particular examples of District positions defined by the CJC as providing direct service delivery were those involving investigative functions.
- Police Prosecutions Corps. In the CJC estimate, all full-time prosecution positions were considered to be an indirect service delivery function.

It should be emphasised that due to current shift and leave structures, at any one time throughout the State roughly only one-quarter of operational officers are available for rostering for duty.⁵⁵ The community should recognise that even a substantial raw increase in overall police numbers will not have much impact on the level of coverage provided at any one time. For example, increasing police numbers by 100 will add, at best, 25 police officers on the streets per shift for the *whole* of the State. Further, because officers typically patrol in pairs, the number of additional active 'units' would only be about half of this.

Rostering Practices

Rostering determines the way in which officers are used at the local level. Rostering practices vary considerably throughout the State – for example, there are one-officer stations and 24-hour stations. For this reason, it is difficult to establish a *typical* rostering pattern. However, the roster sheets for December 1992, at the end of the three-year transitional period, of a 24-hour station in a major provincial city revealed that:

- Lower, more junior ranks were generally used for patrol duties – the main point of contact with the community. For the month examined, a Sergeant was rostered on to patrol duties for only 25 out of 93 shifts (27 per cent).
- Rostering does not appear to be driven by information about service demands. For instance, using calls for service as an indicator of workload, the highest average number of calls (63.8) occurred on Saturday, but the highest average number of officers rostered to work was on Wednesday and Friday (10.7 officers). Conversely, fewer calls were recorded for Monday (average 40) than Sunday (47.8), but Sunday had a lower average number of officers rostered on (8.3 compared to 10).

The QPS is aware of the need for more effective rostering practices. For instance, the monitoring of rostering practices is an integral part of the functions of the Commissioner's Inspectorate. Some other steps, such as trialing innovative rostering practices, have also been introduced in certain regions. However, progress on this

55 For this calculation, the proportion in direct service delivery from Table 5.6 was adjusted according to the following:

- an average of two shifts per day was used, assuming equal numbers of police on each shift (as not all stations operate on a 24-hour basis)
- the average number of police on leave was calculated from a report by the Inspectorate.

issue may be slow due to the industrial implications raised. For example, one significant factor that limits better allocation of officers over shifts is the penalty and overtime rates provided in the Award. (This was also identified by the PSMC in its review; see 1993, p. 78.) Supervising officers who were interviewed in late 1992 commonly indicated that cost concerns influenced their rostering decisions. This was a major concern, as the week-ends and nights were often the busiest policing period.

Summary

The QPS has not yet given sufficient attention to how officers may be more effectively used. Amongst other measures, the QPS needs to manage its current staffing complement so that more police are available for service to the community. The community policing orientation that the QPS has formally embraced must also be reflected in the manner in which police are allocated. This means that the QPS needs to actively pursue a variety of alternative staffing options, such as encouraging Sergeants to perform more patrol duties, instituting flexible rostering practices and incorporating overtime into base salaries. Overall, the way in which *available* officers are allocated to tasks needs to be managed in a more innovative manner so that coverage is increased and service to the community is improved.

ALLOCATION: A STRATEGIC APPROACH

The findings presented in this chapter point to the need for better planning of allocation issues. An integrated and co-ordinated strategy should be developed to guide QPS management in deploying its officers. This strategy should support the community policing orientation espoused by the QPS (see Chapter Four).

In addition, management needs to be cognisant of the impact of various human resource policies and practices upon the overall allocation of personnel. The major practices that influence allocation include:

- **Civilianisation.** The allocation of police officers is partly dependent upon the level of civilianisation. For instance, one civilian administrator in a station may mean that one less police officer is required to "run" that station effectively (see Chapter Six).
- **Transfer and promotion.** These procedures are discussed in Chapter Seven.

- *Logistical support.* It is not possible to deploy officers to certain centres if the support infrastructure cannot handle increased staff. For example, there must be adequate space at the stations and sufficient equipment such as computers, desks and lockers. The PSMC's review (1993, pp. 78-79) highlighted that resources and facilities at some establishments were inadequate. Any staff deployment model must therefore be linked to broader resourcing assessments and strategies.
- *Limitations on the Commissioner of Police.* Government policy has placed limitations on the power of the Commissioner to control staff allocation. For example, as a result of a ministerial direction to the Commissioner of Police in December 1990, government policy prevents the QPS from closing police stations. Moreover, the Commissioner of Police cannot create civilian positions. These limitations highlight the need for forward planning and early consultation with the Minister for Police.

Overall, any strategy must involve continual monitoring of deployment to identify deficiencies and anomalies that develop as the needs of the QPS and the community change. Effective monitoring in turn requires the systematic recording of relevant information.

CONCLUSION

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the QPS has made progress in managing the allocation of police. The most significant changes have been the development and adoption of a model to assist in determining the distribution of police throughout the State; the use of guidelines to evaluate the appropriate level of positions; and the introduction of more orderly decision-making processes for the determination of allocation issues.

The main problem areas identified in this chapter are as follows:

- There is currently no process of advanced planning for overall police numbers. Although police numbers are ultimately the responsibility of the Government, the QPS in conjunction with the Government should endeavour to develop a strategy to identify staffing levels in advance. The QPS has recently initiated a staffing plan that has been approved by Cabinet, but there needs to be an ongoing and continually monitored planning exercise for staff numbers. If the QPS is to better manage its resources, it must be in a position to plan the support needed for increasing numbers of officers, such as more training, cars and facilities. This requires that the QPS has information about future police numbers sufficiently in advance so that any increases can be both planned and budgeted for.
- At times, the QPS has allowed the issue of police numbers to divert attention from allocation issues. There needs to be a greater recognition that allocation is not simply about overall police numbers – it involves deciding where officers should be located and how they can best be used. Currently available human resources could be used more effectively and efficiently. The QPS should actively pursue a variety of alternative staffing options to increase coverage and improve service to the community. These options could include more flexible rostering practices and the incorporation of overtime into base salaries. QPS management is aware of these issues, but because of the industrial implications progress to date has been slow.
- As recognised by QPS management, allocation decisions are not yet systematically linked to other human resource policies and practices, such as civilianisation strategies and transfer and promotion procedures. The QPS has informed the CJC that a Human Resource Management Strategic Plan, which recognises the inter-relations of its human resource practices, is being developed and should be available, in draft form, for the 1995/1996 corporate plan (Correspondence, 9 June 1994).

CHAPTER SIX

CIVILIANISATION

Civilianisation refers to the use of suitably qualified civilian staff in positions not requiring police powers, skills or experience. A police service can civilianise by creating new positions designated for civilian employees, and/or reassigning appropriate police positions to civilian staff.

Although civilianisation was recommended by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, it was not a new concept to the QPS. During the late 1980s, various proposals were made for civilianising parts of the QPS. For instance, the issue was addressed by the QPS in its 1987 Needs Assessment and in a 1988 study by Arthur Andersen and Company. However, no attempts to implement civilianisation were made until the Fitzgerald Inquiry highlighted the issue.

This chapter examines the current status of civilianisation in the QPS. In particular, it discusses the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendation, outlines how the QPS endeavoured to implement this recommendation, and identifies the obstacles to introducing civilianisation on a wider scale.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND CIVILIANISATION

The Fitzgerald Inquiry concluded that many police officers were performing duties that did not relate to their training, skills, expertise or powers. The Inquiry did not regard this as an effective or efficient use of resources:

[w]ith crime levels escalating rapidly, trained police must be available to undertake operational policing duties.

[p]olice training is costly and its purpose is the provision of operational policing duties to the community. (1989, pp. 235-236)

The Inquiry considered that the only valid reason for reserving positions for police officers was the 'need to exercise police authority and use of police skills' (p. 236).

The Inquiry identified several reasons why the QPS used only limited civilian staff, including:

- civilians were considered to be "outsiders" and "intruders"
- part of the police culture and management policy was to secure positions for police officers who were incapable of performing operational duties
- civilians were subject to the control of public servants, which undermined the line of command of senior police
- "desk jobs", such as work in communications centres or operations support, were used as a way of disciplining police
- government ceilings on civilian levels often meant that it was simpler and quicker for the Commissioner of Police to create police positions to perform needed administrative and specialist functions
- personnel and industrial factors: for instance, civilians could not be relieved when they were absent or on leave, and civilian awards allowed industrial action (1989, pp. 235-236).

The Inquiry found that employing police officers in positions not requiring their powers or skills led to:

- a reduction in the number of police available for operational duties
- morale problems, which in turn cause poor performance, absenteeism or resignations
- extra costs as a result of 'artificial arrangements' designed to compensate officers in these positions (p. 236).

The Inquiry proposed a general review and reallocation of resources (p. 235). Such a review would "free-up" police officers for policing duties and complement the 'new community emphasis' within the QPS (p. 236). The process of this review was outlined in the Inquiry's recommendation for the adoption of a policy of civilianisation (see Table 6.1). A list of positions with the potential for civilianisation was also provided (p. 237).

TABLE 6.1: FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO CIVILIANISATION

Recommendation C.1.8

a policy of "civilianisation" be adopted throughout the Police Force, whereby all positions not requiring police powers will, wherever possible, be filled by civilians, and the maximum number of police officers will be available for duties requiring the exercise of police authority. Implementation will require:

- (a) development of current and concise job descriptions for all positions in the Department so that the type of staff, skills and qualifications needed for each position can be determined
- (b) redesign of positions which contain inappropriate mixtures of duties
- (c) a general review and re-allocation of resources to release police from administrative and other specialist non-police roles, and replace them with civilians who are better suited for many of the roles required in a modern police department

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 382.

IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVILIANISATION⁵⁶

After the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the QPS formally adopted a policy of civilianisation. Implementation, which commenced in late 1989, consisted of six major steps, some of which were undertaken concurrently. These steps involved:

- identifying positions suitable for civilianisation
- gaining funding and authority
- creating civilian positions
- creating an implementation strategy and timetable

⁵⁶ This review is based on QPS resource studies and reviews, status reports, Executive Council Minutes, Industrial Relations Commission decisions, staffing plans, tabled correspondence between the Commissioner of Police and the Minister of Police, and interviews conducted in late 1992. Specific responses on the issue of civilianisation were also obtained from the Industrial Relations Branch and the Human Resource Division within the QPS.

- entering industrial negotiations
- releasing police from identified civilian positions.

Identifying Positions Suitable for Civilianisation

Although the Fitzgerald Inquiry did not quantify the number of positions to be civilianised, it did list areas where there was the potential for civilianisation. The QPS undertook to identify suitable positions for civilianisation by initiating regional resource studies and reviews.⁵⁷ In September 1989 all regions and commissioned establishments were requested by the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit⁵⁸ to examine the areas under their command and to nominate those positions appropriate for civilianisation. In late 1989, the QPS also established various project teams to review several units statewide.

One report (23 November 1989) listed 206 positions for 'immediate' civilianisation, including positions of roster clerks, counter clerks and radio operators. Other areas identified included radio and electronics, photographic, document examiners, scientific, transport, telephone co-ordination and electronic recording services. One project team estimated that about 700 positions were suitable with 350 achievable over three years. The initial implementation unit estimated 1000 positions.

The project teams and resource studies did not use consistent strategies for identifying potential positions for civilianisation. Consequently, the issue of precisely how many positions should be civilianised was never resolved.

57 These include the Gold Coast Policing Study; Southern Region Service Demand Survey; Metropolitan South Region Resource Study; Metropolitan North Region Resource Study; Southern Region Resource Study; Far Northern Region Resource Study; North Coast Region Resource Study; Brisbane Central District Resource Study; Traffic Branch Study; Breath Analysis Section Review; Policy, Research and Evaluation Branch Review; Task Force Operational Support Units Review; Radio and Electronics Section Review; Technical/Scientific Services Review; Police Operations Centre Review; Explosives Ordnance Reconnaissance Team and the Disaster Victims Identification Squad Reviews; Brisbane Mobile Patrols Review and Watchhouse Review.

58 An explanation of the implementation units established to assist with the introduction of the Fitzgerald Inquiry reforms is provided in Chapter Two.

Gaining Funding and Authority

To carry out large-scale civilianisation, the QPS required both funding and authorisation from the Government via the Executive Council. There was initial funding and authorisation for the process in 1989/1990. However, further special allocations were not provided until 1993. In the 1993/1994 budget, the State Government provided a \$40 million growth fund to be allocated over the next three years. For 1994/1995, the QPS was advised that funding was available for 79 appointments.⁵⁹

The initial funding in 1989/1990 by Treasury was for 251 civilian positions identified by the QPS. The Executive Council formally authorised 208 positions (out of the 251 to be funded) for civilian staff in early 1990. These positions consisted of mainly clerical functions, although the list included some middle management positions. The specific positions consisted of:

- 100 new or converted police positions
- five Drug Squad positions
- 96 new positions in response to regionalisation
- seven miscellaneous positions.⁶⁰

Creating Civilian Positions

With the introduction of regionalisation, 12 "new" civilian positions were created to staff each of the eight regional headquarters (see Table 6.2). Some of these positions were reallocations from district staffing, although the extent of this reallocation varied between the regions.

59 There may be additional appointments as some funds were left over from last financial year's allocation and others may be employed as part of special projects. The time frame has not been finalised at this stage. These 79 positions also include 26 Police Support Officers (see later), whose appointment is dependent on the relevant legislation being passed.

60 Initially, 10 such positions were created but three of these were later abolished.

TABLE 6.2: REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS: NEW CIVILIAN POSITIONS

Number	Position Title
1	Executive Secretary
1	Personnel Officer
1	Assistant Personnel Officer
1	Finance Officer
1	Assistant Finance Officer
1	Administration/Purchasing Officer
1	Human Services Officer
1	Research Officer
1	Computer Support Officer
3	Clerical/Administrative Officers

Source: Headquarters Special Projects and Personnel Branch 1992.

Since the initial allocation, most regions have altered their structures according to their perceived needs. Further positions which were not in the original allocation, such as Media Officer and Clerk (Rosters), have been created in some regions. As indicated in Figure 6.1, the number of civilian positions within regional headquarters as at March 1994 ranged from 15 to 22 per region, a total of 147 civilian positions.⁶¹

61 This total excludes the civilians employed within the State Crime Operations Command and Operations Support Command Offices.




FIGURE 6.1: ACTUAL CIVILIAN NUMBERS IN REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS (AS AT MARCH 1994)

Source: QPS Human Resource records.

These civilian positions, which were created as a result of regionalisation, did not directly release police officers. However, regionalisation did make various positions in central Headquarters redundant. A review of the role of Headquarters by a project team in November 1990 identified 104 police officers performing administrative duties which had been subsumed by the new regional positions (QPS 1991b, p. 3). These police officers had the potential to be redeployed to operational duties.

Creating an Implementation Strategy and Timetable

A strategy and timetable for implementing civilianisation was adopted at the Command Conference⁶² on 21–22 October 1990 (see Appendix 5). This strategy was based on the findings of the Headquarters Functional Review Team and the status report of 7 October 1990. The completion date for civilianisation under this plan was January 1993. In practice, the strategy did not resolve the number of positions that were civilianisable, or the resource implications of its implementation. It was also unclear to what extent the strategy relied on the regional resource studies and findings of other project teams.

Entering Industrial Negotiations

To resolve the industrial implications of civilianisation, the QPS entered into negotiations with the unions. Matters discussed included the identification of award and legislative changes required for civilians to perform certain tasks, and work restructuring (especially for positions containing a mix of operational and non-police duties). The main industrial issues affecting the introduction of civilianisation were the separate awards, different working conditions for civilian and police employees, including the difficulty of rostering civilians on a 24-hour basis, and the ability of civilian staff to strike.

An agreement on some of these issues was reached between the QPS, the Queensland Police Officers' Union of Employees, and the Queensland Police Union of Employees, on 4 April 1991. This agreement provided that:

- Officers in scientific and technical positions would be allowed to continue as sworn officers in those positions until they either elected to leave the QPS, changed their careers within the organisation, or became unsworn members.
- Retraining would be provided to officers who were to be transferred to operational duties.

62 The Command Conference was a meeting of the senior management of the QPS to discuss and decide policy issues. It aimed to involve regional management in the decision-making process of the QPS. Although this particular Conference is no longer held, a similar Management Conference involving the Assistant Commissioners is now held every three months.

- A new classification of employee – the Police Support Officer – would be created. The Police Support Officer was not to be a fully trained or qualified police officer, but a multi-skilled officer able to support police officers in "police" work. Areas of potential employment included communication centres, watchhouses and station front-counters.
- Appropriate training and supervision for these Police Support Officers was to be made available.

The Police Support Officer classification has been included in the new 'Police Service Award – State', which is the amalgamation of the 'Police Award – State' and the 'Police Officers' Award – State'. This award took effect on 14 September 1992. However, at the time of this report being prepared, Police Support Officers have not yet been employed, although the drafting of a training package is near completion. Delay in formalising these positions has been primarily caused by:

- the need to resolve various industrial issues, such as training, the extent of powers, the classifications within the Police Support Officer band, salary scales, and union membership
- the finalisation of legislative amendments.

The QPS expects to employ at least 26 Police Support Officers in 1994/1995, once the relevant legislative changes have been made.

The CJC understands that as currently proposed, Police Support Officers will be members of the Police Union, will wear uniforms and will be authorised to exercise a limited number of police powers. Arguably, this will be more akin to the creation of an additional police rank, than an extension of civilianisation.

Releasing Police from Identified Civilian Positions

It is difficult to determine the number of police released from identified civilian positions since the Fitzgerald Inquiry. This is because:

- QPS information systems are unable to provide the detail required
- the number of positions funded and created has not "released" an equivalent number of police to operational duties

- some positions potentially suitable for civilianisation have had to be "backfilled" with police officers, because of the need to maintain operational services – for example, this occurred within the Police Communications Centre during February 1991, when newly sworn constables were assigned to duties in the Centre. The extent of such "backfilling" cannot be determined.

Although Treasury agreed in 1989/1990 to fund 251 civilian positions, police records indicated that only 208 positions have been created. Documentation indicates that 197 police were released as a result of the 208 civilian positions authorised by the Executive Council (Nystrom 1992, p. 3). On the information available, it is not possible to determine how many of these officers were subsequently reinstated to operational positions.

STATUS OF CIVILIANISATION

The number of civilians in the QPS has certainly increased since the Fitzgerald Inquiry. According to the *QPS Annual Report 1988/1989*, there were 857 civilians⁶³ and 5219 sworn officers. By 1 July 1994 there were 1,210 civilians⁶⁴ and 6,182 sworn officers.

The distribution of civilians across the QPS is provided in Table 6.3 as at January 1994.

63 As the recording of statistics has been inconsistent, it has been difficult to ascertain the exact number of civilians in the QPS. The following categories were used to determine the number of civilians: Administrative Officers; Specialist Officers and Clerks; Administrative Assistants Grades I and II; Administrative Assistants Grade I (Stenographers and Clerk-Typists); Telephonists; Lecturers; and Miscellaneous. Wages staff were excluded from these calculations. 'Actual strength' figures were used to calculate the number of police officers.

64 This figure excludes staff such as wages staff, trainees, casual staff and ATSI Liaison Officers.

**TABLE 6.3: CIVILIANS WITHIN THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(AS AT JANUARY 1994)**

Office/Region	Number
Executive Offices	41
Finance Division	38
Administration Division	118
Human Resources Division	119
Information Management Division	155
Operations Support Command	134
State Crime Operations Command	62
Metropolitan North Region	90
Metropolitan South Region	62
South Eastern Region	68
Southern Region	74
North Coast Region	82
Central Region	66
Northern Region	64
Far Northern Region	58
Total	1231

Source: QPS Human Resource records.

- Note:
1. This table includes both regional and central Headquarters staff.
 2. State Crime Operations Command consists of the BCIQ and the Crime Operations area of Task Force. This Command was renamed in June 1993.

Table 6.4 shows that the ratio of civilians to police officers improved from approximately 1:6.1 in 1989 to 1:5.1 in 1994.

TABLE 6.4: CIVILIAN AND POLICE NUMBERS (1988-1994)

Year	Number of Civilians	Number of Police	Ratio of Civilians to Police
1988/1989	857	5219	1:6.1
1989/1990	960	5524	1:5.8
1990/1991	1060	5895	1:5.6
1991/1992	1150	6271	1:5.5
1992/1993	1185	6377	1:5.4
1993/1994	1210	6182	1:5.1

Sources: QPS annual reports and statistical reviews; QPS Human Resources Branch.

Although the number of civilians in the QPS has increased substantially since 1988/1989, this does not indicate that adequate civilianisation has occurred. A distinction must be drawn between "new" civilian positions that did not release police officers and "civilianised" police positions. The employment of more civilians does not necessarily mean that more police have been made available for operational duties. For reasons already discussed, it is difficult to determine the number of police positions that have been civilianised.

After the initial allocations, there was little progress on the civilianisation initiative until 1993/1994. This has been recognised by the QPS (see *QPS Annual Report 1990/1991*, 'Commissioner's Foreword' and p. 24) and the PSMC Review (1993, pp. 156, 158). With the 1993/1994 and 1994/1995 State budget allocations, further progress may be possible.

OBSTACLES TO CIVILIANISATION

The ability of the QPS to implement a program of civilianisation has been hampered by:

- implementation problems
- unresolved industrial issues
- government policy
- inadequate funding
- inadequate human resource strategies
- the status of civilians within the QPS.

Implementation Problems

Three major implementation issues can be identified. First, due to the pressure on the QPS to move quickly, civilianisation was not systematically planned. Such planning required the review of all job descriptions and the redesign of positions with inappropriate mixes of duties. To date, there has been no systematic review of positions in the QPS. Generally, job descriptions are examined as vacancies occur. The job workplace redesign project,⁶⁵ introduced by the QPS as part of an industrial agreement, has not provided a comprehensive review of the mix of duties in positions throughout the State. Instead, fragmented internal reviews and regional resource studies have been used to identify positions to be civilianised.

Second, the groups established to develop strategies and timetables did not consult. Implementation plans were also not completed. Each time a new project was established there was a tendency to start again.

Third, civilianisation was poorly explained to affected officers. For instance, many sworn positions in the Radio and Electronics Section were marked as civilianisable. However, in interviews conducted in late 1992, police in this Section indicated that there was confusion about the possible time frame and the options open to them.

⁶⁵ A description is provided in Chapter Five.

Unresolved Industrial Issues

A failure to resolve industrial issues has hampered civilianisation, particularly in areas requiring 24-hour shift work. The *Public Service Management and Employment Act 1988* contains shift work provisions, but the corresponding Public Service award does not. A QPS Personnel Branch study indicated that, if the QPS was able to employ civilians over a 24-hour period, substantial numbers of police could be released for operational duties. For instance, in the South Eastern Region's operations rooms alone, 30 police officers could be made available for operational duties.⁶⁶

Negotiations on industrial issues such as these need to be resolved before further significant civilianisation can be achieved in the QPS.

Government Policy

Civilianisation has also been affected by government policy. For example, the ability of the QPS to create civilian positions has been limited by the imposition of public service ceilings. Moreover, any decision about the composition or "mix" of police personnel has had to be referred to the Minister as it is a matter of government policy.⁶⁷ Consequently, the QPS has not been in a position to create civilian positions on its own initiative.

Inadequate Funding

As it is being implemented by the QPS, civilianisation has increased the number of civilians without decreasing the number of police in the QPS. Hence the initiative has required additional transitional funding – although once it is fully implemented, both Treasury and the QPS estimate significant savings (PSMC 1993, p. 156).

66 An agreement reached in 1984 allows computer staff and telephonists to work on a 24-hour shift under the Public Service Award. This has enabled data entry operators for the Crime Recording Information System for Police (CRISP) to work on a 24-hour shift basis.

67 Tabled correspondence.

The discretionary component of the QPS budget is small and cannot support further large-scale civilianisation strategies. The main funding option being used to implement civilianisation is special allocations from Treasury. In December 1989 Treasury granted a special allocation of approximately \$5 million for the implementation of the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations in 1989/1990. Records indicate that approximately \$1.7 million of this allocation was set aside to fund the initial civilianisation of 100 police positions. There were no further special allocations until the recent \$40 million ("law and order") growth fund from the State Government. The QPS is now using part of this funding for increased civilianisation.⁶⁸

Inadequate Human Resource Strategies⁶⁹

Civilianisation has had three major human resource implications which need to be addressed by the QPS.

- Police officers released to operational duties have not always been retrained. Informal discussions with officers in the education and training area indicate that only fragmented programs have been available. Without appropriate refresher training, the transition from administrative to operational duties becomes difficult for officers, and may have adverse effects on their performance.
- More attention needs to be paid to the training needs of civilian staff. The PSMC indicated in its recent review of the QPS that the training needs of both unsworn and sworn staff had been neglected (1993, p. 4). There are few formal programs, induction or developmental, for civilian staff, although civilians in AO5 and above positions may participate in relevant police training courses, such as the Executive Development Program.⁷⁰

As is also required for police in-service training, relevant and appropriate courses must be systematically planned to address the training requirements of the QPS's civilian staff. The performance appraisal system should be part of this planning cycle, indicating the individual training needs of civilian

68 For instance in 1994/1995, the QPS expects to fund 79 civilian positions from the growth fund allocation (Queensland, Parliament 1994b, p. 66).

69 See CJC 1993b for a more detailed discussion of human resource issues within the QPS.

70 A management course conducted by the QPS for Senior Sergeants and Inspectors.

officers. This training strategy should be linked to the training strategies for police to help ensure integration of civilians into QPS management structures. With the recent appointment of a co-ordinator for unsworn training, strategies and policies for civilian staff should begin to be addressed.

- There needs to be more attention paid to the development of proper career paths for civilians. Inadequate career paths can cause a lack of interest and frustration, possibly leading to absenteeism and resignation. This factor also makes it more difficult for the QPS to attract qualified civilian staff.

This problem has been partly addressed in the draft *Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Management Plan 1993/1994*, which specifically targets the career progression of AO2 positions within the QPS. One positive strategy designed to redress the situation is to 'establish training programs for AO2 target group members to facilitate promotion opportunities' (QPS 1993e, p. 19).

Without suitable human resource strategies, civilianisation cannot work effectively. Structures and policies are required to ensure that qualified, experienced and performing civilian officers are retained and that the skills of both sworn and unsworn officers are developed and maintained.

Status of Civilians

Civilian staff within the QPS are predominantly used for administrative support. The majority of civilian positions are administrative in nature and relatively junior, such as clerks, administrative assistants, property officers and telephonists. As at 1 July 1994 approximately 82 per cent of civilians were employed at the levels of AO1 and AO2, whereas only around four per cent were employed at the levels of AO6 to AO8.⁷¹

Interviews with QPS personnel in late 1992 indicated that there was no strong opposition to civilianisation, but those police interviewed tended to envisage civilians performing only clerical support roles. There appeared to be a resistance to civilians in supervisory roles. This is illustrated by the problems which have arisen in relation to the Regional Education and Training Co-ordinators (sworn police officers) and Regional Personnel Officer (civilian) positions. Some regions attempted to form

71 Source: QPS records. Note these calculations are based on the actual number of civilians in the QPS. It does not include wages and casual staff.

integrated "personnel units" consisting of all regional human resource functions, headed by the Regional Personnel Officer. This meant that the Regional Education and Training Co-ordinator reported to a civilian officer. These arrangements have been largely unsuccessful.

Another factor affecting the integration of civilians into the QPS is the different working conditions of civilian and police staff. Civilian and police officers undertaking the same tasks often have different salaries, hours and vacation entitlements. The Information Systems Branch is an example of where this is occurring.

Overall, a common perception among the civilian employees interviewed in late 1992 was that they were "second-class citizens" within the organisation. This perception may have improved with the recent appointments of civilians to two key senior positions: the Executive Director, Corporate Services and the Director, Human Resources Division. On the other hand, it is not clear whether these changes "at the top" will have had much effect on how civilians feel they are regarded elsewhere in the organisation. Even if there are some positive signs, it is still important from a HRM perspective, for the QPS to actively promote the integration of civilians into the QPS. To help develop appropriate strategies, systematic research such as a regular survey of civilian staff should be undertaken, in order to identify any problems and monitor civilians' perceptions of their position within the QPS (see Chapter Ten).

A CIVILIANISATION STRATEGY

The QPS has estimated that between 400 and 600 positions still have the potential to be civilianised. Similarly, the PSMC Review indicated that between 700 and 1000 positions could be wholly or partly filled by civilians (1993, p. 3). The PSMC emphasised that future civilianisation needed to be properly planned, recognising the links between civilianisation and other human resource functions (pp. 157-158).

A viable long-term civilianisation strategy must include:

- *Training.* New civilian appointees, as well as sworn police officers returning to operational duties, require training to perform their duties satisfactorily.
- *Funding.* The initiative must be adequately funded to prevent the process stalling.

- *Career structures.* Civilian staff require suitable career structures to provide an incentive to joining and remaining with the QPS.
- *Industrial resolution.* Issues such as the employment of Police Support Officers, the content and structure of the two Awards, and the different working conditions between police officers and civilians, must be resolved.
- *Government approval.* Current governmental policy limits the extent of further civilianisation. Both the Government and the QPS need to examine this issue, in light of their continuing commitment to civilianisation in the QPS.
- *Communication.* The civilianisation initiative must be successfully "sold" to police officers to improve the perception, acceptance and status of civilians.

Many of these issues were identified by the PSMC as elements of an effective strategy. The QPS has indicated that it is aware of these issues. The CJC understands that the HRM Branch currently has responsibility for developing a civilianisation steering committee, in line with PSMC recommendation 73.⁷² The QPS has indicated that the Committee has been formed and has met on two occasions to help determine which positions to civilianise under the Government's growth funding program. The Committee will be reconvened as required to give further direction to the civilianisation initiative when more resources are made available (Correspondence, 10 August 1994).

CONCLUSION

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry the QPS has taken some steps to increase its level of civilianisation. Positions with the potential to be civilianised have been identified and the number of civilians employed by the QPS has been increased by 353. With the recent growth fund allocations, there is now a funding basis to support future civilianisation initiatives.

72 This recommendation states that:

By 31 December 1993, a Civilisation Steering Committee comprising senior executives from Operations, Operations Support and Corporate Services prepare for consideration by the Board of Management and the Chair, Criminal Justice Commission, a civilianisation plan which sets targets, includes performance indicators and takes account of the recommendations and suggestions in this report. (1993, p. 158)

To assist the process of civilianisation, the QPS needs to:

- *Address the issue of the mix of civilians and police within the QPS, in conjunction with the Government.* Government policy on the employment of public servants remains a major limitation on increasing the numbers of civilians employed by the QPS.
- *Improve the status of civilians within the QPS.* Although the situation may be changing in some areas, generally it appears that civilians remain "outsiders" within the organisation. Their roles are often perceived as limited to clerical support tasks. The position of civilians is also complicated by the different working conditions and salaries of civilian and police staff.
- *Support the civilianisation initiative with appropriate human resource strategies.* As emphasised by the PSMC, there must be proper support for training, career structures and planning for civilians. Policies are required to ensure that qualified, experienced and motivated civilian staff are retained. This issue has partially been addressed by the QPS with the recent appointment of a co-ordinator of civilian training, but a wider range of measures are required.

Most importantly, civilianisation should remain a priority for the organisation even if obstacles remain in the short-term. In the longer term, the benefits of civilianisation, in particular the more effective use of police officers, can only enhance the performance of the QPS.

CHAPTER SEVEN

TRANSFERS AND PROMOTIONS

Transfer and promotion procedures impact significantly on the operation of the QPS. These procedures can influence the ability of the organisation to retain skilled and motivated officers, the effectiveness of supervision and management, and the level of staff satisfaction within the organisation. The management of these procedures can have substantial implications not only for the motivation and morale of individual officers, but also for the performance of the organisation as a whole.

This chapter examines the transfer and promotion procedures for sworn officers in the QPS. In particular, it reviews:

- the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations on transfers and promotions
- the QPS response to those recommendations
- the current management of transfer and promotion procedures.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND TRANSFERS AND PROMOTIONS

Prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, once officers had successfully completed the relevant examination they were promoted on the basis of their seniority. The principle of the previous promotion procedures was that seniority prevailed *all else being equal*. However, in practice seniority almost always took precedence (QPS 1992c, p. 2). There were no formal procedures governing transfers (Queensland Police Department 1988, p. 167).

The Fitzgerald Inquiry identified several deficiencies in the transfer and promotion procedures. These included:

- discouragement of the pursuit of individual excellence
- a probable detrimental effect on the recruitment and retention of officers with skills and talents suitable to policing

- cumbersome and legalistic appeal processes
- poorly informed transfer decisions
- the inappropriate use of transfers for the handling of disciplinary and performance problems (1989, pp. 253–255).

On the basis of this analysis, the Inquiry made a series of recommendations aimed at introducing promotion procedures based on merit and a formalised mechanism for deciding transfers (see Table 7.1).

Merit-based Promotion

The Fitzgerald Inquiry proposed wide-ranging changes to the existing seniority-based promotion procedures. The recommended changes included:

- minimum length of service for each rank should be no more than a guideline
- all vacancies should be advertised
- regional-based selection panels should be used
- more junior officers should be involved in the selection process
- selection criteria should include job experience, attendance at external tertiary courses and performance appraisal
- some form of career counselling should be established
- job descriptions for all positions should be developed
- there should be a more flexible appeal process headed by senior Inspectorate officers, with informal sessions, no legal representation, and no restrictions on appellants (1989, pp. 253–254).

Formalised Transfers

The Fitzgerald Inquiry recommended the introduction of formal regional procedures for the determination of transfers. In addition, it proposed:

- implementing three-to-five year rotation procedures for officers in sensitive and high risk areas
- abolishing the right to appeal a transfer decision.

In relation to this latter proposal, the Inquiry argued that officers should be expected to serve according to organisational priorities and community interest (1989, pp. 255-256).

TABLE 7.1: MAJOR FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TRANSFER AND PROMOTION OF SWORN OFFICERS

Recommendation C.I.3(a):

Regional Commanders be given responsibility and authority for allocating staff within their regions including control of intra-regional transfers

Recommendation C.I.14:

all vacancies to be advertised, with senior positions advertised outside the Force as well as in the Police Gazette

Recommendation C.I.15:

all promotions be determined on the basis of merit rather than seniority

Recommendation C.I.17:

the promotion appeals procedures be reformed by adopting an informal administrative approach and widening the scope of appellants

Recommendation C.I.18:

all appeals be heard by designated senior officers from the Inspectorate

Recommendation C.I.19:

legal representation not be permitted at appeals

Recommendation C.I.20:

the process of determining transfers be formalized (and regionalized as previously recommended), with no right of appeal against transfer

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, pp. 380, 382-383.

DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFER AND PROMOTION PROCEDURES

In 1990 the legislative basis for merit-based selection and a review process with more informal proceedings was introduced. The relevant provisions were contained in the *Police Service Administration Act 1990* and the *Police Service (Review of Decisions) Regulation 1990*. The revised selection procedures were introduced regionally in October 1990. Formal policy on these procedures became effective on 30 March 1991. This basically coincided with the appointments of personnel officers in the regions.

Since these changes were introduced, there have been two major reviews of the operation of the transfer, promotion and review procedures. The first was an internal review by the QPS; the second was conducted by the PSMC as part of its general review of the QPS.

In December 1991 the Commissioner of Police initiated a review of the promotion, transfer and review procedures. At this time, the regionalised procedures had been operating for about nine months. The Committee for the Review of the Promotion, Transfer and Review Procedures (Review Committee) comprised sworn and unsworn QPS personnel, and independent representatives (including from the PSMC and the unions).

The review found that there was support for the merit principle but widespread suspicion of the integrity of the transfer and promotion process, and dissatisfaction with the delays in the procedures (Review Committee 1992, 'Foreword'). The Review Committee recommended that:

- decentralised selection panels be maintained
- merit-based selection principles be retained
- lateral transfer procedures, exempt from the review process, be introduced
- feedback to unsuccessful applicants, and training for selection panel members, be improved (pp. 1-3).

Shortly after the completion of this review, the PSMC commenced its review of the QPS. As a result, the QPS decided that it would be inappropriate to take any action in relation to the earlier review at that stage.

The PSMC identified similar problems in its review, and to a certain extent duplicated the earlier internal review. In particular, the PSMC found that:

- the procedures were generally distrusted by officers
- more clearly defined standards were needed
- selection panel training was inadequate
- the inability to transfer officers above the rank of Constable impeded efficiency
- delays in the review process were common (1993, pp. 159, 163–164).

The PSMC made 10 recommendations to address these issues, including:

- the development of guidelines for feedback to unsuccessful candidates
- a review of selection panel training
- the concentration of all promotions and transfers into two periods annually
- the preparation of a briefing paper on the industrial and legislative restrictions on lateral transfer, and strategies for addressing these issues
- the publication of a bi-annual analysis of reviews (recommendations 74, 78, 80 and 82, pp. 165–166).

Progress on the implementation of these recommendations has been slow. The issue of lateral transfers was resolved in late 1993, but action on the other recommendations affecting the transfer and promotion system was delayed pending the appointment of the new Director (Human Resources Division). A submission on transfer and promotion issues arising from the PSMC review was considered by the Board of Management on 26 April 1994.


The QPS is also proposing to formulate various transfer policies and to redevelop its promotion system. For the purposes of this reform, the PSMC recommendations will be implemented as short-term measures to improve the perceived difficulties of the current system, while more substantive reforms are being developed to address the types of problems identified in this chapter. This strategy was approved in principle at the June 1994 QPS Management Conference.⁷³

73 Item no. 3.10, Management Conference, 16 and 17 June 1994.

CURRENT TRANSFER AND PROMOTION PROCEDURES: AN ASSESSMENT

There is a considerable volume of movement of officers within the QPS. In the last two years the procedures have handled 1,228 promotions and 3,663 transfers, and 858 applications for review have been lodged.⁷⁴ In 1993/1994, eight per cent of the total number of police officers in the QPS were promoted and 16 per cent were transferred.

The current promotion procedures are briefly outlined in Figure 7.1.



74 Sources: QPS statistical reviews; Commissioner for Police Service Reviews records. The number of reviews lodged is not equivalent to the number of decisions reviewed. More than one officer can apply for a decision to be reviewed.




FIGURE 7.1: OVERVIEW OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE PROMOTION PROCEDURES

Sources: QPS 1992c and interviews with QPS personnel.

Note: 'Assessment Day' refers to the day on which various psychometric tests and other exercises are conducted.

Reform within Transfer and Promotion System

The current transfer and promotion process has addressed several of the deficiencies identified by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. The significant features of the existing process include:

- Seniority is no longer formally used as a criterion. 'Merit' is stated to be the guiding principle for any appointment of an officer to a position in the QPS (section 5.2(2) *Police Service Administration Act 1990*).⁷⁵

75 Merit is defined in section 5.2(5):

For the purposes of this section merit of an officer comprises –

- (a) the integrity, diligence and good conduct of the officer; and
- (b) the potential of the officer to discharge the duties of the position in question; and
- (c) the industry shown by the officer in performance of the duties of office in the course of the officer's career; and
- (d) the physical and mental fitness of the officer to perform the duties of the position in question.

- Regionalised selection panels are used for junior officers, although Commissioned officer appointments are currently handled by central panels.
- Most vacancies are advertised internally, with the exception of Constable positions. Senior and some specialist vacancies are also advertised externally.⁷⁶
- With amendments made to the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*, some transfers are now handled through a formal process under procedures instituted in late 1993. Under the new lateral transfer process, formal submissions are made to a Lateral Transfer Committee which makes recommendations to the Commissioner of Police.⁷⁷ This process handles all transfers at rank, although these arrangements are currently under review as required by the Industrial Agreement governing these ranks.
- While there is no general procedure of rotation for officers in sensitive areas, some sections of the organisation have adopted rotation policies. For example, State Crime Operations rotates its detectives through its units, generally on a two-yearly basis.
- An appeal process for promotion and certain transfer decisions⁷⁸ has been established under Part 9 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990* and the *Police Service (Review of Decisions) Regulation 1990*. Appeals are heard without legal representation before the Commissioners for Police Service Reviews, who are currently part-time CJC commissioners. This arrangement differs from the Inquiry recommendation of using senior officers from the Inspectorate. However, the Review Commissioners have the advantage of being external to, and independent of, the QPS.

76 The larger issue of lateral recruitment is discussed in CJC 1993b.

77 There are union representatives on this Committee.

78 Currently, with the introduction of the new lateral transfer procedures, the review process has been limited to the officer who is subject to an *unrequested* transfer (section 5.13(2)(b) *Police Service Administration Act 1990*). The Fitzgerald Inquiry recommended that there be no right of appeal for any transfer decision. However, for reasons of natural justice, the QPS and the CJC agreed that at least unrequested transfer decisions should be reviewable.

- All restrictions on promotion appeals that applied before the Fitzgerald Inquiry have been dropped. Any officer 'who is aggrieved' has the right to review a promotion decision (section 9.3(1) *Police Service Administration Act 1990*).
- Panel members receive some training, although there has been criticism of the quality of this training.
- Unsworn staff, usually the Regional Personnel Officers, are often used on selection panels for sworn positions.
- Performance evaluation has been introduced by the QPS. A Performance Planning and Assessment (PPA) scheme for all staff (except the Commissioner of Police) has been trialed and reviewed. In July 1993 ranks above that of Inspector and senior civilians were transferred to an executive performance appraisal scheme. Unfortunately, as discussed later in this chapter, there have been problems with the PPA scheme.

Problems with Operation of Transfer and Promotion Procedures

While the promotion system has been substantially reformed, various problems with promotion, transfer and review procedures have been experienced by the QPS. Over the last two years, these difficulties have been identified and documented, principally through the Review Committee and the PSMC review. Similar concerns were also expressed to the CJC in interviews conducted in late 1992 with serving police throughout the State.

There still appears to be a fair amount of disquiet about the transfer and promotion procedures. For instance:

- a recent Police Union survey reported considerable dissatisfaction with these procedures (Melling 1994, pp. 11-13), although as the response rate was not reported, it is difficult to assess the extent of dissatisfaction
- items before the June 1994 Management Conference reflected a variety of concerns about the procedures

- according to an article in the June 1994 *Police Union Journal* by the General President of the Police Union, '[t]here can be no doubt that, by and large, the members of the Queensland Police Service have no faith in the promotion system' (O'Gorman 1994, p. 5).

Given continuing internal dissatisfaction with the promotion and transfer procedures, it is important to address police concerns even if not all of the criticisms are well grounded.

The QPS is already taking steps along these lines. At the June 1994 Management Conference a discussion paper was presented outlining an agenda for the reform of the promotion system. In addition, a number of the PSMC recommendations will be implemented as temporary measures to help alleviate some of the procedural problems (Management Conference, June 1994). However, in the view of the QPS and the CJC, the procedural changes recommended by the PSMC will be of limited use in redressing the fundamental concerns about the current procedures.

The following section discusses the major issues that have been raised by police over the last few years in relation to transfer and promotions procedures. Where relevant, the remedial measures being introduced by the QPS are also discussed.

Perceptions of Transfer and Promotion Procedures

As indicated in interviews conducted with serving officers in late 1992, and by other reviews mentioned above, the present transfer and promotion procedures are distrusted by many officers. Particular concerns expressed by police are that:

- the procedures are time-wasting
- decision-making is of poor quality and inappropriate selection criteria are often used
- the selection panel process varies regionally
- the review process is abused
- the procedures are open to cronyism.

Time-wasting

In a seniority system, when a vacancy occurs it is clear who is the most senior. Merit-based promotion will naturally be more time-consuming than a seniority system. Also, it must be recognised that with the major restructuring of the QPS following the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and the resultant reclassification and creation of positions, extra demands were placed on the new procedures before they had a chance to settle down.

Many of the police interviewed in late 1992 complained that the merit-based selection process was time-consuming. In particular, interviewees pointed to two major sources of delay:

- The excessive time between the advertisement and the final notification. The QPS recognises that there have been delays and steps to streamline the process are being considered. As well, some regions have instituted policies requiring vacancies to be finalised at the regional level within a certain period.⁷⁹ For example, one region has an 'Operation Quickfill' policy whereby all vacancies must be finalised up to the recommendation to the HRM Branch within 28 days.
- Delays in the confirmation of appointments due to the number of reviews, and consequent delays in the review process. During May 1994 the times for the completion of a review ranged from seven weeks to 15 weeks, not including time for results to be posted. According to the Review Commissioners' office, the ideal total time from the lodgement of an application until it is heard should be between 6 to 8 weeks (Correspondence, 24 May 1994). One primary source of delay in the review process identified by the Review Commissioner's office and the PSMC has been the failure of selection panel convenors to supply relevant information in time. For example, during May 1994 the time between the date of request for a report and the date it was received ranged from approximately one to 10 weeks. As a means of addressing this problem, the PSMC recommended that the regulations be amended so that panel convenors must attend reviews (1993, recommendation 75, p. 165). The QPS has indicated that it has no objection to panel convenors attending reviews. However, under the current regulations, Review Commissioners already have the right to call panel convenors and convenors

79 This, of course, cannot impact upon the time taken centrally to ratify the decision.

have the right to attend hearings if they wish to do so. The Review Commissioners have indicated that this right to call convenors is exercised in appropriate circumstances and that there would be little benefit in requiring all convenors to attend reviews as a matter of course.

The complaints about delay indicate that the selection process requires more effective management. In particular, there needs to be better planning and clearer standards, including codification of policy, to manage the workload and distribution of promotional decisions.

Quality of Selection Decisions and Selection Criteria

A common criticism raised in interviews and other forums was the perceived poor quality of decision-making on the part of some selection panels, with a particular concern being the use of selection criteria that were inappropriate to police work. For example, it was frequently stated that:

- the selection process under-weighted length of service and experience, and over-emphasised tertiary qualifications⁸⁰
- the selection criteria should contain minimum length of service requirements
- "jumping" of ranks should not be permitted
- experience should be a major determinant of an officer's ability to perform duties at a higher rank – in turn, length of service was widely seen as a de facto measure of experience.

These views about the selection criteria demonstrate confusion over the concept of "merit", notwithstanding that the principle of "merit" was generally supported by those interviewed.

More recently, the Review Commissioners have indicated that there are a number of factors that impact adversely on the quality of decision-making by the selection panels including: inadequate distinctions being made by panels between experience/length of service and merit and potential, and inadequacies in the written recommendations supplied to panels, particularly in relation to the person's known performance on the job.

⁸⁰ There is no set weighting of the selection criteria for any position within the QPS. The weighting is meant to be determined by individual selection panels, taking account of the different environments in which that position operates.

The QPS and the PSMC have identified a number of possible strategies to improve the quality and management of selection decision-making. These include:

- *Concentrating the promotion process into two periods annually.* The PSMC recommended this reform on the grounds that it would enable applicants and potential selection panel members to plan in advance (1993, recommendation 78, p. 166). The Board of Management has agreed in principle not to implement this recommendation, out of concern for possible delays that could be created between vacancies and appointments. Instead, the QPS is considering regulating, at a district level, the frequency with which selection panels are convened, and the numbers of officers used in the process.
- *Centralising the promotion process.* Centralisation will not necessarily improve the management of selection panels. Permanent central panels, even with an operational representative, run the risk of becoming isolated from the operational environment. In the CJC's view, regional panels should be retained but with a convenor external to the region to help ensure more consistent decisions statewide and communication between regions.
- *More training for panel members.* Currently, a two-day selection panel course must be completed by staff before participation on selection panels, but potential selection panel members clearly require more training than this. In particular, an intensive course should be held for those officers likely to be panel convenors. The PSMC recommended that the HRM Branch review existing selection panel training and introduce a revised course by 30 September 1993 (1993, recommendation 74, p. 165). The Board of Management has adopted this recommendation in conjunction with the PSMC recommendation that the completion of an approved selection panel procedures course be a prerequisite to participating on a panel (recommendation 77, p. 166). However, the implementation timetable for these recommendations has been substantially revised.

Regional Variation

Many of the police interviewed in late 1992 complained about regional variations in the operation of the promotion procedures and the composition of selection panels. For example, some officers said that certain regions had regionally-specific formats for applications. Due to these differences, officers often felt disadvantaged when applying for positions outside their current regions. Overall, regionalisation has contributed to considerable uncertainty about promotion procedures.

The PSMC has made recommendations which may help alleviate the problems caused by the procedural differences between the regions. These include better training for selection panel members, clearer standards for the operation of the procedures, and improved feedback to unsuccessful candidates (1993, pp. 165-166).⁸¹

Other suggestions for improving the consistency of selection decision-making have been raised by the QPS. For instance, the QPS has proposed limiting the selection criteria to a smaller number of key standard areas and introducing a standard application form.

Use of the Review Process

Most officers interviewed expressed concern about the proportion of reviews being requested. QPS figures on reviews show that a fairly substantial proportion of promotion decisions are reviewed: 33 per cent in 1990/1991; 47 per cent in 1991/1992; 34 per cent in 1992/1993; and 35 per cent in 1993/1994 (see Table 7.2). Of the reviews lodged, the majority have been either dismissed or withdrawn. The proportion being upheld has remained fairly constant over the last four years (see Table 7.3).

81 These recommendations are to be implemented by the QPS.

**TABLE 7.2: NUMBER OF PROMOTION AND TRANSFER DECISIONS
(1990-1994)**

	Promotions				Transfers			
	1990/ 1991	1991/ 1992	1992/ 1993	1993/ 1994	1990/ 1991	1991/ 1992	1992/ 1993	1993/ 1994
No. of decisions	601	555	716	512	—	1553	2657	1006
No. of decisions reviewed	196	262	242	181	—	57	52	31
% of decisions reviewed	33	47	34	35	—	4	2	3

Source: QPS statistical reviews; Commissioner for Police Service Reviews records.

- Notes: 1. These figures exclude the initial allocation of recruits to the regions and lateral transfers.
2. The transfer figures for 1990/1991 have not been included in this table, as the number of transfers was incorrectly calculated in the *Statistical Review 1990/1991*.

TABLE 7.3: PROMOTION REVIEW OUTCOMES (1990-1994)

Outcome	1990/1991	1991/1992	1992/1993	1993/1994
Successful (upheld)	7(2%)	21 (3%)	23 (4%)	6 (2%)
Dismissed	111(30%)	227(36%)	193(36%)	108(33%)
Withdrawn	133(36%)	261(42%)	196(37%)	121(37%)
Outstanding	106(29%)	79(13%)	96(18%)	59(18%)
Re-assessed	N/A	6 (1%)	20 (4%)	29 (9%)
Lapsed/Out of Order	13 (4%)	32 (5%)	2 (—)	5 (2%)
Total	370	626	530	328
Number lodged during year	370	579	530	328

Source: QPS statistical reviews; Commissioner for Police Service Reviews records.

- Notes:
1. The number of reviews does not correspond exactly to the number of decisions reviewed.
 2. The outcomes of transfer reviews were not included in the table because: (a) only a small proportion of transfer decisions are reviewed (see Table 7.2); and (b) the 1990/1991 figures for transfers were incorrectly calculated in the *Statistical Review 1990/1991*.
 3. The figures in each year include some reviews that were outstanding from the previous period.
 4. Percentages have been rounded.
 5. 'Reassessed' figures for 1990/1991 were not recorded.

Some officers have argued that these figures are indicative of over-use of the review process, and show the need for stricter guidelines on who is allowed to seek a review. However, the picture presented by the review statistics is over-simplified, as these figures:

- are only for the four-year period of the operation of the new procedures and, at this stage, are not sufficient for identifying trends⁸²
- overstate the number of decisions not being overturned on review, due to the occurrence of multiple reviews against a single decision.

The statistics also cannot reflect the organisational context in which the review procedures are operating. In particular, the high number of review applications could partly be due to officers' confusion over the concept of "merit", or reflect the impact of the radical changes of the last few years on officers' career expectations.

It is possible that review applications will become less common over time, as the new arrangements become more widely understood and accepted.

Bias in Selection Decisions

Various allegations of bias in the selection process were made by police who were interviewed in late 1992. Such complaints still appear to be common, if recent comments in the *Police Union Journal* are a guide.⁸³ In particular, it is often claimed that candidates within the region of the advertised vacancy receive preferential treatment.

The promotions data for 1992 show that, in most regions, generally only about one-third of positions were filled by applicants external to the regions (PSMC 1993, p. 159). Unfortunately, it is difficult to interpret these data in the absence of information on the size or characteristics of the pool of applicants. For instance, the majority of applicants could have been internal to the region advertising, in which case a higher proportion of internal appointees would be expected. Until more comprehensive data become available, it will not be possible to resolve this issue.

82 It is difficult to compare the figures before and after the Fitzgerald Inquiry due to the substantial procedural changes.

83 According to the General President of the Police Union: 'there is "massaging" and, at times, blatant manipulation of the system' (O'Gorman 1994, p. 5).

However, as discussed in this chapter, perceptions of bias can be addressed partly through improving the quality of selection decision-making, ensuring that there is more input into selection decisions from outside the region and providing officers with more information about the procedures and their operation.

Management of Promotions

In addition to the matters discussed above, it is important to look at the overall management of promotions within the QPS. Issues that are of particular concern in this regard are:

- the limited understanding of the concept of "merit" by officers, and particularly by panels
- the absence of a clear process and framework for assessing "merit"
- inadequate mechanisms for monitoring
- the lack of career planning
- an over-emphasis on rank as a career structure.

Concept of "Merit"

As already noted, there is some confusion about the meaning of "merit" on the part of many serving police officers. Much of this confusion is the result of a lack of information. Three ways of addressing this issue are through:

- *Training.* The QPS is acting to improve training for members of selection panels. However, training generally for officers who are or may be applicants for promotion is also required. The QPS has provided some courses in this area – for example, one of the early Competency Acquisition Program (CAP) modules outlined the procedures and the underlying principles of merit-based promotion – but training on issues such as resume writing and handling interviews also needs to be generally available to officers throughout the State.

- *Improved feedback to unsuccessful candidates.* This was an area identified by the PSMC (1993, pp. 160, 165). At a meeting on 26 April 1994, the Board of Management agreed that the PSMC recommendation for the provision of feedback should be implemented.
- *Providing regular information on the operation of the transfer, promotion and review procedures to officers.* The publication of a biannual analysis of reviews, as recommended by the PSMC (p. 166), would assist in improving the standards of selection panels and provide more information to serving officers. Other methods of disseminating regular information on the operation of the procedures also need to be considered.

Assessing "Merit"

Under the current promotion procedures, a vacancy occurs; the position is advertised; applications are submitted by interested officers; a selection panel is formed; applicants are short-listed and interviewed; and the position is then finally filled. This way of assessing the "merit" of applicants for individual positions is inefficient for a number of reasons:

- Considerable logistical and practical difficulties arise as a result of the large number of promotion decisions that occur within the organisation.⁸⁴
- The current procedures do not take into account the significant probability of lateral movement by officers between operational and administrative/managerial positions. The QPS has indicated that recent legislative changes and the application of tenure conditions reinforce the expectation that many officers will move, at short notice, from an administrative to an operational position. As a result, an officer who has been selected on the basis of his or her ability to perform an administrative function could be transferred to operational duties.
- At present, there do not appear to be consistent standards for determining what is required for the performance of particular positions and their associated ranks throughout the State. Apparent inconsistency in decision-making has been one of the most common criticisms of the current promotions procedures.

84 For instance, in 1993/1994 there were 512 promotions and 1,006 transfers (Commissioner for Police Service Reviews records).

As proposed by the QPS, one way of structuring the promotion process to take into account these issues would be to divide the process into two stages – with officers competing on merit at each stage. The first stage would involve some determination of promotion eligibility for various classes of officers at particular stages of their careers. Officers would have to satisfy certain standards of competency before qualifying into the pool of potential applicants. The second stage would mirror the current procedures – those officers who are eligible for promotion would compete on merit for advertised vacancies. For example, officers would compete on merit to enter a developmental training program, the completion of which would be a prerequisite for the ability to apply for promotion.

As pointed out by the QPS, this approach would have the advantage of shifting the emphasis from post-appointment training to pre-appointment training, and should ensure that all officers attaining a particular rank have demonstrated satisfactory competence in key skills. Needless to say, the reform will require careful examination and extensive consultation with stakeholders before it is implemented – a process that the QPS plans to put in place.⁸⁵

Monitoring Procedures

More effective procedures need to be developed for monitoring the operation of the current transfer and promotion procedures. Some limited processes have been introduced, such as collecting routine data on transfers, promotions and reviews, and checking of selection reports from panel convenors by Regional Personnel Officers. Ideally, such a strategy would enable problems to be identified early, and put management in a position to resolve any difficulties. Given the disillusionment with the procedures evidenced during interviews, earlier identification of problems is essential.

⁸⁵ This proposal for the reform of the promotion process was approved in principle at the June 1994 Management Conference.

Career Planning

There is still confusion and uncertainty amongst QPS officers about career progression. The move to merit-based procedures was a fundamental change to the career expectations of officers. Under the previous promotion procedures, officers could generally predict when they would attain each rank. The current merit-based structure does not allow such certainty. It is understandable that this has generated some negative perceptions of the new procedures.

The QPS has not instituted systematic career planning to address these concerns. The PPA scheme could be a basis for career planning, but it has never been used for such purposes. As mentioned earlier, since February 1991 the PPA scheme has been used by the QPS for the evaluation and monitoring of the job performance of officers below the rank of Superintendent. The scheme has several aims, including the planning of work performance, the setting of standards, the assessment of the progress of an officer and the identification of training needs.

This method of appraisal requires that the supervisor of the officer complete the assessment, based on previously established objectives and performance measures. These objectives are set by agreement between the officer and his or her supervisor at the beginning of the assessment period. If the officer being assessed is dissatisfied with the report, he or she can request a formal review, which is conducted by the overseeing officer. An outline of the scheme is provided in Figure 7.2.




FIGURE 7.2: OUTLINE OF THE PERFORMANCE PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT SCHEME

Source: QPS records.

In practice, PPAs have not fulfilled their designed purposes. PPAs are not used for assisting officers in the development of their careers and are not integrated into the other human resources and planning activities of the QPS. For instance, it was indicated in interviews conducted in late 1992 that:

- generally the training needs component of the PPA was not completed
- difficulties were experienced in establishing suitable measures, with supervisors being reluctant to assess their staff other than as "average"

- inappropriate performance measures, such as writing a certain number of traffic tickets, were sometimes used.

Internal reviews have also identified problems with the PPA procedures, as a result of which some changes have been made. For example, the five point rating scale has been collapsed into three categories: 'not met', 'met' or 'exceeded'. However, this does not necessarily force supervisors to correctly appraise their staff.

Three particular issues need to be addressed by the QPS in developing career planning strategies. First, career structures should be linked to developmental training and the promotion system. For example, the completion of a supervisory course could be required in order to compete for particular positions. As mentioned earlier, the QPS, through a consultative process, will be considering this issue in its redevelopment of the transfer and promotion procedures. Properly structured developmental courses would ensure that officers had the requisite knowledge and skills for particular positions, but they would also provide a direction for individual officer career planning. Second, adequate training should be provided to officers and their supervisors so that they are aware of career structures within the organisation and how to use this information to plan individual career paths. This should include the publication of examples of how careers can be planned. Finally, the QPS needs to ensure that supervisors give honest appraisals and advice to officers. Without appropriate feedback, career planning will be difficult to achieve.

Push for Promotion and Career Structures

It is clear from the interviews conducted in late 1992, and from subsequent discussions with many police, that career achievement and satisfaction generally are defined in terms of rank. As a result, there is a general push for promotion, as there is no other major way of gaining status or recognition within the organisation. However, as the Select Committee on the Police Promotional Procedures (NSW) found, police generally indicated that they would be content to continue performing at patrol level without seeking promotion to a supervisory position, if there were suitable salary and other rewards (1991, p. 41).

Recent reforms that have been introduced into the QPS have made it increasingly important that the QPS look at ways of ensuring career development and rewarding job performance other than through rank-based promotions. These reforms relate to:

- the recruitment of tertiary graduates

- the transition to a new rank structure
- the adoption of community policing as an organisation philosophy.

Recruitment of Tertiary Graduates

Due to various factors, including the recent changes to the QPS pre-entry criteria, the proportion of recruits with tertiary qualifications has increased markedly (see Figure 7.3). The transition to a more qualified workforce may present difficulties in later years for the QPS. For instance, a study of graduates in United Kingdom police services found that graduate officers tended to have 'higher career aspirations and greater expectations of the work' than those officers without such qualifications (Smithers, Hill & Silvester 1990, p. 114). In addition, graduate recruits were more likely to resign earlier in their careers – the major reason being related to career prospects (p. 116).

There is not yet sufficient data to evaluate whether similar problems will be experienced in the QPS, as increased graduate recruitment has only occurred in the last three years. However, problems which have arisen elsewhere indicate the importance of taking some appropriate pre-emptive action. Career development, as well as recruiting policies that realistically present the career opportunities available, are of critical importance.




FIGURE 7.3: PERCENTAGE OF RECRUITS WITH COMPLETED TERTIARY QUALIFICATIONS

Source: QPS recruiting data.

- Notes:
1. Some caution must be taken in interpreting this graph due to the small number in the January/May 1994 group when compared to the other groups.
 2. The figures above the bars represent the number of recruits who have completed tertiary qualifications.

Transition to a New Rank Structure

In the interviews conducted in late 1992, police indicated that there was a general lack of support for the new rank structure, especially among officers below the rank of Inspector. A common focus of criticism was the amalgamation of the "classes" within the old ranks. For instance, under the old system an officer could achieve the rank of Sergeant 3/C through the passage of time, whereas the rank of Sergeant 1/C was attained through examination and promotion. These two classes were amalgamated in the new rank structure. As a result, many officers felt that their skills and experience were no longer being recognised.

The negative effects on morale caused by the implementation of the new rank structure led the PSMC, in its review of the QPS, to recommend the introduction of a "stripe" for longer serving Constables (1993, recommendation 83, p. 166). The stripe was apparently intended to be a recognition of the skills and experience of these officers. Concern about the stripe becoming a de facto rank was expressed by various parties, including the CJC. Various alternatives to the "stripe" are currently being examined by the QPS.

This example illustrates the importance of insignia and rank to the recognition of an officer's performance within the QPS. Such an emphasis creates a "push" for promotion – officers advance up the rank structure as an organisational reward for their work. This upwards movement of officers leads to:

- Job dissatisfaction and lack of motivation among many officers as the promotion opportunities above the rank of Senior Sergeant are limited. Traditionally, the bulk of officers remain below the rank of Inspector for most of their careers – over the last four years, the percentage of officers below the rank of Inspector has been around 95 per cent.
- A shift of experienced officers away from "the streets" (see below).

Adoption of Community Policing

The adoption of a community policing commitment by the QPS requires a change to career structures to emphasise the role of general duty officers.

In the present vertical career structure, officers who are performing well "on the streets" must seek promotion to supervisory/administrative positions "off the streets" in order to progress within the organisation. In essence, often the only means of rewarding a good general duty officer is by removing him or her to an administrative or supervisory position.

Over the last five years, around one-third of the QPS has been of the supervisory ranks of Sergeant or above (see Figure 7.4). In June 1994 there were 2,126 officers in these supervisory ranks, representing approximately 34 per cent of all police. This high proportion of supervisory police can have a serious impact on deployment,

because under current operational arrangements movement to more senior ranks frequently involves a shift away from direct service delivery.⁸⁶

These practices are difficult to reconcile with the philosophy of community policing. They contribute to a lack of status for general duty and patrol work, and the loss of motivated competent officers from such assignments (Sparrow, Moore & Kennedy 1990, p. 226).




FIGURE 7.4: SUPERVISORY RANKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POLICE (1982/1983 TO 1993/1994)

Sources: QPS annual reports and statistical reviews; QPS records; CJC records.

86 For instance, as noted in Chapter Five, an examination of duty rosters for December 1992 in a major provincial city showed that Sergeants performed patrol duties on only 27 per cent of the total shifts for that month.

- Notes:
1. 'Supervisory ranks' consist of the ranks of Sergeant and above.
 2. The dotted line represents the change to the new rank structure. Some care must be taken in comparing the years before and after this line. In the years before this change (1982/1983 to 1991/1992), the rank of Sergeant 3/C was excluded from these figures. This rank was attained through length of service and was not a promotion. As a result, it did not usually have significant supervisory duties. The figures collated by the QPS do not distinguish between Sergeants 3/C, Senior Constables and Constables. However, with the change to the new rank structure, Sergeants 3/C were incorporated into the new 'Sergeant' rank. These officers are included in the figures for 1992/1993. The only figures available show that, for 1990/1991, the proportion of officers at the rank of Sergeant 3/C was about two per cent.
 3. For the years 1982/1983 to 1990/1991, the ranks of Chief, Principal and Senior Technical and Scientific Officers were included. These were sworn positions that existed before the new rank structure.
 4. The figures used for calculating the rank distribution for 1993/1994 are as at 1 June 1994. All other figures are as at the relevant financial year.

Summary

The three issues discussed above demonstrate the need for the QPS to consider other types of career structures, rewards and incentives. The CJC understands that these issues will be addressed by the QPS in the course of developing a Human Resource Strategic Plan. Possible strategies that might be included in this plan include:

- overlapping pay scales⁸⁷
- contract employment (based on the career benefits to officers of such employment)⁸⁸

87 The QPS has advised that it anticipates that the introduction of overlapping pay scales and, in particular, contract employment would involve extensive negotiation with both the unions and central agencies. The potential cost, at least in the initial stages, could be considerable (Correspondence, 9 June 1994).

88 For example, a 10-year contract could provide for the payment of a year's salary upon non-renewal by either party. Such a payment allows an officer 12 months to establish another career.

- redefining the roles associated with each rank (for example, defining some Sergeant roles to include more patrol duties)
- flexible leave without pay arrangements, to allow officers to pursue educational and other professional activities outside the QPS.⁸⁹

These strategies should also be supported by appropriate selection criteria for promotion. Wherever possible, selection criteria should reflect the values inherent in the community policing model. Although general community policing criteria are incorporated in job descriptions, many officers interviewed in late 1992 were sceptical that a commitment to community policing was taken seriously as a criterion. As community policing activities were generally undertaken by officers on top of their standard duties, many felt disadvantaged; many officers also believed that inappropriate measures of commitment were used. In practice, panel members and applicants tend to be reluctant to accept innovativeness and other non-traditional policing selection criteria.⁹⁰ In the longer term, if the QPS is to move further towards a community policing model, values and skills appropriate to this model must be recognised and supported in corporate and regional goals, training and policing strategies (see Chapter Four).

CONCLUSION

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the QPS has introduced merit-based promotion procedures, a formal mechanism for determining some transfers, and a review process with more informal proceedings. In most respects, the procedures introduced are consistent with the Inquiry's recommendations. The QPS has also initiated reviews of its transfer, promotion and review procedures. A future overhaul of the promotion process, involving key stakeholders within and outside the QPS, is being proposed. Overall, there has been a serious effort made to reform, and improve, transfers and promotions within the organisation.

89 There are some provisions for unpaid leave available.

90 The QPS in its response to a draft of this report, disagreed with this assessment: In general terms, innovation and community response are recognised by panels and often recognised significantly. Also these areas are usually included in job descriptions albeit necessarily in general terms. (Correspondence, 1 August 1994)

Although there is now more professionalism in these procedures, there are some broader issues in the general operation of the system. These problem areas will not be adequately met by simple procedural changes to the existing system; rather, their solution involves changes to the management of promotions. It is likely that these issues will be addressed as part of the promotions reform to be initiated by the QPS.

The main issues identified in this review are as follows:

- The management of selection panels needs to be addressed. Strategies such as intensive training for potential panel convenors, clearer policy standards and the use of convenors external to the regions on panels would help improve the quality of selection decision-making.
- Selection criteria for all positions need to give more weight to innovativeness, creativity and, where appropriate, a commitment to community-based policing. In practice, selection panel members and potential applicants often appear reluctant to accept selection criteria reflecting non-traditional policing values. At one level, this can be addressed through improved selection panel training and feedback to unsuccessful applicants. The value placed on various aspects of policing should also be reflected in training strategies, and regional and corporate goals.
- The structure of the promotions process needs to be reviewed in light of the difficulties caused by the considerable number of promotions each year, the lateral mobility of officers, and the need for more objective assessment of "merit". Through a consultative process, the QPS is proposing to develop options to improve the consistency and objectivity of the promotion process: one key suggestion is to link eligibility for promotion with the satisfactory completion of developmental training for particular key ranks/positions.
- Better mechanisms need to be developed for the identification and resolution of problems within the transfer, promotion and review procedures. Current monitoring practices have been inadequate for identifying and addressing some of the fundamental problems with these procedures.
- Systematic career planning must become an integral part of the QPS management of its human resources. Career planning is an important mechanism of support for officers, as well as an important management tool for the organisation. Senior management must ensure that career planning structures such as the PPA are used. The QPS review of its promotion and transfer procedures should assist in providing more focus on career planning and performance appraisal systems.

- The development of alternative career structures needs to be seriously considered. This will require the restructuring of career paths within the organisation. The traditional policing career is vertical in nature – an officer works his or her way up the rank structure. However, for the bulk of officers their careers will not progress past the rank of Senior Sergeant. If the QPS is to retain and maintain motivated and competent officers, alternative career structures are needed. Possibilities to be considered are overlapping pay scales and the redefining of the roles of various ranks. These issues will be considered by the QPS in the process of developing its Human Resource Strategic Plan.
- The QPS should work towards lessening the close connection of rank with status and pay. The close association of these factors has had several negative consequences for the adoption of community-based policing. It results in the movement of experienced officers out of the operational area and highlights the continuing low importance attached to the general duties role. The development of overlapping pay scales would be one potential strategy for addressing this issue.

Overall, the reforms which have been made to transfer, promotion and review procedures represent an important step by the QPS towards more effective management of its human resources. The task now is to consolidate these improvements and provide a direction for the future.

CHAPTER EIGHT

STATE CRIME OPERATIONS COMMAND

State Crime Operations Command consists of a collection of specialist investigative units that supplement regional policing capabilities. Unlike the regions, State Crime Operations is organised on a functional basis and has a statewide responsibility.

Initially, State Crime Operations was known as Task Force Command, and included a number of operational support units (such as the Special Emergency Response Team) as well as the specialist investigative units. Task Force Command was established as the result of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Following the PSMC Review, Task Force Command was split into State Crime Operations Command and Operations Support Command.

This chapter examines:

- the Fitzgerald Inquiry criticisms of the specialist criminal investigation units in the QPS
- the Inquiry's recommendation for the establishment of a Task Force Command
- the development and structure of State Crime Operations Command
- issues relating to the current State Crime Operations arrangements in the QPS.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

Originally, many functions now carried out by State Crime Operations were the responsibility of the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB). The CIB was the largest specialist group within the QPS, under the control of an Assistant Commissioner (Crime and Services). It had its headquarters in Brisbane and maintained offices in each of the former regions. Originally detectives outside Brisbane reported to local District Officers.

At the time of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the CIB included the various specialist groups listed in Table 8.1.

TABLE 8.1: PRE-FITZGERALD INQUIRY CIB SPECIAL SQUADS

Special Squad	Staff Numbers	Special Squad	Staff Numbers
Major Crime	12	Railway	14
Homicide	13	Fraud	42
Armed Holdup	8	Sexual Offenders	16
Drug	32	Arson	8
Break and Enter	23	Fauna	2
Dealers	7	Stock	4
Metro. Field Staff	14	University Liaison	1
Auto Theft	23	Headquarters	42

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 239.

Note: 'Metropolitan Field Staff' was a squad that dealt with tasks not normally handled by the other CIB squads. Generally, it assisted other squads in their investigations or supplemented their staffing as required.

Information from the special squads within the CIB was collated and integrated by two major units: the Information Bureau⁹¹ and the Bureau of Criminal Intelligence Queensland (BCIQ).

⁹¹ The Information Bureau essentially dealt with data on reported crime (such as complainants, stolen property, criminal offence reports and criminal histories) and some miscellaneous information (for instance, various licences). It was redeveloped into the Information Management Bureau after the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and more recently has been reorganised into the Police Information Centre and the Information Resource Centre.

According to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, these specialist squads:

- were overrated in their ability to make an impact on crime within their area of speciality
- were largely unaccountable in terms of the activities of individuals and units
- used up considerable resources without needing to justify results
- limited the opportunities for general police to enhance their skills
- were ad hoc responses to crime pressures that depleted resources available for local law enforcement
- in some cases had complete control over particular types of criminal investigations
- had fostered corruption
- tended to guard their information 'jealously'
- were supported by an ineffective intelligence unit that had a limited capacity to integrate and disseminate information throughout the QPS (1989, pp. 240, 269-270).

The Inquiry concluded that, in all but a few cases, the task of investigating or policing any particular type of criminal conduct should not be the exclusive concern of a particular squad:

the tasks performed and techniques used by specialist operational squads are only aspects of standard police work. The process of taking statements, preserving the scenes of crimes, keenly observing, making inquiries, evaluating information and, where necessary, exercising powers such as to search premises or search or detain or arrest persons is the same. Only the relevance of particular facts or lines of inquiry, as pertinent to different types of possible offences, changes. Greater prowess as an investigator is the product of natural imagination, perceptiveness, analytical ability and dedication, not 'specialized or specific' learning or physical or trade skills. Police skill but not specialist skill is what is needed for these tasks. (p. 240)

At that time, little emphasis was given to developing these skills for police officers other than detectives.

The Fitzgerald Inquiry addressed its concerns in two major sets of recommendations. First, the Inquiry proposed a new approach to organising criminal investigative activity. Under this scheme, special squads would be progressively replaced by the establishment of a Task Force arrangement within a regionalised community-based police service (see Table 8.2 for the specific recommendations). Most activities would be handled by local police – 'Task Force Command' was to deal with the few exceptions that could arise under the regional model (p. 243). Second, the Inquiry set out a number of recommendations to improve the management and dissemination of information and intelligence for criminal investigation, and policing more generally.

**TABLE 8.2: MAJOR FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS
ON TASK FORCE**

Recommendation C.I.1

The recommended structure provides for:

- (d) a clear division between operational, Task Force, and administration/support functions

Recommendation C.I.2

- (b) three commands, viz., Region, Task Force and Support Services
- (e) Regional Commanders to be entitled to call upon the administrative, operational, and Task Force support from Head Office and to be in command of any such units located in their regions
- (f) the position of Commander of the Task Force Division to be established in Head Office at a level equivalent to Regional Commanders

Recommendation C.I.3

- (d) Regional Commanders assume responsibility for:
 - (iv) direction of specialist support by Task Force personnel at regional level.
- (e) Task Force command, which will contain personnel based in the regions and Head Office, assume responsibility for:
 - (i) operations against major crime and organised crime
 - (ii) assisting regional command in specific investigations
 - (iii) assuming temporary responsibility for particular problems in particular areas
 - (iv) covert and surveillance operations
 - (v) anti-terrorism operations

Recommendation C.I.4

Task Force staff:

- (a) be recruited by competitive entry at any rank based on merit
- (b) include both police and civilian specialists
- (c) include personnel seconded on short term assignment from other jurisdictions
- (d) assume regional responsibilities when not required for Task Force duties
- (e) be encouraged to move into and out of regional operations at various stages of their careers

Recommendation C.L.6

- (c) all police officers on duty, including those on detection and investigative work, and Task Force staff, are to be in uniform in all but exceptional circumstances

Recommendation C.L.9

the present system of specialised units each with its own hierarchy, including specialist criminal investigation squads, be progressively abolished in conjunction with the regionalization process

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, pp. 380-382.

Task Force Arrangements

It is difficult to determine the precise nature of the Task Force arrangements proposed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. First, the meaning of 'task force' is unclear. The proposals in the report do not adequately distinguish between the creation of an organisational structure of a Task Force Command and the use of task forces to deal with particular crime problems. Second, the Inquiry did not discuss the role of regional CIBs within the Task Force structure: were they to disband, or to continue? However, by implication, specialist detective roles were to be generally abandoned. It is clear that the Inquiry envisaged most criminal investigations being conducted at the local level by local police, supervised and supported by the region (1989, p. 243). This reflected the community-based focus that was recommended by the Inquiry.

The principle features of the Task Force Command arrangements proposed by the Inquiry were as follows:

- Task Force Command would complement the investigative capacity of the regions and extend operations of the QPS to statewide activities.
- Task Force Command would be responsible for operations against major and organised crime.
- Task Force Command would assist Regional Commands in specific investigations as requested.

- Individual "mini" task forces would be constituted to deal with a specific major or organised crime problem: '[t]he principle of Task Force organisation should be assignment-specific with a minimum number of permanent established Task Forces' (p. 244). Once the problem had been sufficiently dealt with the mini-task force would disband. However, the Inquiry recognised the need for permanent specialist functions in the areas of drugs, covert surveillance and fraud, provided that such activities were adequately resourced (p. 244).
- Task Force Command would operate through personnel based in the regions and staff located at central Headquarters. Regional personnel were to be regularly rotated through task forces. When not engaged in an assigned task force on a major, or organised crime activity, Task Force members would assume normal regional responsibilities. Consequently, Task Force Command personnel, located in the regions, could supply any specialist investigators and operational support required for local investigations (p. 244).
- These task forces were to be composed of staff with skills appropriate to the problem being tackled. This implied a multi-disciplinary and, sometimes, a multi-regional approach to investigations. It was envisaged that Task Force Command staff would include both police and civilian specialists where appropriate (p. 244).
- Task Force Command members would gain skills by moving in and out of Command operations without the need for membership of a task force to become an exclusive career option (p. 244). It was anticipated that assignment to Task Force Command would 'avoid long periods of continuous contact or associations between groups of Task Force members and criminal elements' (p. 244).

Role of Intelligence

There was one major recommendation covering both information and intelligence – that information systems be reviewed, emphasising reorganisation and the development of control systems for access (1989, recommendation B.1.6, p. 378). The Fitzgerald Inquiry envisaged one professionally managed unit, handling all the crime information and intelligence of the QPS, to replace the BCIQ and the Information Bureau (p. 270). The QPS intelligence function was to be overseen by the CJC's Intelligence Division, which would work closely with the QPS to monitor and report on the progress of criminal intelligence activity within the State (pp. 317–318).

DEVELOPMENT OF TASK FORCE COMMAND

On 12 March 1990 the Metropolitan CIB was abolished. In its place, a Task Force Command was established with the Assistant Commissioner⁹² being appointed in June 1990. The Assistant Commissioner reported to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations).

Task Force Command was the location for a diverse policing group. It contained the remains of the Metropolitan CIB left after regionalisation, establishment of the CJC, attrition and disciplinary action. It also included several operational support units that could not be completely decentralised, such as the Special Emergency Response Team.⁹³ However, as late as 1991 units such as the Prison Liaison Unit⁹⁴ were still being located within the Task Force Command structure. Appendix 6 briefly sets out the changes made since the Fitzgerald Inquiry.

The role of Task Force Command was not defined until 21 January 1991, when a mission statement for the Command was adopted. The role and responsibilities of Task Force (Crime Operations), the group of criminal investigative units within Task Force, were identified in a circular to all regions, dated 22 January 1991.

In June 1993, Task Force Command was split into State Crime Operations Command and Operations Support Command as a result of the PSMC Review. State Crime Operations Command now consists of the criminal investigative and intelligence units.

The current State Crime Operations has evolved over the last three years through a series of reviews that have modified the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations in a variety of ways. These reviews include the following:⁹⁵

- *Task Force (Crime Operations) Review*, by a Consultancy Bureau team, 1990 (Weber review)
- *Review by the Police Inspectorate*, August 1991 (confidential)

92 At that time, the position was called 'Commander'.

93 Although some of these units have a number of part-time or full-time members in various regions.

94 Now known as the Corrective Services Investigations Unit.

95 Individual units of State Crime Operations have also been reviewed. For example, the BCIO was subject to a review in 1990.

- *Evaluation of the Detection of Offences Program* by the QPS and Queensland Treasury, February 1992
- *Review of Task Force (Crime Operations)*, by Task Force members, April 1992
- *Review of the Queensland Police Service* by the PSMC, April 1993.

These reviews generally took different approaches to that of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, with the result that the Inquiry model was progressively modified. The following discussion examines how these reviews have contributed to the present organisation of State Crime Operations.

Weber Review

As part of the implementation of the regionalisation process, the criminal investigation functions of Task Force were examined by a team attached to the Consultancy Bureau, with assistance from selected serving QPS officers.

This team was directed to review the structure, functions and operations of the existing Task Force and to make detailed recommendations relating to the role, responsibilities, staffing, organisation and operations of Crime Operations, in accordance with the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (Consultancy Bureau 1990, p. 2). The review commenced after both a new Police Commissioner and Task Force Assistant Commissioner had been appointed. By then, Task Force had been accommodated in the new Roma Street premises. This meant that certain squads and some practices were already settled by the time the review team examined Crime Operations.

The Weber review concluded that:

- The function of Crime Operations was unclear and confusion continued regarding its authority, responsibility and lines of command.
- Although the "popular image" of the group was that of experienced detectives especially selected for their criminal investigation skills, the existing Crime Operations group did not have the capacity to fulfil such a role.

- The "remnant" specialist squads were simply too small, and investigative efforts too fragmented, to be effective. Their role was limited and constrained by a lack of specialist intelligence, surveillance and undercover capacity, as well as a generally reactive investigative strategy.
- There were no formal criteria for engagement or assistance. Requests from regions were dealt with on an individual basis, with no mutually understood guidelines for co-operation.
- There was widespread frustration throughout Task Force and the regions, as the roles of each were unclear (1990, pp. 3, 8-9).

The major recommendations of the Weber review were that:

- Crime Operations be restructured
- a Major Crime Group with the ability to form investigative task forces replace a multitude of smaller crime units
- up to 25 per cent of Crime Operations be staffed by regional detectives through staff rotation and secondments aimed at investigative skills development (pp. 16, 33).

These recommendations were adopted by the QPS, with the important exception of the proposal that Crime Operations be staffed by up to 25 per cent of regional detectives. While this recommendation was consistent with the Fitzgerald Inquiry proposals regarding secondment of regional personnel, it was rejected after discussions

between the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and regional Assistant Commissioners, due to administrative, financial and operational considerations.⁹⁶ The rejection of this recommendation effectively ensured the growth of Crime Operations by creating a large permanent staff.⁹⁷

Inspectorate Review

Task Force was reviewed by the Inspectorate (an internal monitoring unit within the QPS) in August 1991. The aim of this inspection was to report on the current standing of:

- organisational charts
- strategic plans/goals
- Performance Planning and Assessment structure
- the internal and external processes of communication
- internal controls related to project management.

96 For example, it was calculated that an officer moving to Brisbane to work in Crime Operations would cost the originating region \$7300.80 for two months and \$103.20 per day thereafter. However, this estimate must be qualified in three major respects:

- this calculation was not accurate for all regions, as metropolitan regional transfers would have incurred no such costs
- the estimate did not take into account the cost of maintaining a permanent squad in Headquarters
- the original concept did not necessarily involve the location of all officers at a central place.

These points aside, it was certainly the case that:

- regions did not wish to lose staff to Task Force if that staff member could not be replaced (note that regions do not gain extra staff to replace the seconded officers)
- regions did not wish to pay for staff engaged in Task Force activities which may have had nothing to do with that region.

97 Regions acquiesced to the creation of permanent Task Force positions, even though some expressed reservations about losing their "best detectives" to Task Force.

Two significant findings of this review were that:

- Task Force should not grow separately from the rest of the QPS and should maintain statewide aims and goals.
- There was a need to review the structure of Task Force. Task Force had become a repository of various police establishments which had not been allotted to a Regional Command for a number of reasons. These included units which were not needed in all regions, ceremonial units, and many support units which had a potential statewide role.

Queensland Police Service and Treasury Review

In February 1992 the Treasury completed its evaluation of the QPS's Detection of Offences Program. The overriding concern of Treasury was to implement integrated management practices in the QPS. The Treasury report noted that:

- Although the Fitzgerald Inquiry envisaged a regionally and centrally based group, Task Force had, in fact, become solely centrally based.
- Task Force was not providing services based on statewide priorities. Rather, it appeared to concentrate on the more heavily populated areas of the State.
- Due to a number of factors specialist squads had re-emerged.

Treasury was basically supportive of this last development, arguing that the concept of disbanding all specialist squads had been an over-reaction which had had a detrimental effect on police effectiveness in criminal investigations (QPS & Queensland Treasury 1992, pp. 55-57).

Internal Task Force Review

A review of Task Force (Crime Operations) was conducted internally by Task Force members in April 1992. Its focus was on administrative issues such as structures, staffing, and training. Amongst other matters, the report accepted that specialisation within Task Force (Crime Operations) should be retained as a necessity (QPS 1992e, p. 4). Thus, the structure it proposed did not disturb the squad arrangements already in place.

The review did not attempt to assess how effectively the organisation addressed the problems of criminal investigations. Instead, it looked briefly at the internal efficiency of particular squads and supported calls by the various units for increased resources.

Public Sector Management Commission Review

In its 1993 review of the QPS, the PSMC examined aspects of Task Force arrangements. The most serious issue raised in the report was the claim that Task Force (Crime Operations) attended to only 1.2 per cent of total major crime in the State (1993, p. 98). The PSMC did not provide any details about how this estimate was obtained. In any event, this type of statistical measure is not an appropriate way of assessing the value of Task Force. Other factors that should be taken into account include:

- The different types of investigations conducted by Task Force Command. The PSMC figures do not differentiate difficult, protracted or resource-intensive investigations from the more routine.
- The provision of substantial non-operational assistance by Task Force Command, such as advice, on a continuing basis. For instance, the Auto Theft Team within the Major Crime Squad handles requests for advice and assistance daily.
- The use of joint investigations that lead to an arrest by a region without Task Force Command having the arrest attributed to their efforts. For statistical purposes, arrests are generally attributed to the region in which the incident was reported.
- The training role of Task Force Command.

In all, the PSMC made eight specific recommendations relating to Task Force (1993, pp. 100–101, 106). These dealt with the restructuring of Task Force into State Crime Operations and Operations Support, the development of a workload-based analysis of the appropriate locations of detectives, the implementation of monitoring and accountability mechanisms, financial guidelines for the meeting of Task Force costs in regional operations, and the reorientation of Task Force to be 'task specific'.

According to the QPS, at the time of writing, only two PSMC recommendations (namely, 32 and 33) remain to be implemented. These recommendations concern the development of a workload-based analysis of the appropriate location of detectives in Crime Operations compared with possible regional major crime units, and the establishment of monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Work has commenced on these issues, but progress will be slow due to the absence of adequate information systems. A special project team has been formed, with input from the CJC, to address the issue of monitoring performance. It is anticipated that the project will not be completed until the end of 1995.

PRESENT STATE CRIME OPERATIONS ARRANGEMENTS

There have been some major changes to the organisation of Task Force Command since its establishment. When it was initially set up, Task Force Command was a mix of specialist criminal investigation, criminal intelligence and operational policing support units. Since the PSMC's report was released, Task Force Command has been "pared down" to Crime Operations and the BCIQ, and is now known as State Crime Operations. The operational support units are now located in the Services Division of Operations Support Command.⁹⁸ Under the new arrangements, both State Crime Operations and Operations Support Command report to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations).

The present units within State Crime Operations are shown in Table 8.3.

⁹⁸ Examples of the operational support units located in Operations Support Command include the Police Communications Centre, the Air Wing, Dog Squad, the Special Emergency Response Team, Disaster Victim Identification and Railway Squads.

TABLE 8.3: CURRENT STATE CRIME OPERATIONS UNITS

Detective Superintendent's Office	Intelligence, Education and Training Unit
Administration and Co-ordination Unit	Child Abuse Investigations Unit
Education and Research Unit	Child Exploitation Investigations Unit
Counter Terrorist/VIP Protection	Corrective Services Investigations Unit
Crime Stoppers	Major Crime Investigations Squad
Drug Squad	Missing Persons Unit
Wildlife Protection Squad	Sex Offences Investigations Squad
Fraud Squad	Special Operations Team
Homicide Squad	Bureau of Criminal Intelligence
Covert/Surveillance Squad	Technical Support Unit

Source: State Crime Operations Command.

- Note:
1. At present, the Special Operations Team focuses primarily on issues relating to prostitution.
 2. The 1994/1995 State Budget provides for the establishment of a Property Crime Squad.

Comparison with Fitzgerald Inquiry Recommendations

State Crime Operations, as it has developed, differs in a number of ways from the structure proposed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Specifically:

- State Crime Operations is completely centralised. It does not consist of a mix of regional and central personnel. Rather, the arrangement adopted is to send out staff from a central location to assist in regional investigations.

- There remains a strong demarcation between general duty police and detectives. The Fitzgerald Inquiry envisaged that criminal investigations would no longer be the exclusive responsibility of detectives, but a part of general policing within a community-based orientation. The Inquiry found that certain basic tasks of detectives did not differ from skills employed by general duty officers.
- Specialist squads have been retained, although there is considerably more turnover than in the pre-Inquiry days. The approach adopted by the QPS is based on generalist detectives who are rotated through dedicated squads. Under the rotation policy, detectives work in a squad usually for about two years before being reassigned to another squad.⁹⁹
- Due primarily to budgetary considerations, formalised rotation of *regional* staff through State Crime Operations has not occurred, although there is an informal system of "rotation" through the operation of the transfer and promotion system. However, this has not been a planned approach and the amount of rotation can vary substantially from year-to-year.
- The use of civilian investigative specialists within State Crime Operations has been limited for a variety of reasons, including government policy on the employment of public servants. To date, the use of civilians in the investigative function includes two positions in the Fraud Squad and at least one in the Drug Squad. There is one civilian intelligence analyst position within the BCIQ.

⁹⁹ The CJC recognises that certain units are maintained due to Ministerial directives (for example, the Wildlife Protection Squad).

STATE CRIME OPERATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT¹⁰⁰

Benefits of Current State Crime Operations Arrangements

Despite the major differences between current State Crime Operations arrangements and the original Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations (as outlined above), several benefits have flowed from the new structure. Specifically:

- The accountability of both teams and their individual officers has been enhanced. For example, there are six-monthly internal audits of the expenditures of teams and squads; the Drug Squad undertakes cost-benefit analyses at the end of its operations; and various teams require their detectives to maintain time logs.
- Strategic and operational planning is being introduced to guide the future operations and direction of teams.
- The opportunity for the development of systematic corruption has been limited by removing absolute exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of crimes. In particular:
 - there is no longer any assumption of exclusive responsibility for particular offences by any squad – the same types of offences may be investigated by either regions or State Crime Operations depending on the circumstances
 - the Assistant Commissioner in each region generally has control over the criminal investigations within that region
 - the internal rotational policy adopted by State Crime Operations means that officers generally do not serve more than two consecutive years in any squad.

100 This assessment is based on information from QPS and CJC files, internal QPS reviews and reports, interviews of police and CJC personnel in late 1992 and early 1993, and more recent informal consultations with police from the regions and State Crime Operations.

- Improved intelligence systems have been implemented. In 1991 the Queensland Intelligence Database (QUID) was introduced. This initiative has largely been successful, although some problems have emerged which have been recognised by the QPS. Over the last year a network of intelligence officers (known as the Queensland Police Intelligence Network) has been established in the regions to help with the collection and dissemination of information.
- State Crime Operations has taken on a substantial training role. Currently it provides most specialised investigative skills training within the QPS.¹⁰¹ For example, State Crime Operations has been involved in developing courses on economic crime, auto theft training, intelligence analysis and investigative skills. The Detective Training Program for the preparation of plain clothes officers for the classification of detectives throughout the QPS was also an initiative of State Crime Operations.
- The State Crime Operations arrangements allow a more proactive approach to be taken. State Crime Operations detectives do not have to take calls for immediate response except in limited circumstances. In contrast, the work of detectives within the regions is incident driven, responding to reported or detected crimes. Due to their workload, regional detectives spend more time processing offence reports than investigating.
- The QPS's involvement in the QPS/CJC Joint Organised Crime Task Force (JOCTF) shows a recognition of the limits of traditional forms of investigation. This task force is structured to achieve a long-term, strategic view of a crime problem. It comprises multi-disciplinary personnel organised into teams which employ broad investigative strategies.¹⁰² This is in contrast to traditional investigations which tend to be independent and unco-ordinated.¹⁰³ The JOCTF has achieved significant gains in the investigation of organised crime in Queensland.

101 The extent to which general police are being allowed and/or encouraged to develop and use criminal investigative skills is not known. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is still limited, and varies between regions and districts.

102 State Crime Operations and the regions frequently supplement staffing in various operations. Senior personnel in the CJC and the QPS regularly liaise. The overall operation of the JOCTF is regulated by a memorandum of understanding between the CJC and the QPS.

103 The work of the JOCTF is described in some detail in the CJC's *Annual Report 1992/1993*.

- Though it cannot be accurately measured, a more professional, committed approach within State Crime Operations appears to be developing. Interviews with detectives have generally indicated a willingness to consider different approaches to the crime problem and a preparedness to be more accountable.

Problems with Current Operation of State Crime Operations

There are several problems with the current operation of State Crime Operations and regional arrangements that need to be addressed by the QPS. These are not the sole responsibility of State Crime Operations itself. These problems include:

- lack of integration with the regions, including the inadequate management of regional requests for assistance
- difficulties in measuring the performance of State Crime Operations
- fragmented dissemination of investigative skills
- slow development of investigative skills training for general duties officers
- unclear intelligence role.

Integration between State Crime Operations and Regions

There are still some tensions in relations between State Crime Operations and the regions. The responsibilities of State Crime Operations (Crime Operations Branch) and the type of regional assistance provided (known as the terms of engagement) have been formally documented. However, some regions have demonstrated a reluctance to use State Crime Operations as a resource. Although this situation appears to be improving, as recently as March this year senior officers in one non-metropolitan region observed to a CJC researcher that they believed State Crime Operations still gave priority to the south-eastern corner of the State, and that 'you had to pay for them' to come into a region. Although these views may not be well grounded, the fact that they are still being expressed is of some significance.

The sometimes strained relations between State Crime Operations and the regions can be attributed to several factors, including:

- *Unclear definition of the responsibilities of State Crime Operations and the regions.* There are many facets of police work which do not fit neatly into either a regional or State Crime Operations responsibility. When this occurs, the deficiency often becomes a gap which State Crime Operations is obliged to fill.
- *The investigation of similar types of offences by State Crime Operations and the regions.* The charter of State Crime Operations gives it a specialised role of investigating organised and major crime. However, regional detectives and their State Crime Operations counterparts at present conduct investigations that are in many respects identical. Part of the problem here is that the definition of organised crime adopted by the QPS encompasses fairly minor offences and does not necessarily suggest the investigation of large-scale criminal enterprises. In some cases, this has resulted in overlapping investigations and the duplication of activities.
- *The dominance of the south-eastern corner in the operational outlook of State Crime Operations.* The present structure is based almost entirely in Brisbane.
- *Dissatisfaction with the working arrangements once State Crime Operations detectives have entered a region.* Some regional detectives have expressed concerns that State Crime Operations engagement means the regions lose control of the investigation, with the result that State Crime Operations, rather than local, objectives are pursued.

This lack of integration between State Crime Operations and the regions is not simply a State Crime Operations problem – it is also an issue for the regions and the management of the QPS more generally. This situation is slowly improving as more officers gain promotion/transfer into and out of State Crime Operations and as the roles and responsibilities and terms of engagement of State Crime Operations become more widely understood. For instance, a recent QPS survey, undertaken as part of the implementation of the PSMC recommendations, indicated a reasonable level of satisfaction with the current regional/State Crime Operations arrangements among Regional Crime Co-ordinators.

Measuring Performance of State Crime Operations

The PSMC found that there were 'no appropriate performance indicators to monitor the performance [of State Crime Operations] for management purposes or external scrutiny' (1993, p. 100). At present, State Crime Operations has no clear performance indicators for either the work of detectives or the organisational unit, and does not systematically record information to measure such performance. For example, there is no complete record of requests for State Crime Operations assistance and thus no measure of State Crime Operations involvement in regional investigations.

In addition, some of the performance indicators in the QPS corporate plan are not appropriate for assessing the work of this part of the organisation. For instance, levels of victimisation or fear of crime are more easily associated with regional activities than those of State Crime Operations. If State Crime Operations acts according to its charter of 'organised and major crime', then it should not be expected to compete with the regions on similar performance indicators. Another factor complicating the measurement of the performance of State Crime Operations is that standard clear-up rates are not appropriate performance indicators in an organised crime setting. The build-up of comprehensive data to indicate the scale and scope of a particular organised crime area is painstaking and gradual. A similar issue is faced by the JOCTF. The management of State Crime Operations is aware that a qualitative approach to measuring success in these situations should be combined with traditional quantitative indicators. For instance, the number of drug-related arrests of itself does not indicate the seriousness of the offences involved.

As noted earlier, the difficult exercise of devising suitable performance measures for specialist detectives and State Crime Operations has now commenced. Input from various stakeholders, including the CJC, will be sought. This performance measurement project is seen as providing a base for the implementation of PSMC recommendations 32 (developing a workload-based analysis of the appropriate location of detectives within Crime Operations compared with possible major crime units in regions) and 33 (ensuring adequate performance monitoring and accountability mechanisms). Until this project is completed, it will be difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the contribution of State Crime Operations to the overall operation of the QPS.

Dissemination of Investigative Skills

The focus of the Task Force arrangements proposed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry was the greater involvement of uniformed police in criminal investigations. There remain several barriers to increasing the participation of uniformed police in criminal investigations. These include:

- *Perceptions of the role of investigation.* Criminal investigation is still viewed as a "special skill" and as the function of detectives. This is a view held by both uniformed officers and detectives.
- *The work demands on uniformed staff.* Due to current work practices, uniformed officers tend to be tied up in responding to calls. They often have little time to undertake minor investigations or engage in problem-solving.
- *The uniformed and detective structures.* The existence of a strong demarcation between uniformed and detective staff within the QPS diminishes the incentive for uniformed police to become more actively involved in criminal investigations. Criminal investigations are routinely handed over to the detectives, rather than uniformed officers "following up" on the initial complaint.

Training is a first step in overcoming these barriers. Knowledge and skills will increase the confidence of uniformed officers to become involved in local investigations as part of their duties. There will always be a role for specialised detectives, especially in relation to the investigation of major offences and more complex matters. However, the QPS must also provide the environment, in terms of appropriate work practices and management, to allow uniformed police to undertake investigative work where appropriate.

Training in Investigative Skills

The Fitzgerald Inquiry recognised that, with the transfer of specialist roles to the regions, many more police would have to receive specialist training. However, until late 1992 very little of this type of training was provided to plain clothes officers, detectives and general duty officers.

State Crime Operations is now playing a more prominent role in the area of specialist skills training. For example, generalist police are being assisted to identify altered vehicles by the development of a training package for regional use. Nonetheless, the provision of specialist skills training still consists largely of fragmented responses to

perceived problems, rather than being based on an overall assessment of the training required by officers at various key stages in their careers. As discussed in the CJC's report on education and training (1993b), a more strategic approach to the development and planning of in-service training is required. In particular, the type and nature of specialist skills training needs to be part of a broader education and training strategy.

Intelligence Role

In the past there has been a perception among regional officers that the responsibility of the BCIQ extends only to State Crime Operations. At times this view has resulted in a failure to distinguish between the activities of BCIQ and the Crime Operations area. For example, this perception is reflected in recommendation 38 of the PSMC report (1993, p. 106). The PSMC found that the surveillance activities of Crime Operations and BCIQ overlapped and recommended their amalgamation (p. 106). This proposal failed to recognise the strategic organisational purpose of the BCIQ. The CJC agrees with the QPS decision that the surveillance responsibilities of BCIQ and Crime Operations Branch should continue to be separate.

CONCLUSION

State Crime Operations differs considerably in structure and operation from the arrangements proposed in the Fitzgerald Inquiry. In particular, State Crime Operations:

- is centralised
- is based on the generalist detective working within specialist units
- has no formal rotation of regional staff, although informally some rotation is occurring due to transfers and promotions
- has few civilian investigative specialists, partly as the result of government policy on the employment of public servants.

Notwithstanding these differences, the current State Crime Operations arrangements have enhanced accountability and professionalism, improved intelligence and resources, limited the opportunities for the development of systematic corruption, and developed a strong training role. On this basis, the CJC endorses the retention of the current squad structure provided a training role is continued and the rotation policy maintained.

Several issues remain to be addressed by the QPS in relation to State Crime Operations and the role of detectives generally:

- The current arrangements tend to maintain and reinforce the prestige of the detective role. This is in contrast to the Inquiry's emphasis on the importance of local uniformed police.¹⁰⁴
- To date, there has been little investigative training for uniformed officers. Training packages are gradually being developed, but insufficient opportunities for local uniformed officers to use these skills have been provided by regions.
- There is no acceptable method for assessing the work of detectives in particular, and State Crime Operations in general. This is not unique to the QPS. Other policing organisations also experience difficulties in measuring the work of detectives. As indicated, State Crime Operations and QPS management generally are well aware of the need to develop more appropriate performance measures and have initiated a long-term project, with input from the CJC, which should address this problem.
- The relationship between State Crime Operations and the regions was developed under conditions of considerable organisational instability and widespread uncertainty over roles and functions. This situation has improved in more recent times, but further clarification of functions needs to be undertaken.

104 The QPS does not agree with this assessment. In a comment on an earlier draft of this report, the QPS has stated that:

[t]he current arrangements existing at State Crime Operations Command ... do not support the belief that the Detective role within the Queensland Police Service is any more prestigious than any other section within the Service. It is unavoidable within any organisation that certain groups do attract a perception of elitism due to the nature of duties they perform. In many cases this is caused by media and other organisations' attention. (Correspondence, 9 June 1994)

CHAPTER NINE

MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SERVICES

The need of the QPS for effective information services cannot be over-emphasised. In order for police managers to deploy their staff and resources to respond to trends in criminal activity, they need information. Managers need to know what is happening in their regions, districts and divisions and which types of incidents cause the most problems (Committee of Review of the Queensland Police Service Information Bureau 1992, p. 1). Without accurate and accessible information, police cannot adequately manage their resources.

Until recently, the QPS has relied on manual collation, multiple non-integrated and sometimes duplicated information systems, and limited accessing facilities. By the time of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, members of the QPS involved with information management were aware of the deficiencies of these systems. However, the Inquiry's criticisms and recommendations provided a catalyst for some significant reforms to the information services of the QPS.

This chapter examines the management of information services in the QPS.¹⁰⁵ In particular, it discusses:

- the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry
- key management issues relating to planning and policy, co-ordination, and data integrity and quality.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry highlighted the importance of information to modern policing. The report stated that:

Comprehensive accurate information is essential to combating crime, especially organized crime.

105 A glossary of key terms is provided in Appendix 7.

Relevant statistics are essential to planning the proper allocation of and needs for police resources.

Reliable, comprehensive information is vital to any Police Department.

Most information comes from operational police, and accordingly its reliability and comprehensiveness is totally dependant on the individual officers who provide it. (1989, pp. 168, 229, 268-269)

The Inquiry (section 8.8, pp. 268-273) also examined the QPS's information and support systems; that is, the broad area of information management. The Inquiry's report noted that '[e]vidence and submissions before this Commission point to deficiencies in present information and support systems within the Police Department which seriously diminish overall performance' (p. 268). It also suggested that 'improvements anticipated from systems developed in recent years have not been realized' (p. 268), due to:

- ineffective management
- lack of strategic planning
- lack of integration of systems
- inadequate controls over the integrity and quality of information (pp. 268, 271).

In the opinion of the Inquiry, these problems had manifested themselves in several ways, including:

- the ineffective operation of the then Information Bureau (now the Information Management Bureau)¹⁰⁶ and the BCIQ
- the generation of misleading crime statistics
- the poor dissemination of information (pp. 269, 271-272).

106 The Information Management Bureau has been recently reorganised into two units: the Information Resource Centre and the Police Information Centre. For the purposes of this chapter, the name 'Information Management Bureau' will be used.

Various proposals to improve the management of information in the QPS were made by the Inquiry. The major recommendation¹⁰⁷ was for a review of information systems, emphasising reorganisation and the development of systems to control access (see Table 9.1). The Inquiry also suggested:

- improvements in the dissemination of information on policy and procedures by 'regular training and refresher courses'
- the expansion of computer message facilities
- the use of a combination of techniques to advise on and monitor changes in information management, including computers, training squads, seminars and reviews (p. 273).

In addition, the structural changes in organisational arrangements proposed by the Inquiry had consequences for information management (see pp. 273–281). One of the QPS's three Commands, a Support Services Command, was to include 'information and intelligence' (p. 364).

107 See also recommendations B.II.6 and C.I.30, pp. 378, 383.

TABLE 9.1: MAJOR FITZGERALD INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Recommendation B.II.6

comprehensive review of police information systems in co-operation with specialist external consultants and officers of the Police Department to achieve objectives as follows:

- (a) development of an information bureau, professionally managed by civilian specialists, and responsible for all of the Department's criminal records, associated information and intelligence, and the collection, analysis, storage, access, and dissemination of information by the Police
- (b) definition of the complementary role of the Police Information Bureau and the Intelligence Division of the CJC, and arrangements by which the Intelligence Division will oversee the Information Bureau and its liaison with federal and interstate agencies, including the National Crime Authority and ASIO
- (c) re-organization of the Computer Branch under a civilian manager
- (d) development of control systems which facilitate legitimate access by field staff to enable them to do their work effectively but prevent unauthorised access to departmental information from inside or outside the Police Force, specify penalties for misuse, and ensure the integrity of information held

Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 378.

OTHER REVIEWS OF QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

As well as the Fitzgerald Inquiry, there have been numerous other reports on information management in the QPS. Aspects of information management have been reviewed extensively, and often revisited, in recent years. Much of this activity was a result of the Fitzgerald Inquiry's findings.

These reviews have included:

- An early report from external consultants commissioned by the Government during the Fitzgerald Inquiry which proposed that \$45-\$50 million be spent over five years to upgrade systems (Arthur Andersen & Company 1988).

- Various reports from units within the QPS and external agencies, undertaken to assist in the implementation of the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations. These included an 'Information Bureau Staff Review' in 1989 by the QPS; 'Information Systems Overview' in 1990 by the Consultancy Bureau; QPS 'Review of Information Systems and Internal Communications' and 'Review of the Computer Branch' in 1990; and the Committee of Review of the Queensland Police Service Information Bureau in 1992.
- Documents required by Treasury as a result of program budgeting. For example, the *Evaluation of the Detection of Offences Program* (1992) discussed information systems.
- More recently, information management was examined as part of the PSMC's review of the QPS (1993). The PSMC review found that the QPS focussed more on 'computing' than the management of information systems (p. 230) and that there was insufficient co-ordination of information services (p. 231).

Although deficiencies in the information services of the QPS have been well documented through these reviews, difficulties have been experienced in achieving effective reform. In particular:

- The neglected state of the QPS's information systems and hardware at the time of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, combined with the ongoing information demands of officers, presented various budgetary and logistical obstacles to upgrading.
- The continuing reviews of information management over the last four years have not provided a stable environment for implementing change. There never seemed to be a period for "settling in".
- Although a strategic plan was prepared for 1992-1996, it was not until recently that it was accepted by all those involved in information management.

Despite these obstacles, the QPS has undertaken a major overhaul and reorientation of its information management practices. However, problems remain. The QPS's own planning documents clearly indicate an awareness of the problems facing information management and the difficulties attending their resolution. These issues are discussed below.

CURRENT STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES

Structures

There are two structures for the delivery of computing services within the QPS. These are:

- Regional Computer Support Officers who report to the Regional Assistant Commissioners. Regional Computer Support Officers provide a link between central information management, and police activities and needs at a regional level. The people in these positions generally have broad work experience, do not necessarily have formal qualifications in computer science, and have wider interests than system development. Their role is broad, ranging from wiring and computer installation to planning and policy issues.
- A central Information Management Division, under a civilian Director, consisting of several individual units concerned with various aspects of information management. Both the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989, p. 378) and the PSMC (1993, p. 240) recommended the amalgamation of the various central sections of the QPS dealing with information management (Figures 9.1 and 9.2 illustrate these changes). The Inquiry used the term 'an Information Bureau' without necessarily meaning the then QPS Information Management Bureau. The PSMC, in its review, refers to an Information Management Division.¹⁰⁸

The organisational changes recommended by the PSMC have been implemented by the QPS.

108 Contrary to the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendation, intelligence functions have remained separate. The BCIO is located in the State Crimes Operation Command, with the CJC's Intelligence Division having an overseeing function. The CJC is of the view that this separation is justified.




FIGURE 9.1: MAJOR ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT – POST-FITZGERALD INQUIRY (1992)

Source: Adapted from QPS organisational chart 1992.




FIGURE 9.2: MAJOR ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT – CURRENT (1993/1994)

Source: Adapted from OPS organisational chart 1994.

Note: For the full organisational chart, see Appendix 3.

Strategies

The strategies proposed by the QPS for current and future information management have two broad aims: long-term system integration across the QPS, and short-term directing of resources to urgent needs. This blueprint has been provided in three major documents, namely the:

- *Queensland Police Service Information Strategic Plan 1992-1996*, prepared by the QPS Information Planning Branch. This plan, which has been accepted by management, provides the direction that the QPS needs for its information management functions. Importantly, it identifies the essential information needs of the QPS and the current major information systems servicing police officers (see Table 9.2).
- *Queensland Police Service Information Technology Operational Plan 1993-94*, which looks at the progress to date of the Information Strategic Plan and schedules the implementation of the more immediate initiatives.
- *Queensland Police Service Information Technology Architecture Study (1992)*, which concentrates on hardware issues confronting the QPS and outlines how the technology needs to be arranged to support the Information Strategic Plan.

TABLE 9.2: MAJOR QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1994)

- Queensland Intelligence Database (QUID)
- Crime Reporting Information System for Police (CRISP)
- Computer Aided Despatch (CAD)
- Traffic Incident System
- Weapons System
- Modified Drug Index
- Persons of Interest System
- Vehicles of Interest System
- Property of Interest System
- Traffic Offence Notice Management System
- Specimen Charges
- Index System (including Criminal Offence Report Index, Correspondence Registers, Major Incident Recording and Tapes Index)
- Vehicle Registration System and Drivers' Licence System (provided by Department of Transport)

Source: QPS Information Management Division.

CURRENT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT

There is no doubt that the delivery of information services has been enhanced since the Fitzgerald Inquiry. For instance:

- The introduction of Macintosh personal computers to all police stations in 1991 has substantially reduced the amount of paperwork and proved useful in providing some standardised forms – although statewide standardisation of all forms has yet to be achieved.
- Computerised crime recording (CRISP) has been piloted and is now being implemented statewide. CRISP is now operational in Metro-South, Metro-North and South Eastern. It provides valuable operational information that is quickly available to police, has relieved police from some paperwork, and should enable the compilation of more accurate and comprehensive statistics on reported crime.¹⁰⁹
- An intelligence database (QUID) has been developed.
- The production and quality of crime statistics has improved due to the redevelopment of the Information Management Bureau.
- A strategic direction to guide future development has been put in place.

However, as identified in various reviews such as that by the PSMC, several factors have limited the effectiveness of current information services delivery. These problems are common to many large organisations that are heavily dependent on information. They relate to:

- funding
- the development of corporate standards for the use of computing resources and information systems
- data security
- the relationship between the central and regional computing structures

109 Although CRISP is an important source of information on reported crime, it does not provide all the information required at a divisional level.

- the accessibility of computing resources and information systems
- the provision of information for local management purposes.

Funding

Delivery of information systems is always a problem, particularly in periods of financial constraint. The pressure of previous investments in existing computing resources – in terms of staffing, expertise, hardware, software and financial commitment – can be intense. For example, the QPS's strategic plan makes a commitment to open systems (QPS 1992b, p. 22), which would involve moving away from the previous dependency on a mainframe computer. However, the amount of funds outlaid on the mainframe has created an understandable obstacle to moving to an open computing environment.

The QPS has put together a composite strategy for upgrading information systems and technology. The Information Strategic Plan called for \$62 million over five years (QPS 1992b, pp. 77–78). Thus far, two special budgetary allocations for information services have been provided; \$5 million for the purchase of personal computers; and \$10 million recoverable funding for CRISP and infrastructure projects. The State Budget for 1994/1995 includes an allocation of \$30 million over the next three years for the development of integrated information systems (Queensland, Parliament 1994c, p. 279). However, the funding of ongoing system maintenance has been, and may remain, a problem. Possible alternatives for funding information management are currently being investigated by the QPS. Even if viable alternatives are found, it is still likely that the Information Strategic Plan will end up being under-resourced.

Standards for Computing Resources and Information Systems

Historically, there were no consistent organisation-wide information system standards in the QPS, although there were a number of localised "standards". This is a common phenomenon in many organisations. Absolute consistency is very hard to achieve, and is not always viewed as desirable by users with an efficient, working, but supposedly "inconsistent" product *at hand* for some particular task. As there were no consistent standards across the QPS, local standards proliferated as police attended to their own needs.

The QPS is now working on several initiatives to establish corporate standards for information management. These include:

- The development of policies for both hardware and software in line with the Information Strategic Plan and the Information Technology Architecture Study. In addition, the PSMC recommends that a migration strategy for integrating various technologies and standards for Computer Systems Officers be developed (1993, recommendations 142 and 144, p. 240). The QPS has indicated that the implementation of these recommendations is progressing.
- An Information Steering Committee has been set up to co-ordinate systems development within the QPS, especially projects that have implications across the QPS. Despite the Committee's shortcomings (highlighted by PSMC, pp. 233-234), its establishment has prompted communication about what projects are under way and their outcomes.¹¹⁰
- Project management guidelines are being introduced over the next two or three years across the entire QPS. Simple procedures, standards and recording processes for all projects (not just in information management) have been developed. These apply to all local and statewide projects.

The development of these standards should promote the move to integrated systems as outlined in the Information Strategic Plan. However, there are three main difficulties in establishing standards and moving towards integration. First, the very success of a non-integrated, short-term system such as CRISP may act as an impediment to the acceptance of standardisation. CRISP can hardly be taken away from operational police without an equivalent standardised replacement. CRISP is appropriately classified as a short-term improvement in the Information Strategic Plan, but runs the risk of becoming entrenched as a long-term solution.

Second, there is a tension between the enforcement of standards and the dissemination of innovative local products. Locally developed programs have to be registered and approved by the Information Systems Branch. Major information management projects (defined as those which have a substantive impact on more than one organisational unit) must be submitted to the Information Steering Committee for approval and prioritisation. Projects identified and proposed by a region are not required to be approved by the Information Steering Committee, provided they do not

110 The PSMC made a number of recommendations to improve the operation of this Committee (see recommendations 135-137, p. 234). As a result, the Committee has been restructured (recommendation 135) and work is continuing on the other recommendations.

impact on areas outside that region. Dissemination of approved software is left to the regions. These strict requirements, although consistent with standardisation and integration, make it difficult for regions to disseminate useful local products. For example, Central Region produced a Traffic Fatality Database, which was not distributed because work pressures did not allow the region to produce a manual, develop a help index and comply with other stringent compatibility requirements not strictly necessary for a local system. Until these activities are undertaken, this database cannot be formally distributed to other regions. This example highlights the need for the QPS to ensure a balance between integration and innovation.

Third, there are no monitoring mechanisms in place to enforce any standards. For instance, although there is a list of "standard" equipment, there is no means of ensuring that the regions actually purchase such equipment.

Data Security

Subject to the availability of a connected terminal, the QPS mainframe is effectively available to all officers who have user identification and a password. The security systems provide audit trails of all data accessed for query purposes and the identification of the inquirer and the terminal used for the inquiry. Data security is not a major problem on the mainframe. Matters are much less secure on personal computers and, to an extent, on local area networks, due in part to the nature of the technology. The Macintosh personal computers cannot be locked up or have individual directories secured.

The QPS has made few policy statements in this area, although various ad hoc guidelines and directives have been promulgated. These directives have often been developed at a regional level by the Regional Computer Support Officer on behalf of the Assistant Commissioner. For example, interviews in late 1992 and mid-1993 indicated that:

- guidelines had been issued about making back-ups to floppy disks
- directives had been issued to smaller stations that disks are not to be kept on the person, but to be kept near the personal computer
- officers had been informed that confidential information was not to be stored on hard disks, but must put into safe storage.

The issue of data security was also raised by the PSMC in its review of the QPS. The CJC understands that the QPS is currently reviewing the security arrangements in relation to such matters.

Relationship Between Regional and Central Computing Structures

Generally, relations between the regional and central computing structures have been strained. The main source of conflict has been between the Regional Computer Support Officers and the Information Systems Branch, which has a co-ordinating role. There have been several factors contributing to this situation, including:

- *Perceptions of decreasing involvement by the Information Systems Branch in regional computing issues.* According to police and regional computer personnel interviewed in late 1992, the regions believed that the Branch had passed on the responsibilities for certain functions, without providing the necessary resources to achieve them. Whether or not this perception was correct, it was a source of frustration for regional officers. There were obviously misunderstandings between the Regional Computer Support Officers and the Information Systems Branch about the level of support and assistance that the Branch should be offering.
- *Workload.* Both Regional Computer Support Officers and the Information Systems Branch have substantial work demands. A typical workload for a Regional Computer Support Officer was estimated at 60 hours a week in interviews with some Regional Computer Support Officers. As a consequence, these officers tend to work reactively. The PSMC Review found that Regional Computer Support Officers were not sufficiently resourced (1993, p. 242). This situation has been compounded by the Information Systems Branch's own high internal workload commitments, and its inability to offer greater assistance to Regional Computer Support Officers.
- *Unclear delineation of responsibilities between the regional and central units.* For example, the responsibility for the funding of regional computing initiatives has not always been clear. As a result of the lack of guidelines, individual regions and directorates were able to purchase personal computers according to their own priorities, but networking of these purchases was the responsibility of the central Information Systems Branch.

Overall, these factors indicate a lack of co-ordination and communication between the Information Systems Branch and the Regional Computer Support Officers. Similar difficulties were also documented by the PSMC (1993, p. 242), which recommended that the QPS:

- clarify the financial obligations for the provision of information services
- define the reporting arrangements for Regional Computer Support Officers
- develop a strategy for the provision of support to Regional Computer Support Officers (recommendations 147-149, p. 242).

Implementation of these recommendations by the QPS is progressing.

Accessibility of Computing Resources and Information Systems

Access to computing resources and information systems is a significant problem for the QPS. This is attributable to several factors:

- *Lack of networking.* At present, access to large-scale systems is still limited due to the lack of networking. Two examples demonstrate the problems that this is causing operational police officers:
 - In April 1994 about 42 per cent of the State's police stations were not connected to the QPS mainframe computer. Some officers in outlying stations without a connected terminal have to ring through (or in some cases drive) to the nearest station with a terminal connected to the mainframe to record information (for example, traffic) or search for information. This ties up equipment – for instance, telephones and terminals – and reduces officers' time on operational duty, both at the outlying station and the connected station.
 - Better use of CRISP and MAPINFO is hindered by the lack of networked personal computers. For instance, data from CRISP are downloaded centrally and sent to district offices on disk so that the information can be geographically mapped on MAPINFO. Thus, for urgent tasks, data entry for MAPINFO is carried out at district offices rather than waiting for downloaded data to be delivered.

The QPS is aware of the networking problem and is taking steps to address this issue. Under the network replacement project,¹¹¹ the AWA terminal network will be replaced by PC-based networks which will ultimately link all stations. The State Budget for 1994/1995 is providing \$1.6 million for linking the other 150 police stations to the QPS mainframe (Queensland, Parliament 1994b, p. 66). This will enhance the usefulness of the personal computers. Once networked, it is envisaged that the personal computers will facilitate access to all current large-scale computer systems (for example, CRISP, persons of interest, motor vehicles of interest, drivers' licenses, criminal histories, wanted and missing persons), allow access to electronic mail, and facilitate data transfer.

- *Lack of terminals.* Many officers interviewed during late 1992 were concerned about the number of terminals and personal computers that were available. It appeared that officers frequently had to wait to use machines to complete tasks. Most regions believed that the initial allocation of personal computers under the tender was insufficient for the needs of officers, especially in light of the increasing use of computers by the QPS. The allocation of the personal computers was made on the basis of a four workstation local area network for each 24-hour station and a stand-alone personal computer for all other stations. Regions could adjust these numbers subject to every station having at least one personal computer and a maximum of eight in each 24-hour station. The small discretionary component of regional budgets has limited the ability of regions to rectify shortages themselves.
- *Inadequate computer training.* For the most part, personal computers have been used as word processors. Where available, other uses have generally also included information access and messages. However, more innovative divisional or district use of the personal computers has been slow to develop. Although lack of networking has contributed to this situation, inadequate training is a key factor. With the introduction of the personal computers, short training sessions were conducted throughout the State. Individual regions have provided further computer training in response to the needs of their officers and there are also part-time District Computer Training Officers.

111 Some regions have funded networking of their personal computers. For example, at the end of 1992 Far Northern Region had networked 16 out of 42 stations (excluding regional headquarters). Similarly, at central Headquarters all personnel computers in State Crime Operations Command have been networked.

Despite these steps, officers who were interviewed in late 1992 frequently expressed a lack of confidence and knowledge in using the computers other than as "type-writers". This lack of training has hindered a more effective use of computers at the divisional level for management purposes.

Production of Information for Local Management

At this stage, accessible and useable information has not always been available to divisional managers on a statewide basis, although various initiatives by the QPS – such as the implementation of CRISP throughout the State – should improve this situation in the longer term.

Even when CRISP goes statewide, it will not satisfy all the information needs of local managers. CRISP is an important source of recent information, but it only produces statistics of reported crime within a division. More information is needed if Officers-in-Charge of stations are to manage their divisions effectively and respond to the individual needs of their communities. This type of localised information is vital to the successful implementation of community-based policing.

The importance of utilising a wide range of information has been shown in the CJC's pilot beat policing project in Toowoomba. For example, through the analysis of calls for service, addresses generating a significant number of calls for police assistance, and thus consuming much police time, can be identified (see Chapter Four). Once the problem is known, steps to reduce the incidence of calls can be taken. Simply examining crime reports would not show the extent of the problem, because in Toowoomba around 66 per cent of calls made to police do not relate to a criminal matter (CJC unpublished data).

Information on calls for service is collected for some regions. For instance, Command and Control's CAD system can provide this information for Metro-North and Metro-South regions. North Coast has introduced a mini-CAD system, which is being "picked up" by other regions. However, at this stage these systems are basically used for collecting data, despatching and intelligence purposes. Their use needs to be extended to managing incidents.¹¹²

112 For instance: analysing repeat calls for service to develop strategies to reduce such calls; and providing information on previous calls involving a particular address to officers responding to the call. In Brisbane, the CAD system is used to "flag" certain information from previous jobs at a particular address (such as weapons, history of violence), but it is not at this stage used to manage calls for service.

The improvement of information quality at the divisional level needs to be a priority of the QPS. To a considerable extent the level and quality of information should improve with the future extension of CRISP and the introduction of mini-CAD to other locations.

CONCLUSION

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, there has been a significant improvement in the quality of information services in the QPS. For instance:

- personal computers have been introduced to all stations
- computerised crime recording (CRISP) is being implemented statewide
- an intelligence database (QUID) has been developed
- the generation of crime statistics has improved
- a strategic direction has been put in place to guide future development.

Several problems have also been encountered by the QPS in its efforts to provide better information services to its officers. These problems are not unusual for a large and complex organisation, but they do continue to hinder the operational capacity of the police. Particular concerns include:

- the lack of networking, although progress on addressing this problem is expected
- limited access to computing facilities
- fragmented policies on information management issues – the QPS is reviewing various aspects of its information policies as part of implementing the PSMC recommendations
- difficulties in the provision of co-ordinated computing support, which should be addressed as part of the implementation of the PSMC recommendations
- most importantly, limited provision of accurate, recent local information at the divisional level.

In the end, as it is the officers "on the street" who provide the direct service to the community, the QPS needs to give priority to improving the quality and quantity of information available to these officers. The current strategies of the QPS, including the extension of the network and the expansion of CRISP statewide, should contribute to better access to, and improvements in the quality of, information for operational police.

CHAPTER TEN

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Many of the issues addressed in this report – both the achievements and the shortcomings – have implications for the management structures and processes within the QPS. This chapter assesses the management practices of the QPS and identifies the main barriers to better management within the organisation. Although problems in organisational practices and structures are identified, these are not criticisms of the capabilities of individual managers. Managers themselves are constrained by the structures and processes of their organisations.

FITZGERALD INQUIRY AND MANAGEMENT

Throughout its report, the Fitzgerald Inquiry identified various deficiencies in the management of the QPS. Some of these references were to broad issues of management philosophy and style, while others referred to very specific problems. For example:

- [m]anagement and support systems within the Department are deficient ... [t]hey need professional management, operation and review.
- [w]ithin the Queensland Police Force there is excessive reliance on an authoritarian style of management, which is encouraged by the rigid rank structure.
- [t]he approach to management in the Queensland Police Force assumes that management skills can be readily acquired and applied through intuition, or after short term courses run by 'in house' police instructors.
- [t]he present organisational situation, where positions have responsibility without appropriate authority, also leads to the tendency to pass decision-making 'up the line'. If organisational arrangements do not require officers to make decisions, or permit them to make decisions (with punishments if decisions taken later prove to be inappropriate), there is no incentive for officers to develop decision-making expertise.

- [p]resent management style, structural arrangements and lack of appropriate authority levels have resulted in a decision process which is centralised and paper intensive . . .
- the decision-making environment is so rule-bound and inflexible that the information coming to management is often edited and made to 'fit' established formulas. (1989, pp. 224, 264-266, 365)

In short, the Inquiry found that the management style of the QPS was inflexible, paper-bound and failed to encourage innovation. These deficiencies highlighted the authoritarian "command and control" practices of the organisation. In the Inquiry's view, the QPS needed to introduce modern corporate management techniques: '[m]anagement style . . . must be modified to allow greater flexibility and efficiency' (p. 365). Many of the Inquiry's recommendations were aimed at improving the management of the QPS, such as by regionalising and restructuring the organisation, recruiting staff with management skills, reviewing administrative and financial systems, and introducing a performance appraisal scheme.

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Problems Faced by Police Managers

In assessing the management practices of the QPS, the CJC is aware of the substantial constraints imposed on police managers. In particular, difficulties are caused by:

- The continuing day-to-day demands on managers during periods of rapid organisation change and reform.
- The lack of clarity about the role and scope of policing. The QPS is an organisation with multiple goals, and therefore management must deploy resources widely to satisfy the many expectations of the community.
- The impact of outside influences and institutions on the activities of officers. For instance, police officers are often unavailable for duty due to court attendance to give evidence, or are called upon to police special events. In this sense the QPS is not always free to deploy resources simply according to its organisational needs.

Issues for Management

There are four key issues confronting corporate management in the QPS. These relate to the need to:

- develop a strategic orientation
- ensure effective measuring and monitoring of organisational performance
- improve human resource development and management
- develop a more flexible management style that encourages initiative and problem-solving.

Strategic Planning

The QPS, like all State agencies in Queensland, has adopted program management. Program management requires agencies to identify their mission, express this in terms of organisational goals, and monitor progress towards these goals. Corporate planning provides a framework within which strategic and operational planning, resource management and budgeting can be developed and integrated.

In 1990 the QPS produced its corporate plan for 1990–1995. The original plan identified six corporate goals. These were to:

- enhance the safety of people in Queensland
- prevent crime
- investigate and solve crime
- improve the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the QPS
- enhance the professionalism of the QPS
- restore public confidence in the QPS.

In addition to a central corporate plan, each region produced corporate (or strategic) plans. However, some of these had little or no connection with the organisational corporate plan.

The QPS encountered difficulties with the introduction of program management that were similar to those experienced by many public sector organisations. The problems included:

- *Inappropriate or vague corporate goals.* The day-to-day activities of the organisation were at odds with the organisation's stated mission and goals. Distinctions between programs were artificial and, consequently, caused problems in evaluating the performance of those programs.
- *Inappropriate use of corporate plans within regions.* One difficulty with the initial round of strategic planning was that divisional and district strategic plans were often almost identical in content and therefore of limited value to managers.
- *Performance indicators.* The QPS had 'real difficulties in developing meaningful strategies and performance indicators' (PSMC 1993, p. 45).

The new 1994-1997 corporate plan is an outcome of statewide consultation and a planning process which commenced in November 1992. Although the six goals are similar, the programs for budgeting purposes have been considerably revised. There is evidence of a change in the strategic planning process, with more broad-based participation. The new corporate plan was developed by a senior executive team, with executive input into the development of performance indicators. Under the new scheme regions have action plans, but the strategic direction will be set centrally. Action plans will be monitored through central Headquarters.

A common problem with corporate planning exercises is that planning tends to be an activity of compliance rather than an integral part of the management of the organisation. The QPS has acknowledged that initially the planning process was partially originated to comply with Public Finance Standards. However, it has indicated to the CJC¹¹³ that the new planning process has been readily accepted and supported across the State. Such acceptance is essential if the QPS is to move away from a predominantly reactive approach to a more strategic orientation.

113 Correspondence, 9 June 1994.

Measuring and Monitoring

A key function of management is to regularly monitor the performance of individuals, units and the organisation as a whole. This task requires relevant and usable performance indicators, and systematic methods of data collection, analysis and dissemination. This monitoring function is crucial, as it involves providing management with information to help improve the quality of the organisation's services.

To date, the QPS has not succeeded in integrating monitoring into its management processes. A particular difficulty for the QPS is that the determination of performance indicators has been problematic at all levels of the organisation. Until recently there have not been any standard reporting formats for the regions (see Chapter Three) and local performance indicators for the use of local managers are still being developed (see, for example, the discussion in relation to State Crime Operations in Chapter Eight).

On the positive side, the QPS has made an effort to move away from the traditional, but limited, performance indicators of crime and police clear-up rates.¹¹⁴ In the new corporate plan, the QPS has attempted to develop a range of performance measures under each of the six corporate goals. However, there are practical difficulties which will have to be resolved before these measures can be fully utilised. For example, three performance indicators under the 'people in Queensland feel safe' goal are 'public perception of police response', 'rate of unreported offences', and 'level of perceived public safety' (QPS 1994a, p. 13). The QPS is yet to settle on a suitable method for collecting this type of information on a regular basis.¹¹⁵

114 The Fitzgerald Inquiry was critical of the QPS's reliance on these types of indicators (1989, p. 159). Although recognising that the establishment of 'sound performance indicators is never easy', the Inquiry noted that:

[e]nough is now known, . . . to produce some realistic objectives and anticipated results specific to policing and monitor these on a two or three year rolling basis each year. (p. 272)

115 The QPS has indicated to the CJC that it anticipates that by June 1995 a comprehensive system of reporting will be in place (Correspondence, 9 June 1994).

Human Resource Development and Management

The importance of effective management of human resources was discussed in the CJC's report on recruitment and training (1993b, p. 8). This review found that the lack of a HRM strategic plan was a serious deficiency in the management of the QPS (pp. 10, 78-79) and that fragmented and unco-ordinated policies often had unintended consequences for other parts of the human resource system (p. 10).

The QPS has begun to address this issue of a strategic approach to human resource policies and practices with the appointment of a Human Resources Director and the commencement of work on the development of a HRM plan. In formulating this HRM plan, one of the most important human resource issues which needs to be addressed is the development and training of managers. To be an effectively managed organisation, the QPS must ensure that its managers have access to training and support. To date, only limited management and supervisory training has been available, as has been recognised by the QPS and other reviews (PSMC 1993, p. 178; CJC 1993b, p. 49). For instance:

- little supervisory training has been provided to middle ranks
- the Executive Development Program has not sufficiently prepared officers for a strategic management role
- access to external management training offered at universities has been limited and little organisational support has been provided to those wishing to undertake these courses
- despite recent revisions, the Study and Research Assistance Scheme (SARAS) still under-estimates the support required by many officers to undertake tertiary study
- limited management training has been provided to civilian staff.

The QPS, in its 1994-1997 corporate plan, has made a commitment to professionalising its management. To give effect to this objective, the QPS needs to invest time and resources in developing management skills and expertise within the organisation. Strategies for nurturing such skills might include:

- appropriate developmental training for supervisory (Sergeants/Senior Sergeants), managerial (Inspectors/Superintendents/Chief Superintendents) and executive ranks, and for civilians in supervisory and managerial positions

- visitor programs for top managers and management experts to the QPS
- where appropriate, secondments and exchanges with other public and private sector organisations
- arrangements with universities and other tertiary providers of short management courses
- encouragement of management studies as a priority area for the SARAS
- leave arrangements for officers to undertake full-time management courses outside policing institutions.

If implemented, these initiatives, and other reforms to personnel practices discussed elsewhere in this report, would assist the QPS to make more effective use of its human resources and improve the skills of supervisors and managers.

Management Style

The Fitzgerald Inquiry was very critical of the QPS's reliance on the "command and control" style of management and the associated emphasis on hierarchical, top-down vertical communication, and formal, structured processes and procedures. Given the size and complexity of the QPS, and the wide ranging structural changes which have occurred in the organisation over the last few years, it is difficult to determine the extent to which there has been a shift away from this model. However, the following observations would appear to be in order:

- The QPS has taken steps to improve communication between management and other levels of the organisation. In recent correspondence with the CJC the QPS has expressed the view that 'the Service has moved significantly to a far more consultative style of management than that which existed pre-Fitzgerald'.

The QPS provides a range of sources for communication including a fortnightly bulletin and gazette, a 3 monthly magazine, Commissioner's Circulars, localised and area specific newsletters and extensive use of the computerised message system. Senior officers consistently attend courses to interact with the personnel attending. Constables' and Sergeants' committees are encouraged. (Correspondence, 9 June 1994)

Despite the efforts which have been made in this regard, it appears that officers at lower levels of the organisation still have concerns about internal communications practices. In interviews conducted in late 1992, many officers complained that they received little or no advance notice of organisational changes and were frequently 'told what to do' without reasons being provided. It may be that perceptions have become more positive in the last two years, as the pace of change has slowed and organisational arrangements have become more stable. However, it is interesting to note the comments made by about two-thirds of the 252 Constables responding to a CJC survey about career and training issues conducted in April of this year.¹¹⁶ Their observations included: '... there is a breakdown in communication between upper management [and operational police]. This ... can create [an] us and them mentality'; '... no appreciation from hierarchy [for work performed]'; and '[t]he lack of support from superiors'.

It may be that these comments are not representative of the QPS as a whole. Management styles can vary considerably across regions and between districts and divisions. Moreover, in any large organisation there will always be some staff who will be unhappy about the level of the communication and the way in which the organisation is run, regardless of how much effort is made by management. On the other hand, it is important not to ignore the possibility that a perceived lack of communication is a significant cause of discontent amongst QPS staff. If systematic research (see below) shows this to be the case, the QPS will need to take appropriate corrective action.

- Effective communication requires not only that managers keep subordinates properly informed, but also that there is a flow of information from subordinates back to managers. Managers need to know what is going on in the organisation so that they can monitor their own performance and respond to the concerns of staff. Opportunities for feedback may exist already in the QPS, but there would be value in using a more systematic approach to soliciting views from within the organisation.

For instance, the New South Wales Police Service conducts annual "cultural surveys" of its members to obtain their opinions on such matters as:

- whether they feel adequately involved in the decision-making process

- the level of internal communication and openness
- whether initiative is encouraged
- the management style of superiors
- the degree of support provided to members of the organisation.

A similar regular survey, modified as necessary, would be a valuable management tool for the QPS.

- There has been some devolution of authority as a result of regionalisation, but as noted in Chapter Three, generally speaking, decision-making remains centralised within the regions. The caution which the QPS has shown in this regard is understandable. The organisation must have uniform statewide policies and procedures to ensure that the law and QPS policy are applied consistently, and that there is no unnecessary duplication and overlap. Moreover, it will always be necessary to use a "command and control" management style to deal with many operational matters (such as large investigations, sieges and searches). However, it is important that, within these constraints, the QPS works toward developing decision-making structures which will facilitate organisational flexibility and responsiveness, and give operational officers more ownership over problems and decisions. This will require:

- in the longer term, increasing the amount of authority and responsibility which can be exercised at lower levels of the organisation
- providing decision-makers at these lower levels with a clear statement of their responsibilities and appropriate guidance and direction in relation to statewide policies and procedures
- ensuring that sufficient resources and information are available at divisional level for officers to respond to local needs and issues
- encouraging an ethos of innovation and problem-solving throughout the organisation.

CONCLUSION

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, there have been major structural and procedural changes within the QPS. This review has highlighted four issues crucial to the development of more modern and professional management practices within the QPS. These issues relate to:

- *Developing a strategic orientation.* Although corporate planning has been adopted by the QPS, it needs to be used more effectively as a strategic management tool.
- *Ensuring more effective measuring and monitoring of organisational performance.* The QPS needs to implement a cycle of regular monitoring to identify and resolve problems. The QPS is moving towards adoption of standard reporting formats and is developing a wider array of performance indicators, but there are concerns about whether it will be able to collect the data required for some of these indicators.
- *Improving the management and development of the organisation's human resources.* The QPS needs to give priority to the management and development of its human resources. In particular, it must strive to provide quality management and supervisory training to police and civilian staff.
- *Improving internal management processes and styles.* The QPS must endeavour to develop a more flexible management style which promotes internal communication and encourages initiative and problem-solving. As part of this exercise, the QPS should consider conducting regular surveys of its members, along the lines of the "cultural surveys" used by the New South Wales Police Service.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

The Fitzgerald Inquiry recommended wide ranging reforms to the QPS. These changes were aimed at creating a more open, effective and accountable organisation that would be responsive to the needs of the community. The implementation of these reforms has caused uncertainty and disruption, but some major strides have been made. The preceding chapters assessed the achievements and shortcomings of the QPS in particular areas, as well as proposing possible strategies for addressing problems which have been identified. This final chapter summarises the overall progress of reform within the QPS and identifies some broad issues that should be addressed in future policies and practices.

ASSESSMENT OF REFORM IN QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

A common strategy for measuring the extent of implementation of a report is to "tick off", or count, the number of recommendations which have been adopted. However the check-list approach has two major limitations. First, it allows only two choices – either a recommendation has been implemented or it has not. In many instances, it is more useful to measure implementation in terms of the degree to which a recommendation has been implemented. Second, the technique of "ticking off" recommendations can exaggerate the degree of change, as this approach treats all recommendations as equivalent. Some recommendations clearly require more fundamental change than others and, accordingly, should be assigned more weight.

As indicated in Chapter One, the approach taken in this review has been to assess how much progress the QPS has made towards the underlying model of a police service envisaged by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, rather than simply summarising what has been done in relation to specific recommendations. The main elements of the "Fitzgerald Inquiry model", and the extent to which they have been realised, can be summarised as follows:

- *Police resources and personnel would be used efficiently and deployed according to rational criteria.*

The QPS has taken several steps to improve its deployment of resources and personnel. For example, a more orderly decision-making process for the deployment of police has been introduced, anomalies in the distribution of officers are being addressed, and budgetary systems have been improved. However, there is still substantial scope for the QPS to use its police officers more effectively (see Chapter Five). Some police are performing tasks that could be undertaken by civilian staff. Current rostering, overtime and leave structures also limit the way in which operational police are used at the divisional level. Alternative staffing options have not yet been developed. The ability of the QPS to make progress in this area will depend on a number of factors, including industrial awards and conditions, possible union resistance, financial implications and government policy.

It has also been difficult for the QPS to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources across the regions. The allocation of funding to regions was initially done on the basis of historical factors. The QPS has found it difficult to alter this pattern in light of the regions' competition for resources (see Chapter Three). In addition, the QPS has not yet developed a resourcing model for the allocation of physical resources and funds between regions and within regions.

- *Information systems would be up-to-date, flexible and suited to the needs of the organisation and the community as a whole.*

Information systems and access to computer resources have substantially improved since the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Personal computers have been introduced into all stations; new information systems for crime recording and intelligence have been developed; and a strategic direction for future developments has been established. Access to these systems remains an issue and the capacity of the systems to provide accurate localised information is still limited (see Chapter Nine). However, it must be recognised that these issues arise in many large, complex organisations – they are not unique to the QPS.

- *Civilians would be accepted and regarded as an important part of the organisation.*

Substantial early progress was made in relation to civilianisation. With recent additional government funding further progress is likely (see Chapter Six). The status of civilians within the QPS appears to have improved to some extent with the creation of some senior civilian management positions, but most civilians employed by the QPS are still employed in subordinate administrative and clerical positions. The appointment of a civilian training co-ordinator represents an important step towards the recognition of the human resource needs of civilian staff, as does the development of an EEO Management Plan. However, the QPS needs to do more to put in place the human resource policies required to support civilianisation strategies.

- *Generalist policing would be held in high esteem, with the generalist police officer being regarded as the crucial "front-line" of the organisation.*

In line with the philosophy of community policing, the Fitzgerald Inquiry saw the general duties police officer as the crucial "front-line" of the organisation. In practice, this is an area where relatively little change has occurred:

- general duty officers, for the most part, still lack prestige (see Chapter Four)
- career structures continue to revolve around movement away from general duties towards administration or criminal investigation (see Chapter Seven)
- there is only limited involvement of supervisory ranks in patrol work (see Chapter Five).

- *There would be less emphasis on rank, hierarchy and specialisation.*

Consistent with the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the number of ranks has been reduced and command structures have been regionalised (see Chapter Three). There is still considerable emphasis on specialisation, as evidenced by the sharp demarcation between detective work and general policing, and the organisation of State Crime Operations Command into permanent, specialised squads. However, the CJC acknowledges that the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations in relation to Task Force (now State Crime Operations) were impractical in some respects (see Chapter Eight).

● *The workforce would be well trained and equipped with appropriate skills.*

Since the Fitzgerald Inquiry there have been significant improvements in recruit education and training, as highlighted in the CJC's report on recruitment and education (1993b). Less progress has been made in planning for, and delivering, training at other levels of the organisation. A certain amount of training has been provided to some officers, and a distance education competency-based program has been introduced, but training structures are not linked to career planning, promotions and other human resource practices. In particular, insufficient training is available at the supervisory and management level (see Chapter Ten). To a large extent, the principle source of management training is still "on-the-job" experience.

QPS management is aware of the need to upgrade in-service training and there are positive signs that the development of in-service training, and a more planned approach to training generally, will be a priority of the organisation.

● *Talent would be nurtured and rewarded, with promotion being based strictly on merit.*

Promotion procedures based on merit have replaced the old seniority-based system. This has been a key reform which provides the foundation for the development of a modern, professional police service. However, as acknowledged by QPS management, there are some problems with the operation and management of promotion procedures (see Chapter Seven). Particular concerns include:

- insufficient training for selection panel members
- no integration of developmental training and promotion procedures
- a reluctance by selection panels to adopt selection criteria reflecting non-traditional policing values, such as innovativeness and problem-solving
- inadequate career planning mechanisms.

The proposed QPS review of the promotion process is likely to address these issues.

- *Crime prevention would be a high priority.*

At a local level, various initiatives to utilise crime prevention methods have been developed, particularly in the form of the expansion of Neighbourhood Watch and related programs. The Safety Audit program and the Women's Safety Project are other examples of programs which have a strong preventative focus. However, overall there has been a tendency to rely too heavily on generic programs (such as Neighbourhood Watch), or short-term "one-off" projects, instead of developing longer term initiatives addressing particular local community and crime problems (see Chapter Four). Policing strategies are still predominantly reactive rather than proactive.

- *The organisation would be responsive to the needs and problems of local communities.*

The QPS is undoubtedly more open to input from the community than it was before the Fitzgerald Inquiry, but there have been difficulties in establishing effective community liaison mechanisms. In particular, community consultative committees have only had limited success (see Chapter Four).

The Fitzgerald Inquiry anticipated that regionalisation would promote responsiveness to local communities, but in practice it has made relatively little difference to relations and structures within regions (see Chapter Three). Decision-making still tends to be centralised within regions. Divisions and districts do not have the control over the allocation of personnel and resources needed to respond more effectively to the local needs of their communities. The QPS has recently expressed a commitment to move decision-making 'closer to the point of delivery of service' (QPS 1994b, p. 11). This may eventually result in a change in management practices and structures to allow more localised decision-making where appropriate.

- *Problem-solving and innovation would be encouraged at all levels.*

In practice, the encouragement of innovation and the application of problem-solving strategies by police officers has been constrained by:

- the continuing reliance on a "command and control" organisational structure
- the difficulties which police have experienced in accessing localised information in a useable form

- lack of autonomy at lower levels of the organisation
- insufficient promotional and other incentives for police to develop innovative policing strategies (see Chapters Four and Ten).

The CJC recognises the importance of following orders and complying with legal and procedural requirements, but greater application of problem-solving strategies is essential if the QPS is to respond effectively to local community needs and problems.

- *There would be a high level of professionalism in management, including better supervision of operational police.*

The QPS has formally embraced corporate planning, although it is yet to build a strategic orientation into the decision-making process and is still in the process of developing appropriate criteria and mechanisms for monitoring the performance of units and processes (see Chapter Ten). As previously noted, the QPS must endeavour to provide access to quality modern management training to managers and supervisors.

In summary, there has been substantial reform in the QPS over the last five years. The bulk of the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommendations have been implemented, at least partially, and there has been considerable movement towards the organisational model which underpinned these recommendations. Overall, progress has been satisfactory given the state of the organisation before the Fitzgerald Inquiry. However, the QPS needs to consolidate the changes which have been implemented and there are several outstanding issues to be resolved, particularly in respect to community policing and associated personnel and management changes.

FUTURE REFORM AND QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

The primary purpose of this review has been to assess the progress made by the QPS towards the Fitzgerald Inquiry model. In the course of undertaking this review the CJC has identified a number of important issues – some of which are already being addressed by the QPS, others which have received relatively little attention up until now. This section summarises the more important of these issues, under four broad headings: organisational issues, problem-solving and community policing issues, human resource issues and management issues.

Organisational Issues

- ensuring that service-wide priorities are embraced by senior management
- clearly defining and communicating roles and responsibilities between regional and central units
- ensuring that the role and responsibilities of State Crime Operations Command are clearly understood in the regions
- improving the quality, quantity and accessibility of information for local officers
- addressing major information management problems, such as networking, access to computer facilities and the co-ordination of computer support.

Problem-Solving and Community Policing Issues

- increasing the opportunities and resources for the exercise of autonomy at the divisional level
- developing an effective organisation-wide strategy for integrating community policing and associated problem-solving strategies into mainstream operational policing (including clearly defining and communicating the concept of community policing and establishing appropriate monitoring systems)
- creating organisational conditions that promote and support innovation and problem-solving
- improving lines of communication and liaison with the community
- providing more investigative training for uniformed officers.

Human Resource Issues

- implementing a process for planning increases in police numbers
- actively pursuing alternative staffing options, such as single officer patrols, flexible rostering and revised payment systems, so that officers are deployed more effectively and efficiently
- maintaining civilianisation as a priority for the organisation and improving the status of civilians within the organisation through the provision of appropriate human resource strategies, such as training and career structures
- improving the quality of decision-making within the promotion process, through strategies such as intensive selection panel training, the use of external panel convenors, improved feedback to unsuccessful applicants and clearer guidelines
- introducing better monitoring mechanisms for the identification and resolution of problems in the promotion and review process
- developing alternative career structures through means such as flexible leave arrangements and contract employment
- loosening the link between rank, pay and status by such means as overlapping pay-scales.

Management Issues

- developing a strategic orientation within the organisation – including implementing appropriate performance measures for the organisation and emphasising the importance of monitoring activities on a regular basis
- more specifically, developing appropriate performance indicators to measure the work of detectives in particular, and State Crime Operations Command in general
- implementing a HRM Strategic Plan and, in particular, providing better management and supervisory training

- developing strategies for identifying issues of concern to staff and obtaining more comprehensive information about management styles and processes
- recognising the critical role of middle managers within the organisation through the provision of appropriate training, resources, support and feedback.

CONCLUSION

In the five years since the report of the Fitzgerald Inquiry was published, the QPS has become a substantially more accountable, open and professional organisation. To the great credit of the QPS, these gains were achieved under very difficult conditions: much of the QPS was demoralised by the Inquiry; a large number of significant changes had to be implemented quickly; and the imperatives of reform had to be balanced against the daily demands of providing a continuing service to the community.

Although it is important to acknowledge the progress which has been made, it should not be assumed that the process of reform has now been completed. As indicated in this report, more needs to be done in several areas to institutionalise within the QPS the organisational characteristics and values envisaged by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Most importantly, reform should not be seen within the organisation as a "one-off" event, but as a process of continually exploring how to better police the community. The CJC is confident that the need for ongoing reform is recognised by the senior management of the QPS and hopes that over the next few years there will be further progress towards the Fitzgerald Inquiry model.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

DETAILS OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Interviews were conducted with officers, and in some cases civilians, working in the following organisational units of the QPS:

- **Far Northern Region**

Regional Headquarters (Cairns)
Cairns District Office
Innisfail District Office
Atherton Division
Thursday Island Division

- **Southern Region**

Regional Headquarters (Toowoomba)
Charleville District Office
Toowoomba District Office
Goondiwindi Division
Toowoomba Division

- **Central Region**

Regional Headquarters (Rockhampton)
Longreach District Office
Mackay District Office
Rockhampton District Office
Clermont Division
Barcaldine Division
Longreach Division

- **Northern Region**

Regional Headquarters (Townsville)
Mt Isa District Office
Townsville District Office
Charters Towers Division
Cloncurry Division

- **South Eastern Region**

Regional Headquarters (Broadbeach)
Gold Coast District Office
Logan District Office
Logan Central Division
Nerang Division

- **Metro-South Region**

Regional Headquarters (Springwood)
South Brisbane District
Wynnum District
Annerley Division
Inala Division

- **Metro-North Region**

Regional Headquarters (Milton)
Brisbane Central District
North Brisbane District
Toowong Division
Sandgate Division

- **North Coast Region**

Regional Headquarters (Maroochydore)
Bundaberg District
Sunshine Coast District
Murgon Division
Noosa Heads Division

- **Task Force
(now State Crime Operations and
Operations Support Command)**

Task Force Command
Crime Operations

- **Police Headquarters**


Commissioner of Police
Deputy Commissioners (2)
Inspectorate
Finance & Administration Directorate
Personnel Directorate
Policy, Research & Evaluation Directorate
Technical Services Directorate

- **Police Academy**

In addition, CJC researchers met with officers from the Queensland Police Officers Union of Employees and the Queensland Police Union of Employees, members of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Implementation Unit and the Departmental Implementation Task Force. Police officers within the CJC were also interviewed, as were some officers from New South Wales Police Service.

APPENDIX 2

ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (PRE-FITZGERALD INQUIRY)




Source: Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 222.

Note: There was a separate public servant structure reporting to the Commissioner.

APPENDIX 3

ORGANISATION OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (CURRENT STRUCTURE)



Source: Adapted from QPS organisational chart 1994.

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE RANK STRUCTURE

A5

Category of Officer	Old Rank	New Rank
Other Officers*	Senior Sergeant	Senior Sergeant
	Senior Technical Officer, Grade III	
	Senior Scientific Officer, Grade III	
	Senior Technical Officer, Grade II	
	Senior Scientific Officer, Grade II	
	Sergeant, 1st class	Sergeant
	Sergeant, 2nd class	
	Senior Technical Officer, Grade I	
	Sergeant, 3rd class	
	Technical Officer, Grade III	
	Scientific Officer, Grade III	
	Senior Constable	Senior Constable
	Constable, 1st class	
	Technical Officer, Grade II	
	Scientific Officer, Grade II	
	Constable	Constable
	Technical Officer, Grade I	
	Scientific Officer, Grade I	

Source: *Police Service (Ranks) Regulation 1991*.

- * Another category created under this award was the Police Support Officer. The terms and conditions of this position are still being negotiated.

APPENDIX 5

IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVILIANISATION TIMETABLE

The proposed timetable devised at the October 1990 Command Conference for the implementation of civilianisation was as follows:

12 November 1990

- Enter into discussions with unions.
- Commence presentation to respective areas to be finished by the end of November 1990.
- Commence restructuring of positions within the respective Sections/Areas to provide a flexible skill based remuneration and classification scheme.
- Commence objective analysis of support functions in the respective Sections/Areas to establish how best to provide efficient and effective operational support.
- Commence personal interviews with all police/technical/scientific officers by relevant Director or Implementation personnel, to determine options that suit individual staff.

30 April 1991

- Complete work restructuring.
- Declare all appropriate police/technical/scientific positions as unsworn personnel positions.
- Second all police/technical/scientific officers into vacant unsworn personnel positions.
- Continue personal interviews with all police/technical/scientific officers by relevant Director or Implementation personnel, to determine options that suit individual members.

December 1992

- Advertise positions not already advertised.

1 January 1993

- Process for civilianisation of police/technical/scientific area completed.
- Advertise all remaining positions held by seconded police/technical/scientific officers vacant to be filled by unsworn staff.

APPENDIX 6

MAIN SPECIAL SQUADS PRE- AND POST-FITZGERALD INQUIRY

Special Squads 1987-1988	Staffing	Action	Current Squads	Staffing as at March 1994
Major Crime	12	Retained (now in State Crime Operations Command).	Major Crime - includes the following investigation teams: - Auto Theft - Armed Holdup - Stolen Property Investigation Unit	64
Homicide	13	Retained (now in State Crime Operations Command).	Homicide	18
Sexual Offenders	16	Retained (now in State Crime Operations Command).	Sex Offences Investigation	12
Juvenile Aid Bureau (included Missing Persons, Child Abuse)	79	Structure altered into separate units (within State Crime Operations Command).	Missing Persons Unit Child Abuse Investigations Unit Child Exploitation Investigations Unit	7 31 7

Special Squads 1987-1988	Staffing	Action	Current Squads	Staffing as at March 1994
Drug	32	Retained (within State Crime Operations Command).	Drug	47
Break and Enter	23	Disbanded and re-allocated. Functions to Major Crime.	-	-
Dealers	7	Disbanded and re-allocated. Functions to Major Crime.	-	-
Auto Theft	23	Disbanded and re-allocated. Functions to Major Crime.	-	-
Railway	14	Disbanded and re-formed (now in Operations Support Command).	Railway	18
Fraud	42	Retained (now in State Crime Operations Command).	Fraud - includes the following teams: - Arson - Workers Compensation Board Unit - Proceeds of Crime Unit	35
Armed Holdup	8	Disbanded. Functions to Major Crime.	-	-
Arson	8	Disbanded. Functions to Major Crime.	-	-

Special Squads 1987-1988	Staffing	Action	Current Squads	Staffing as at March 1994
Stock	4	Disbanded. Positions re-allocated between Metro South and South-Eastern regions.	-	-
Fauna	2	Retained (now in State Crime Operations Command).	Wildlife Protection	2
University Liaison	1	Disbanded. Position re-allocated to Metro North region.	-	-
Metropolitan Field Staff	14	Re-allocated.	-	-
Headquarters	42	Re-allocated. New administration unit formed. Later divided into two commands.	State Crime Operations Command Office Operations Support Command Office	6 2
BCIQ	32	Retained (now in State Crime Operations Command).	BCIQ	41
Traffic Accident Investigation Squad	19	Retained (now in Operations Support Command).	Accident Investigation Squad	17
Brisbane Mobile Patrols	194	Disbanded and re-allocated to Metro-North and Metro-South regions.	-	-

Special Squads 1987-1988	Staffing	Action	Current Squads	Staffing as at March 1994
Casino Crime Squad	4	Attached to the South-Eastern Region.	-	-
Licensing Branch	26	Disbanded. Detectives re-allocated to Major Crime.	-	-
Mounted Squad	10	Retained (now in Operations Support Command).	Mounted Police	9
Water Police	28	Retained (now in Operations Support Command).	Water Police	29
Tactical Response Group (consisting of Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Team, Tactical Response Team, Public Safety Response Team, Disaster Victim Identification Team, Dog Squad, Police Rescue)	13 (excluding part-time members)	Basically retained (now in Operations Support Command).	Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Team Special Emergency Response Team Public Safety Response Team Disaster Victim Identification Team Dog Squad	4 31 * 1* 15
-	-	Formed since the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Initially called Prison Liaison Unit (in State Crime Operations Command).	Corrective Services Investigative Unit	12

Special Squads 1987-1988	Staffing	Action	Current Squads	Staffing as at March 1994
Special Branch		Disbanded and re-allocated. Functions of counter terrorism and VIP protection re-assigned to a new squad. Initially it was part of the BCIQ (now in State Crime Operations Command).	Counter Terrorist/VIP Protection	12
-	-	There was, and remains, a surveillance unit within the BCIQ. The formation of a separate unit within Crime Operations occurred in November 1989 (in State Crime Operations Command).	Covert and Surveillance Unit	31
-	-	Formed since the Fitzgerald Inquiry (in State Crime Operations Command).	Intelligence, Education and Training	4
-	-	Formed since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, in August 1989. Initially in the Commissioner's Office, later moved to Task Force/State Crime Operations Command.	Crime Stoppers	7

Special Squads 1987-1988	Staffing	Action	Current Squads	Staffing as at March 1994
-	-	Formed since the Fitzgerald Inquiry (in State Crime Operations Command)	Special Operations Team	11

Sources: Fitzgerald Inquiry; CJC and QPS files.

Notes: 1. Task Force Command was divided into State Crime Operations Command and Operations Support Command after the PSMC review.

2. Actual staffing figures have been used.

3. An asterisk (*) after staffing figures indicates that additional positions are being gazetted in these Teams. In particular, the Public Safety Response Team was originally staffed by part-time members. It is now to have a full-time establishment of 27.

APPENDIX 7

MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SERVICES: GLOSSARY

architecture

At the level of an information system as a whole, the architecture defines how the components of that information system will interact with one another in order to exchange information and run programs in a co-ordinated manner.

*Computer Aided Despatch
(CAD)*

This is a system designed to control job allocation and vehicle resources in metropolitan Brisbane. Briefly the system operates as follows: when a phone call is received at the Police Communications Centre, the details are immediately entered into the computer. These details are then passed via computer to the controller who allocates a priority to the job. The computer then passes the job to the radio operator, who details jobs to police mobile patrols in the order of priority.

*Crime Reporting Information
System for Police (CRISP)*

This is the name of a crime recording system, modified from software developed in Lancashire, England. The central feature of this system is that police officers phone trained data entry operators from the scene of the crime and dictate their Criminal Offence Report. If a phone is unavailable, officers have four hours in which to phone from the station. The report is immediately entered into the system using a semi-standardised vocabulary that facilitates subsequent retrieval.

database

This is a computer machine-readable file in which selected attributes are stored in a defined way, permitting rapid retrieval (that is a structured store of data).

data model

A representation of data affecting a particular area of an organisation's operations.

<i>download</i>	Transfer of a program or file from one system or device to be processed by another level in the control hierarchy.
<i>floppy disk</i>	This is a disk for the storage of data that can be read by a personal computer. Typically, floppy disks have the capacity to store the equivalent of about 100 to 500 pages of text.
<i>hard disk</i>	This is an internal disk for the storage of data by a personal computer.
<i>hardware</i>	This refers to the physical devices, usually the computer, peripherals and communications equipment. By contrast, software refers to the programs that provide instructions to the computers.
<i>information systems</i>	Any system that processes information.
<i>information technology</i>	This is a general label for electronic technologies designed for collecting, storing, processing and communicating information.
<i>local area network (LAN)</i>	A set of interconnected or linked personal computers, which together form a network. Typically, LANs do not extend beyond a building, where direct physical linking by cables is practicable.
<i>mainframe</i>	A large computer with considerable computational and storage capacity.
<i>MAPINFO</i>	Software that geographically maps data.

network

A set of interconnected computers that may share access to common databases. Typically, a network consists of one central computer (the 'server'), and a set of less powerful computers linked to it. The AWA (or Amalgamated Wireless Australia) terminal network is simply the 'brand' of network that the QPS had previously purchased.

open systems

This is an ambiguous term, but generally refers to the capability of software to run on the hardware of different vendors and on different platforms of the same vendor.

QPS Mainframe

This refers to the ICL mainframe that the QPS purchased. Most of the main central information systems are held on this mainframe.

Queensland Intelligence Database (QUID)

A criminal intelligence system, written in INDEPOL, for the ICL mainframe.

relational database

A particular type of database that stores information hierarchically.

software

This refers to the computer programs that contain instructions for the computer to perform particular operations.