Crime and Corruption Commission
QUEENSLAND

Sector insights

Queensland Police Service

1 July 2020 to 30 June 2025



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Overview

The Queensland Police Service (QPS) is Queensland's primary law enforcement and community safety agency.

Police in Queensland are given significant powers and resources to keep the community safe. This includes the power to arrest and detain alleged offenders, powers to search and seize property, and the power to use force that is reasonably necessary to protect the community from harm.

Queensland police make decisions which affect the lives of individuals, the safety of the community, and how public funds are prioritised and used.

The QPS is a large, complex, statewide organisation, which includes frontline, frontline support and corporate functions.

The CCC as Queensland's police oversight body oversees both corrupt conduct and police misconduct, police related incidents and the police discipline system. Unless otherwise noted, the data in these pages and references to "corruption" include both corrupt conduct and police misconduct.

These factors give rise to a unique combination of corruption risks and enablers. The CCC's corruption priorities also include priorities of relevance to the QPS. In turn, this requires specific prevention approaches and close collaboration with QPS to support them in dealing with corruption in the service.

The insights provided here are drawn from analysis of CCC complaints, investigations and other intelligence, along with reviews of publicly available reports, literature and data.

Notes about sector insights data

The corruption trends, risks and enablers described in these pages are based on a review of complaints received by the CCC relating to the Queensland Police Service between 1 July 2020 and 30 June 2025, as well as investigations, intelligence and open-source information from the same period.

These insights provide general observations about the sector as a whole over that period, and individual parts of the sector may experience their own unique corruption risks.

As these insights have been drawn from various sources, some observations may be slightly different to the data in the Corruption Complaints Dashboard (CCD) and Corruption Allegations Data Dashboard (CADD). CCD, CADD and these sector insights should be considered together to provide a range of perspectives on the risks for a given sector or agency.

Key facts about the Queensland Police Service

- The QPS' workforce includes both *police officers* (also referred to as "sworn officers" or "sworn members") and *staff members* who are unsworn employees employed under the *Public Sector Act 2022*.
- As of 2026, the QPS had more than 19,000 paid employees, including police officers and staff members.
- According to the 2026-27 Queensland Government budget, the QPS manages a budget of over $4 billion, most of which is allocated to police and community safety.
- Queensland has seven police regions and 15 police districts. See **Table 1**.

- In June 2024, the State Emergency Service (SES) and the newly established Marine Rescue Queensland (MRQ) became services in their own right within the QPS

Table 1. Police regions and districts.

Far Northern Region	Northern Region	Central Region	North Coast Region	Brisbane Region	South Eastern Region	Southern Region
Far North District	Mt Isa District Townsville District	Capricornia District Mackay District	Wide Bay Burnett District Sunshine Coast District Moreton District	North Brisbane District South Brisbane District	Logan District Gold Coast District	Darling Downs District Ipswich District South West District

Complaint trends and insights

Over the past five financial years the number of complaints received by the CCC about the QPS has generally increased, although since 2024-25 this trend has shown a decline. The increasing trend is consistent with increases observed by the CCC across all sectors and is in line with growth in Queensland's population, growth in the QPS workforce, and changing rates of reported crime.

Trends in the complaints received by the CCC about the QPS include:

- **Most complaints received by the CCC related to alleged corruption by police officers**, which is consistent with about two-thirds of the QPS workforce being sworn police officers, their exercise of legal and statutory powers and having greater interactions with the public compared to civilian employees at the QPS.
- **Most complaints received by the CCC related to QPS employees working in Regional Operations Command**, which is consistent with a higher number of employees being attached to districts and groups in frontline policing and operational roles.
- **Brisbane, South Eastern and North Coast Regions** feature prevalently in complaints received by the CCC, which is consistent with their larger communities, demand on policing services and larger workforces.
- **Responding to incidents, investigating offences and managing confidential information** are high-risk activities for the sector. Complaints received by the CCC about the QPS commonly relate to:
  - **Responses to incidents and investigating offences —** which includes conduct by police during the response to an incident or event, such as when responding to a call for assistance by a member of the public, or during an investigation.
  - **Arrests and detection —** such as conduct during the process of a police officer bringing a person under control and usually, but not necessarily, arresting or formally detaining the person.
  - **Behaviours unrelated to a work function —** which includes behaviours not related to or arising from their position of authority (regardless of whether they were on or off duty at the time of conduct).
  - **Information control and management —** such as the handling and use of confidential information, access to systems and alleged unauthorised or inappropriate release of information.
- **Corruption risks vary based on role and level of interaction with the community**. High-risk activities for staff members in frontline roles, such as unsworn watchhouse officers, are similar to risks for sworn police officers, influenced by their high levels of interaction with the public, including vulnerable and at-risk groups. Corruption risks for staff members are comparable to other public sector employees given the broad range of corporate and administrative activities they undertake, such as human resource management, information control, management of public assets, and service delivery.
- **Most complaints about the QPS were received from the public,** which reflects the frontline nature of policing and the volume of interactions they have with members of the community.
- In line with the CCC's statutory corruption functions, we only investigate or monitor the most serious or systemic cases of police misconduct or corrupt conduct. Due to the volume of complaints we receive and the principles of co-operation, capacity building and devolution, **most QPS complaints were referred to the QPS to deal with**. Any matter referred to the QPS to deal with may be monitored by the CCC to ensure transparency and accountability.

- The CCC is informed of, and oversees investigations into, **police-related deaths** (a death that has happened during, or as a result of, police operations; or a death in custody). These deaths commonly involve a person who was the target of a police operation self-harming during the operation or while in custody; a death during a police pursuit; or from the discharge of a police firearm.
- The CCC also has an oversight role in **significant events** involving police that result in serious injury to an alleged offender. These commonly relate to the use of force by police, or injuries an alleged offender sustained during an arrest or while in custody.

Visit our website to view our Corruption Complaints Dashboard.

Common allegation types

Over the past five financial years, the most frequent types of allegations contained in complaints received by the CCC about QPS employees related to the following behaviours:

Allegation	Conduct involves…
Failure of duty	Not complying with a legal, policy or reporting obligation or executing duties of their position to an appropriate standard. It can include failures resulting from a lack of knowledge, competence or appropriate care and diligence but does not include deliberate acts or omissions with the intent to gain a benefit or cause detriment to another.
Unprofessional personal conduct	A wide range of behaviours, such as unprofessional conduct (e.g. rudeness, verbal abuse, mistreatment) towards a member of the public or a colleague, inappropriate sexual relationships or physical contact, reporting for duty while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, unauthorised absence from duty, being named as a respondent on a domestic violence order (or breaching the provisions of an order), or any other personal conduct contravening a code of conduct.
Misuse of authority	A QPS employee abusing their position to benefit themselves or others, including favouring a family member, friend, associate or benefactor, or furthering their own interests.
Assault/use excessive force	Assaults or use of excessive force with a weapon or without a weapon, as well as threats to assault or use force.
Inappropriate exercise of operational discretion	An arrest or search (including the manner/timing/use of handcuffs/damage/mess) that is unnecessary or inappropriate given the circumstances, failure to provide an arrest warrant or provide reason for arrest, improperly refusing to grant bail, unnecessarily applying safety protocols, as well as prosecuting (or refusing to prosecute/initiate proceedings) inappropriately given the circumstances.

Misuse of information	Accessing official information without proper authorisation and/or disclosing information to people who are not authorised to have the information.

Read more about the allegation and activity categories used by the CCC.

Corruption risks and enablers

Risk factors for corruption are influenced by an employee's role (including whether they are sworn or unsworn), their responsibilities, and their level of interaction with members of the public and detainees.

The QPS operates from various locations across the state, including police facilities and watchhouses, neighbourhood beats and shopfronts, headquarters and regional offices, district offices, communication centres, police academies, patrol groups, depots, support centres and offices.

Organisationally, the QPS is structured into regions, districts, divisions and commands. Each police district is supported by specialist units, including the Child Protection and Investigation Units, Criminal Investigation Branches, Intelligence Units, Scenes of Crime and Scientific Units, Dog Squad Units, Forensic Crash Units, Road Policing Units, Prosecutions Corp and Water Police Units.

In addition to delivering frontline policing and emergency management services, the QPS has corporate roles and functions required to support delivery of its frontline services.

Vulnerable functions and activities

Below are some of the main activities or functions vulnerable to corruption (or perceptions of it) within the Queensland Police Service, based on trends and themes in complaints received by the CCC.

Note: This is not an exhaustive list of all activities or work functions which may be vulnerable to fraud and corruption.

Function or activity	Vulnerabilities
Responses to incidents (call for service, general duties inquiries, etc.)	Conduct during the response by police to an incident or event (i.e. resulting from a response to a call for assistance by a member of the public, or from police observation or interaction while conducting a patrol or inquiries).
Investigations	Corrupt conduct or police misconduct during an investigation.
Arrests and detention	Conduct during the process of bringing a person under control, such as arresting or formally detaining the person.
Behaviours unrelated to a work function	Behaviours that are not related to, or did not arise from, the subject officer's position of authority (whether or not the officer was on duty or off duty at the time of the conduct).
Information control and records management	Non-compliance with policies and procedures and the misuse of confidential information.

Key risks for police officers

Police officers are often in frontline roles acting as first responders to calls for service. They are also entrusted with significant powers, equipment and access to information to maintain public safety, which can expose risks associated with the misuse of information, misuse of authority and failure of duty.

Key risk areas for police officers include:

- **Inappropriate exercise of operational discretion:** This involves officers failing to exercise their lawful discretion appropriately, including unnecessarily or inappropriately arresting a person; failing to produce a warrant or provide a reason for an arrest; conducting a search unnecessarily or in inappropriate conditions; or improperly refusing to grant bail.
- **Responses to incidents:** This includes concerns about the exercise of powers; responses to alleged domestic violence incidents; misuse of or failure to use body worn cameras; rude or dismissive language; or issues with the accuracy of reports or statements.
- **Investigations:** Including not filing affidavits; failing to contact or update victims; not fully briefing supervisors; missing court appearances; and not acting within the statute of limitation period.
- **Behaviours unrelated to a work function:** This includes criminal offending and behaviours such as breaching court orders; maintaining criminal associations; sexual harassment or sexual offences; fraud; stalking; use, supply or trafficking of illicit substances; intimidation, coercion, threats or actual physical violence or assault.
- **Arrests and detention:** Including use of force that may result in injuries to alleged offenders during arrests; unlawful arrests or detention; concerns about the misuse of or failure to use body worn cameras; and inappropriate use of restraint techniques.
- **Information control and management:** This includes the inappropriate sharing of body worn camera footage; accessing and sharing information held on police systems; disclosing the details of victims or witnesses to alleged offenders.

Key risks for staff members

QPS staff members undertake a range of duties and typically have different responsibilities to sworn police officers. However, they share some risks in common with sworn police officers, particularly staff members who work in watchhouses or police facilities and have direct interactions with detainees, offenders and members of the public.

Key risk areas for staff members include:

- **Responses to incidents and service delivery:** This includes poor treatment of alleged offenders on arrival at watchhouses; unprofessional, rude or dismissive behaviours by staff at police station front desks; and incidents reported to Policelink (a service for reporting non-urgent matters) not being recorded.
- **Investigations:** This includes failing to prepare documents for court or providing false statements.
- **Arrests and detention**: Including injuries to detainees; harassment and intimidation; inappropriate use of restraint techniques by watchhouse officers.
- **Custodial duties:** This includes failing to provide medical care; causing injuries to persons in custody; falsifying supervision and care records; and not correctly recording and storing detainees' property.

- **Prosecution:** Including concerns about the veracity of statements, reports and affidavits; failing to provide updates to victims; and breaching professional obligations.
- **Information control and management:** Including accessing or disclosing official information without a legitimate reason; unintentionally disclosing official information; falsifying information or records; acquiring or retaining information or records illegally; or inadequately safeguarding information.
- **Human resource management**: This includes being absent from duty; poorly managed conflicts of interest or interference in employment decisions (such as the recruitment, promotion or termination of employees); misuse of allowances or entitlements; and matters relating to conduct or discipline, including interfering with or undermining investigations by providing false information, statements or complaints.
- **Management or misuse of public assets and resources:** Including asset and financial management, such as overseeing financial transactions and assets, acquiring goods or services; procuring consumables, capital equipment, ICT equipment, real property, infrastructure and services; facilities management; misuse of public funds, resources or facilities; and the outsourcing of functions and subsequent contracting.

Other areas of risk for the Queensland Police Service

- **Declarable associations and conflicts of interest:** Failing to declare and appropriately manage conflicts of interest and associations can expose risks around compromised investigations, the release of confidential information and perceived or actual bias or favouritism.
- **Work pressure and demands:** Recent reviews and inquiries have highlighted widespread fatigue, burnout and psychological stress impacting QPS employees, exacerbated by an increasing demand for police assistance. High levels of burnout coupled with increasing pressure and work demands can heighten risks associated with failing to respond to incidents, excessive use of force, and interactions which may not meet community standards.
- **High-risk work environments:** Police work in complex and often highly volatile work environments. QPS employees working in certain types of environments, such as watchhouses and entertainment precincts, and those who undertake certain roles (such as general duties and road policing, which have higher levels of interaction with the community, or officers in roles which have regular or protracted interactions with criminals) can be more susceptible to corruption.
- **Social and demographic trends:** Police officers are required to attend a broad range of incidents. In protecting the safety of individuals and the community, they often deal with vulnerable persons, including young people, people experiencing mental health issues or affected by drugs and/or alcohol, as well as persons displaying anti-social, violent or aggressive behaviours. These can be dynamic and challenging situations, with a potential risk of harm to both the public and QPS members.
- **Focus on particular types of offending:** Changing community attitudes towards police, a focus on particular types of offending — such as domestic and family violence and youth crime — and relevant bail decisions result in more interactions between frontline workers and the public and contribute to increased arrests and issues associated with overcrowding of police watchhouses.
- **Attrition and resourcing gaps:** Across the service, the attrition of sworn police officers has increased. At the same time, the number of new police recruits securing frontline roles has increased, as too has the number of officers separating within their first few years of service. High rates of attrition can result in resourcing gaps, increased workload pressures and demands, and a loss of corporate, legal and operational knowledge.



Enablers of corruption

Our experience suggests that corruption risks in the Queensland Police Service can increase due to:

- **Insufficient initial and ongoing training**, including the use of body worn cameras, management of persons held in watchhouses and de-escalation techniques when arresting and detaining individuals.
- **Inadequate practical guidance or training** on the application of legislation and operational practices.
- **Problematic individual, workplace, team or station values or subcultures**, particularly where these are reflected in engagement with the community or practices such as employee complaint handling practices, disciplinary processes and performance management.
- **Limited risk awareness, oversight or ineffective mitigation of corruption risks**, including the disclosure and management of declarable associations and conflicts of interest.
- **High levels of discretion or authority in policing roles**, particularly in activities such as responding to incidents, increasing the potential for the failure of duty, unprofessional conduct or assault/excessive use of force.
- **Poor supervision, oversight and performance management** creating opportunities for wrongdoing to occur or go undetected, such as the inappropriate exercise of discretion, excessive use of force and misuse of public resources.
- **Lack of awareness of, or compliance with, whole-of-government processes and policies**, leading to the misuse or mismanagement of public funds.
- **Poor recordkeeping practices**, including in recruitment processes and workforce management, reducing transparency and accountability, and increasing the risk of non-compliance with employment obligations or mishandling of information.

Perceptions of corruption in the Queensland Police Service

In 2025, the CCC conducted research to measure perceptions of corruption in Queensland. This is a snapshot of key findings from a survey of Queensland Police employees.

Only a very small proportion of Queensland Police employees completed this survey. That means these results should be interpreted with caution and should not be assumed to represent the views of Queensland Police employees more generally.


Perceived corruption risks

Prevalence of corruption

There was strong acknowledgement that corruption occurs in Queensland, and a majority agree that it is a problem within the state.

- Nine in ten (89%) QPS employees agreed corruption happens in Queensland, with two thirds (64%) agreeing it is a problem.
- Corruption was thought to be more of a problem in local government (63% agree) and state government (59%) compared to the QPS as a whole (45%). One in three perceived it to be a problem in their workplace specifically (35%).

Figure 1. QPS employees' perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in Queensland (QPS Employees Report, pg. 33).




Base: Total sample – QPS employees – Excludes 'Don't know' (variable base size, as shown in chart) | Note: Data labels <4% not shown on the chart
C1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements...?

Concerns about corrupt behaviours

Several corruption behaviours elicit high levels of concern amongst QPS employees.

- QPS employees were most concerned about *corruption in government recruitment of senior positions* (81% 'very' or 'fairly' concerned).
- High levels of concern were also attributed to *complex government procurement for major projects* (79% 'very' or 'fairly' concerned) and *corruption amongst elected officials* (77%).
- Two in three QPS employees also reported being concerned about corruption in licence or permit processes (67%) and/or in *grant funding processes* (67%).


Figure 2. Concern about corrupt behaviours in Queensland (QPS Employees Report, pg. 35).



Base: Total sample – QPS employees – Excludes 'Don't know' (variable base size, as shown in chart)
C5. How concerned are you about the following behaviours in Queensland?

- *Corruption in police responses to domestic violence*, and *excessive force against detained youths*, attracted relatively lower concerns (both 42%).
- Behaviours considered the highest risk included *mishandling and misuse of confidential information* (85%), *bullying and harassment* (83%), *non-compliance with policies and procedures* (82%) and *problems in hiring and screening new employees* (80%).
- Issues relating to *improper lobbying* (64%) or *bribery* (62%), *foreign interference* (65%) and the *improper sale or disposal of public assets* (63%) were ranked lower risk, relative to other corruption risks identified.

Figure 3. Perceived extent to which behaviours present a corruption risk in the workplace (QPS Employees Report, pg. 39).




Base: Total sample – QPS employees – Excludes 'Don't know'
C3. To what extent do you think the following behaviours present a corruption risk in your workplace...?
C4. And, to what extent do you think the following behaviours present a corruption risk in your workplace...?

Identifying and reporting corruption

A majority of QPS employees expect personal repercussions if they were to report corruption, and there is doubt as to whether meaningful action would be taken.

- Just over half of QPS employees (53%) believed their workplace to be 'very' or 'fairly' vulnerable to corruption, whilst close to half (45%) considered it 'not very' or 'not at all' vulnerable.
- A majority of QPS employees reported being comfortable lodging a corruption report with the CCC (65%), whilst far fewer (41%) agreed that they would be comfortable lodging a complaint to their workplace.
- More than half of QPS employees reported having witnessed or suspected corruption in the previous 5 years (57%). Close to two in three (63%) of those who witnessed or suspected corruption went on to report it.
- QPS employees were very confident they would be able to recognise corruption (80%), and seven in ten would report it (72%), despite there being an expectation of personal repercussions for many (58%).

Figure 4. QPS employees' perceptions of reporting corruption (QPS Employees Report, pg. 46).




Base: Total sample – QPS employees – Excludes 'Don't know' (variable base size, as shown in chart)
D1. Thinking about the reporting of corruption in Queensland, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements…?
Note: ^Throughout the report, green is used to denote 'strongly agree/agree' responses in charts. For this statement, 'strongly agree/agree' is considered a negative response.

Barriers to reporting corruption

A fear of personal repercussions is the most common reason for not feeling comfortable making a report to the CCC.

- Relatively few employees expected meaningful action would be taken as a result of their reporting of corruption (29% agreed, 44% disagreed).
- Concerningly, there was an expectation that reporting corruption could lead to a loss of employment, with one in four 'strongly' agreeing that they could lose their job if they made a report (23%). A strong preference for anonymity in reporting was also apparent (47% agree).
- Half of QPS employees indicated that they did not prefer reporting internally within their workplace (49% disagreed this is a preference).
- However, among those who reported corruption in the previous 5 years, the top reporting channels were QPS (58%) and the employee's supervisor or manager (39%).
- The CCC was the third most common reporting channel (29%). Similarly, for those who had not yet reported corruption, supervisors and managers were the most common reporting channel of choice (48%), followed by the CCC (42%).

Figure 5. Perceived barriers to reporting corruption (QPS Employees Report, pg. 24).



Prevention strategies and resources

Queensland police officers are subject to the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*, the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000*, and various other Queensland and Commonwealth legislation. All employees are subject to the Queensland Police Service's Operational Procedures Manual, other internal policies and procedures, the Standard of Professional Practice, and the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service.

Together, these set expectations for integrity, accountability, transparency, appropriate use of authority, risk management, and professional conduct, ensuring police powers are exercised lawfully, proportionately, and in the public interest, while maintaining community confidence and trust in policing.

Prevention strategies

Some strategies that can help prevent corruption in the Queensland Police Service include:

- Robust employee and recruit screening, supported by initial and ongoing training and education on legal and integrity obligations and areas vulnerable to corruption.
- Strengthening information handling and recordkeeping practices, including policies and procedures for the management and dissemination of confidential information, particularly relating to the use of shared mailboxes.
- Initial and ongoing training for high-risk roles and work environments, including a focus on:
  - ensuring conflicts of interest and declarable associations are declared and managed appropriately
  - proper use of police resources, systems, information, equipment and vehicles
  - committing to professional development and applying training strategies to embed skills. E.g., officers actively apply de-escalation techniques and defensive tactics in everyday practice to develop their skills and capability to respond appropriately in situations requiring the use of force
  - embedding de-escalation and behavioural management techniques via informal scenario or practice sessions with colleagues, especially for employees working in watchhouses or police facilities who interact directly with detainees, offenders and the public.

Operational Skills and Tactics training

Police officers receive annual training in de-escalation, defensive tactics and appropriate use of force through the Operational Skills and Tactics (OST) program.

- Clear and accessible policies and procedures supported by training, guidance materials and transparent human resource and financial delegation frameworks.
- Ensuring managers and supervisors provide effective supervision to help deter and detect wrongdoing, such as the misuse of confidential information, and work resources or time.

- Reinforcing clear organisational expectations about behaviours and ensuring these expectations are consistently communicated and embedded across recruitment, training, and operational policies.
- Leveraging technology and data analytics to track and monitor declarable associations and conflicts of interest, control sensitive information, and enable stronger auditing, oversight and governance.
- Conducting reviews, audits or inspections of high-risk activities, processes and decisions, including compliance with obligations to report the use of police powers (including the use of force), activation and storage of body worn cameras and handling of confidential information (including the maintenance and storage of hardcopy records).
- Robust monitoring and review of high-risk policing activities, including the use of police powers and force, and the oversight of covert activities, such as the management of criminal informants and human sources.
- Internal assurance over high-risk corporate activities, including procurement activities and expenditure, recruitment decisions, and audits of timesheets, travel and allowance claims.

CCC resources

Advisories, case studies and factsheets

- Corruption prevention advisories
- Prevention in focus: case studies
- Corruption priorities: How they guide our work
- Improper access to public sector databases, no. 2 - May 2019
- Body worn cameras – their role in complaint resolution - November 2018
- The potential cost of failing to perform duties as a police officer: What you should know - May 2018
- Improper access to public sector databases: What you should know - February 2018
- Personal relationships, professional boundaries: how to manage potential corruption risks – April 2020
- Discretionary decision-making powers: Identifying potential corruption risks – December 2020
- Assessing complaints of corrupt conduct: A guide for assessors and decision-makers
- How to classify matters of corrupt conduct pursuant to section 40 directions - A five-step guide for public officials and delegated decision makers
- Assessing allegations of corrupt conduct: A guide to recordkeeping under section 40A
- Guide to assessing allegations about misuse of confidential information

Corruption Perceptions Survey 2025

- Corruption Perceptions Survey 2025: Queensland Police Service Employee Report

Corruption Investigation Reports

- Investigation Sphynx: An investigation into allegations of corrupt conduct surrounding the QPS's decision to enter into the Stones Corner lease

- Operation Impala: A report on misuse of confidential information in the Queensland public sector
- Fraud prevention or fraud risk? A report on an investigation into Queensland Police Service's Project Synergy
- Operation Tesco: Report of an investigation into allegations of police misconduct on the Gold Coast
- Dangerous liaisons: A report arising from a CMC investigation into allegations of police misconduct (Operation Capri)

Other resources

- Queensland Ombudsman
- Office of the Information Commissioner
- Queensland Audit Office




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