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LITERATURE REVIEW: CORRECTIONAL CORRUPTION

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Contents

Introduction

Context

According to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC), allegations about corruption in Queensland correctional facilities have increased over the last three years—in particular, the number of allegations about assaults/excessive uses of force and the misuse of official information (CCC, 2018b). Correctional corruption is not, however, a problem isolated to Queensland, as evinced by major investigations conducted by other anti-corruption bodies in Australia, for example those by the Corruption and Crime Commission in Western Australia (2017), the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) in Victoria (2017b), and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales (2010, 2013). Moreover, the current review comes in the wake of wider inquiries into correctional corruption in Australia, such as those by IBAC (2017a) and Human Rights Watch (2018). Correctional corruption is a significant problem in similar jurisdictions such as the United States, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation set up, in 2014, a dedicated prison corruption initiative, focusing on smuggling of contraband (Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity, 2016).

The Nature of Correctional Settings

The ubiquity of correctional corruption stems, in part, from organisational factors that make correctional environments particularly susceptible to corrupt practices. It is important to recognise that correctional behaviour does not occur within a vacuum: correctional corruption is not only a reflection of the choices of particular individuals, but must also be understood as behaviours that occur in the context of the organisational and normative systems within which individuals work. Such a perspective is essential, especially where it is clear that instances of corruption are not isolated or that they recur over time. The correctional environment has its own unique features, in terms of organisational climates, structures, and cultures, which provide opportunities for deviance (Goldsmith, Halsey, & Groves, 2016). The growth in the Queensland prisoner population has led to various systemic pressures (e.g., overcrowding, demand for new staff, and demand for infastructure projects), with important implications for correctional corruption (CCC, 2018b).

Some degree of correctional corruption is largely unavoidable. Correctional managers and their staff cannot "control," at least all the time or in all respects, the prison environment. There is frequently an unstable accommodation of power between officers and prisoners, creating a dynamic order that leaves room for both conflict between officers and prisoners, as well as for cooperation and compromise—a degree of "give and take" that is needed to ensure secure and relatively ordered prisoners. Corruption thus needs to be seen as an inevitable part of the configurations of power and the consequential "negotiated orders" (Sykes, 1958; Trammell, 2009) between staff and clientele in most correctional settings. This concession obliges correctional organisations to set priorities as to which forms of correctional corruption are to be tackled first and which are relatively less harmful, rather than trying to achieve "absolute integrity" (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996). This perspective—which we call promoting correctional *integrity*—is instrumental in understanding the motivations for some forms of

corruption (e.g., why officers may sometimes turn a blind eye to certain breaches), and in developing appropriate and effective anti-corruption measures for correctional settings.

Methodology

This Literature Review was commissioned in a very short time frame of less than two weeks. The authors have drawn substantially on the work done for the recent book by Goldsmith, Halsey and Groves, *Tackling Correctional Corruption* (2016), as well as conducting additional literature searches to ensure that more recent work (post-2015) is reflected in the discussion of themes. Both Goldsmith and Halsey have undertaken many hundreds of interviews with prisoners over the past decade or so. In the course of these visits to prisons and these interviews, matters of correctional integrity have come up for discussion or observation. This field knowledge also informs our presentation of the issues and suggestions for ways of responding to threats and incidents of correctional corruption.

Structure of Report

Though there is the potential for a number of corrupt practices in correctional settings, the majority of harmful practices can be classified into five key areas:

- Inappropriate relationships
- Trafficking of contraband
- Assaults, use of force and control
- Misuses of prisoner information
- Procurement

Each of these areas will be analysed in the following sections, with attention given to the nature of these practices as well as their motivations or drivers.

Following this, we describe the factors that inhibit or enhance the discovery and reporting of correctional corruption in general. The final chapter lays out a best-practice approach to tackling correctional corruption.

Inappropriate Relationships

The Nature of the Problem

Inappropriate relationships are often the starting point, or context, for various forms of correctional corruption. The notion of "inappropriate" refers to relationships where there is the potential for exploitation of one individual by another, and/or a risk to good order from actual or perceived favouritism.

For a number of reasons, correctional environments are particularly vulnerable to inappropriate relationships. First, due to the confines of correctional environments, staff and prisoner interactions are frequent and can be of a prolonged length (years, or decades in the case of a lifer). Second, given the high prisoner–officer ratios in many correctional settings, maintaining order and authority depends in large part on the compliance of prisoners. That is, while staff hold structural, or official, power, prisoners often hold situational power. This dependency, in effect, establishes a potential "line of credit" to those prisoners who cooperate in such circumstances that can later be drawn upon to seek various favours from staff.

Moreover, in the complexities of human relationships, there are inevitably degrees of inappropriateness, which may make clear boundaries often difficult to identify. For instance, to some extent it is reasonable and expected that prison staff develop professional, cordial relationships with inmates; the movement towards more therapeutic models of correctional treatment is likely to further increase the intimacy of relationships between staff (including custodial staff) and prisoners. Security and welfare needs may, at times, be pitted against each other in a way that can make the line between acceptable and unacceptable relationships within correctional settings unclear or altogether ignored.

Furthermore, it may be difficult to maintain a clear understanding of boundaries in the context of dynamic and evolving relationships—in which relationship may form or arise for one or more purposes but change during the life of the relationship. A small, apparently innocuous exchange may lay the foundation for subsequent, more compromising exchanges; this "slippery slope" process is well-documented in the literature (Elliott, 2006; Jones, 2013; Marquant Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; McIlwain, 2004). Gradual and less obvious changes in the nature and demands of the relationship that build up to significant integrity breaches are typical in the phenomenon of *grooming* of officers by prisoners (Liebling, Price, & Shefer, 2011; McAlinden, 2012).

Inappropriate relationships can develop inside correctional settings (*endogenous* relationships), such as those between regular officers and prisoners. They can also exist between those inside institutions with those outside (*exogenous* relationships), such as those between officers, prisoners, and friends or associates of prisoners located outside the correctional setting. In the latter case, the significant relationship usually (but not always) exists between the prisoner and an outside associate (colleague, relative, family member, etc.), in which the staff member plays a significant third-party role by facilitating the conduct of that relationship in some way.

Inappropriate endogenous relationship are common in correctional settings (Alleyne, 2012; Beck, Berzofsky, & Caspar, 2013; Worley, Marquart, & Mullings, 2003). Their incidence arises from the high degree of interaction and sociality between staff and prisoners, noted

above, that characterises custodial correctional settings. Within such intimate relationships (Crawley & Crawley, 2008), there are frequent opportunities for officers to exercise discretion, for example, by providing extra access to prison facilities or to personal phone calls (Liebling & Arnold, 2004). It also means that interactions of a less transactional or self-interested nature are common, such as hearing others talk about their personal problems or simply discussing common interests and hobbies. The familiarity facilitated by such shared settings can have the effect of blurring the line between officers and prisoners, from the officers' perspective. This can transform officers' understanding of their role and responsibilities in the correctional context, as well as their broader beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours (Gonzalez Chavez, 2017). It also provides a greater opportunity for the exploitation of personal information, both in terms of information officers share with prisoners, or vice versa—whether such sharing of information occurs intentionally or inadvertently.

Inappropriate relationships can also occur between prisoners and non-custodial staff, (e.g., instructors, health workers, and psychologists). These relationships differ from those between custodial staff and prisoners, in that they typically have a therapeutic or rehabilitative focus, rather than a strict security focus. This implies a prisoner-centredness in many cases, often necessitating interactions in secluded and private settings within prisons (e.g., one-on-one contact in a private consultation room). Though this is justifiable on professional and prisoner privacy grounds, the removal of these interactions from scrutiny inevitably poses risks in terms of security, officer safety, and prisoner welfare.

Exogenous relationships, though less common in terms of corruption instances, can have substantial impacts on prison integrity. Of chief concern here are relationships involving correctional staff as third parties between prisoners and their associates outside the prison. To prisoners, officers are potentially highly valuable links or facilitators in relation to a range of illegal exchanges by prisoners and their associates outside prison. Officers have controls over visitors, telephones and letters. Staff have the ability to connect with individuals outside the prison in order to meet prisoner demands within the prison (e.g., illicit drug consumption and trafficking). In inappropriate exogenous relationships, staff members serve as conduits for these exchanges or, alternatively, cover for others (e.g., visitors) who can play this role. As long as there is demand for various goods on the inside of prisons, there will be incentives for both prisoners and their associates to cultivate and form relationships with correctional staff.

Opportunistic inappropriate relationships that develop within correctional settings are a key concern for correctional facilities, being far more common than deliberate "insiders" who infiltrate correctional centres by seeking employment with the aim of exploiting their position (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2013). The latter risk should not, however, be ignored. A recent investigation into recruitment policies at the Rikers Island correctional complex (New York City Department of Investigation, 2015) revealed that 35 per cent—out of 150 applicant files—of recently hired officers had significant 'red flags' relating to their good character or background (such as prior criminal activity, associations with known gang members, contact with inmates, and significant debt issues). The Rikers complex had been suffering considerable corruption issues, including crimes related to violence, contraband smuggling and falsification of documents and evidence.

The presence of criminal gang members inside prisons elevates officers' risk of being drawn into inappropriate relationships. The strength of criminal network ties allows gang members to effectively conduct business as usual even from within prison walls (Skarbek, 2011, 2014)—

but they will, to a large extent, rely on officers to facilitate their connections to the outside world. This aspect of contemporary prison life in many prisons is reflected in the high number of seizures of mobile phones. Many prisoners we have interviewed in Australian prisons have confirmed that officers have supplied these phones on many occasions. In this way, corrupt officers can contribute to the continuation of organised crime from within prison. In terms of maintaining integrity, officers must contend with the power of these prisoners and their outside connections, rendering it more difficult for many officers to resist inducements or threats drawing them into facilitatory roles.

Main Drivers

Imprisonment involves, by default, the experience of various deprivations or *pains* (Sykes, 1958). Prisoners are likely to desire, therefore, additional or different goods not provided by the correctional setting—motivating them to seek out staff to help them in meeting these demands. The impetus for an inappropriate relationship is therefore likely to originate from prisoners. Most commonly, prisoners seek out material goods, sometimes contraband (Worley et al., 2003), though it has been pointed out that goods themselves are not always an end in themselves but sometimes a means for prisoners show dominance and power over others (Elliott, 2006).

In order to gain access to goods, prisoners need to cultivate relationships with staff members who they view as likely accomplices. This practice—also known as *grooming*—often follows a step-by-step process. Disclosures by officers to prisoners of crises or unhappiness in their personal lives are widely acknowledged as common thresholds or tipping points in the deepening of inappropriate relationships. McIlwain (2004, p. 118) uses the term "soft capture" to refer to the combination of circumstances that result in the compromise of staff authority, being, firstly, the commission of minor breaches often for altruistic motives and, secondly, the failure of the workplace culture in which these interactions occur to detect and take appropriate action to check such behaviours. However, officers are reluctant to acknowledge, discuss or raise minor breaches (Jones, 2013), making it difficult to intervene early before more serious and damaging forms of misconduct emerge. As with other masculine environments, admitting to personal fallibility in relation to dealings at work is infrequent and counter to the organisational culture (Goldsmith et al., 2016).

As with prisoners, officers and other staff are often driven by sexual and economic motives in participating in inappropriate relationships (Goldsmith et al., 2016; Worley et al., 2003). A potentially important consideration in the current climate is the increasing presence in recent years of females in custodial as well as professional roles. Since prison populations are overwhelmingly male, the opportunity for romantic and sexual heterosexual relationships has increased (Jones, 2013; Faulkner & Regehr, 2011). Female officers who have been involved in inappropriate relationships have reported loneliness in their personal lives, seeking emotional support and intimacy from male prisoners (Marquart et al., 2001).

It is critical to examine the factors operating within correctional settings that encourage officers to justify, excuse or acquiesce in the formation and maintenance of inappropriate relationships. For instance, feelings of being isolated at work, situational factors such as type and location of job postings, and limited availability of monitoring and debriefing, can lead to inappropriate relationships (Jones, 2013). Work stress and low pay for correctional staff may similarly

provide a temptation to get involved in inappropriate relationships (Worley & Worley, 2016). Greed, as well as need, can be prompted by unparalleled access to extra income-earning opportunities around drug trafficking, such that that staff seeking to make extra income are well placed to do so. Workplace-based grievances or dissatisfaction with one's organisation can also lead employees to drift into various forms of misconduct (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2013; Eklin, 2015; Griffin & Hepburn 2005; Lambert, Hogan, & Griffin, 2007) that can include inappropriate relationships. On the other hand, correctional settings with strong peer support and supervision may be associated with a lower incidence of inappropriate relationships (Worley, Worley, & Hsu, 2017). The importance of peer support is a theme we return to in the final chapter.

Certain places and spaces within correctional environments pose additional risks in terms of the formation and conduct of inappropriate relationships. Private places with restricted access (e.g., teaching rooms, storage areas) provide discreet environments where sexual liaisons or contraband exchanges can be conducted (Marquart et al., 2001). Likewise, officers working alone, in remote locations lacking surveillance by other officers, are at heightened risk of inappropriate relationships. Prisoners with particular responsibilities in prison industry are well placed to initiate contacts with staff members (Worley et al., 2003). Co-location of staff and wider use of CCTV can increase the prospects for both deterrence and detection of this kind of corruption.

An additional area for consideration is the increasing role of the internet in facilitating exogenous inappropriate relationships in particular. Information found online about correctional staff members exposes them to the risk of being contacted or befriended by associates of prisoners. This may in turn leave the officer open to manipulation for the purposes of facilitating communication with, or transfer of goods to, prisoners. Surveillance of online relationships is undoubtedly more difficult than of those occurring within the physical confines of a correctional centre. A clear social media policy, and training of staff in relation to this risk, are important in mitigating the risks posed by social media.

Trafficking of Contraband

The Nature of the Problem

Contraband spans both illicit (non-prescription drugs) as well as licit commodities (e.g., alcohol, mobile phones, knives, pornography) that pose a threat to prisoner and staff wellbeing. Trafficking of contraband seems to have increased in recent years: In the 2016-17 financial year alone, there were 2,975 contraband incidents in Queensland correctional facilities, an increase of three per cent from the previous year (Silva, 2018). The exceedingly high number of drug users in prison creates a substantial black market for drugs in particular; indeed, illicit drugs constitute the most commonly seized contraband item (Rodas, Bode, & Dolan, 2012).

The trafficking of contraband can put the safety of prisoners and prison staff at risk where the trafficked items include, say, weapons, mobile phones (to coordinate prison protests or escapes) or harder drugs (which can cause prisoners to become unduly aggressive and unpredictable, or fuel a cycle of drug debts, intimidation and violence—see Copes, Higgins, Tewksbury, & Dabney, 2011). More broadly, trafficking can lead to officers becoming compromised, both in terms of being open to extortion or blackmail, and in terms of the impact on social perceptions of their integrity.

Techniques for trafficking items into prison may differ depending on the security level of the facility. Using visitors as "mules" or sending contraband by post appears to be more common in lower security prisons, while in more restrictive prisons traffickers rely more on officers to deliver prohibited items (Stevens, 1997). Other channels include newly arrived prisoners smuggling drugs into facilities, throwing packages over prison walls or fences, or using remote-controlled helicopters or drones (Chambers, 2010; Evershed, 2014).

Importantly, large-scale and long-term trafficking activities are likely to require the conscious cooperation of prison officers and/or staff (Goldsmith et al., 2016). One decade ago, the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) reported that around 15 per cent of correctional officers sampled in Queensland had direct knowledge of staff bringing contraband into prisons, while eight per cent reported they had direct knowledge of officers smuggling drugs into prisons. Nearly 30 per cent of respondents reported knowing of situations where prisoners were warned of impending searches (CMC, 2009, p. 20). Furthermore, third parties play an important role in the contraband trade. Exogenous relationships between prisoners, staff, and prisoners' associates outside prison may be highly effective for smuggling contraband, since searches conducted on staff entering the prison are normally less rigorous than those conducted on visitors (Goldsmith et al., 2016).

Once contraband makes its way into prison, it must then be effectively concealed. In the US context, Burke and Owen (2010, p. 12) note that "authorities have found devices hidden under mattresses; concealed by wrist watches; and contained inside body cavities, rice and cereal containers, false bottoms of boxes, hollowed-out books, toilets, televisions, radios, light fixtures, portable fans, socks, and duffle bags." Prison libraries can also act as distribution centres for contraband, wherein prisoners develop a complex but efficient means for delivering contraband to one another through the checking in and out of various books and magazines.

Main Drivers

The main driver of contraband trafficking in custodial facilities is the scarcity of particular goods and services in these environments. In effect, prisoners are deprived of conventional avenues for the experience of pleasure. The contraband trade is very much about trying to alleviate the *pains of imprisonment*—boredom, pointless routine, psychic anguish and isolation. Understood in this way, it becomes easy to see why drugs and mobile phones are the most trafficked items. Where there is demand for items that fulfil basic psychological needs, contraband will be trafficked even into the most "secure" correctional facilities. In a sense, prison conditions inherently create the demand for contraband (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985). This creates a series of paradoxes. The first is that an unwavering demand will always be met with attempts to supply, and as the risks involved in securing the supply are increased, the stakes will also increase (that is, the payoff for corruption will become greater). Given that correctional staff can feel underpaid or undervalued, they are less likely to play by the rules of the game asked of them, and may instead seek to be compensated in some way for their perceived deprivation or "strain" (Merton, 1938).

Another paradox is that contraband trafficking is *positively* correlated with the good order and stability of prison systems (that is, they are likely to co-occur)—both rely on the strength of the informal social system within a prison (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985). Prisons function relatively smoothly because they strike (either by accident or by design) a balance between the formal and informal rules governing each facility. "[T]he distribution of specific contraband items—different types of narcotics—[is] essential for both custodial staff and key inmates in the control of the [prison] environment" (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985, p. 442).

Too often, this uncomfortable truth is overlooked in efforts to understand and prevent correctional corruption. Officers are known to turn a blind eye to the use of some drugs that have a "pacifying" effect on prisoners (Keene, 1997), or to even mock their fellow officers for reporting particular kinds of (drug) activity (Liebling et al., 2011). Though it is possible that the willingness to turn a blind eye to small infractions around contraband may lead to a greater willingness to overlook more serious misconduct, the key point is that, in understanding causes and facilitators of trafficking, certain levels and types of contraband can have positive impacts on the climate of the prison—leading officers to engage in rule breaking to facilitate order.

A dominant theme to emerge from the literature on correctional corruption is that trafficking contraband is easy and there is relatively little chance of officers being detected for such activity (Goldsmith et al., 2016). There are inherent vulnerabilities in a security system governed by humans, where error, laziness, or leniency towards colleagues can interfere with the proper execution of security procedures. Complacency among staff responsible for security is a major vulnerability in terms of prison corruption; the temptation to cut corners or turn a blind eye to fellow officers leaves the door open, sometimes literally, for corrupt acts to occur. Moreover, security procedures are unlikely to be foolproof and are thus inherently limited in their ability to detect contraband. Officers can detect weaknesses in such systems and switch to alternate strategies to bring in contraband, as described by one officer: "if they pat you down you're not going to take anything in your pockets and they're not going to touch you in the genital area. So it's moot anyway, it's a moot point the whole search policy" (ICAC, 2004, p. 15).

Assaults, Use of Force and Control

The Nature of the Problem

Violence in prisons is omnipresent (Kupers, 1996), though like other threats to correctional integrity, there are strong political disincentives to conceal allegations of such matters. In the United States, 2.4 per cent of federal and state prisoners (more than 31,400 prisoners) reported having been physically or sexually assaulted by officers (Beck et al., 2013; National Prison Rape Elimination Committee, 2009). A survey of custodial officers in Queensland found more than one-quarter reported physical assault of offenders by officers at least "sometimes" (CMC, 2009, p. 16) As noted earlier, the nature of correctional settings is one in which officers' (in)ability to effectively contain and restrain prisoners lies at the heart of interactions and relationships. In many instances, officer use of force will be justified so long as it is proportionate to the threat posed by prisoners. In this section, we consider scenarios in which officer-on-prisoner use of force arguably exceeds what is reasonably proportionate or otherwise justifiable.

Officer use of force against prisoners can take several forms. In some cases, officers might apply a level of force in response to a threat, where there was some level of force called for but the amount could be considered excessive. For example, overuse of legitimate restraint techniques (e.g., authorised use of weapons such as batons, tasers, mace/pepper spray, etc.), overuse of control practices (e.g., strip-searches and solitary confinement, Human Rights Watch, 2018) and verbal threats used to enforce compliance (Farber, 2007; Martin, 2006). Cell extractions "gone wrong" and misguided efforts to quell riots are contexts in which this type of force can easily occur (e.g., Bath, 2015).

In other cases, there may be no official pretext for the use of force, but rather, it is an expression of frustration, hostility, vengeance or even the quest for entertainment. The point in such cases is less about assertion of control in particular instances where there is a perceived threat from a prisoner or group, and more about demonstrating the dominance of one group (staff) over another (prisoners). Particular groups or cliques of officers may together form subcultures of dominance and abuse.

The type of force employed may be of a physical or of a sexual nature (e.g., Hunter, 2014). Importantly, the intimidation arising from the threat of such contact can itself be considered a use of force (Bourdieu, 2001; Heilpern, 1998). The capacity for those in power to intimidate, through threatened use of force or involuntary restraint, can result in humiliation in non-sexual and sexual ways. For example, the Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory revealed allegations of abuse, including officers conducting unnecessary strip-searches, bribing detainees to engage in humiliating acts, and withholding access to basic human needs such as food, water, and the use of toilets (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). Threat of violence can be particularly distressing to those with a traumatic history of violence, such as women who have been in domestic violence relationships (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Another form of unjustified use of force can arise from overlooking or even encouraging violence between prisoners. Prison officers are able to control prisoner cell allocation and shared spaces, facilitating exposure of prisoners to assault from other prisoners (e.g., Collins,

2015). In some instances, violence may be directly incited, while at other times violence may be more passively facilitated. The growing influence of prison gangs has meant officers have at times been offered incentives to "turn a blind eye" to violent gang enforcement activities (Kulman & May, 2015; see also Copes et al., 2011). Perceived staff endorsement of violence can lead to an atmosphere of permissibility wherein prisoners increasingly justify their violent behaviour towards others (Trammell & Rundle, 2015).

Assaults and displays of excessive force typically occur in "low-visibility" areas, such as cells, recreation areas, poorly supervised common areas (e.g., showers) and other "blind spots" (Wortley, 2002). There is also a risk of misuse of force when officers feel they may need to exercise greater control, such as when transferring prisoners within or between facilities (Collins, 2015). Human Rights Watch (2018) identified that prisoners with disabilities may be particularly prone to excessive use of force, as their credibility may be questioned, and their allegations of abuse questioned or disbelieved.

Main Drivers

The use of force and assaults in correctional environments are a product of the dynamic power relationship between officers and prisoners, as well as characteristics of the organisational structure, culture and climate.

There has been relatively little research on understanding officer characteristics that might make them more likely to use excessive force. Some personality traits may predispose certain individuals to seek out prison officer roles (Carnahan & McFarland, 2007; Reicher & Haslam, 2006). As Lerman and Page (2016) note, the misuse of force by officers against prisoners can function as an expression of officers' punitive attitudes and values towards prisoners.

However, most research tends to show that excessive use of force is typically not related to individual characteristics. Although some types of assaults are wedded to particular characteristics of assailants (e.g., likelihood of assaults in cross-gender situations, most notably sexual abuse of female prisoners by male correctional officers: McIlwain, 2004), it is generally factors associated with the work environment—and how these affect officers' attitudes—that have more influence on officers' propensity to use or threaten use of force against prisoners (see Gorta, 1998; McIlwain, 2004). For instance, dissatisfaction with employment conditions, such as inadequate pay or perceptions that society undervalues one's role, may lead some officers to seek alternative forms of empowerment such as abuse of prisoners (Gibbons & Katzenbach, 2006; Merton, 1938).

Importantly, attitudes and rationalisations regarding the use of force in prisons are more readily sustained where organisational cultures and structures support such justifications. Various features of the correctional environment are likely to engender such a culture. First, prisons house violent and difficult prisoners that outnumber staff, (perhaps justifiably) giving rise to officer perceptions of prisons as dangerous places and the resulting need to use force to control conditions and protect themselves (Ben-David et al., 1996). Moreover, prisons are disproportionately characterised by an "us versus them" dynamic: the law-abiding community versus deviant community, which is highly salient in prison structures. The social distance and dehumanisation assigned to prisoners (Bourdieu, 2001) inevitably exposes them to greater violence and domination by staff (Trammell, 2011; McIlwain, 2004; Marquart et al., 2001;

Government Accountability Office, 1999). Perceptions of prisoners as "undeserving" establish conditions unfavourable to systemic respect for prisoner rights.

Another structural characteristic of the correctional environment which may lead to abuses is the amount of control correctional officers have over such settings. Officers are knowledgeable about less visible areas, and may even control the surveillance capabilities of CCTV in areas—enabling the commission of violent acts or coerced sexual practices (Wortley, 2002). Furthermore, prisoner demand for contraband provides officers (who can facilitate the trafficking of such items) leverage in being able to exchange goods for sexual (or nonsexual) favours.

Organisational culture is in turn situated within a wider political climate marked by "tough on crime" discourses and increasing rates of incarceration. Overcrowding, poor living conditions, and limited availability of therapeutic programs can foster misuses of force, as force is more frequently used to maintain control over larger, more dissatisfied populations (Harris, 2012; Useem & Piehl, 2006). This is significant in organisational climates where overall staff numbers and the resources allocated to corrections have been reduced, and where communities are more willing to tolerate "official violence" in prisons in order to restore order (Zdenkowski & Brown, 1982).

Misuses of Prisoner Information

The Nature of the Problem

Information records, it has been said, have "supremacy" in the prison system (McIlwain, 2004, p. 254). In an age of increased digitisation and access to big data, this statement is especially relevant. Increases in the volume of information stored digitally, and the centrality and sharing of records across institutions, increase opportunities to misuse such data. Indeed, some have named the misuse of confidential information as one of the greatest corruption risks facing the criminal justice system (Goldsmith, 2015; Gorta, 2006). Though data on this issue are hard to find, there is some evidence that misuse of prisoner information is not uncommon. The CMC survey of Queensland correctional officers found that as many as 40 per cent of officers thought release of confidential information occurred at least "sometimes," if not more frequently (CMC, 2009, p. 16); for "false reports" the corresponding rate was 12 per cent. Around one-quarter of officers in the sample reported that they had direct evidence of unauthorised disclosure of confidential information.

Information held in correctional settings can take a variety of forms. These include legal information relating to court orders (convictions, sentences, supervision orders, etc.) or proceedings in which the prisoner has been a party or is planning to be a party to legal proceedings (e.g., an appeal). Information may also relate to health matters, such as medical, or psychological material relating to the prisoner disclosed confidentially in the course of treatment. Records also, of course, contain personal information—details of social security numbers, other personal identifying information, details regarding family members, friends and associates, including their places of residence and occupations. It is fairly obvious that information in each of these categories is potentially sensitive and therefore should be protected and respected.

Some information about prisoners will be more informal in nature. Typically, such information will not be stored in official records, instead residing in the personal knowledge of staff and other prisoners. For example, it might be information communicated in a conversation between an officer and a prisoner of a personal nature. Such unofficial information can nonetheless have a tradeable value, and might thus be shared inappropriately for essentially the same reasons that official information is shared.

Misuses of information can be placed into the following categories of behaviour: *unauthorised access*, *unauthorised disclosure*, and *falsification of records*. Unauthorised access refers to instances where staff access information (to which they may have legitimate access) for unauthorised purposes (e.g., curiosity). Unauthorised disclosure occurs when confidential prisoner information is shared with others, such as other prisoners or third parties (e.g., media, associates of prisoners). Where disclosure leads to widespread dissemination, for example, through media publication of photographs or information relating to the whereabouts and condition of a notorious prisoner, there is the potential for serious harms in terms of prisoner safety and institutional security, as well as reputational harm to the institutions and officers involved.

The last category, falsification of records, refers to deliberate inaccurate recording (whether by commission or omission) or prisoner records. Such behaviours can prejudice the prisoner

within the system, for example a fabrication of a breach of rules could cause a delay in that prisoner's release. Conversely, falsification can benefit prisoners. In one reported case, records were fabricated to indicate that compliance had occurred when in fact it had not (ICAC, 2011). Falsification of documents can also protect institutional interests, such as documenting treatments that were not in fact provided, or failing to document injuries (Vaughn & Smith, 2006). The content and uses made of confidential information are matters of enormous consequence. For instance, where records have been corrupted through false reports of prisoner misconduct, the decisions taken on the basis of that misinformation are likely to be unfair, to generate prisoner resentment, and thereby potentially undermine security and rehabilitation outcomes.

Main Drivers

Prisoner information is used in a variety of decisions, such as classification for accommodation, eligibility for parole, and access to treatment programs. Such information thus has potentially prejudicial consequences for correctional clients—opening the door for integrity breaches (Ruppert, 2013). Officers can exercise considerable power over prisoners through their influence over what gets reported and recorded, and how, and what happens to that information. Mistreatment (including destroying) of a prisoner's personal legal papers is one tactic that officers may use to provoke or punish a prisoner (e.g., Heyward, 2011). Revenge thus figures as a significant motivation to misuse information. In other cases, officers may disclose confidential information on the basis of benevolent, rather than malicious or self-interested, intentions.

Economic advantage is another key driver of information misuse. Although misuses of information by officers can occur for vindictive or personal reasons, there is also a market for this kind of information, especially as it relates to notorious offenders or potential key witnesses in upcoming criminal trials. Some prisoners, it is clear, have celebrity value attached to their notoriety, which introduces an element of temptation for those with access to their information. Third parties outside the correctional setting who may wish to access personal information include the media, victims of crime, organised crime groups, and associates of other individuals in the correctional system. Officers willing or coerced to service particular exogenous relationships become relevant here. The existence of such markets for information is therefore a significant risk factor (e.g., BBC News, 2014; Leveson, 2012).

It is worth noting that unauthorised disclosure may be more likely to occur inadvertently rather than deliberately, for instance through misunderstandings around prisoners' rights to privacy and confidentiality, and carelessness. McIlwain (2004) found that non-custodial staff members in Queensland correctional centres often have a hard time understanding rules around prisoner confidentiality. A widespread view was that sharing information of this kind among other staff did not constitute misconduct. A similar difficulty has also been observed in relation to community corrections staff (ICAC, 2006) and police officers (People, 2008). Such confusion or carelessness is sure to be magnified by guidance principles and procedures that are difficult to locate and/or comprehend. In addition to the area of conflicts of interest, the issue of prisoner records is perhaps the other issue generating most risks to correctional integrity, and thus in need of more attention in areas such as training and supervision.

Procurement

The Nature of the Problem

Corrupt procurement activities are rife in the public sector. In Victoria, more than a quarter of IBAC corruption investigations, and three-quarters of its public hearings, relate to procurement processes (IBAC, 2016). Prisons present many opportunities of this kind. The rapidly growing prison population must be sustained by considerable capital expenditure on infrastructure, goods, and services. Prisons have grown in size and number in the past decade. This means more buildings, more contractors coming and going, and the demands from caring for an expanded prison population. In 2012–2013, Australian expenditure on corrections totalled AUD$2.4 billion, approximately 25 per cent of which went to procurement (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014).

The sheer size of this industry—the amount of money and resources flowing through it—provides significant temptation and opportunity for those willing to engage in corrupt behaviour (Souryal, 2009). Within the correctional setting, these forms of corruption can impact the quality and quantity of goods and services available, which, in turn, affect the quality of life in correctional settings.

Procurement corruption concerns the misuse of one's position to engage in activities such as bribery, extortion, receipt of kickbacks, theft, fraud, abuse of discretion, exploitation of conflicts of interest, nepotism, cronyism and favouritism (Graycar & Smith, 2011; Transparency International, 2006). The forms most relevant to the correctional context are *bribery* or *kickbacks*—favours or rewards given to employees to award a contract to a provider and/or to administer/report on that provider favourably over time.

The procurement contract process itself is multifaceted and involves a series of procedures and stages. These range from project identification and submission of bids through to contract award and performance assessment (Ware, Moss, Campos, & Noone, 2011); each step offers opportunities for integrity breaches. Corruption in the procurement process may manifest as unnecessary/overestimated expenditure, provision of substandard goods and services (to cut expenditures), creation of false suppliers, leaking confidential bids to others, use of a single source/supplier without justification, duplication or falsification of invoices, excessive emergency works requiring bypass of usual procedures, among others (see Graycar & Prenzler, 2013; Transparency International, 2006).

Procurement corruption necessitates the exploitation of a relationship between the employer and an outside provider (an exogenous relationship), in which the employee exploits a positional advantage within a procurement process for personal benefit. While such activities are typically low visibility in nature, they can be threatened by any structures or practices that heighten transparency in operations between correctional institutions and third parties. Having said this, it is important to recognise that the line between inappropriate and appropriate dealings may be unclear at times, especially in environments that have informal systems of back-scratching (Macaulay, 2011; IBAC 2017b). In some jurisdictions, small gifts are allowed (e.g., ICAC, 2011), which, while attempting to factor in human reciprocity and generosity, create a risk to integrity. It may be difficult to prove when a gift is, in fact, a bribe. In answer to this dilemma, one can begin by looking at the motivation behind the "gift" and its acceptance.

Where either party's intention is to bypass competitive or merit-based (transparent) processes, there is a clear integrity risk.

In addition, there are those officers who are aware of corrupt procurement activities but do not participate in or report it. For example, in a recent investigation in Victoria, it was found that numerous staff and executives were aware of the potential conflict of interest between the officer in question and the contractor (the officer's son's company), but little was done to address this risk, one manager citing "time pressures" as reason for allowing works to continue. Business services managers did not implement systems or checks to ensure the integrity of the processes, and did not follow up initial concerns and complaints with any substantive action (IBAC, 2017b).

Main Drivers

The payoffs for engaging in procurement-related corruption are significant. In the Victorian case reported above, the prison manager in question was able to subvert procurement processes to provide his son's businesses with AUD$1.56 million worth in contracts (IBAC, 2017b). Similarly, in one of the largest corruption cases in the United States, in 2017 the former Mississippi corrections commissioner was sentenced to 20 years in prison on the back of 49 counts of corruption, totalling at least US$1.4 million in bribes and kickbacks to direct more than US$800 million worth of contracts favourably (Gates, 2017). Thus, financial motivations are central here.

From a situational crime perspective, it is important to look at the specific opportunities in correctional sites for this kind (and, indeed, other kinds) of corruption. Those opportunities can arise from job responsibility and/or physical location. *Access* and *authority* are thus relevant considerations in assessing risk of the commission of corrupt acts.

It is not surprising, then, that senior correctional officers and those with responsibilities for budgetary decisions are at high risk of engaging in procurement-related corruption (such as the Mississippi case). Where responsibility for a procurement activity is laid in a single (or a few) officer's hands—particularly if the entire process from initiation to payment is handled by that person—without sufficient oversight, the opportunity for corruption is significant (e.g., DiNapoli, 2014). Weak procurement procedures and low transparency can result in abuse of discretion by those in positions of power (e.g., Kitchin, 2010). Furthermore, the dependence on outside suppliers for procurement inevitably opens the door to various channels of influence from third parties.

Particular organisational cultures and climates can also facilitate corrupt procurement activities. Organisations are often loath to punish, or check too closely, the actions of employees who are seen by managers and peers as doing a difficult job relatively well (Goldsmith et al. 2016). In this way, organisational objectives and the "day-to-day" functioning of the correctional system may sometimes conflict with issues of integrity.

Of particular note, the trend towards privatisation of the prison sector introduces tensions around the disparity between public and private roles and responsibilities (Box & Forde, 2007). Accountability and service quality can suffer in the pursuit of profit, as substandard services are contracted in order to lower operational costs (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013;

Johnston, 2004; Soring, 2008). Private providers have also been reported to exploit governments by overcharging for services provided (Morris, 2013). In addition, private companies are incentivised to increase consumption of their "product" for profit, leading to perverse outcomes in the corrections sector. For example, two judges in Pennsylvania accepted kickbacks from a juvenile detention facility for sending offenders to those facilities for minor offences that likely did not warrant detention (Chen, 2009). Moreover, the large size of the prison sector means that it is sometimes difficult to find alternative suppliers, especially those able to step in and take over such large contracts (Plimmer, 2015). Equally, in some rural and regional environments, it may be difficult to source some goods or services except from a small range of suppliers. Given this difficulty, those in government procurement areas may be willing to overlook integrity risks or even a supplier's previous breaches. Prison system managers need to recognise these vulnerabilities and take active steps to avoid or manage risk.

Uncovering and Reporting Corruption

A key consideration in understanding any form of corruption is the factors that allow such behaviours to be undetected or unreported. Since there are few incentives for prisoners themselves to report employee misconduct (Goldsmith et al., 2016), much of the responsibility in practical as well as formal terms resides in the hands of correctional staff. Within the correctional sector, however, there can often be an organisational, cultural and political resistance to admitting to, or searching for, instances of corruption (Adshead, 2013; McIlwain, 2004; Podmore, 2012). At the organisational level, while staff may be generally more likely to report misconduct that they perceive as more serious, there is particular reticence to reporting some forms of corruption, namely sexual relationships with offenders and supply of drugs to offenders (CMC, 2009). In one study, non-custodial corrections staff in Queensland provided four reasons for their unwillingness to make formal complaints about misconduct (McIlwain, 2004): (1) nothing happens if a report is made, so the effort taken to report is wasted; (2) management tends to tolerate low-level misconduct, so any complaint is unlikely to be progressed; (3) prison management actively discourages employees from reporting suspected integrity breaches; and (4) fear of repercussions from peers.

The organisational integrity literature clearly confirms that setting and maintaining the right "tone at the top" is fundamental to building an organisational culture that supports integrity. As suggested by the findings of McIlwain's (2004) study, correctional staff often do not report corruption due to their perceptions of correctional leaders' and managers' attitudes towards its disclosure and resolution. In particular, a culture of bias and favouritism practiced by senior management can contribute to feelings of powerlessness and an unwillingness to take action against misconduct (see CMC, 2009). Of course, it is difficult to ensure managers set the right tone (e.g., making a strong point about investigating corruption allegations) when there are organisational and political pressures for an official public image of integrity and "calm efficiency" (Crewe, 2007; Podmore 2012).

In the case of private sector providers, a culture of concealing corruption can arise due to performance-related payment schemes within service provision agreements. These agreements between service providers and governments determine what will be paid to, or withheld from, a contracted service provider in relation to meeting or failing to meet certain performance standards. Bonuses for maintaining good order could incentivise management and staff to allow certain corrupt practices to occur and could lead to an organisational culture that actively discourages self-scrutiny and whistleblowing (e.g., Guardian Australia, 2015).

Another reason staff in either public or privately run prisons may be unwilling to report corruption is a fear of repercussions from peers (McIlwain, 2004). Such a fear or threat may be blunt and overt, in terms of a fear of intimidation, mockery, and reprisals and by colleagues (Crawley, 2004)—or it may be a result of an internal moral dilemma about betraying one's colleagues (i.e., a sense of peer loyalty; Loyens, 2011). The perception among staff that correctional work is dangerous, underappreciated, and poorly regarded by many in the community, can reinforce a kind of solidarity that is resistant to external criticism and to expressions of internal dissent (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). In such environments, anti-reporting attitudes are created and maintained as officers are socialised into accepting rationalisations used to excuse or ignore corrupt behaviour. In other words, there are often strong social incentives to overlook instances of corrupt behaviour.

Finally, it is important to recognise that some level of resistance to reporting corruption may actually be pragmatic on the part of prison staff, especially if the consequences of not doing so are relatively benign, and such tolerance is conducive to a larger 'good' in the form of less violent, more cooperative prisoners. This approach, while needing further elaboration and consultation, is part of what we call for overall—a realist approach to dealing with prison corruption. This approach requires that priorities are identified and adopted as part of prison procedures and objectives. This does not mean that all forms of corruption should be tolerated. However, establishing organisational structures, cultures and climates conducive to reporting corrupt practices requires an acknowledgement of the difficult balancing act between integrity and current understandings of prison security and safety, and the need for a more open and honest discussion about priorities. This point will be explored further in the next section.

Tackling Correctional Corruption

Promoting Correctional Integrity

For a number of reasons, absolute correctional integrity is neither possible nor desirable. First, time and resources constraints preclude institutions from doing the things required for "absolute integrity" (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996), especially in busy places such as prisons. For example, there are practical limits to how much employees or staff can be routinely checked without impacting disproportionately on other tasks and functions. Even if this were to occur, in the absence of failsafe security procedures and technologies (which are arguably impossible to achieve within a human environment) there will inevitably be "holes" in the system to be exploited. This is why a realist view of correctional integrity is needed.

A realist view, for example, accepts that it is necessary as a general rule to place trust in employees to exercise their discretion appropriately. Pursuing absolute integrity can come at the cost of prison operation and efficacy. Anti-corruption measures will be ineffective so long as they conflict with the wider aims of correctional systems and the legitimate work methods of employees. For instance, aiming for absolute integrity can threaten the quality of officer-prisoner relations—which are critical in correctional environments (Crewe, 2009; Liebling & Arnold, 2004). A degree of compromise and negotiation between staff and prisoners is desirable at times, in terms of enabling the system to respond to individual needs and, in some more limited measure, requests.

This is not the same as "inmate appeasement": "continuous [officer] acquiescence to inmate demands" (Cerrato, 2014, p. 288). Negotiating the line between appeasement and appropriate concessions is arguably the primary moral hazard faced by officers in their jobs (Goldsmith et al., 2016). A system of heavy surveillance can lead to officer feelings of inadequacy and resentment, which could in turn breed resistance and disobedience. A sustainable level of correctional integrity depends on ensuring a workplace climate of organisational justice and fairness, in which staff feel trusted and valued. Unethical demands may be less likely to be made (and the rewards for yielding to them less attractive) where the environment provides adequately for both inmate and staff needs, in terms of humanity, professionalism, fairness, and support.

Recognising a degree of trade-off between implementing integrity measures and achieving maximum operational efficiency should not, however, provide a pretext for stasis or inaction in how we seek to improve correctional integrity performance, including encouraging and expecting employees, staff and managers to lift their standards in various ways. There is a need to establish priorities of corruption reduction and integrity promotion so that resources can be used to target those priorities.

Our approach to building correctional integrity—conceived below in terms of Place, People, and Processes—needs in turn to be viewed in conjunction with our framework of organisational *climate*, organisational *structure* and organisational *culture* (Goldsmith et al., 2016, pp. 16–17). Climate points to the fact that any reforms need to take account of changing political priorities, budgetary constraints as well as public expectations around prisons, punishment, and attitudes to rehabilitation. Structure implies that there are formal mechanisms and established rules governing correctional institutions—some of which will be very difficult to change (such

as the rules protecting prison staff from being fully searched on entry to the workplace). Culture refers to the informal practices of various groups within organisations that preserve its "smooth" functioning (such as turning a blind eye to low level drug use for the sake of achieving prisoner compliance in more serious matters). All three of these dimensions are constantly in play and need factoring into any effort to detect and deal effectively with correctional corruption.

Place

The location, size and security level of particular prisons can impact upon recognition and reporting of, as well as responses to, corrupt behaviour.

Location affects opportunities for correctional corruption. In regional and rural correctional settings there is a much a higher likelihood that prison staff will come into close physical contact—either inadvertently or by dint of situational factors—with prisoners' friends or family members in various community settings (e.g., pubs, sporting clubs, supermarkets, etc.). Managing the risks from inappropriate relationships and conflicts of interest therefore is critical. In such communities, the children of prison staff and of prisoners may frequent the same school. Bumping into the parent, partner, sibling or carer of a prisoner's child or children is therefore a real prospect. Rules regarding what it is and is not appropriate to say and do in such circumstances need to be clearly and concisely articulated at the point of recruitment and throughout the employ of staff.

The frequenting of settings designed to inculcate a relaxed and more open social stance may present a particularly fertile ground for striking up inappropriate conversations between prison staff and family members and/or associates of prisoners. Adding to the complexity of this situation is that prison staff (in their much valued "down time") may not recognize the risks associated with these settings—such as when a conversation is struck around work life without knowledge that one of the interlocutors is a relative or partner of a prisoner under the prison officer's "care". These scenarios require prison staff to be vigilant about such risks. Adequate supervision and peer support measures are important. In smaller communities, especially, prison staff need to be carefully equipped with the *techniques for recognising grooming activities beyond those that inevitably occur within prisons*. The community space—the space where officers and other staff are likely to be "off guard"—is one that potentially heralds the *beginning* not the end of correctional corruption.

Some regional facilities also tend to have closer proximity to the manufacturers and suppliers of illicit drugs. Particular rural and regional communities (e.g., Gladstone, Townsville, Maryborough) known, for example, to be heavily involved in crystal methamphetamine (ice) production pose particular risks for correctional environments. Both officers and visitors become vectors for the smuggling of drugs. Prisons are major potential markets for the supply and consumption of drugs. It is probable that many officers in rural and regional locations will have attended the same schools or once have been friends with people now heavily ensconced in the illicit drug trade (pers. conv. with prisoners and officers in various Australian jurisdictions). The implications of such familiarity (present or past) are serious in terms of corruption risks—especially when even the smallest quantity of ice can sell in prison for five to 10 times its street value. Add to this the demand for other items such as mobile phones and

SIM cards—as well as the fact that a prison officer can make a fortnight's wage through delivery of just one phone—the temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour is high.

Taking active steps to mitigate these risks needs to involve an appropriate and well-articulated mix of situational and social measures (discussed further below under Architecture and Technology). A key challenge is for correctional authorities to constantly and better monitor the changing nature of *exogenous* threats posed by the location of custodial facilities. The risks here are fluid and are liable to change according to drug markets, preponderance of serious and organised crime groups in the local and wider areas, unemployment levels, as well as in relation to *endogenous* factors such as the incarceration of "well-connected" or notorious prisoners, and the strains (economic, sexual, emotional) and past employment experiences of particular prison staff.

Rural and regional locations can pose particular problems in the areas of procurement and recruitment, given the relatively finite range of providers of some critical services to prisons (e.g., building, maintenance, food and other perishable supplies). It is more likely that the contractor and (potential) clients will be known to each other at a personal level of one kind or another (e.g., through children attending the same school or sporting club or through mixing at the local hotel or bar, etc.). In such circumstances, kickbacks—or quid pro quo agreements done "off the books"—can more easily eventuate whether for provision of electrical, carpentry or plumbing work, or for construction and/or expansion of a particular facility.

Prisons in metropolitan areas are often larger, more impersonal places than those in regional and rural areas. A wider range of visitors is one consequence of these locations. Remand facilities—which tend to be city based—are particularly prone to pressures from prisoners in ways that differ from other custodial settings. For instance, prisoners in such facilities place a particularly high premium on obtaining information about their case, their visits, their access to children, and so forth. These are facilities where prisoners are often forced to go "cold turkey" in terms of their drug and/or alcohol addictions. And they are places where fear of reprisal from other prisoners/offenders or associates on the street is high since the dust has often not settled around who will or might give up whom for a lesser sentence.

These pressures can indirectly empower officers in ways that are corrupting. The ways in which officers contribute to decisions around who gets which cell, what gets written on a prisoner's file, who gets transferred when and to where, who receives an extra visit, who will get which prison job, and so forth, play directly into grooming opportunities and the potential for pay-offs and kick-backs. Prison staff in large metropolitan remand facilities need, therefore, to be particularly suited to the job. There are, as just outlined, a multitude of specific pressures apt to draw them into corrupt practices. In such places—but also in metropolitan facilities housing a combination of remandees and sentenced prisoners—staff need to have absolute confidence that the processes and practices put in train by prison managers will enable them to deal promptly and fairly with the (reasonable) demands of prisoners. Prison staff are more liable to act outside agreed protocols or bend or break the rules when they repeatedly find that the processes and rules don't work in day-to-day interactions with prisoners (see Goldsmith et al., 2016, pp. 21–22).

The type of correctional facility impacts corruption and its various forms. Open prisons—traditionally if not exclusively located in rural and regional areas—are less likely to see prison staff involved in trafficking illicit commodities since these are relatively easily obtained

without their assistance (i.e., the open perimeter lends itself to any number of "drop and collect" episodes of which a proportion will inevitably make their way into the facility proper). Probably the biggest protection against prisoners grooming officers in such places is the threat of losing the privileges of being in an open prison. The flipside, of course, is that the less rigid and "heavy" nature of such settings means that bending or breaking the rules may attract less attention than similar infractions in higher security environments. *Open prisons need therefore to be particularly vigilant around development of safeguards against inappropriate relationships*. These "more relaxed" environments can, precisely on account of their more social dimension or remit, inadvertently promote over-familiarity between persons whose relationship should be strictly built around monitoring and/or mentoring (more on static versus dynamic security below).

Maximum and medium security prison managers need to be especially attuned to the risk of correctional corruption. Maximum security settings are designed by their very nature to operationalize regimes of sparseness—whether in terms of food, number of visits, access to phone calls, objects permitted in cell, number of hours out of cell, access to criminogenic and other programs, and like. This sparseness, as we have spoken about elsewhere, sets up the ongoing potential for the corruption of officers through their enlistment in prisoners' plans and desires to make prison life easier. *As a rule, the tougher and more restrictive the regime, the higher the stakes (i.e., potential for reward) for involvement in corrupt practices*. The risks posed by prisoners incarcerated for, or who have strong links to, serious and organised crime, need particular attention. The rewards capable of being offered by such persons/groups for corrupt behaviour can be substantial as can the capacity for such prisoners to "reach" particular officers or their family members should they not comply (see IBAC, 2015, for a discussion of how organised crime groups target public sector workers).

Because the stakes are so high, officers and professional staff working in segregation or solitary confinement sections of a facility may have the most to gain (emotionally, culturally and/or economically) from engaging in corrupt practices. Prisoners in these circumstances—especially those serving life without the possibility of parole—have little if anything to lose. A proportion of these prisoners will therefore try any means to get access to illicit or prescription drugs, to better quality food, to an additional visit, or to implements (paintbrushes, pens, etc.) that might ease the psychic pain of their situation. Some will lay the groundwork for this through their relationships with professional staff and officers. What might seem an innocuous request (e.g., for a paper clip or a pen) can quickly turn into something very different (such as a shiv and a stabbing). Equally, even a small quantity of drugs smuggled in by an officer can spark violent and unpredictable behaviour putting staff (and prisoners) at risk. Trafficking drugs into the deepest end of the prison estate (segregation or supermax) provides the highest economic windfall for corrupt prison staff. *The vetting of staff in these areas needs therefore to be second to none*. Recruitment processes need to unearth track records of outstanding conduct and high degrees of emotional intelligence (the ability to know when one is being "played" as against when to show empathy or concern). Further, the rules for engagement with prisoners—and the certainty of consequences for breaching those rules—need to be made repeatedly and abundantly clear to all.

Although heavily monitored via CCTV, maximum security prisons tend to be areas where the potential for, or actual use of, excessive force is most likely. Officers in these locations need to be well trained not just in physical and tactical dimensions of the job, but also in the social and psychological impacts of incarceration—especially when confinement is of a prolonged nature

or when the prisoner has complex needs (e.g., a proclivity toward paranoia, claustrophobia, and/or psychosis). Maximum security settings risk promoting boredom among staff and prisoners alike. The para-military structure and routine invites deviance from the norm.

A busy prison is a good prison. If true, a prison that meaningfully engages prisoners and prison staff in a wide range of legitimate activities is less likely to foster corrupt practices. A key task is to ensure that staff do not become too comfortable with their "place." Staff should not only be rotated through different parts of the same facility, but where possible should rotate through other facilities as well. Such processes help to disrupt the relations necessary for corruption (i.e., predictability of contact and establishment of trust between would-be actors) and challenges staff to learn new and worthwhile aspects of the job. New skills and diversity of roles may also assist with promotion, which again can be a good protective mechanism against the feeling that one must cut corners to get ahead in correctional officer work.

The architecture of prisons bears directly on the opportunities for, and frequency of, a variety of corrupt practices. In any prison, the perimeter and the entry and exit points (sally port and gatehouse) are central considerations to any situational approach to designing out corruption (Wortley, 2002). Perimeters of prisons—particularly medium and maximum security facilities—must be illuminated during night hours and surveilled through state of the art CCTV technology. Continuous testing for and resolution of blind spots should be routinely implemented. Technologies for detecting and intercepting drones must also be considered and deployed in relation to enhancing perimeter security.

Entry and exit points present obvious opportunities for corruption. The sally port should be designed and staffed in a way that is able to efficiently check, monitor and catalogue all vehicles and persons in and out of the facility *without exception*. That means scanning and vetting *every* driver and passenger no matter how familiar sally port staff are with the movements and bone fides of such persons. A particular challenge exists during times of prison expansion whereby the temptation might be to allow trade vehicles through—for the sake of expediency—without proper checking and cataloguing of all tools. Such cataloguing needs to be through not only on the first few entries and exits but for *all* such movements. Sally port staff should be regularly rotated through other parts of the facility.

The gatehouse represents possibly the most important situational line of defence against correctional corruption. Minimum, medium and maximum security facilities must develop and follow standard rules and practices for vetting, scanning, detecting, and where appropriate, searching *all* persons entering and exiting facilities. Inconsistency of approach across facilities and within the same facility represents a fatal flaw in trying to design out and detect corruption. Hard decisions need to be taken by correctional executives and prison managers requiring prison staff—officers and professional personnel—to not only be scanned but subject to random pat downs and searches as part and parcel of their job. Given repeated problems with anti-jamming technologies (which purport but usually fail to render mobile phones smuggled into prisons unusable), the capture of such items prior to entry into the prison proper is paramount. However, the most expensive state-of-the-art scanning and biometric equipment— increasingly present at many custodial facilities—will mean little if further measures are not taken to "catch up" with those who know how to game or get around these systems (such as standing at a particular angle so as to avoid detection, or smuggling in a phone without any metal parts, etc.).

Given the ample evidence that prison officers are a primary vector for contraband, a strategy for tackling union resistance to random (full) searches needs prioritising. The end game is safety at work and safety for the community. That means those wishing to work in prisons must be prepared to endure an extra level of physical scrutiny as a condition of entry to the workplace. Again, staff in gatehouses need to be rotated through the facility. Regular monitoring by supervisors of CCTV from these vulnerable areas is needed to ensure that a deterrent effect is present and real for officers, visitors and prisoners. To avoid "tip-offs," strategies for keeping news of impending random searches confidential are essential.

People

There are a multitude of people associated with the running and maintenance of good order within any prison. The more prominent categories include prison managers, senior operational staff, prison officers (experienced and new recruits), professional staff (social workers, psychologists, nurses, etc.), visitors (family, lawyers, faith based personnel, other volunteers), contractors, and, of course, prisoners. Anti-correctional corruption measures should focus on known points of vulnerability among these categories and strengthen the protective measures around such. The more prominent issues are mentioned here.

Prison managers are fundamental to the upholding and operationalising of correctional integrity. Accordingly, the character and communication skills of such persons need to be second to none. They need to have an eye on endogenous and exogenous threats and understand how the organizational climate, culture and structure of corrections invite or protect against corrupt activity. The very best managers need to be briefly rotated out of "their" prison in order to help identify and improve facilities that have particular problems.

There needs to be a productive and close alliance and regular correspondence between correctional intelligence personnel/police and prison managers. At the same time—and requiring particular skill—prison managers need to have the trust of their staff and, as far as practicable, the trust of prisoners. Staff and prisoners—if they are to report suspected corrupt behaviour—must have absolute confidence in the way that managers will deal with information supplied them. Equipping prison managers with the capacity to attend best practice workshops and/or conferences on anti-corruption measures should be a priority. The learnings from such attendance should be disclosed to staff and to correctional executives and adjustments to current practices made.

Length of officer service bears directly on risk of corruption. New prison officer recruits—say, those with less than two years' experience—are vulnerable to grooming and falling foul of corrupt practices. This places ongoing importance on recruitment and vetting practices. A combination of "life experience" as well as excellent interpersonal skills should be at the forefront of the essential attributes of new officers. Prisoners will deliberately exploit naïve officers or those they believe can be "got at." All prisons should have a roster that permits and implements a structured buddying system whereby an experienced officer or officers and new recruits "walk the wing" together. New recruits need to feel that their training dovetails with the reality of prison work. There should not—as there often appears to be—a widespread assumption that the job works one way and the theory works another. If recruits are consistently being told by their buddy or mentor to "leave behind" everything learned in prison officer

training classes, then something is fundamentally awry with the recruitment and on-boarding processes.

Equally, it is unreasonable to think that any training module will cover all the vicissitudes of the job proper. Especially in the early months of their employ, recruits need concrete avenues for expressing their concerns or fears surrounding their work. They need to be able to vent their apprehensions—including situations where they believe they may have crossed "a line"—to supervisors in the first instance but also potentially to senior prison management without, at least in the first instance, fear of reprisal or job loss. Prison managers that cater for and actively encourage such feedback will do better in the anti-corruption stakes because they are attuned to learning about the scenarios that present as risks or grey areas for those new to the job.

Experienced officers—say, those with more than five years in the job—are also vulnerable to corrupt practice. One reason for this is that such persons have a longer institutional memory and are liable to know what can and what cannot fly under the radar in terms of integrity breaches. Such officers also have a much better understanding of how the informal prison economy works and their possible place within it should they risk acting in corrupt ways (such as turning a blind eye during visits). Others will know where the blind spots are (for handing over contraband, for engaging in sexual misconduct, etc.) or who else to enjoin (from officer ranks) in corrupt practices.

Officers who have been in the job for, say, a decade or more are likely to experience some measure of burn out and need, therefore, to be particularly vigilant about letting standards slip (Brough & Williams, 2007). Again, presenting officers with new challenges and with sufficient opportunities for career development and promotion is key to maintaining standards. Sufficient leave and capacity for debriefing are also important measures that can enhance the feeling of belonging and contentment among more experienced officers (but also new recruits).

The skill set and extensive experience of particular officers needs to be treated as an asset and as a potential hazard (Farkas, 2000; Tait, 2011). On the one hand, a respected and experienced officer might influence the behaviour of others and act as an important intermediary between the tone at the top and the translation of that tone "down" into the landings and other parts of the prison (gatehouse, sally port, etc.). On another reading, such officers can inadvertently form their own cliques. This in turn—depending on circumstances—can lead to the slow or more rapid departure from accepted correctional standards. Key here is a proactive stance from supervisors and managers regarding performance of more senior frontline officers and recognition of leadership potential. The work of the best officers has to have some place to go other than "more of the same" year in year out. Otherwise, it is likely these talents will be directed toward nefarious purposes.

Professional staff must also be trained in how to recognize grooming behaviours. This applies particularly to those working in the health section (with ready access to prescription medication) as well as those working in emotionally demanding roles (social workers and psychologists). There must be clear procedures for reporting possible breaches and for seeking clarification around what is and is not appropriate conduct in what ultimately can be very testing circumstances. This is a challenge for custodial environments that increasingly require a degree of "personal connection" between say, a psychologist and their patient, but also demand professional distance.

Visitors can pose a threat to correctional integrity. No category of visitor should be presumed above suspicion. Lawyers, dignitaries (politicians), religious figures, volunteers (Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc.) and family or friends of prisoners all need to be treated in precisely the same fashion on entry and exit from the facility. Evidence, though, clearly shows that friends and family of prisoners pose the highest risk in terms of contraband trafficking with transactions most likely to take place in and around prison visits (Goldsmith et al., 2016, chapter 4). In addition, officers responsible for scanning visitors and supervising visits should be randomly re-rostered without notice. This is one of few ways that the alignment between the predictability of the system (the same staff members being on at the same times each and every week) and the capacity to bribe or otherwise receive favoured treatment prior to and during visits can be interrupted. Another tactic for slowing the flow of contraband would be to prohibit bathroom breaks during prison visits (a known moment for removing or secreting drugs and other items from body cavities).

The demands of dynamic security can potentially conflict with the need to maintain appropriate relationships in prisons (see Halsey & Deegan, 2017). With few exceptions (such as supermaximum confinement) prisons are increasingly moving away from a purely static model of security to one based additionally on social dynamics. Dynamic security relies on officers getting to know "their" prisoners and breaking down, intentionally or otherwise, the barrier between "them" (prisoners) and "us" (prison staff). This is consistent with international trends toward a more proactive officer whose task is to motivate prisoners to rehabilitate, to intervene in their personal problems, to mentor them, and to foster prisoners' emotional development (Ministry of Justice, 2016). The role of turn-key, while still very much part and parcel of an officer's duties, now sits along side this more "human" and pro-social approach to prisoner management. Prisoner managers and correctional executives need therefore to think carefully about how dynamic security might create new opportunities for corrupt conduct. Familiarity between prisoners and officers is touted as the key to a well-ordered and more rehabilitative environment but it can also—if not carefully managed—open up avenues for blackmail and extortion. As people learn more and more about each other, that information becomes a key currency in the leveraging of favours and illicit conduct from officers.

The prestige accorded to correctional work can weigh on how officers conceive of their role (see Goldsmith et al., 2016, pp. 19–20). The colloquial view is that most prison officers could not cut it elsewhere in life (as failed soldiers or police or security personnel) and that the correctional space provides them with some limited professional status. Another view is that prisons involve one set of undereducated people (i.e., officers) surveilling and trying to manage another set of undereducated people (i.e., prisoners). The reality, of course, is far more complex. Indeed, in terms of engaging and connecting practically to public safety and protection, the work of prison officers and prison staff more generally is of high social and economic value. Steps need to be taken to reinforce this view both to current and prospective staff and to the wider public who oftentimes misunderstand the purpose of imprisonment and the nature of prison officer work.

Processes

Good processes are necessary but not sufficient. Correctional corruption in its different forms, while sometimes facilitated by or involving prisoners, raises questions about failures by officers to comply in some way with the formal procedures and requirements of the prison

system. Some forms of corruption, we have noted, are far more serious and disruptive of the good order in prisons than others. Trafficking illicit drugs such as ice and heroin into prison, and access to mobile phones, for example, can result in unacceptable forms of victimisation of prisoners and even potential harm to persons outside prison as well as to officers. Anti-corruption measures are particularly important here in terms of detecting, disrupting, deterring, and dealing firmly (through disciplinary proceedings, criminal prosecution, etc.) with serious breaches. There is an extensive literature in Australia and abroad that sets out the kinds of tools that are needed to ensure a high level of accountability in correctional as well as other public service settings (e.g., CCC, 2018a).

More will be said shortly about ensuring adequate tools for the correctional environments. However, by themselves they are not adequate for the challenges faced. There needs also to be a broader focus on correctional integrity that is preventive in its focus. Correctional integrity, as we define it, arises when a correctional system manifests a wholeness of purpose among the agency, its staff and employees in terms of pursuing its approved mission by appropriate means (Goldsmith et al., 2016, p. 3). Thus, in addition to having appropriately resourced anti-corruption tools, there needs to be a set of strategies and processes that, through communication, training, supervision, and monitoring, reinforces and ensures a correctional culture of integrity.

Correctional integrity requires attention to organisational culture. Research from criminology and social psychology confirms the power of peer influences in organisational settings to determine what occurs in those settings, rather than what the formal procedures in place require or direct employees to do. While official disciplinary and performance management mechanisms need to be in place and effective in what they do, in order to deal with serious breaches and deter further breaches, the avoidance of an entrenched workplace culture of corruption requires a broader response. It must also pay attention to the main drivers of organisational culture, and especially peer influence. Prison officers, like employees in other workplaces, will often be more concerned about how their actions are judged by their fellow officers than by the prospect that management may object and take steps to punish them (Hollinger & Davis, 2005).

Employees in organisations in which corruption is widely practised often engage in this conduct out of feelings of injustice about their working conditions. Greed and opportunity remain key important motivations, but do not account for all acts of corruption. The sense of injustice may arise from dissatisfaction regarding pay, the physical environments in which they work, and the challenges they face in their daily work. These matters will often be talked about among fellow officers, and give rise to explanations or justifications for "not following procedure" in various ways.

Supervisors and management are responsible for culture. The culture will also reflect what is tolerated, or those behaviours to which a blind eye is turned, by management and supervisors. The best procedures in the world for addressing corruption will not work if there is not also a focused willingness and determination to ensure that those procedures are applied firmly and consistently. The story of entrenched or repeat patterns of correctional corruption often involves a failure of front-line supervision and by management to ensure that supervisory arrangements are adequate and effective. As prisons adapt to rapid growth of employees as well as prisoners, and casualisation of employment becomes or remains a cost-containment strategy, there are repeated instances of supervision failure induced by churn of personnel

through those roles (see ICAC, 2006). The result is that there is little effective direction or accountability for what employees do on a day-to-day basis. In order for correctional integrity to emerge and grow, there must be sufficient, ongoing guidance from other personnel, and especially supervisors and managers, to ensure that the processes followed and outcomes achieved are appropriate and in keeping with the policies and rules of the prison system.

Values influence culture. The values that shape correctional integrity can come, as we have noted, from peers. This largely occurs and takes a toxic turn when the organisation does not effectively communicate and reinforce the values of the organisation and ensure that processes and practices are in place to reinforce those values. The values are critical because they set the parameters for what correctional integrity looks like. The values of safe containment, respectful treatment, and assistance to reform and re-enter mainstream society should govern the procedures and processes in place in any correctional setting. They should also, through resourcing, training and broader organisational messaging, shape how the leaders and managers approach their relationships with staff and prisoners.

A leadership or management group that does not actively endorse and support the right values cannot expect its employees to act differently and indeed better—the tone at the top, in terms of signalling a commitment to integrity to the key values of the organisation, is of fundamental importance. Where this does not occur, employees will often take matters into their own hands, feeling that they are being neglected or treated unfairly. This is why it is important not just to have procedures in place for dealing with corruption, but also to have a leadership and management group that is visibly supportive of those who uphold the right values, and which is prepared to take decisive action to confront and deal with those employees whose actions undermine those values.

Procedures for Supporting Correctional Integrity

As noted above, there is a range of anti-corruption tools potentially applicable and appropriate to correctional settings. There is not the need nor the space here to re-describe them in detail (See CCC, 2018a). However, some procedures and tools are important in terms of the signals an organisation sends about what its integrity is and demands. In some cases, their application has not been sufficient or consistent enough to achieve the desired ends. Even worse, sometimes the procedures have proven to be counter-productive, by in effect punishing those who attempt to do the right thing and neglecting or failing to deal effectively with wrongdoing. Overall, it can be said, there is not enough knowledge yet relating to the effectiveness of anti-corruption tools, so that what is developed is often reactive to particular crises or an emulation of practice in another jurisdiction. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to conduct scientific studies in this area, there are sufficient case studies and scandals of mistreatment to point to the limitations of some current procedures. More attention to devising effective procedures is required.

Taking the elements of the Corruption Prevention Strategy of the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission as our guide, strategies need to enable employees and others to recognise corrupt conduct, to report it, and then enable an effective response.

Recognition: Correctional staff need to be trained in the vulnerabilities to corruption of the systems and environments in which they work. These can be related to the physical

environment, the relationships in the workplace, and the operating systems in place that determine selection, training, classification decisions, access to personal information, benefits and training opportunities. Those working in corrections need to accept that corruption is something their fellow employees are capable of, and be able to identify temptations and opportunities in the workplace. The work group, as well as the individual officer, must be capable of recognition of corruption as a pre-condition for taking action.

A consistent and glaring failure of recognition in many instances of correctional corruption arises in the area of conflict of interest. When the interests of a prison officer diverge from the interests of his or her employer or fellow workers, a conflict of interest may exist. Many managers, as well as officers, fail to see conflicts between the performance of their role and the advantages of a personal kind that they derive, or are seen by others to derive, from their conduct in that role. Blindness on this issue lies behind the formation of inappropriate relationships, the allocation of contracts to friends and relatives, and the extraction of bribes from prisoners, contractors and others (see Goldsmith et al., 2016, chapter 7).

For greater recognition, correctional employees at all levels need comprehensive training and regular monitoring in relation to conflicts of interest, given the pervasive failures in this regard behind many instances of correctional corruption. Efforts are needed to strengthen the self-regulatory capability of the work group, so that peer influence reinforces, rather than detracts from, correctional integrity.

Above all else, the core values of the organisation need to be articulated to all staff, and instilled through discussion and demonstrated through leadership by example. As Goldsmith and colleagues (2016, p. 141) note:

> [R]eal integrity improvement depends on more than just strong effective mechanisms for detecting and dealing with those breaching rules, and relatedly, on cooperative individuals willing to go "against the odds" of the culture and "top down" signals. More pervasive organisational signalling is required from leadership and professional groups within correctional settings. It depends ultimately … on the system's ability to project and support a vision of correctional integrity that welcomes expression of concern about present operations and finds ways of responding sensitively and concretely to those concerns.

More will be said under Responding (below) in regards to how this signalling might be done.

Reporting: Integrity depends in large part upon having the ability to collect information from witnesses or those directly affected by particular behaviours. Employees are best placed to know when things are not being done properly in the workplace, including when serious forms of corruption are taking place. However, study after study confirms the reluctance of many employees to take the step of reporting instances of suspected or actual corruption (see Goldsmith et al., 2016, chapter 8). Another way of looking at this is to say that the procedures in place to encourage reporting, and to protect those who report potential cases of organisational corruption, are not effective.

A recent Australian study of organisational whistleblowing procedures surveyed a range of public and private sector organisations, noting generally that the organisations were "finding it difficult to realise their own goals of having processes which provide strong staff support and protection" (Brown & Lawrence, 2017, p. 13). The same study concluded that public sector systems in Australia were weak in terms of support and protection for whistleblowers.

This means that many opportunities for addressing corruption are currently being missed, and therefore no appropriate action is being taken. The result is often that corruption becomes a pattern. This can affect how employees engage with their workplaces. Discomfort with acts of corruption may lead to employees seeking to move, or just disengage from doing their jobs properly and effectively. Here, it can be observed, the absence of suitable procedures to redress employee reluctance to report, or their patent failure to work when they are used to report corruption, sends powerful signals throughout the workplace that the values of correctional integrity are not being taken seriously, or at least seriously enough, by the leadership, management, and prison system as a whole. This is addressed further in the next section.

Responding: Reports of corruption need a comprehensive response. This includes adjusting selection, vetting, training, and supervision arrangements, as well as establishing effective whistleblower protections, to ensure that they are more effective in future, and that officer culture is directed towards reinforcing integrity rather than undermining it. Building integrity is a matter requiring continuous vigilance and improvement across the organisation. A lateral approach to this task should be adopted. Enlisting officers in the process of identification of risks, and in devising of measures to address those risks, is more likely to build legitimacy of the systems put in place and result in compliance in the workplace.

Prison managers should aspire to what has been termed "conspicuously ethical leadership" (Goldsmith, 2001) as part of a concerted signalling of organisational commitment to integrity in prisons. Leadership of this kind requires a willingness to "walk the talk"—to take clear actions to reinforce the importance of upholding the core values of correctional institutions. The qualities of forthrightness, candour, and especially courage are central here. How those who "blow the whistle" are treated is very important in terms of the signals sent by management to employees on these matters.

Unfortunately, the history of organisational whistleblowing in Australia across the public and private sectors is not one of which we can generally be proud (Barker, 2017; De Maria, 1999; Goldsmith, 2001). Employees who do the right thing in this regard should be recognised as integrity champions, not scapegoated (Daniel, 1998). As suggested earlier, it is not enough to protect those employees who report suspected corruption. There also need to be incentives (including rewards) and other forms of encouragement (recognition) openly provided to those who in good faith report their suspicions.

Specific anti-corruption control measures continue to be an essential part of the response toolkit (see CCC, 2018a). Investigation and prosecution of cases of serious corruption is required in order to signal that serious wrongdoing will not be tolerated. Situational corruption prevention measures, including CCTV and scanning machines, are needed in critical locations of correctional centres, such as entry and exit points (gate houses, sally ports, and areas where prisoners and staff can interact in relative isolation from the rest of prison life (consultation areas, class rooms, workshops).

Consistent approaches to conduct of searches of staff, prisoners, and visitors are needed to ensure that it is done thoroughly and that all potential vulnerabilities for contraband are checked. Rotations of responsibility for such tasks is desirable so that those responsible do not become entrenched or complacent towards this responsibility. Random and targeted drug testing of staff as well as prisoners need to be deployed in order to identify problematic substance use that can indicate vulnerabilities to participation in corruption.

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