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Police use of force in Queensland watch-houses

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Crime and Corruption Commission

GPO Box 3123, Brisbane QLD 4001

Level 2, North Tower Green Square

515 St Pauls Terrace

Fortitude Valley QLD 4006

Phone: 07 3360 6060

(toll-free outside Brisbane: 1800 061 611)

Fax: 07 3360 6333

Email: mailbox@ccc.qld.gov.au

Note: This publication is accessible through the CCC website <www.ccc.qld.gov.au>.

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Summary

Background

Assessing and dealing with allegations of assault/excessive use of force involving Queensland Police Service (QPS) officers is a key area of focus of the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) because of the volume of allegations, risk to the community and potential to undermine public confidence in police.

Between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2017 there were 1667 allegations of assault/excessive use of force involving sworn or civilian members of the QPS. This was the second most frequent allegation type involving the QPS. Two hundred and eight of the 1667 allegations related to assaults occurring in watch-houses. CCC investigations prompted research to better understand how force is being used in Queensland watch-houses, particularly given the large volume of detainees processed through Queensland watch-houses each year.

This research sought to improve understanding of the nature and frequency of force being used by officers in Queensland watch-houses, examine injuries to people detained in a watch-house resulting from the use of force and assess compliance with Queensland Police Service (QPS) use of force and injury reporting requirements. To do so, the research examined closed circuit television (CCTV) footage from five watch-houses (“the Watch-house Review”), QPS administrative data, and CCC allegations and investigations data.

Key findings

The nature of use of force in watch-houses

Estimating the prevalence of use of force in watch-houses is difficult. The Watch-house Review found that, on average, 3 out of 10 detainees experienced some use of force at the front charge counter, this included many detainees who were brought into the watch-house in handcuffs, which is not unexpected. When detainees entering the watch-house in handcuffs were removed from the analysis, the prevalence of use of force (at the front charge counter) decreased to about 1 use of force incident for every 10 people who entered a watch-house. The absence of comparable data from another jurisdiction makes it difficult to make meaning of this information, but it does not suggest widespread or excessive use of force in watch-houses. This information will serve as a baseline for future research in the watch-house environment.

The Watch-house Review found that officers most frequently used a physical restraint (principally arm restraints) to resolve situations in watch-houses. This suggests officers are electing to use “lower-level” use of force options where they can, as opposed to “higher-level” options such as physical strikes and weapons. Batons, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, Tasers and firearms were used infrequently in watch-houses (noting that firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses).

Despite this, a considerable proportion of uses of force in watch-houses involved compliant detainees. In some cases, force was applied to compliant detainees in handcuffs. It is not clear how the use of force is warranted in these circumstances or reflects QPS policy to only use the minimum amount of force necessary to resolve the situation. The CCC has therefore recommended that the QPS examine adherence to the minimum use of force policy (see Recommendation 1).

The CCC continues to deal with matters involving allegations of excessive use of force in watch-houses. Approximately 12 per cent of all QPS assault/use of excessive force allegations received by the CCC between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2017 occurred in a watch-house, compared with 41 per cent that occurred in the street or a public space.

Perhaps not unexpectedly, uses of force in watch-houses that are the subject of complaints to the CCC involve higher-level use of force options. In rare cases, the CCC has investigated incidents where officers have used force that is best characterised as a possible criminal assault rather than a “use of force”. While certainly exceptions, these cases do highlight the need for continued monitoring by the QPS and the CCC.

Injuries to detainees resulting from use of force and compliance with QPS reporting requirements

No detainee injuries (including likely injuries) as a result of a use of force were identified in the Watch-house Review. This is a very positive finding and suggests that detainee injuries resulting from the use of force are infrequent in the watch-house environment. Notwithstanding this, injuries — some quite significant — were identified in a number of allegations to the CCC involving use of force in watch-houses. Very few QPRIME¹ Use of Force Reports or Significant Event Messages were generated for these matters, although the information available was not always sufficient to assess whether they were reportable under QPS policy. Given the unresolved nature of this key issue, the CCC has recommended that the QPS audits compliance with use of force reporting requirements (see Recommendation 2).

Given that the Watch-house Review suggests that injuries resulting from the use of force occur infrequently, the CCC has also recommended that the QPS consider lowering its use of force/injury reporting threshold (see Recommendation 3).

Other observations about QPS systems, policies and procedures

A range of other issues were identified during this project and require consideration by the QPS.

- Although the capabilities of the CCTV systems in each of the five watch-houses included in the Watch-house Review complied with both QPS standards and the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA) recommendations for police CCTV systems, automated sound recording would significantly aid the QPS and the CCC in assessing and investigating allegations of misconduct and corruption (see Recommendation 4). The CCC acknowledges the budget implications of this recommendation.
- Due to maintenance and “technical errors”, not all of the footage requested by the CCC from violent detention cells (VDCs) in three of the large watch-houses and the remote watch-house was able to be obtained. Clearly, the integrity of systems and QPS processes for dealing with faulty systems is critically important to ensuring the safety of detainees and facilitating the assessment and investigation of allegations of misconduct and corruption. The CCC has recommended that the QPS provides improved guidance to officers about maintaining watch-house CCTV systems and dealing with system errors (see Recommendation 5).
- QPS policies governing the reporting of uses of force in watch-houses — the Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) and watch-house Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and instructions — are complex, sometimes ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. The CCC has recommended that the QPS review these policies with respect to use of force reporting requirements (see Recommendation 6).

1 Queensland Police Records and Information Management Exchange.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The CCC recommends that the QPS requires watch-house Officers in Charge (OICs) to assess the extent to which the minimum use of force policy is adhered to in their watch-house and report on this as part of the divisional performance review process.

Recommendation 2

The CCC recommends that the QPS audits compliance with use of force reporting requirements.

Recommendation 3

The CCC recommends that the QPS explores whether a lower use of force/injury reporting threshold (a) for watch-houses and (b) more generally is in the public interest and would allow the QPS to form a better understanding of how officers use force.

Recommendation 4

The CCC recommends that the QPS considers upgrading all watch-house CCTV systems so that all cameras automatically record sound (audio).

Recommendation 5

The CCC recommends that the QPS provides improved guidance to officers about:

- maintaining watch-house CCTV systems
- dealing with system errors, including the processes for identifying, reporting and fixing malfunctions, and how to manage detainees if a cell's camera is not functional.

This guidance should be available to all watch-house staff via local SOPs or instructions.

Recommendation 6

The CCC recommends that the QPS:

- reviews relevant sections of the OPM to ensure that use of force reporting requirements are clearly communicated to officers, including ensuring that there is internal consistency and no unnecessary duplication
- reviews watch-house SOPs and instructions with respect to use of force reporting requirements, particularly to ensure that there is consistency with the OPM, key terms are clearly defined and the person responsible for fulfilling each reporting requirement is clearly stated
- implements processes to ensure that (a) changes to the OPM are made in a holistic and integrated fashion and (b) watch-house SOPs and instructions are kept up to date and consistent with the OPM.

QPS response to recommendations

On 1 November 2017 the QPS responded to the CCC's watch-house report recommendations (see Appendix 5):

- **Response to recommendations 1, 2 and 3:** The QPS advised that the changes proposed under recommendations 1, 2 and 3 were considered alongside recommendations arising from the Violent Confrontations Review and Task Force Bletchley, which have resulted in some changes to QPS policy. However, the QPS notes that their work on use of force reporting is ongoing.
- **Response to recommendation 4:** This recommendation was supported in principle, and the QPS intends to upgrade to automatic audio recording progressively. At present, one watchhouse has had this installed, and one other is scheduled.
- **Response to recommendation 5:** The QPS advised that they would provide guidance to OICs about maintaining watchhouse CCTV systems and dealing with system errors.
- **Response to recommendation 6:** The QPS has redrafted their use of force policy wording to make it clearer.

Introduction

Rationale for the report

The Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) has a strategic focus of examining excessive use of force in the public sector. Police use of force continues to be a priority area of scrutiny for the CCC. Reflecting this, the CCC recently allocated additional resources to assess, review and investigate use of force complaints referred to the CCC. These investigations prompted research to better understand how force is being used in Queensland watch-houses.

The use of force in a watch-house is not necessarily problematic. Queensland police officers and watch-house officers have the power to use force in certain circumstances during the performance of their functions.² However, Queensland Police Service (QPS) policy requires all officers to only use the minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident, and each application of force must be authorised, justified, reasonable/ proportionate/appropriate, legally defensible and tactically sound and effective.³ Officers are guided by policy and receive training to help them make sound use of force decisions.

It is important to understand how this legal and policy framework translates into the watch-house environment, which has long been recognised as a unique policing environment. Watch-houses are highly ordered and contained environments that are controlled by strict processes and procedures. However, they are also potentially volatile environments where people detained may be vulnerable (e.g. experiencing mental health issues), under the influence of drugs or alcohol, uncooperative, aggressive or erratic. The interaction of these environmental factors has led to different expectations about how often police should use force in a watch-house.

One view is that force should be used less in a watch-house because the risks to the public and the influence of outside factors is considerably less than on the streets (Independent Police Complaints Commission 2016). The controlled and process-driven nature of the environment may decrease unpredictability and may provide fewer opportunities for situations to escalate to a level where force is required to resolve them.

A contrary view is that some factors may increase the likelihood that force will be used to resolve an incident in a watch-house. Stronger force may be necessary in the confined spaces of a watch-house to withdraw a person safely from a cell or avoid getting too close to a detainee (Australian Federal Police & Commonwealth Ombudsman 2007). The high concentration of officers in a watch-house means that sometimes numerous police respond to an individual incident, which creates the potential for the situation to quickly escalate as more officers become involved (Independent Police Complaints Commission 2016). Further, people in custody are required to comply with intrusive police practices such as strip searches and pat downs as part of their processing on arrival, and these have been associated with detainee noncompliance, use of force complaints and police misconduct (Australian Federal Police &

2 The *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000* (the PPRA) provides both police officers and civilian watch-house officers with the power to use reasonably necessary force when exercising or attempting to exercise their powers or to prevent a person from escaping from lawful custody (sections 615 and 652 PPRA). That force does not include force that is likely to cause grievous bodily harm to the person or the person's death. Police officers, but not civilian watch-house officers, also have the power to use reasonably necessary force against people in critical situations, which includes force likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death (section 616 PPRA).

3 The Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) translates the PPRA into the operational context. Police use of force is addressed in Chapter 14 — Operational Skills and Practices. This applies to both sworn police and civilian watch-house officers.

Commonwealth Ombudsman 2007; Corruption and Crime Commission 2013, 2015; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 2015).⁴

Between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2017 there were 1667 allegations of assault/excessive use of force in Queensland Police Service (QPS). This was the second most frequent allegation type for QPS. Of these 208 allegations related to assaults occurring in watch-houses. Given that, on average, over 146 000 detainees (or nearly 55 000 distinct people) are processed through Queensland's 59 watch-houses each year,⁵ the CCC decided that it was important to better understand the force used in this challenging policing environment, examine injuries that result from this use of force and assess compliance with use of force and injury reporting requirements.

Method

Aims

This project sought to:

- develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and frequency of force being used by officers in Queensland watch-houses
- examine injuries to people detained in a watch-house resulting from the use of force
- assess compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements.

Importantly, the project did not seek to determine whether individual uses of force were appropriate in the circumstances. Existing QPS and CCC assessment processes deal with allegations of corrupt conduct, including allegations involving use of force.

Definitions

Key concepts were defined as follows (see Appendix 1 for a full explanation of definitions):

- **Watch-house** — a police facility containing cells for holding people in custody, usually for longer periods of time, and distinct from holding cells at police stations.⁶
- **Use of force** — a use of any of the following by a police officer or civilian watch-house officer ("an officer") against a person:
 - a baton
 - Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray (presentation or spray)⁷
 - a physical restraint
 - a physical strike
 - a restraining accoutrement (i.e. handcuffs, flexible handcuffs)
 - a Taser (unholstering, presentation or deployment)
 - a Service firearm (unholstering, presentation or discharge)⁸
 - any other method to apply force to a person.

4 The potential for police misconduct exists because of the inherent power imbalance when a person is deprived of their liberty (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 2015).

5 Data supplied by the Public Safety Business Agency (PSBA).

6 Section 16.1 of the OPM states that "holding cells at police stations are designed to hold prisoners in a custody for a short time, whilst watch-houses are primarily designed to hold persons overnight or for 24 hours or longer".

7 For three of the watch-houses included in the Watch-house Review (see page 6), the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or instructions specified that only foam-type OC spray (versus the standard streamer-type spray) was permitted to be used in the watch-house.

8 Note that firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses. They were nevertheless included in the definition of use of force for completeness.

- **Injury** — an identifiable or likely bodily injury to a person, where bodily injury means an abrasion, a cut, bleeding, a fracture, swelling, an internal injury, bruising, a sprain or concussion (consistent with the injury types recorded in QPS QPRIME Use of Force Reports).⁹ An “identifiable” bodily injury is one that can be observed either in the vision of the closed circuit television (CCTV) footage or by audio captured in the CCTV footage (see below); a “likely” bodily injury is one where a reasonable person would conclude that the detainee was likely to have sustained a bodily injury as a result of the use of force.¹⁰
- **Detainee behaviour** — the detainee’s observable behaviour prior to the use of force. The Canadian National Use of Force Framework (NUFF; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2000) was used as an analytical tool for categorising the text descriptions of a detainee’s behaviour prior to a use a force.¹¹ The NUFF outlines five behaviour categories — “Cooperative”, “Passive resistant”, “Active resistant”, “Assaultive” or “Likely to inflict grievous bodily harm or death” (see Appendix 1).¹²
- **Reportable use of force** — a use of force that an officer is required to report in writing under the QPS Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) or local Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or instructions. This is done via a QPRIME Use of Force Report, Significant Event Message (SEM) or QPRIME custody report/detention log entry. If and how a use of force in a watch-house needs to be reported depends on both what type of force is used and the nature of any associated injury. In some cases, reporting requirements also differ between different watch-houses.

Data sources, collection and analysis

Data from a number of sources were examined to achieve the aims of the project.

Legislation and QPS policies

Relevant legislation, the QPS OPM and SOPs or instructions for each of the five watch-houses included in the Watch-house Review (see below) were examined to determine how force can be used in watch-houses, and how uses of force and any resulting injuries are required to be reported.

CCTV footage from a sample of watch-houses (“the Watch-house Review”)

All Queensland watch-houses have CCTV cameras to capture the activities of officers and people in custody. This footage provides valuable data to examine the nature of officers’ use of force and injuries to detainees. The CCC’s review of CCTV footage is referred to as the Watch-house Review (see Appendixes 2 and 3 for a full description of the Watch-house Review method and a copy of the coding instrument).

Time and resource limitations prevented an analysis of all CCTV footage from all Queensland watch-houses, a sample of five watch-houses was selected for the Review.

Four were selected because they have high numbers of detainees and encompass different geographical locations across Queensland (“the large watch-houses”); the fifth watch-house was selected because it is located in an Indigenous community (“the remote watch-house”; see Appendix 2 for more details).

9 QPRIME is the Queensland Police Records and Information Management Exchange.

10 This definition was adopted for the Watch-house Review in recognition that the quality of the CCTV footage and lack of available audio would limit coders’ ability to identify injuries.

11 The NUFF was used because the QPS Situational Use of Force Model does not include specific categories of behaviour.

12 A detainee’s behaviour was assigned to one of these categories based on the CCTV footage. This categorisation may differ from the perceptions of the officer involved.

A sample of CCTV footage was then requested from these watch-houses from cameras filming three “high risk” locations for use of force — the front charge counter, the hallway leading from the front charge counter and the violent detention cells (VDCs).¹³ For the four large watch-houses, footage was obtained from peak intake periods (12 midnight to 5 am on Saturdays and Sundays) between 24 October and 15 November 2015. For the remote watch-house, footage was obtained from all times between 2 November and 29 November 2015. A longer period of time was required because fewer people were detained during the days and times sampled for the other watch-houses. (See Appendix 2 for more details). In total, approximately 704 hours of CCTV footage from the five selected watch-houses were reviewed.

While this approach provides valuable information about police use of force in watch-houses, the methodology has implications for how this use of force data should be interpreted:

- Use of force has been measured in two ways. A “use of force incident” refers to an incident where a detainee appears in the CCTV footage and is subject to at least one use of force. A use of force incident may involve one or more “uses of force”, which refers to the specific use of force (as defined on page 5) applied to a unique detainee.
- A single use of force may have been observed more than once. While the path of people detained in custody can be different, there is a general work process flow:
 1. A person entering the watch-house is initially processed at the front charge counter (one camera they may be recorded on).
 2. If the person is detained in the watch-house, they then proceed down the hallway (another camera they may be recorded on) and are placed in a cell.
 3. If a person is violent or aggressive while they are in the watch-house, they may be placed in a VDC (another camera they may be recorded on).¹⁴

Some cameras may therefore capture a use of force that is also captured by another camera. For example, a use of force that occurs in the hallway may already have been captured at the front charge counter.

To avoid the same use of force being counted multiple times, use of force numbers should not be totalled across the different camera locations. The prevalence of use of force was calculated based only on use of force that occurred at the front charge counter.

- It is not possible to describe all uses of force that an individual was subject to during their time in the watch-house. Detainees were not tracked through the watch-house. To do so would have required the path of each person to be identified and all cameras covering that path to be accessed and reviewed for the entire duration of the person’s stay. To do so would have been resource-intensive and taken a significant period of time, limiting the CCC’s ability to provide a timely review of use of force in watch-houses.
- It is not possible to assess the appropriateness of individual uses of force. Police use of force decisions are complex and reflect the risk assessments of individual officers. The methodology was unable to examine the factors that influenced officers’ decision-making.
- Some injuries that result from use of force may not be identified in CCTV footage. While including likely injuries in the definition of injury decreases the likelihood that injuries are under-reported in this research, it is possible that some injuries were not visible in the CCTV footage and were therefore not included in these analyses.
- Results cannot be generalised to all watch-houses in Queensland. The Watch-house Review was an exploratory exercise and its findings are not representative of use of force

13 These locations were considered “high risk” in the sense that they were identified by watch-house Officers in Charge (OICs) as those where there was the highest likelihood of police officers using force against detainees.

14 The OPM (section 16.12.4 Violent detention cells) states that “the watch-house manager is to, in situations where a violent detention cell is available: (i) only use violent detention cells for the management of violent or aggressive prisoners in the interests of safety of those prisoners and other persons; and (ii) ensure that a violent detention cell is not used for punishment of prisoners.”

in watch-houses across Queensland. The results should be interpreted as a description of the use of force that was captured by cameras in three watch-house locations during particular times at the five watch-houses in the sample.

CCC COMPASS data

The CCC Complaints and Operations Management, Processing and Statistical System (COMPASS) records allegations of corrupt conduct made against Queensland public officials and information relevant to corrupt conduct investigations by the CCC. Allegations involving police “assault/use of excessive force” received by the CCC between 1 July and 31 December 2015 ($n = 372$) were analysed to better understand the types of use of force that prompt complaints to the CCC, including the nature of any resulting injuries. Incidents that occurred in a watch-house were analysed and compared with incidents that occurred in a public space (e.g. on the street outside a nightclub, in a park). While the two environments are very different, they are both “high risk” policing environments in the sense that they generate a large number of complaints about police.

CCC investigations involving use of force in watch-houses

Five recent CCC investigations involving use of force in watch-houses were reviewed to better understand the types of uses of force in watch-houses that require investigation by the CCC, and to examine injuries to watch-house detainees that result from use of force. Compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements was also assessed.

QPS QPRIME and other records

Official QPS records — QPRIME Use of Force Reports, SEMs and QPRIME Custody Reports — were reviewed to examine compliance with use of force and injury reporting requirements. QPRIME data were also used to obtain detainees’ demographic information.

The legislative, policy and operational context for use of force in Queensland watch-houses

Use of force legislation and policy

Queensland police officers have the power to use force in certain circumstances during the performance of their functions. The *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000* (the PPRA) provides police officers with the power to use reasonably necessary force when exercising or attempting to exercise their powers, to prevent a person from escaping from lawful custody and in critical situations. Only in critical situations are police officers able to use force that is likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death to the person.¹⁵

Civilian watch-house officers are also lawfully able to use reasonably necessary force when exercising or attempting to exercise their powers and to prevent a person from escaping from lawful custody, but that force does not include force likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death.¹⁶

The QPS OPM translates this law into the operational context. Police use of force is addressed in Chapter 14 — Operational Skills and Practices and includes guidance and instruction that underpins all policies, procedures, education and training related to how police and watch-house officers use force. At the time of analysis, the OPM contained the following guidance relevant to this report:¹⁷

- Police and watch-house officers “should only use the minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident”.
- “All use of force applications must be authorised, justified, reasonable/proportionate/appropriate, legally defensible and tactically sound and effective.”
- The Situational Use of Force Model, which outlines use of force options available to police, “assists the police officer to select the most appropriate option(s) to resolve an incident”. The Situational Use of Force Model is not restrictive, and the police officer may use their discretion to select whichever option they deem necessary for the context of the incident (i.e. to escalate or de-escalate the use of force).
- Not all use of force options exist in a watch-house environment. Firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses and civilian watch-house officers also do not carry batons or Tasers.
- “Police and watch-house officers should consider all the use of force options available to them and all the circumstances of an incident when determining the most appropriate use of force option(s) to be used.” Key considerations include the physical attributes of the detainee and the officer, the location of the incident and the possibility of injury to any party.

In some cases, watch-house SOPs or instructions are developed to augment the OPM and give officers local-level guidance for dealing with detainees and performing relevant duties.

15 Sections 615 and 616 of the PPRA.

16 Section 652 of the PPRA.

17 Chapter 14 of the Operational Procedures Manual. Please note that recent changes to the OPM may not be reflected in these points.

Use of force reporting requirements in watch-houses

The OPM and individual watch-house SOPs and instructions require officers to report when certain types of force are used in a watch-house. This includes reporting via both written reports (e.g. QPRIME Use of Force Reports) and other reporting mechanisms that may not necessarily be documented such as, notifications about incidents to certain commissioned officers, which may be done over the phone.

In terms of written reports, whether a use of force in a watch-house needs to be reported depends on both what type of force is used and the nature of any associated injury. In some cases, reporting requirements also differ between different watch-houses.

Generally speaking,¹⁸ a reportable use of force in a watch-house is one in which:

- an officer:
 - uses OC spray (presentation or spray)
 - uses a Taser (unholstering, presentation or deployment)
 - presents and uses an object as a use of force option against a person.¹⁹
- an injury occurs to any person, including an officer, as a result of an officer using:
 - a baton²⁰
 - open hand tactics (physical restraints)
 - closed hand tactics (physical strikes)
 - a restraining accoutrement.

Note that an “injury” in this case means a “reportable injury” and is defined in the OPM as “an identifiable bodily injury to a person requiring first aid or medical treatment by a qualified ambulance officer, nurse or doctor at the time of the incident”.²¹

When a reportable use of force occurs in a watch-house, chapter 14 of the OPM requires the officer who used the reportable use of force (or their supervisor if the officer is incapacitated) to complete a QPRIME Use of Force Report within 24 hours of creating the relevant QPRIME occurrence.

Depending on the type of force used, the nature of any associated injury and the watch-house in question, the use of force may also need to be reported via an SEM or an entry on the detainee’s custody report/detention log.²² These requirements come from both the OPM and individual watch-house SOPs and instructions. For example, section 1.18 of the OPM requires all incidents resulting in a serious injury to be reported via an SEM.²³

18 What is a reportable use of force in a watch-house primarily reflects the QPS definition of “reportable use of force incident” in the OPM (section 14.3.9 Use of force reporting), but some watch-house SOPs and instructions make additional uses of force reportable via an SEM or custody report/detention log entry.

19 The use of a firearm in a watch-house would also be a reportable use of force (but noting that firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses).

20 At one of the large watch-houses, a baton use is reportable (via an SEM only) whether it causes a reportable injury or not.

21 Section 14.3.9 Use of force reporting.

22 At the time of the Watch-house Review, SEMs were required for any use of force causing serious injury or death at all watch-houses; all Taser uses at two of the large watch-houses and Taser deployments at all other watch-houses; and any use of force causing a non-serious injury at one of the large watch-houses if required by the District Duty Officer (note that the WH4 instructions referred to “injuries” without clearly defining the term). An entry on the detainee’s custody report/detention log was required for any use of force causing serious injury at all watch-houses; any deployment (spray) of OC spray at two of the large watch-houses and at the remote watch-house; any use of force causing a reportable injury or death at one of the large watch-houses; and any use of force causing a non-serious injury at one of the large watch-houses.

23 The QPS Service Manuals Definitions state that serious injury “means: (i) grievous bodily harm...; (ii) an injury caused by the discharge of a firearm; or (iii) any injury or illness which significantly affects the physical health or condition of any person; and (iv) includes any physical condition which requires the person to be admitted to hospital or receive ongoing treatment by a medical practitioner beyond initial examination and diagnosis.” Examples include broken bones and concussion.

Use of force in Queensland watch-houses

Findings from the Watch-house Review

Prevalence of use of force in watch-houses

The prevalence of use of force in watch-houses was calculated by determining the proportion of people who entered the watch-house during the review period who had some force used against them at the front charge counter. This approach underestimates the actual level of force observed across the three camera locations, but is most accurate in the circumstances.

The findings show that, of the three camera locations, use of force was most prevalent at the front charge counter (see Table 1). On average, 3 out of 10 detainees experienced some use of force at the front charge counter. Further analysis revealed that a large proportion of these use of force incidents involved the continuing use of a restraining accoutrement (i.e. handcuffs) that was first applied outside the watch-house. These and several other “continuing” use of force incidents were removed from subsequent prevalence analyses to provide an accurate account of force used to deal with incidents that occurred inside the watch-house. These findings indicate that the number of detainees who had force used against them at the front charge counter decreased to 1 in 10 (see Table 2).

As shown in Table 2 most detainees were male and approximately 34 years of age. The CCC was unable to accurately match all detainees observed in the CCTV footage to a Custody Report. This was because there were sometimes multiple detainees of similar ages and gender in view at one time. It was not always possible to find a Custody Report identifying a person of the same gender and approximate age as the detainee at the front charge counter and there was a large amount of missing demographic data in the Custody Reports. This is also why other demographic characteristics such as Indigenous status were not examined by the CCC.

Table 2 shows the number of detainees who entered the five watch-houses during the review period, the number and rate of detainees who had force used against them at the front charge counter both including “continuing” use of force incidents, and with these removed, and basic detainee demographic information.

Table 1. Use of force incidents and uses of force by camera location

Camera location		Total ^a	Inside watch-house only
Front charge counter	Use of force incidents	112	28
	Uses of force	183	96
Hallway from front charge counter	Use of force incidents	41	21
	Uses of force	78	58
Inside VDC	Use of force incidents	10	10
	Uses of force	77	77

Notes:

a Total includes “continuing” use of force incidents and uses of force.

“Use of force incidents” refers to an incident where a unique detainee appears in the CCTV footage and is subject to at least one use of force. “Uses of force” refers to a unique use of force applied to a unique detainee (see Appendix 1).

Table 2. Summary of prevalence of use of force and demographics in watch-houses

		Total across all five watch- houses	Range	
			Minimum	Maximum
Number of detainees ^a		331	22	132
Number of detainees who had forced used against them at front charge counter ^b	Total	112	2	38
	Inside watch-house only	28	1	14
Rate of detainees who had force used against them at front charge counter (per 10 detainees) ^c	Total	3	<1	8
	Inside watch-house only	1	<1	1
Demographics ^d	Male	60	2	22
	Female	12	0	5
	Mean age	34	27	57

Notes:

- a Total number of people who entered the watch-house during the review period, as per data from watch-house custody reports.
- b Total number of people observed to have force used against them at the front charge counter during the review period.
- c Rate equals the number of detainees who had force used against them at the front charge counter divided by the number of people who entered the watch-house multiplied by 10.
- d From the CCTV footage of the 112 use of force incidents that occurred at the front charge counters of the five watch-houses, 72 detainees (64%) were able to be matched to their QPRIME Custody Report to determine their gender breakdown and mean age.

Types of force used in watch-houses

As previously indicated, a large number of use of force incidents inside the five watch-houses involved the continuation of uses of force that were first applied outside the watch-house. Of 107 such uses of force, almost all involved people being brought into the watch-house in handcuffs ($n = 102$, 95%).²⁴

The types of force initially applied inside the watch-house were far more diverse. Table 3 shows that officers across the five watch-houses:

- most often used physical restraints ($n = 80$, 83% of uses of force at the front charge counter; hallway $n = 49$, 84%; VDC $n = 63$, 82%)
- used physical strikes very infrequently (front charge counter $n = 3$, 3%; hallway $n = 2$, 3%; VDC $n = 3$, 4%)
- did not use batons, OC spray, Tasers or firearms, noting that firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses and only police officers (not civilian watch-house officers) can use batons and Tasers.

Detainee behaviour prior to a use of force was also examined to better understand the circumstances in which different types of force were used in the five watch-houses. As shown in Table 3, officers often used force on compliant detainees. This occurred in 42 per cent of uses of force at the front charge counter, ($n = 40$), 24 per cent of uses in the hallway ($n = 14$) and 39 per cent of uses in the VDC ($n = 30$). In most of these cases the force used was a physical restraint (front charge counter $n = 34$, 85% of uses on compliant detainees; hallway $n = 10$, 71%; VDC $n = 28$, 93%). Two physical strikes were used against compliant detainees in VDCs.

²⁴ Handcuffs were the only restraining accoutrement observed in the CCTV footage.

Table 3. Type of force used in watch-houses (excluding uses of force that commenced outside the watch-house), by camera location and detainee behaviour

Camera location	Type of force	Behaviour of detainee					Total
		Compliant	Passive resistant	Active resistant	Assaultive	Unknown ^a	
Front charge counter	Physical strike	0	0	2	0	1	3
	Restraining accoutrement	4	0	0	0	5	9
	Physical restraint	34	17	15	2	12	80
	Other	2	1	1	0	0	4
	Total	40	18	18	2	18	96
Hallway from front charge counter	Physical strike	0	0	2	0	0	2
	Restraint accoutrement	1	0	0	0	3	4
	Physical restraint	10	3	2	2	32	49
	Other	3	0	0	0	0	3
	Total	14	3	4	2	35	58
Inside VDC	Physical strike	2	0	1	0	0	3
	Restraining accoutrement	0	0	0	0	6	6
	Physical restraint	28	0	19	6	10	63
	Other	0	0	4	1	0	5
	Total	30	0	24	7	16	77

Notes:

a "Unknown" was used to describe the behaviour of detainees who appeared in view already having force used against them. Their behaviour prior to the force being used was therefore unable to be assessed.

Totals across camera locations were not calculated due to the possibility that some uses of force were observed on more than one camera, leading to double counting.

Use of physical restraints in watch-houses

Because physical restraints were the most commonly used type of force inside the five watch-houses, these uses were examined to better understand what physical restraint options were used in what circumstances. Table 4 shows that:

- The most frequently used physical restraints were arm restraints, including hammer locks, arm bars and wrist locks ($n = 51$, 64% of physical restraints used at the front charge counter; hallway $n = 26$, 53%; VDC $n = 31$, 49%), and come along holds (front charge counter $n = 22$, 28%; hallway $n = 18$, 37%; VDC $n = 8$, 13%).
- Neck restraints were used four times at the front charge counter, three times in the hallway from the front charge counter and four times in the VDC.

Physical restraints were used to deal with all types of detainee behaviour (i.e. compliant, passive resistant, active resistant and assaultive), but were most often used on compliant detainees. Notably, at the front charge counter, a third of those detainees whose behaviour was known were compliant and had an arm restraint used against them ($n = 21$; see Table 4).

Table 4. Type of physical restraint used in watch-houses (excluding uses of force that commenced outside the watch-house), by camera location and detainee behaviour

Camera location	Type of physical restraint	Behaviour of detainee					Total
		Compliant	Passive resistant	Active resistant	Assaultive	Unknown ^a	
Front charge counter	Application of body weight	2	0	0	0	0	2
	Come along hold	9	2	5	0	6	22
	Wrist lock	0	0	0	0	1	1
	Arm restraint	21	14	9	2	5	51
	Leg restraint	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Neck restraint	2	1	1	0	0	4
	Total	34	17	15	2	12	80
Hallway from front charge counter	Application of body weight	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Come along hold	2	1	0	0	15	18
	Wrist lock	0	0	0	0	2	2
	Arm restraint	7	2	2	2	13	26
	Leg restraint	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Neck restraint	1	0	0	0	2	3
	Total	10	3	2	2	32	49
Inside VDC	Application of body weight	4	0	2	2	0	8
	Come along hold	4	0	0	0	4	8
	Wrist lock	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Arm restraint	17	0	8	2	4	31
	Leg restraint	3	0	8	1	0	12
	Neck restraint	0	0	1	1	2	4
	Total	28	0	19	6	10	63

Notes:

a "Unknown" was used to describe the behaviour of detainees who appeared in view already having force used against them. Their behaviour prior to the force being used was therefore unable to be assessed.

Totals across camera locations were not calculated due to the possibility that some uses of force were observed on more than one camera, leading to double counting.

Use of force against handcuffed detainees

The types of force applied to detainees already in handcuffs was also examined (regardless of whether the handcuffs were applied outside or inside the watch-house). In total, 120 use of force incidents involved at least one use of handcuffs. Of those, 19 incidents (16%, comprising 47 unique uses of force) involved one or more uses of force after the detainee had been handcuffed.

As shown in Table 5:

- Officers most often used a physical restraint after the application of handcuffs ($n = 14$, 93% of uses on handcuffed detainees at the front charge counter; hallway $n = 11$, 85%; VDC $n = 17$, 90%).
- Handcuffed detainees who had additional force used against them were most often actively resistant (front charge counter $n = 6$, 40%; hallway $n = 4$, 31%; VDC $n = 11$, 58%), but officers also used force on a number of handcuffed detainees who were compliant (front charge counter $n = 6$, 40%; hallway $n = 6$, 46%; VDC $n = 4$, 21%).

Table 5. Type of force used against handcuffed detainees, by camera location and detainee behaviour

Camera location	Type of force	Behaviour of detainee					Total
		Compliant	Passive resistant	Active resistant	Assaultive	Unknown ^a	
Front charge counter	Physical strike	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Physical restraint	6	0	6	0	2	14
	Other	0	0	0	0	1	1
	Total	6	0	6	0	3	15
Hallway from front charge counter	Physical strike	0	0	2	0	0	2
	Physical restraint	6	0	2	0	3	11
	Other	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	6	0	4	0	3	13
Inside VDC	Physical strike	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Physical restraint	4	0	9	4	0	17
	Other	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total	4	0	11	4	0	19

Notes:

- a “Unknown” was used to describe the behaviour of detainees who appeared in view already having force used against them. Their behaviour prior to the force being used was therefore unable to be assessed.

Totals across camera locations were not calculated due to the possibility that some uses of force were observed on more than one camera, leading to double counting.

Injuries to detainees resulting from use of force and compliance with QPS reporting requirements

No injuries to detainees (including likely injuries) as a result of use of force were identified in the Watch-house Review. This suggests that detainee injuries resulting from the use of force are infrequent in the watch-house environment.

The absence of injuries was reflected in QPS reporting. Consistent with the fact that none of the uses of force identified in the Watch-house Review were reportable, there were no QPRIME Use of Force Reports submitted between July and December 2015 for any incidents occurring in the sampled watch-houses. It appears that QPS officers are complying with their reporting obligations in terms of not reporting uses of force that are not required to be reported. However, the absence of reportable uses of force in the Watch-house Review means that whether officers are complying with the positive obligation to report cannot be assessed.

Findings from the analysis of CCC allegations data

Number of allegations

Between 1 July and 31 December 2015, the CCC received 372 allegations involving police “assault/use of excessive force”.²⁵ Of these allegations, 46 (related to 27 matters) were identified as having occurred in a watch-house.²⁶ These 46 allegations represented 12 per cent of assault/use of excessive force allegations and 2 per cent of all QPS allegations for the period.

To give these figures some context, the number of allegations involving use of force that occurred in a watch-house was compared with the number of allegations involving use of force that occurred in a public space. Of the 372 allegations, 155 (relating to 80 matters) were identified as having occurred in the street or a public space. These 155 allegations represented 42 per cent of assault/use of excessive force allegations and 8 per cent of all QPS allegations for the period.

This comparison shows that allegations involving use of force that occurred in a public space are far more frequent than allegations involving use of force that occurred in a watch-house. In the absence of further contextual information (which was not available for this research), this result is difficult to interpret and may support a range of competing explanations. For instance, it could be that the higher number of allegations in public spaces simply reflects the much higher number of police–citizen interactions that take place in that environment. Alternatively, use of force in watch-houses may be applied in a different manner that attracts fewer allegations.

Types of force used

For each assault/use of excessive force allegation in a watch-house or public space, the type of force involved was determined using the same use of force definitions as in the Watch-house Review (see Appendix 1). Analysis of this data showed that the type of force associated with allegations is different for watch-houses and public spaces. Compared with allegations of assault/use of excessive force occurring in the street or a public space:

- a higher proportion of watch-house allegations involved physical strikes (40% compared with 28%)
- a lower proportion of watch-house allegations involved a restraining accoutrement (15% compared with 31%)
- watch-house allegations, as expected, involved fewer uses of OC spray, Tasers and firearms (no uses in watch-house allegations compared with 4%, 2% and 1%, respectively; see Table 6).

²⁵ This number does not include threats of assault/excessive use of force.

²⁶ Allegations were not restricted to watch-houses in the Watch-house Review sample.

Table 6. Type of force involved in assault/use of excessive force allegations to the CCC (1 July to 31 December 2015) in watch-houses compared to in the street/a public space

Type of force	Allegations in a watch-house		Allegations in the street/a public space	
	Number	Per cent ^a	Number	Per cent ^a
Physical strike	16	40	44	28
Physical restraint	10	25	39	24
Restraining accoutrement	6	15	49	31
Other	7	18	17	11
Baton	1	3	1	1
OC spray	0	0	6	4
Taser	0	0	3	2
Firearm	0	0	1	1
Total (known types)	40	100	160	100
Unknown ^b	29		56	
Total	69		216	

Notes:

a Percentages are based on uses of force that were able to be coded (i.e. unknown uses of force excluded).

b Not enough information was available to determine the type of use of force.

When considered alongside the findings of the Watch-house Review, the CCC allegations data indicate that although higher-level uses of force occur less frequently in watch-houses, they are more likely to generate a complaint to the CCC. Compared with the general profile of use of force across the five watch-houses examined:

- a much higher proportion of assault/use of excessive force allegations involved a physical strike (40%, compared with 3% of uses of force at the front charge counters, 3% in hallways and 4% in VDCs).
- a lower proportion of assault/use of excessive force allegations involved a physical restraint (25%, compared with 83% at the front charge counters, 84% in hallways and 82% in VDCs).
- a slightly higher proportion of assault/use of excessive force allegations involved a restraining accoutrement (15%, compared with 9% at the front charge counters, 7% in hallways and 8% in VDCs).

Injuries to detainees resulting from use of force and compliance with QPS reporting requirements

Injuries were often reported in allegations to the CCC, but corresponding use of force reports were rare. Of the 27 matters that involved an allegation of assault/use of excessive force in a watch-house, seven (26%) described injuries associated with the application of that force, including bruising and soft tissue damage, dislocated and broken bones and concussion.

No QPRIME Use of Force Report, a SEM or a detention log entry reporting the use of force or injury could be located for any of these matters.

In comparison, a slightly higher proportion of allegations involving assault/use of excessive force in the street or a public space identified that an injury occurred as a result of the force applied. Of the 80 matters that involved an allegation of assault/use of excessive force in the street or a public space, 31 (39%) described injuries associated with the application of that force, including swelling and bruising, broken teeth, lacerations requiring stitches, fractures, spinal injuries and crushed vertebrae. In only five of these matters (16%) was a QPRIME Use of

Force Report ($n = 3$) or an SEM ($n = 4$) located noting an injury to the subject.^{27, 28} In two cases, the reported injury in the Use of Force Report differed from the injury described in the allegation — one Use of Force Report described a sore wrist/arm when the allegation described a broken arm (a fractured wrist was, noted in the corresponding SEM), while another described bruising to the head when the allegation described a loss of consciousness and a seizure (which was also noted in the corresponding SEM). The third Use of Force Report described abrasions, bruising and minor lacerations to the head when the allegation related to unspecified injuries from a kick in the head. For the final two matters, only an SEM was submitted, describing the subject's injuries as resulting from something other than a use of force.

Because it was not always possible to ascertain whether the injuries were reportable under QPS policy (because of limited descriptions of the injuries and limited methods for verifying injuries), it is not possible to determine whether the above findings suggest systemic noncompliance with injury reporting requirements, or the QPS injury reporting threshold is so high that some seemingly serious injuries are not captured by the policy.

Observations from CCC investigations

Five CCC investigations involving the use of force in a watch-house were reviewed to identify the type of force used, identify any injuries sustained by the detainee and assess compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements.

Of the five investigations:

- Two investigations involved force that is not specified in QPS policy. No QPRIME Use of Force Report was submitted in either case. Both incidents resulted in significant injuries, but given medical assistance was not sought in either case, the injuries were not deemed reportable via a Use of Force Report (see definition of reportable injury on page 10).
- Two investigations involved the application of a strangle hold.²⁹ Neither use of force resulted in a reportable injury.
- One investigation involved the application of a lateral vascular neck restraint.³⁰ The force did not result in a reportable injury.

Perhaps the most significant observation emerging from the analysis of CCC investigations is that in some cases officers use force that is not specified in the OPM or taught in training. That force is best characterised as a possible criminal assault rather than a “use of force”. In such cases, the officer may not provide the detainee with the necessary medical attention or report the incident in an effort to avoid detection.

27 In another four matters, QPRIME Use of Force Reports were submitted, but they described different types of force to the allegation and no injuries were reported.

28 In some cases, there was limited information in the allegation to enable the CCC to search for relevant reports.

29 For the purposes of this research, the CCC defined a strangle hold as where the officer places one or both of their hands around the person's neck from the front (see Appendix 1).

30 According to section 14.3.3 of the OPM, a lateral vascular neck restraint “applies pressure to the sides of the neck (i.e. compression of the carotid arteries, jugular veins and carotid bulb) resulting in a decrease of blood supply to the brain and leading to altered levels of consciousness. The objective of this technique is to establish subject compliance either voluntarily or involuntarily.” The OPM states that this type of neck restraint should not be used unless “an incident is assessed as high risk and there is an immediate operational necessity to apply the restraint” or an officer is “acting or aiding in self-defence”.

Key findings and observations

The nature of use of force in watch-houses

This project sought to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and frequency of force being used by officers in Queensland watch-houses. The research indicates:

- A considerable proportion of people entering a watch-house were brought into the watch-house in handcuffs. When these people are removed from the analysis, the prevalence of use of force (measured at the front charge counter) drops to about 1 use of force incident for every 10 people who entered the watch-house. The absence of comparable data from another jurisdiction makes it difficult to make meaning of this information, but it does not suggest widespread or excessive use of force in watch-houses. This information will serve as a baseline for future research in the watch-house environment.
- Officers most frequently used a physical restraint to deal with detainees. Notwithstanding the CCC's position that the use of any physical force on a compliant detainee is questionable (see below), the predominant use of physical restraints (principally arm restraints) to resolve situations in watch-houses — whether detainees are behaving in a passive resistant, active resistant or assaultive manner — suggests that officers are electing to use lower-level options where they can, reflecting QPS policy to only use the minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident. While this is a positive finding, it cannot be generalised to all watch-houses throughout Queensland. The CCC echoes the QPS's recent finding that "the Service is unable to have confidence that the philosophy [to use the minimum amount of force] is being consistently applied" because "lower-level" use of force options are not required to be routinely reported by officers (QPS 2016, p. 64).
- A considerable proportion of uses of force in watch-houses involved compliant detainees. The most striking example of this was a number of compliant detainees who were already in handcuffs when they had other force (mostly arm restraints) applied to them. It is not clear how the use of force is warranted in these circumstances or reflects QPS policy to only use the minimum amount of force necessary to resolve a situation. Indeed, in these cases it may be argued that there is no "situation" to resolve. These findings are consistent with an apparent over-reliance on the use of more than a minimum amount of force noted in the QPS's Task Force Bletchley report and further support the QPS seeking to emphasise the importance of communication as a precursor to other use of force options.

Further attention should also be given to assessing whether the QPS's minimum use of force philosophy is being consistently applied in watch-houses. As noted above, there are limitations in the QPS's current use of force reporting requirements that make this difficult and reforms to reporting requirements and processes are ongoing. In the interim, adherence to the QPS's minimum use of force policy should be monitored by watch-house Officers in Charge (OICs) and incorporated into the divisional performance review process.

- As expected, use of force options such as batons, OC spray, Tasers and firearms were used infrequently in watch-houses (noting that firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses).
- The CCC continues to receive a significant number of allegations about "assault/use of excessive force" in watch-houses, representing 12 per cent of all QPS allegations categorised as assault/use of excessive force in the six months from July to December 2015.
- The nature of allegations about the use of force in watch-houses appears to be different from allegations about the use of force in streets or public spaces. Compared with allegations of assault/use of excessive force in the street or a public space, allegations from watch-houses more often involved physical strikes and less often involved restraining

accoutrements, OC spray, Tasers or firearms (noting that firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses).

- Rarely, officers have used force that is best characterised as a possible criminal assault rather than a “use of force”. In the absence of a complaint to the QPS or CCC, these matters may be difficult to detect.

Recommendation 1

The CCC recommends that the QPS requires watch-house OICs to assess the extent to which the minimum use of force policy is adhered to in their watch-house and report on this as part of the divisional performance review process.

QPS response to recommendation 1

The recommendations from the Violent Confrontations Review (VCR) and Task Force Bletchley (TFB) have resulted in changes being made to a number of sections of the QPS Operational Procedures Manual (OPM).

Recommendation 15 of Task Force Bletchley has resulted in the policy for OPM 1.17.1 being amended to include any (i) use of force of such a nature that by exception as described in this part should be referred to Significant Event Review Panel (threshold to be determined by the Chair).

Recommendation 27 VCR has resulted in the policy for OPM 1.3.2 District Performance Review being modified to include:

As part of district performance reviews, districts are to evaluate any:

- (i) Significant Event Review Panel related issues (see ss. 1.17.1: ‘Significant event review matter’ and 1.17.2: ‘Purpose of Significant Event Review Panels’ of this chapter; and
- (ii) Use of force related issues,

In addition to the focus of discussion points listed above. Districts should also discuss how a culture of continual improvement and good practices are promoted.

A use of force summary is also provided to District Officers on a daily basis in the daily crime summary report. This report provides opportunity to drill down into reported crime and use of force recorded within district boundaries. Identification of concerns or trends in relation to use of force by officers are identified in Daily District summaries, through the Significant Event Review Panel process and the District Performance Review.

Ethical Standards Command continues to work with the QPS Digital and Frontline Services Unit to improve the Use of Force reporting structure within the QPrime database as part of Recommendation 24 from VCR. This is an ongoing body of work which aims to capture broader categories of use of force options employed by officers.

Injuries to detainees resulting from use of force and compliance with QPS reporting requirements

The findings about injuries to detainees and compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements are inconclusive. The research indicates:

- No injuries to detainees (including likely injuries) as a result of use of force were identified in the Watch-house Review. This suggests that detainee injuries resulting from the use of force are infrequent in the watch-house environment. Methodological limitations mean that this finding should be treated with caution.
- A considerable number of complainants to the CCC alleged that injuries — some quite significant — have resulted from use of force in watch-houses (and a comparative group of incidents that occurred in the street or a public space). Very few QPRIME Use of Force Reports and SEMs were generated for these matters by officers. Because it was not always possible to ascertain which of these injuries were required to be reported under QPS policy (because of both limited descriptions of the injuries, and limited methods for verifying injuries described in the complaints), it is difficult to determine whether this finding reflects systemic under-reporting or a high reporting threshold (i.e. a threshold requiring only relatively serious injuries to be reported). These issues require further consideration. Given that the Watch-house Review suggests that injuries resulting from the use of force occur infrequently, the QPS may be in a position to lower the use of force/injury reporting threshold without creating a significant additional administrative burden.

Recommendation 2

The CCC recommends that the QPS audits compliance with use of force reporting requirements.

Recommendation 3

The CCC recommends that the QPS explores whether a lower use of force/injury reporting threshold (a) for watch-houses and (b) more generally is in the public interest and would allow the QPS to form a better understanding of how officers use force.

QPS response to recommendation 2

See response to Recommendation 1.

QPS response to recommendation 3

See response to Recommendation 1.

Other observations about QPS systems, policies and procedures

During the course of this project a number of issues were identified regarding QPS systems, policies and procedures relevant to the watch-house environment and use of force.

Compliance with watch-house CCTV system standards

The capabilities of the CCTV systems in each of the five watch-houses included in the Watch-house Review were assessed to ascertain compliance with both QPS standards and the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA) recommendations for police CCTV systems in general (i.e. not confined to a watch-house environment; ANZPAA 2014). The CCTV systems were found to comply with these standards (see Appendix 4). However, the systems have only very limited manually-activated audio recording capability. More audio recording would significantly aid the QPS and the CCC in assessing and investigating allegations of misconduct and corruption in watch-houses.

Response to recommendation 4

The CCC recommends that the QPS considers upgrading all watch-house CCTV systems so that all cameras automatically record sound (audio).

QPS response to recommendation 4

This recommendation is supported in principle. The QPS have undertaken a review of the 67 watchhouse facilities state-wide to identify the cost implications for upgrades to CCTV audio capabilities. Currently the Brisbane City Watchhouse is the only facility with automatic audio recording capabilities. The QPS routinely conducts evolutionary upgrades of watchhouse facility equipment. It is proposed that the addition of automatic audio recording capability will be included in the upgrade program of watchhouses progressively to ensure that the most current available equipment is installed during the upgrade process. The Gympie watchhouse is scheduled to be the next watchhouse to have an automatic audio recording capability installed.

Practices when CCTV is not working

Four of the five watch-houses were unable to supply all VDC footage requested by the CCC (58 hours of footage that was requested was not received by the CCC). Reasons given for the footage not being provided included “shut down of a VDC for maintenance” and “technical errors”.³¹ It was not clear whether the technical errors prevented the real-time recording of detainees or related only to the downloading of recorded information. Clearly, a lack of real-time recording creates a risk that detainees are not being appropriately monitored, while problems with either recording or downloading footage can hamper the investigation of incidents.

The SOPs of the five watch-houses do not currently include instructions for how to deal with technical errors with the CCTV system, other than advising officers that they should report the problem to the Shift Supervisor and providing contact details for the company contracted by the QPS to provide maintenance. To improve detainee safety and facilitate the effective and timely investigation of incidents, it would be valuable for officers to be given more guidance,

31 As per consultations with watch-house OICs.

particularly about the processes for identifying, reporting and fixing malfunctions, and how to manage detainees if a cell's camera is not functional (e.g. shut the cell down).

Recommendation 5

The CCC recommends that the QPS provides improved guidance to officers about:

- maintaining watch-house CCTV systems
- dealing with system errors, including the processes for identifying, reporting and fixing malfunctions, and how to manage detainees if a cell's camera is not functional.

This guidance should be available to all watch-house staff via local SOPs or instructions.

QPS response to recommendation 5

The Operational Procedures Manual and the Digital Electronic Recording or Interviews and Evidence Manual provides the policy and procedural framework for the use of CCTV and digital recordings for policing operations. Recording systems differ in watchhouses across the state so local procedures are seen as the most appropriate approach to developing guidelines for maintenance and redundancy plans for malfunctions of CCTV systems. In order to effect improvements in the guidance to watchhouse staff, ongoing communication is directed to OIC's regarding the inclusion of guidance material for inspection, testing and reporting faults in CCTV systems within Station instructions.

Reporting requirements in watch-houses

The CCC reviewed all use of force reporting requirements contained in the OPM and the SOPs for the five watch-houses included in the Watch-house Review. This included reporting via both written reports (e.g. QPRIME Use of Force Reports) and other reporting mechanisms that may not necessarily be documented (e.g. notifications about incidents to certain commissioned officers, which may be done over the phone). In doing so, the CCC identified a number of problems in the policies that may increase the likelihood of uses of force in watch-houses not being reported.

There are three key problems with the use of force reporting requirements in the OPM:

- There are a large number of possible reporting requirements, contained in numerous sections of the OPM.
- Different sections of the OPM contain similar but slightly different reporting requirements for the same kind of incident.
- The person (position or rank) responsible for fulfilling a reporting requirement is sometimes different in different sections of the OPM.

In general, five key problems were identified in the SOPs reviewed from the five watch-houses:

- Some watch-house instructions and SOPs are out of date, and may not incorporate information related to updates to the OPM.
- Some watch-house instructions and SOPs contain reporting requirements that differ from those in the OPM.
- All watch-house instructions and SOPs reviewed lack clear definitions of important terms.

- The person (position or rank) responsible for fulfilling a reporting requirement is often unclear in watch-house instructions and SOPs.
- Reporting requirements differ considerably between watch-houses.

Overall, the policies governing the reporting of uses of force in watch-houses are complex, sometimes ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. It may therefore be difficult for officers to identify and understand their reporting obligations, potentially affecting reporting compliance. Such a policy environment is also easier for officers to exploit in terms of intentionally avoiding their reporting obligations.

The CCC recommends that the QPS reviews relevant sections of the OPM, and watch-house instructions and SOPs. The QPS should also consider how it can ensure that its policies clearly communicate use of force reporting requirements to officers, especially as policy changes are made. The problems identified here suggest that:

- Changes to the OPM may not always be made in a holistic or integrated fashion, leading to similar matters being dealt with inconsistently in different parts of the OPM.
- There are inadequate procedures for ensuring that watch-house SOPs and instructions are clear and consistent, including being consistent with the OPM. This was particularly apparent when some watch-house OICs updated their SOPs or instructions after the project team asked questions about some reporting requirements. If effective quality assurance processes were in place, the need for these changes would have been identified well beforehand.

Recommendation 6

The CCC recommends that the QPS:

- reviews relevant sections of the OPM to ensure that use of force reporting requirements are clearly communicated to officers, including ensuring that there is internal consistency and no unnecessary duplication
- reviews watch-house SOPs and instructions with respect to use of force reporting requirements, particularly to ensure that there is consistency with the OPM, key terms are clearly defined and the person responsible for fulfilling each reporting requirement is clearly stated implements processes to ensure that (a) changes to the OPM are made in a holistic and integrated fashion and (b) watch-house SOPs and instructions are kept up to date and consistent with the OPM.

QPS response to recommendation 6

A result of the Violent Confrontations Review, section 14.3: 'Use of force,' of the OPM was redrafted to ensure clear, concise and consistent policy was articulated to officers in manner so as to avoid any ambiguity. Responsibility sits with the respective Officers In Charge to ensure local procedures adhere to corporate policy and legislation.

The QPS routinely reviews and updates policy to ensure it is relevant and effective. This review process includes consultation with relevant stakeholders throughout the review process. Key stakeholder feedback is incorporated into the revision of policy to ensure it remains operationally effective.

Appendix 1: Definitions used in this research

The following definitions were adopted for the purposes of this research.

Watch-house

A watch-house is a police facility containing cells for holding people in custody, usually for longer periods of time, and distinct from holding cells at police stations.³²

Use of force

A use of force is a use of any of the following by a police officer or civilian watch-house officer (“an officer”) against a person:

- a baton
- OC spray (including both pointing an OC spray canister in the direction of a person and spraying OC spray at a person)
- a physical restraint (i.e. arm restraint, come along hold, application of body weight, lateral vascular neck restraint, strangle hold, neck restraint, leg restraint, respiratory neck restraint/choke hold)
- a physical strike (i.e. closed hand, elbow strike, head strike, kick, knee strike, open hand)
- a restraining accoutrement (i.e. handcuffs, flexible handcuffs)
- a Taser (including drawing a Taser out of its holster, pointing a Taser in the direction of a person, holding or pressing a Taser against a person, and deploying a Taser)
- a Service firearm (including drawing a firearm out of its holster, pointing a firearm in the direction of a person, and discharging a firearm)³³
- any other method to apply force to a person (including pulling, back of the head restraints and ankle cuffs).

Full definitions of the specific types of physical restraints, physical strikes, restraining accoutrements and other methods referred to above are provided in Table A1.1. Some of these definitions are from the QPS OPM, while others were supplied in a consultation with the QPS State Watch-house Group Coordinator. The remainder of the definitions were developed by the CCC based on uses of force observed in the Watch-house Review (see Appendix 2) that were not captured by existing QPS definitions of force.

Note that a use of force involves one officer and one unique detainee. An “incident involving use of force” (also referred to as a “use of force incident”) refers to an incident where a unique detainee is subject to one or more uses of force by one or more officers.

³² Section 16.1 of the OPM states that “holding cells at police stations are designed to hold prisoners in a custody for a short time, whilst watch-houses are primarily designed to hold persons overnight or for 24 hours or longer”.

³³ Firearms are not permitted inside watch-houses.

Table A1.1. Definitions for specific types of physical restraints, physical strikes, restraining accoutrements and other methods used to apply force to a detainee

Specific type of force	Definition
Physical restraints	
Arm restraint	<p>The officer holds a person’s arm in a way so as to control or restrain them. Types of arm restraints include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Hammer lock</i> — the officer manipulates person’s body to be bent forward with their arms held behind their back (consultation with the QPS). • <i>Arm bar</i> — the officer holds a person’s wrist and puts their other arm on the top of the back of the person’s same arm and bends the person forward (consultation with the QPS). • <i>Wrist lock</i> — the officer twists a person’s arm to look like a chicken wing; the person’s arm is held above the elbow and the wrist is flexed forward with the fingers pointing down (consultation with the QPS). • <i>Other arm restraints</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The officer bends one or both of a person’s arms behind the person’s back (CCC). – The officer holds a person’s wrist or wrists against the charge counter (usually to perform a search and pat down; CCC). – The officer holds a person’s wrist or wrists against the wall to keep the person in place (CCC).
Come along hold	The officer holds a person at the wrist and on the upper arm and has the ability to use pain control techniques on their pressure points (consultation with the QPS).
Application of body weight	The officer uses the weight of their body to control or restrain a person (consultation with the QPS). For example, where an officer lays their body weight on top of a person to hold them still and keep them in a contained area.
Lateral vascular neck restraint (carotid neck restraint)	The officer applies pressure to the sides of a person’s neck (i.e. compression of the carotid arteries, jugular veins and carotid bulb) resulting in a decrease of blood supply to the brain and leading to altered levels of consciousness (OPM).
Strangle hold	The officer places one or both of their hands around a person’s neck from the front (CCC).
Neck restraint	The officer holds the back of a person’s neck to restrain them (CCC).
Leg restraint	The officer holds a person’s leg in a way so as to control or restrain them. An example of this is when a person is lying face down on the floor and their legs are bent backwards and held by an officer (CCC).
Respiratory neck restraint (choke hold)	The officer applies pressure directly to a person’s trachea (wind pipe) and establishes subject control through the principles of pain and strangulation (OPM).
Physical strikes	
Closed hand strike	The officer strikes a person with a closed fist (consultation with the QPS).
Elbow strike	The officer strikes a person with their elbow (consultation with the QPS).
Head strike	The officer head-butts a person (consultation with the QPS).
Kick	The officer strikes a person with their foot or leg (consultation with the QPS).
Knee strike	The officer strikes a person with their knee (consultation with the QPS).
Open hand	The officer strikes a person with an open hand e.g. slapping or pushing a person (consultation with the QPS).

Specific type of force	Definition
Restraining accoutrements	
Handcuffs	The officer uses Service issued handcuffs to restrain a person's wrists (OPM).
Flexi-cuffs ^a	The officer uses cable ties to restrain a person's wrists (OPM).
Other methods used to apply force to a person	
Pull	The officer pulls a person as a means to drag their body (e.g. the officer pulls a person down the hallway by their, or an officer pulls a person's arm with enough force to drag them into a cell) (CCC).
Back of the head restraint	The officer puts their hand to the back of the detainee's head to control them (usually applied against a surface, e.g. the charge counter, cell wall or cell floor) (CCC).
Ankle cuffs	The officer uses Service issued handcuffs to restrain a person's ankles (CCC).

Note:

- a Section 14.19.5 of the OPM states that "unless otherwise authorised, police officers and watch-house officers are not to possess, carry or use flexible handcuffs or similar restraint devices."

Reportable use of force

A reportable use of force is a use of force that an officer is required to report in writing under the OPM or local SOPs or instructions. This is done via a QPRIME Use of Force Report, SEM or QPRIME custody report/detention log entry.

Whether and how a use of force in a watch-house needs to be reported depends on both what type of force is used and the nature of any associated injury. In some cases, reporting requirements also differ between different watch-houses.

Injury

For the purposes of the Watch-house Review (see Appendix 2), an injury is an identifiable or likely bodily injury to a person, where bodily injury means an abrasion, a cut, bleeding, a fracture, swelling, internal injuries, bruising, sprains and concussion (consistent with the injury types recorded in QPS QPRIME Use of Force Reports). An *identifiable* bodily injury is one that can be observed either in the vision of the CCTV footage or by audio captured in the CCTV footage (although no audio footage was ultimately able to be obtained in the Watch-house Review).³⁴ A *likely* bodily injury is one where a reasonable person would conclude that the detainee was likely to have sustained a bodily injury as a result of the use of force.

For the purposes of examining the CCC allegations and investigations data, an injury means a bodily injury (defined as above) described in the complaint or investigation materials.

Detainee behaviour

Detainee behaviour refers to the detainee's observable behaviour prior to the use of force. The Canadian National Use of Force Framework (NUFF; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2000) was used as an analytical tool for categorising the text descriptions of detainee behaviour. Note that the NUFF was used because the QPS Situational Use of Force Model does not include categories of detainee behaviour. Table A1.2 presents definitions for the four behaviour categories adopted in this research (noting a fifth classification of "unknown" was adopted for incidents in which it was not possible to ascertain a detainee's behaviour due to the timing of them coming into the view of the CCTV camera).

³⁴ Some injuries may not be identifiable via CCTV footage. For example, coders would not have been able to identify bruising under clothes, some fractures or a heart attack.

Table A1.2. Detainee behaviour categories in a watch-house environment

Detainee behaviour category ^{a, b}	Description of detainee behaviour	Examples from project data
Compliant ^c	The detainee responds appropriately to the officer's presence, direction and control. ^c	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The detainee appears to willingly comply with directions. • The detainee displays neutral body language, including appearing to exchange words/laugh with officers. • The detainee is clutching their stomach like they are injured/ill or is unsteady on their feet and needs minor physical guidance/support to follow the officer's directions. The detainee does not resist this support (e.g. the detainee needs to be held up to stand/walk, lies on the counter while being processed, or almost runs into walls). • The detainee is heavily restrained and is forced to comply with directions. This is frequently preceded by some level of detainee resistance, after which the detainee is heavily restrained and no longer resists.
Passive resistance	The detainee refuses, with little or no physical action, to cooperate with the officer's lawful direction. This can assume the form of a verbal refusal or consciously contrived physical activity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The detainee's body language suggests that they are ignoring or are refusing/unwilling to carry out an officer's directions (e.g. the detainee removes or refuses to place their hand on the charge counter when directed to do so, stands still when directed to move, or carelessly throws their property instead of placing it where instructed).
Active resistance	The detainee uses non-assaultive physical action to resist, or while resisting, an officer's lawful direction. Examples include pulling away to prevent or escape control, or overt movements such as walking towards or away from an officer. Running away is another example of active resistance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The detainee moves away from an officer who is approaching them. • The detainee moves towards an officer who is directing them to move in another direction. This action is not performed with the intent to harm but out of disagreement, frustration or defiance. • The detainee struggles against their holds but does not move to harm an officer or themselves (e.g. the detainee continually struggles while restrained and may or may not successfully force an officer to release their grip).
Assaultive	The detainee applies force or attempts or threatens to apply force by an act or gesture. Examples include kicking and punching but may also include aggressive body language that signals the intent to assault.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The detainee's behaviour appears violent, aggressive or threatening (e.g. the detainee thrashes around violently, makes a move to strike an officer, uses threatening/aggressive body language, or attempts to harm themselves or others).

Notes:

- a Taken from the Canadian NUFF (Canadian Association of Police Chiefs 2000).
- b "Likely to inflict grievous bodily harm or death" has not been included as a detainee behaviour category because no incidents were recorded in the CCC's project that matched its criteria.
- c The use of force in a policing context has been defined as the amount of effort required by police to compel compliance by an unwilling detainee (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2012). The Canadian NUFF uses "Cooperative" instead of "Compliant" to indicate individuals who appropriately respond to an officer's direction. The CCC felt that "Cooperative" suggested a willingness to abide by an officer's instruction, which was not broad enough to include detainees who had been forced to comply through previous uses of force.

Appendix 2: Method used to conduct the research

Aim

This project sought to:

- develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and frequency of force being used by officers in Queensland watch-houses
- examine injuries to people detained in a watch-house resulting from the use of force
- assess compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements.

The project did not seek to determine whether individual uses of force were appropriate in the circumstances. Existing QPS and CCC assessment processes deal with allegations of corrupt conduct, including allegations involving use of force.

Data sources

The project examined data from a number of sources:

- legislation and QPS policies
- CCTV footage from a sample of watch-houses (“the Watch-house Review”)
- CCC COMPASS data
- CCC investigations involving use of force in watch-houses
- QPS QPRIME and custody records.

Legislation and QPS policies

Relevant legislation (the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000* and the *Criminal Code Act 1899*), the QPS OPM and SOPs or instructions for each of the five watch-houses included in the Watch-house Review (see below) were examined to determine how force can be used in watch-houses and how uses of force and any resulting injuries are required to be reported.

CCTV footage from a sample of watch-houses (“the Watch-house Review”)

All Queensland watch-houses have CCTV cameras to capture the activities of officers and people in custody. This footage provides valuable data to examine the nature of officers’ use of force and injuries to detainees. The CCC’s review of CCTV footage is referred to as the Watch-house Review.

Time and resource limitations prevented an analysis of all CCTV footage from all Queensland watch-houses. A sample of five watch-houses was selected for the Review and a sample of CCTV footage was then requested from each of these watch-houses. The frameworks used to determine the sample of watch-houses and the sample of CCTV footage requested are described below.

Sampling frameworks

Watch-houses

The five watch-houses were sampled based on the following criteria:

- QPS region (to encompass watch-houses across the QPS)

- geographic location/regional profile (to encompass watch-houses in different kinds of communities across Queensland; regional profiles³⁵ of the five watch-houses were two cities, one outer and one inner regional area, and one very remote area)
- volume of detainees (to maximise opportunities for uses of force to be observed; watch-houses had between less than 1000 to more than 10 000 detainees for the period of analysis)
- size (e.g. number of beds and cells; as above)
- location in an Indigenous community (this was considered important for historical reasons, but note that the research does not focus on the use of force against Indigenous people).³⁶

CCTV footage

CCTV footage was requested from each watch-house from the main camera filming three locations — the front charge counter, the hallway leading from the front charge counter to the cells and the VDCs. These locations were selected because they were nominated by watch-house OICs as those where there was the highest likelihood of police officers using force against detainees and therefore were expected to provide the most possible data for analysis. For those watch-houses with more than two VDCs, only the two most frequently used cells (as advised by the OICs) were included.

For the four large watch-houses, footage was requested from peak intake periods (12 midnight to 5 am on Saturdays and Sundays) between 24 October 2015 and 15 November 2015. Again, these days and times were chosen to provide the most possible use of force data for analysis. In total, 600 hours of CCTV footage were requested for the four large watch-houses.

Less people are processed through the remote watch-house compared with the other watch-houses, so a longer period of time was required. CCTV footage was therefore requested for detainees known to have been processed between 2 November 2015 and 29 November 2015. Between one and two hours of footage were requested per camera to enable the person to be observed as they moved through the watch-house. In total, 155.5 hours of CCTV footage were requested.

Note that not all of the requested footage could be obtained from the five watch-houses. Reasons for this included a VDC being shut down for maintenance and technical errors. CCTV footage was received on discs.

Coding of CCTV footage from watch-houses

Coding instrument

A coding instrument comprising 106 questions in nine parts was developed to code the CCTV footage (see Appendix 3). The nine parts were:

- *Incident details.* These included questions regarding the watch-house, camera location and the time the incident commenced and concluded.
- *Detainee demographics.* These were limited to gender, date of birth, Indigenous status, nationality and country of birth, and were extracted from the QPRIME Custody Report (full) including the Detention Log.
- *Officer demographics.* These were limited to gender, date of birth and rank. It was intended to obtain these from any QPRIME Use of Force Reports generated regarding an incident, but there were no Use of Force Reports generated in the time period examined in the Review.

35 Regional profiles were determined using resident population (2011) Australian Bureau of Statistics Remoteness Area, Queensland Regional Profiles data from the Queensland Government Statisticians Office.

36 At the 2011 census, almost 90 per cent of the population of remote watch-house location identified as Indigenous (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011).

- *Use of force details.* These questions included an open-ended description of the incident, and questions regarding where the use of force happened and what type of force was used.
- *Detainee behaviour.* This part comprised an open-ended description of the detainee's behaviour before each police use of force.
- *Detainee injury.* These questions assessed the presence and description of any identifiable or likely injuries that were a result of a use of force.
- *Reporting.* This part included a question regarding whether the use of force was reportable via a QPRIME Use of Force Report, SEM or QPRIME custody report/detention log entry.
- *Coding factors.* These questions asked coders to identify any factors that had influenced their ability to code the CCTV footage.
- *Reportable uses of force.* This part examined inconsistencies between the CCTV footage and any relevant reports (e.g. QPRIME Use of Force Reports) generated for a reportable use of force.

Training of coders

Coders were trained before coding the CCTV footage. Training materials included a coding manual, the coding instrument and a sample of CCTV footage of uses of force in watch-houses obtained from the CCC's Corruption Operations. Training addressed use of force definitions, frequently asked questions about coding (e.g. "How do I code an incident if there is more than one detainee?") and the process and method for completing the coding instrument in Checkbox (an online survey tool).

Pilot testing

Coders pilot tested the coding instrument using a sample of CCTV footage of uses of force in watch-houses obtained from the CCC's Corruption Operations. Coders independently watched and coded each use of force using the coding instrument. Feedback from coders was sought about their ability to code the defined types of force, any problems they experienced using CCTV footage and the congruency between what was observed on the CCTV footage and the coding instrument. This feedback resulted in slight modifications to the structure of the coding instrument and the inclusion of additional response options for some questions. Another round of piloting was conducted to ascertain the level of agreement between coders, also serving as the first stage of formally assessing inter-rater reliability (IRR). This initial stage revealed a high level of agreement between the two coders.

Coding the final sample

Uses of force were identified by monitors from the CCC's Electronic Collections Unit (ECU). Monitors viewed 678 hours of footage across the five watch-houses and flagged possible uses of force. Two coders from the project team then coded all incidents flagged by the monitors using an online version of the coding instrument. Coding was completed over a two week period.

CCC COMPASS data

The CCC Complaints and Operations Management, Processing and Statistical System (COMPASS) records allegations of corrupt conduct made against Queensland public officials and information relevant to corrupt conduct investigations by the CCC. Allegations involving police "assault/use of excessive force" (not including threats) received by the CCC between 1 July 2015 and 31 December 2015 were analysed ($n = 372$) to better understand the types of force that prompt complaints to the CCC, including the nature of any resulting injuries. Incidents that occurred in a watch-house were analysed and compared with incidents that occurred in a public space (e.g. on the street outside a nightclub, in a park). While the two

environments are very different, they are both “high risk” policing environments in the sense that they generate a large number of complaints to the CCC about police.

CCC investigations involving use of force in watch-houses

Five recent CCC investigations involving use of force in watch-houses were reviewed to better understand the types of uses of force in watch-houses that require investigation by the CCC, and to examine injuries to watch-house detainees that result from use of force. Compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements was also assessed.

QPS QPRIME and other records

QPRIME Use of Force Reports, SEMs and QPRIME Custody Reports were reviewed to examine compliance with QPS use of force and injury reporting requirements. Note that, in trying to determine whether injuries described in allegations to the CCC had been reported as required, the information in the allegation was sometimes limited (e.g. did not specify the date or location of the incident). This means that reports may have been submitted in relation to the matter, but they were unable to be located by the CCC.

QPRIME data were also used to obtain detainees’ demographic information (gender, Indigenous status, nationality, country of birth and date of birth). Any identifying information such as names was discarded. Demographic details were obtained by searching all relevant QPRIME Custody Reports for one recording a person as having entered the watch-house at the same date and time as when a detainee was viewed on the CCTV footage. As this matching process often resulted in more than one possible match, the Detention Log was also searched using a series of steps to confirm the detainee’s identity:

- For detainees in the charge area, the Detention Log was used to determine when they were recorded as being processed at the front charge counter. This was done by matching activity observed in the CCTV footage with the time recorded for the detainee’s routine search, breath testing and property logging. If the Detention Log entries for that person matched the time on the CCTV footage and no other person was processed at that same time, the detainee was identified as that individual.
- For detainees placed in the VDC, the Detention Log was searched to find a record of an individual placed in a VDC at the date and time of the CCTV footage. If the Detention Log entry for that person matched the time on the CCTV footage, the detainee was identified as that individual.

If a match was determined, demographic details were recorded. If there was more than one identity that could possibly be attributed to an individual in the CCTV footage, the detainee was coded as “unknown” to avoid mistakenly identifying detainees.

Data analysis

Data from the Watch-house Review and COMPASS were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics version 22, and was cleaned prior to subsequent analyses.

Coding consistency

To assess IRR in the Watch-house Review, a random sample of 27 incidents (17%) was drawn from the overall study population of 163 incidents. These incidents were coded by two coders, although one coder did not code incidents from the remote watch-house so these were not included in the IRR sample.

IRR was assessed by calculating a statistic called Cohen’s kappa for each item in the coding instrument. A kappa value above .800 is considered to indicate an acceptable level of

agreement (“almost perfect agreement”; Landis & Koch 1977). Table A2.1 shows that overall there was a high level of agreement between the two coders. It was decided not to report any findings from these those items with a kappa below .800.

Table A2.1. Inter-rater reliability results

Item	Agreement (kappa)	Significant? ^a
Incident-related items		
Camera number	1.000	Yes
Camera location	1.000	Yes
Audio available	1.000	Yes
Date of incident	1.000	Yes
Gender — detainee	1.000	Yes
Indigenous status — detainee	.882	Yes
Nationality — detainee	.000	No
Date of birth — detainee	.000	No
Use of force-related items		
Use of force number	1.000	Yes
Is the same officer responsible for this use of force as in the use of force previously coded?	.853	Yes
What type of force was used by the officer?	.923	Yes
What type of physical strike was used? Open hand	1.000	Yes
What type of restraining accoutrement was used? Handcuffs	.965	Yes
What type of physical restraint was used?	.940	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Head	.652	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Neck	.785	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Torso front	1.000	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Torso rear	1.000	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Right arm	.557	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Left arm	.497	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Left hand	.000	No
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Wrists	.913	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Right leg	-.014	No
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Left leg	1.000	Yes
What part of the body did the use of force impact? Both legs	.571	Yes
Approximately how many times was that type of force used by the officer?	.822	Yes
Are there any concerns about this use of force?	.000	No
Are there any more uses of force to code?	1.000	Yes
Detainee injury items		
Was there an identifiable injury to the detainee as a result of this use of force?	1.000	Yes
Was there a likely injury to the detainee as a result of this use of force?	1.000	Yes

Item	Agreement (kappa)	Significant? ^a
Reporting items		
Is the use of force reportable?	1.000	Yes

Note:

- a Refers to whether the result was “statistically significant”, meaning the difference is such that it cannot be reasonably explained as a chance occurrence.

Descriptive analyses

Frequencies and percentages were calculated to describe the results from the Watch-house Review overall, for each watch-house and for each camera location. This included for the frequency of use of force, the type of force used by officers and the behaviour of detainees.

The use of CCTV footage from cameras from multiple watch-house locations meant that there was the potential for the same use of force to be counted more than once, but it was not possible to determine when this occurred. To avoid multiple counting, which would inflate the prevalence of use of force, prevalence was calculated by determining the proportion of people who entered the watch-house during the review period who had some force used against them at the front charge counter. This was expressed as a rate per 10 detainees who entered the watch-house. This approach underestimates the actual level of force observed across the three camera locations, but is most accurate in the circumstances.

Frequencies and percentages were also calculated to compare allegations to the CCC of assault/use of excessive force in watch-houses with those in public spaces.

Considerations in interpreting findings from the Watch-house Review

The review of watch-house CCTV footage provides valuable information about the use of force in watch-houses, but there are a several points to consider in interpreting the findings.

Availability of audio

The availability of audio was limited for the CCTV footage requested from the five watch-houses. Only two watch-houses provided CCTV footage with audio. The audio available for the single-coded video file from one of these watch-houses was not properly synchronised with the video stream, meaning the audio was of no use during coding. Without audio, the project team was unable to determine what communication took place between officers and detainees.

Retrieval of CCTV footage

Four of the five watch-houses were unable to provide all of the CCTV footage requested, largely due to technical errors. Three of the large watch-houses all had footage missing from the VDCs, while the remote watch-house had footage missing from all three camera locations. The missing footage means that uses of force may have been under-counted, especially in the VDCs.

Quality of CCTV footage

Some CCTV footage was of poor quality and lacked clarity. This meant that coders were at times limited in their ability to code use of force incidents, particularly in being able to accurately identify certain types of use of force (e.g. handcuffs). Another problem affecting coding was that the camera did not always provide visibility of all activity related to the use of force.

Coding of CCTV footage across multiple cameras

The use of cameras from multiple watch-house locations means that a single use of force may have been observed more than once. While the path of people detained in custody can be different, there is a general work process flow:

1. A person entering the watch-house is initially processed at the front charge counter (one camera they may be recorded on).
2. If the person is detained in the watch-house, they then proceed down the hallway (another camera they may be recorded on) and are placed in a cell.
3. If a person is violent or aggressive while they are in the watch-house, they may be placed in a VDC (another camera they may be recorded on).³⁷

Some cameras may therefore capture a use of force that is also captured by another camera. For example, a use of force that occurs in the hallway may already have been captured at the front charge counter.

To avoid the same use of force being counted multiple times, use of force numbers should not be totalled across the different camera locations. Further, the prevalence of use of force has been calculated based only on use of force that occurred at the front charge counter.

Identification of detainees

It was not always possible to ascertain the identity of a detainee observed in the CCTV footage from QPRIME Custody Reports. At the front charge counter, this was because:

- Sometimes there were two or more people with the same entered time and date, and it was not possible for coders to accurately ascertain which Custody Report related to which detainee.
- The time displayed on the CCTV footage did not always match with the time and date on a Custody Report. This may have been due to delays in the officer entering the detainee's details into QPRIME.

Coders were also unable to locate some entries related to detainees who were placed in a VDC. Coders checked the detainee's Detention Log according to the date and time they were placed in the VDC (taken from the date and time displayed on the CCTV footage), but were unable to find relevant entries for 50 per cent of people detained in a VDC.

Intoxicated/drug affected detainees

The Watch-house Review may have over-sampled people who were intoxicated or drug affected because of the days and times examined at the large watch-houses. This may be particularly true for the watch-houses located in cities with large entertainment districts. The Drug Use Monitoring in Australia (DUMA) program found that 70 per cent of people detained on a Friday or Saturday night had consumed alcohol 48 hours before their arrest, compared with 50 per cent on other days of the week (Sweeney & Payne 2011). Many of the detainees in the Watch-house Review appeared to be intoxicated, but there was no rigorous and systematic way to determine this accurately. This potential over-sampling may have implications for the amount and type of force used to control detainees who were possibly unsteady or uncooperative.

37 The OPM (section 16.12.4 Violent detention cells) states that "the watch-house manager is to, in situations where a violent detention cell is available: (i) only use violent detention cells for the management of violent or aggressive prisoners in the interests of safety of those prisoners and other persons; and (ii) ensure that a violent detention cell is not used for punishment of prisoners."

Appropriateness of police use of force

It was not possible to assess the appropriateness of force used by police. Police use of force decisions are complex and reflect risk assessments of individual officers. The methodology was unable to examine the factors that influenced officers' decision-making.

Generalisability of findings to all watch-houses

The findings cannot be generalised to all watch-houses in Queensland. The Watch-house Review was an exploratory exercise and its findings are not representative of use of force in watch-houses across Queensland. The results should be interpreted as a description of the use of force that was captured by cameras in three watch-house locations during particular times at the five watch-houses in the sample.

Appendix 3: Coding instrument

Note: Locations in this form are withheld for confidentiality purposes.

1. Coder name		
2. Date of coding		
3. Please note Response ID in Excel spreadsheet: e.g. @@ResponselD		
INCIDENT DETAILS		
4. Watch-house incident number <i>Code in the following format: L01 ([Location] Watch-house Incident 01).</i> <i>Consult Excel Masterfile for allocated incidents and identifiers.</i>		
5. Use of force number <i>Code in the following format: 1 (use of force 1 in the overall incident).</i>		
6. Watch-house <i>Select from list.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Location 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Location 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Location 3	<input type="checkbox"/> Location 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Location 5
7. Camera number <i>Code in whole numbers only.</i>		
8. Camera location	<input type="checkbox"/> Front charge counter <input type="checkbox"/> Hallway from the charge counter	<input type="checkbox"/> Inside Violent Detention Cell <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____
9. Was there audio?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
10. Date of incident		
11. What time did the use of force incident commence? NOTE: Record the time as displayed at the bottom left-hand side of the screen of the DVD when the subject first enters the footage before the use of force occurs (e.g. in minutes — 30:03 would mean 30 mins and 3 secs).		
12. What time did the use of force incident conclude? NOTE: Record the time as displayed at the bottom left-hand side of the screen of the DVD when the subject leaves the frame after the final use of force occurs (e.g. in minutes — 30:03 would mean 30 mins and 3 secs).		

<p>13. Provide a description of the whole incident based on the CCTV footage.</p> <p>NOTE: Describe the whole incident from beginning to end in your own words. Include details of how the interaction between the detainee and officer began, how the situation appears to escalate to the use of force (e.g. the behaviour of the detainee), what type of force was used and what happened to the detainee after the force was used.</p> <p>NOTE: Copy and paste this into a Word/Text file if there is more than one use of force, as it will need to be replicated for each individual use of force in an incident.</p>		
DETAINEE DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS		
14. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/> Female	<input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
<i>Taken from QPRIME Custody Report.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Male	<input type="checkbox"/> Missing
15. Date of birth (dd/mm/yyyy)		
<i>Taken from QPRIME Custody Report.</i>		
<i>If DOB is unknown or missing, please enter</i>		
16. Indigenous status	<input type="checkbox"/> Aboriginal	<input type="checkbox"/> Both
<i>Taken from QPRIME Custody Report.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Torres Strait Islander	<input type="checkbox"/> Neither
	<input type="checkbox"/> Refused to answer	<input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
		<input type="checkbox"/> Missing
17. Nationality		
<i>Taken from QPRIME Custody Report.</i>		
18. Country of birth		
<i>Taken from QPRIME Custody Report.</i>		
OFFICER DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS		
<i>Only for reportable uses of force</i>		
19. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/> Female	<input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
<i>Taken from QPRIME Use of Force Report.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Male	<input type="checkbox"/> Missing
20. Date of birth (dd/mm/yyyy)		
<i>Taken from QPRIME records.</i>		
<i>If DOB is unknown or missing, please enter</i>		
21. Rank		
<i>Taken from QPRIME Use of Force Report.</i>		
22. Is the same officer responsible for this use of force as in the use of force previously coded?		
USE OF FORCE DETAILS		
Use of force		
23. Where did the use of force happen?	<input type="checkbox"/> Front charge counter	<input type="checkbox"/> Inside Violent Detention Cell
NOTE: Please select the location where the use of force commenced.	<input type="checkbox"/> Hallway from the charge counter	<input type="checkbox"/> Outside the watch-house and continued inside the watch-house

		<input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)
24. What type of force was used by the officer?	<input type="checkbox"/> OC spray/foam <input type="checkbox"/> Physical strike <input type="checkbox"/> Restraining accoutrement <input type="checkbox"/> Baton	<input type="checkbox"/> Physical restraint <input type="checkbox"/> Taser <input type="checkbox"/> Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Other force (specify)
25. Indicate what type of OC spray/foam force was used	<input type="checkbox"/> Presentation	<input type="checkbox"/> Spray
26. Indicate what type of physical strike was used	<input type="checkbox"/> Closed-hand <input type="checkbox"/> Elbow strike <input type="checkbox"/> Kick	<input type="checkbox"/> Head strike <input type="checkbox"/> Knee strike <input type="checkbox"/> Open-hand
27. Indicate what type of restraining accoutrement was used	<input type="checkbox"/> Handcuffs	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible handcuffs
28. Indicate what type of physical restraint was used	<input type="checkbox"/> Application of body weight <input type="checkbox"/> Come along hold <input type="checkbox"/> Lateral vascular neck restraint <input type="checkbox"/> Respiratory neck restraint/choke hold	<input type="checkbox"/> Arm restraint <input type="checkbox"/> Leg restraint <input type="checkbox"/> Wrist lock
29. Indicate what type of Taser force was used	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawal from holster <input type="checkbox"/> Presentation <input type="checkbox"/> Holding or pressing against a person	<input type="checkbox"/> Deployment: Probe mode <input type="checkbox"/> Deployment: Drive stun <input type="checkbox"/> Deployment: Both
30. Indicate what type of firearm force was used	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawal from holster <input type="checkbox"/> Presentation	<input type="checkbox"/> Discharge
31. What body part (of the detainee) did the use of force impact?	<input type="checkbox"/> Head (any other part of the head not elsewhere specified) <input type="checkbox"/> Eye/s <input type="checkbox"/> Nose <input type="checkbox"/> Ear/s <input type="checkbox"/> Face (any other part of the face not elsewhere specified) <input type="checkbox"/> Neck <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (front) <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (rear) <input type="checkbox"/> Arm (left)	<input type="checkbox"/> Arm (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Arm (both) <input type="checkbox"/> Hand (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Hand (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Wrist/s <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (both) <input type="checkbox"/> Foot (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Foot (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Other
32. Approximately how many times was the same type of force used by the officer?	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> More than 5 (specify)

For example, write “4” if a Taser was deployed 4 times, or “6” if the officer punched the detainee 6 times (closed-hand strike).

Detainee behaviour

33. What behaviour was displayed by the detainee prior to this police use of force?

NOTE 1: Please provide details regarding the detainee’s observable behaviour (what the detainee was doing) before force was used. Please be specific, and provide observations rather than interpretations – for example, commenting “the detainee looked angry” is not specific and is an interpretation. Commenting “the detainee had their fists clenched at their sides and spat at the officer” or “the detainee was sitting on a bench talking to the officer” is more specific and focused on what was observed.

NOTE 2: If you are commenting on a subsequent use of force (i.e. the 2nd, 3rd, 4th etc.), please also comment on whether there was an opportunity for a change in the detainee’s behaviour from the use of force that occurred before this one. If there was an opportunity for behaviour change, please describe what the behaviour change was. Please comment on whether the detainee’s behaviour escalated (e.g. they became more aggressive), the detainee’s behaviour deescalated (e.g. they stopped punching police) but they remained noncompliant, or if the detainee’s behaviour deescalated to the point of them being compliant.

Detainee injury

34. Was there an identifiable injury to the detainee as a result of this use of force? Yes No

NOTE: An injury is identifiable if it can be observed in either the vision of the CCTV footage or by audio captured in the CCTV footage (e.g. a comment from the detainee, an officer or paramedic about the detainee having sustained an injury).

35. Describe the identifiable injury the detainee sustained.

NOTE: Please include information about the body part that was injured and the nature of the injury sustained.

36. What is the best description of the type of identifiable injury the detainee sustained? Please choose one only.

<input type="checkbox"/> Abrasion	<input type="checkbox"/> Bleeding
<input type="checkbox"/> Bruising	<input type="checkbox"/> Sprain
<input type="checkbox"/> Concussion	<input type="checkbox"/> Fracture
<input type="checkbox"/> Internal injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Swelling
<input type="checkbox"/> Cut/laceration	<input type="checkbox"/> Other

37. To what body part (of the detainee) did the above identifiable injury occur?

<input type="checkbox"/> Head (any other part of the head not elsewhere specified)	<input type="checkbox"/> Arm (right)
	<input type="checkbox"/> Arm (both)

	<input type="checkbox"/> Eye/s <input type="checkbox"/> Nose <input type="checkbox"/> Ear/s <input type="checkbox"/> Face (any other part of the face not elsewhere specified) <input type="checkbox"/> Neck <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (front) <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (rear) <input type="checkbox"/> Arm (left)	<input type="checkbox"/> Hand (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Hand (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Wrist/s <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (both) <input type="checkbox"/> Foot (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Foot (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Other
38. Was there another identifiable injury to the detainee as a result of this use of force?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, repeat identifiable injury section to code multiple injuries)	<input type="checkbox"/> No
39. Was there a likely injury to the detainee as a result of this use of force? NOTE: An injury is likely if a reasonable person would conclude that the detainee was likely to have sustained an injury as a result of the use of force.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
40. Describe the likely injury the detainee sustained. NOTE: Please include information about the body part that was injured and the nature of the injury sustained.		
41. On what basis do you think there was a likely injury? <i>Please provide detailed comments (e.g. the officer pushed the detainee very hard into a wall and the detainee's head hit the wall).</i>		
42. What is the best description of the type of likely injury the detainee sustained? <i>Please choose one only.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Abrasion <input type="checkbox"/> Bruising <input type="checkbox"/> Concussion <input type="checkbox"/> Internal injury <input type="checkbox"/> Cut/laceration	<input type="checkbox"/> Bleeding <input type="checkbox"/> Sprain <input type="checkbox"/> Fracture <input type="checkbox"/> Swelling <input type="checkbox"/> Other
43. To what body part (of the detainee) did the above likely injury occur?	<input type="checkbox"/> Head (any other part of the head not elsewhere specified) <input type="checkbox"/> Eye/s <input type="checkbox"/> Nose <input type="checkbox"/> Ear/s <input type="checkbox"/> Face (any other part of the face not elsewhere specified) <input type="checkbox"/> Neck <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (front) <input type="checkbox"/> Torso (rear)	<input type="checkbox"/> Arm (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Arm (both) <input type="checkbox"/> Hand (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Hand (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Wrist/s <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Leg (both) <input type="checkbox"/> Foot (left) <input type="checkbox"/> Foot (right) <input type="checkbox"/> Other

	<input type="checkbox"/> Arm (left)	
44. Was there another likely injury to the detainee as a result of this use of force? NOTE: An injury is likely if a reasonable person would conclude that the detainee was likely to have sustained an injury as a result of the use of force.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, repeat likely injury section to code multiple injuries)	<input type="checkbox"/> No
Reporting		
45. Is the use of force reportable? NOTE: Refer to the Excel spreadsheet detailing reporting requirements for the relevant watch-house.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
46. How was the use of force required to be reported? <i>Check multiple boxes if applicable.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> QPRIME Use of Force Report <input type="checkbox"/> Custody Report/Detention Log entry	<input type="checkbox"/> Significant Event Message
47. Would you like to skip to the reportable uses of force section now and come back to it later?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes, I'll come back to it later	<input type="checkbox"/> No, I'll do it right now
48. Were the required reports completed? <i>Tick each relevant box if the report was done.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> QPRIME Use of Force Report	
49. Date completed		
50. Were the required reports completed? <i>Tick each relevant box if the report was done.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Custody Report/Detention Log entry	
51. Date completed		
52. Were the required reports completed? <i>Tick each relevant box if the report was done.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Significant Event Message	
53. Date completed		
54. Are there any apparent inconsistencies between any of the reports and the CCTV footage?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
55. Which reports contain apparent inconsistencies with the CCTV footage?	<input type="checkbox"/> QPRIME Use of Force Report <input type="checkbox"/> Custody Report/Detention Log entry	<input type="checkbox"/> Significant Event Message
56. What are the inconsistencies? <i>Describe how the report/s are inconsistent with the CCTV footage.</i> NOTE: These inconsistencies will be identified and examined as a team. Things to consider include:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there visible injuries that have not been reported? • Are visible injuries reported differently (e.g. in terms of the nature, the body part injured)? • Is there important information missing (e.g. a Taser was used)? • Are the detainee's precipitating behaviours accurately described? • Are officer actions accurately described? 	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is information about the detainee's behaviour not recorded in the report despite it being identifiable in the CCTV footage? 		
Other		
57. Are there any concerns about this use of force?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
58. What are these concerns?		
<p>59. Was there anything that influenced your ability to code this use of force?</p> <p>NOTE: Please comment on anything that inhibited your assessment of the CCTV footage and therefore your ability to code the use of force accurately. This could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A cell door was in the way. Activity occurred off screen. There was no audio. What people were saying couldn't be heard clearly via the audio. There were too many people on the screen to determine exactly what was happening. <p>Please also comment on any specific questions you found difficult to code or were unable to code.</p>		
60. Is additional video footage necessary for coding this use of force further?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (please specify below)	<input type="checkbox"/> No
61. Please specify why		
62. Are there more uses of force to code?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No
<i>This question will not alter the survey but must be completed for SPSS checking purposes.</i>		
63. Any other comments		

Appendix 4: Comparison of QPS CCTV standards and ANZPAA CCTV Recommendations

Table A4.1. Comparison of QPS CCTV standards and ANZPAA CCTV recommendations

QPS CCTV standards ^a		ANZPAA CCTV recommendations ^b		
Number and placement of cameras	100% of detainee areas must be recorded		100% of detainee areas must be recorded	
Video quality	Recording rate	5 images per second	Recording rate	4 or more images of target travelling at fast pace through a camera's field of view; 8 frames per second for half-second movement through field of view
	Minimum recording resolution	640 x 480 for IP cameras; 704 x 288 for analogue cameras	Minimum recording resolution	N/A
Audio capability	Front charge counter	Nil	No requirements for audio to accompany video, but a requirement for audio to be correctly synchronised with video	
	Hallway leading from front charge counter	Nil		
	VDCs	Nil		
Retention	186 days ^c		28 days	

Notes:

- a QPS standards supplied via consultation with Property and Facilities Management, Business Services Division, PSBA.
- b ANZPAA 2014.
- c For all recordings at all camera locations.

Appendix 5: QPS letter of response to report recommendations



QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
200 ROMA STREET BRISBANE QLD 4000 AUSTRALIA
GPO BOX 1440 BRISBANE QLD 4001 AUSTRALIA
TELEPHONE: 07 3364 6488 FACSIMILE: 07 3364 4650



Our Ref: *Doc 17/15 22206*

Your Ref:

1 November 2017

Mr Alan MacSporran
Chairperson
Crime and Corruption Commission
GPO Box 3123
Brisbane Qld 4001



Dear Mr MacSporran *Alan*

I refer to your correspondence dated 13 October 2017 requesting a formal response regarding the status of the six recommendations from the report on police use of force in Queensland watchhouses.

The QPS undertook to consider these recommendations alongside those recommendations resulting from the Violent Confrontations Review and Task Force Bletchley. The QPS has commenced progression of the recommendations of the Task Force Bletchley and Violent Confrontations Review and continues to work towards the policy and procedural changes recommended from the Crime and Corruption Commission review into the police use of force in Queensland watchhouses.


The details of the current status of the recommendations under consideration by the QPS is attached and has been collated with the assistance from the Assistant Commissioners from Ethical Standards Command, Organisational Capability Command and Brisbane Region.

The QPS has undertaken to improve the reporting and oversight of use of force in all areas of policing operations with considerable progress made in this regard. I note that the responses provided will be publicly available when the public version of the report is released.

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

I trust this information is of assistance.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Ian Stewart', is written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the end.

IAN STEWART
COMMISSIONER

References

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Legislation and associated material cited in this report

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld)

District Instructions (for two watch-houses)

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)

QPS Operational Procedures Manual (Issue 49, October 2015)

QPS Service Manuals Definitions (October 2015)

Standard Operating Procedures (for all five watch-houses)



Crime and Corruption Commission

QUEENSLAND

Crime and Corruption Commission

GPO Box 3123, Brisbane QLD 4001

Level 2, North Tower Green Square
515 St Pauls Terrace, Fortitude Valley QLD 4006

Phone: 07 3360 6060
(toll-free outside Brisbane: 1800 061 611)

Fax: 07 3360 6333

Email: mailbox@ccc.qld.gov.au

www.ccc.qld.gov.au

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