Problem-oriented policing in a detective environment
A Queensland case study

Gabi Hoffmann, Margot Legosz and Dennis Budz
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**CMC vision:**
To be a powerful agent for protecting Queenslanders from major crime and promoting a trustworthy public sector.

**CMC mission:**
To combat crime and raise public sector integrity.
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Preface

Problem-oriented policing (known as ‘POP’) is an important innovation that holds much promise for improving the effectiveness of the police to deal with specific crime problems. However, even though much has been learned over the past two decades about this style of policing, a major challenge remains: the capacity of police organisations to adapt and integrate a POP approach into core policing. This project presents an important case study that illustrates both the potential and the challenges of POP for contemporary police services.

Many people contributed to this report, in particular Richard Bray, the project’s Strategic Analyst from the Queensland Police Service. His commitment and steadfast belief that a POP approach could work in a detective environment was critical to the operation of the project.

Support was also given to the project by staff from the Queensland Police Service’s South Eastern Region, especially Assistant Commissioner Ian Stewart, and the detectives, plain clothes investigators and uniformed police who were involved in Operation Astra.

This report was written by Dr Gabi Hoffmann, Dr Margot Legosz and Mr Dennis Budz from the Crime and Misconduct Commission’s Research and Prevention Unit. The report was edited and prepared for publication by the CMC’s Communications Unit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BCIQ</td>
<td>Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Queensland</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>closed circuit television</td>
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<td>CIB</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Bureau</td>
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<td>CPTED</td>
<td>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>problem-oriented policing</td>
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<td>POPP</td>
<td>problem-oriented partnership policing</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>problem-solving cell</td>
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<td>QPS</td>
<td>Queensland Police Service</td>
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<td>NRMA</td>
<td>National Roads and Motorists’ Association (New South Wales)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td>Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment (problem-solving model)</td>
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<td>SSASS</td>
<td>Southport Sexual Assault Support Service</td>
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<td>UUMV</td>
<td>unlawful use of a motor vehicle</td>
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One of the most significant developments in policing in recent years has been problem-oriented policing (POP). The POP approach involves police analysing the underlying features of crime and community problems systematically and then developing, implementing and evaluating responses to solve those underlying problems, rather than simply reacting to crimes after they have occurred. As well as helping reduce crime, the potential benefits of a POP approach include savings in police time because repeat calls are reduced, more efficient and effective services to the public whose concerns are attended to at the source, greater job satisfaction for officers, and overall cost savings for the criminal justice system.

The Queensland Police Service (QPS) is committed to POP and in recent years has provided significant encouragement and resources to implement it as a statewide strategy to address crime and community problems. Numerous demonstration projects have been conducted. However, these have usually been implemented by general duties officers — the use of POP by detectives is rare.

Between September 2001 and August 2002, a joint project by the QPS and the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) was implemented and evaluated to assess the effectiveness of using POP in an investigative environment at the Gold Coast.

The objectives of the project were to improve detectives’ access to, and the quality and utility of, crime-related information so that they could treat the causes of the crime and community problems they encountered by employing a broad range of strategies in partnership with other agencies (i.e. the key features of POP).

Four operations were implemented during the 12-month trial. The first three operations (an initiative to address assaults and robberies occurring in a small area of Surfers Paradise called Mugger’s Mile; an initiative to reduce the loss of personal property in and around Gold Coast beaches and car parks; and an initiative to reduce the incidence of drink-spiking and related rape complaints in nightclubs on the Gold Coast) were relatively unsuccessful. In brief, this was because there were not enough detectives available to implement the initiatives, and those detectives who were available failed to ‘own’ the problems and the new way of approaching them (POP).

Although the Strategic Analyst employed for the project used the classic SARA model (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) and provided ongoing and in-depth information about a range of crime-related problems on the Gold Coast, along with suggestions for a wide and varied range of appropriate response options, the initiatives failed to gain momentum because the analyst was required to conduct the work in a vacuum. He was physically isolated from the detectives and the projects were unable to proceed as desired because not enough detectives were available to implement them. On the other hand, the analyst forged some valuable relationships with potential external and internal partners for the QPS.
The fourth operation was implemented differently, however, and provided a welcome turnaround for the project. Operation Astra was designed to trial the effectiveness of using a highly specialised team of police officers to reduce car theft — a major problem on the Gold Coast. The Astra team included not only the civilian analyst and some detectives, but also uniformed police. Close working relationships were also developed with the Queensland Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (BCIQ), car yards, auctioneers and repairers. The detectives worked consistently with all members of the team and external agencies on a daily basis. Notably, the team was re-located to their own space at the Runaway Bay Police Station where they were physically isolated from their other daily demands and had the opportunity to brainstorm the project as pertinent issues arose. Although disbanded at the end of the trial, the project made considerable headway in a very brief time with a number of arrests and criminal charges leading to a significant decrease in car theft compared to a similar period in the previous year.

There are lessons that can be learned from this demonstration project. For example, the success of Operation Astra illustrated the usefulness of specialist POP teams. Short-term teams that apply the principles of POP to target discrete crime or community problems clearly have the potential to be very effective. Ultimately, if such teams were used more frequently, this should facilitate the adoption of POP more broadly across the QPS.

At first there was considerable resistance to the use of POP by most detectives who were expected to participate in the project. Their attitude appeared to be linked directly to their lack of training in POP. Despite it being identified as a high priority for the project, the QPS did not provide the necessary training within the timeframe allowed for the project. Without training, or at least participation in some awareness sessions about POP, many of the detectives were unconvinced about its benefits and were disinclined to participate, preferring to use standard reactive policing practices. The detectives ultimately involved in Operation Astra, however, more readily adopted the concepts of POP and moved enthusiastically into implementing the processes required to address the problem of car thefts on the Gold Coast, with considerable success.

There were also problems with staff turnover, including the project’s supervisory ‘champions’, the Officers in Charge (OICs). During the 12-month trial, the position of OIC changed three times and, although each OIC was keen to progress the project, the state of flux in staffing at the Gold Coast at that time, along with some major crime that required ‘all hands on deck’, meant that little time, resources and enthusiasm were left for the trial.

Nevertheless, the success of Operation Astra, despite considerable resistance and at times what seemed to be insurmountable barriers, suggests that POP can be both effective and viable within an investigative environment. The CMC encourages detectives and the QPS more broadly to learn from this project and to continue to implement POP incrementally throughout the organisation.
Structure of the report

Chapter 1 provides background information about a problem-oriented policing project conducted by the QPS in an investigative environment on the Gold Coast. A brief overview of the research literature is included.

Chapter 2 provides detailed information about the design and operation of the project, including its rationale, its setting and main objectives. The evaluation methodology is also described.

Chapter 3 presents the key findings. Following a brief description of the four major case studies implemented for the project, the chapter describes the results of the process and impact evaluations and summarises the key findings.

Chapter 4 explores the lessons learned from the project and the way forward.
1: Background

Problem-oriented policing (POP) is an innovative approach to addressing the underlying causes of crime and community problems in a systematic way. The QPS is now committed to this approach and several demonstration projects have been conducted. However, these have usually been conducted by general duties officers. This chapter provides background information about an innovative POP project conducted by detectives at the Gold Coast. It also examines research literature relevant to the application of POP in an investigative environment.

Since the early 1990s, the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), now the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), has encouraged the QPS to take a problem-oriented approach to the delivery of policing services to the community. For example, starting in 1994 the CJC and the QPS established several pilot projects that aimed to develop a capacity within the QPS to work in partnership with the community to solve local policing problems. These were:

- **Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project (1995)**. This project gave individual officers responsibility and ownership for policing a designated geographic area and required them to take a problem-solving approach to crime and community problems. The project established that residential-style police beats were an effective and viable policing strategy in Queensland.

- **Beenleigh Calls for Service Project (1998)**. The project was designed to determine whether the application of problem-solving techniques would reduce the number of repeat calls for service in a police division. An evaluation of the project concluded that policing efforts directed at repeat-call locations successfully reduced police workload.

- **Beenleigh Break and Enter Reduction Project (2001)**. The project was designed to improve the police response to the problem of residential break and enters with a particular focus on reducing the risk of repeat victimisation and the number of offences in identified hotspots. This was accomplished by employing a three-tiered problem-oriented response aimed at the victim, the victim’s residence, and the victim’s neighbourhood.

Although each of these projects was deemed successful, they focused on trialling POP in the context of general duties policing. In contrast, the project described in this report aimed to encourage police investigators to apply a POP approach to criminal investigation, an area largely unexplored in Queensland. This report provides a summary of the project, including information about its scope, evaluation strategy and key findings or lessons learned.

Overview of research and practice

The POP approach

The standard operational approach for general duties police consists of responding to specific calls for service, dealing with them as efficiently as possible, getting back on patrol, waiting for the next call and then repeating the process. Herman Goldstein in his seminal article (1979) and subsequent book (1990), however,
outlined a different way for police to approach their work. He referred to this approach as ‘problem-oriented policing’. Simply, POP requires police to analyse clusters of policing incidents and then target the underlying cause of the problem, rather than simply responding to separate incidents and then moving on to the next call.

Goldstein (1990) argued that most police agencies see the primary work unit of policing as an incident, such as the theft of a car or a dispute between neighbours. These incidents are usually handled in an isolated, self-contained way. The problem (i.e. a collection of incidents) and the factors that led to the problem are not dealt with. POP, on the other hand, requires officers to move beyond just responding to incidents to acknowledge that they can be the result of underlying conditions. Therefore, officers need to recognise the relationships between similar incidents and discover what conditions give rise to them, and then deal with the underlying causes. Addressing the causes of problems, however, does not mean fixing broad societal problems such as unemployment or poverty, as police clearly cannot fix such problems, but it does mean dealing with the problem at a level where police can target resources and address the deepest underlying conditions that are amenable to intervention (Scott 2000).

POP aims to make improvements to public safety and security and to increase police effectiveness, especially for substantial problems (Scott 2000; Eck & Spelman 1987). Eck and Spelman (p. 49) documented the five main objectives of POP:

1. to totally eliminate a problem
2. to substantially reduce a problem (reduce the number of incidents it creates)
3. to reduce the harm created by a problem (reduce the seriousness of the incidents)
4. to deal with a problem better (e.g. treat people more humanely, or reduce costs)
5. to remove the problem from police consideration (if another agency can deal with it more effectively).

**Key POP assumptions**

Inherent in the POP approach are these key assumptions:

- **Proactive policing is at least as important as reactive policing.** Goldstein (1990, p. 46) argues that ‘rather than wait until problems have reached sufficient magnitude to generate community concern and only then react to them, police should be able to use data in their possession to identify problems at an earlier stage and to share their knowledge with the community’. Similarly, Scott (2000) notes that being proactive means preventing future harm, not just addressing past harm. This shift away from reacting to crimes/events of disorder that have already occurred to taking action to prevent them from happening in the first place (i.e. being proactive) is an important part of POP.

- **Rank-and-file officers are vital to the success of the initiative.** Inherent in the POP approach is the value placed on rank-and-file officers. According to Goldstein (1990) general duties officers, especially if they are permanently assigned to an area, are in the best position to identify problems from the bottom up. In fact, some POP projects have been effective because of this approach (CJC 1995). Nonetheless, as Scott (2000) points out, POP will not progress unless supervisors and managers are involved and accord it high importance within their organisations.
• **Policing is not just about law enforcement but also involves disorder and quality-of-life issues.** Previous research (CJC 1996) has shown that the majority of demands for police service do not involve crime and that simple law enforcement is very limited in what it can achieve. POP is concerned with any substantial community problem that requires police involvement and is not simply limited to a crime focus.

• **The community needs to be engaged through partnerships with other agencies.** POP requires creating and fostering links with other agencies and organisations (Pollard 1996). Partnerships are closely related to POP because problems that need to be addressed are frequently influenced by things that are outside the immediate control of police. Partnerships can also enable long-term strategies to be put in place that can be maintained after initial police attention is complete.

**Other policing concepts**

Frequently, police officers state that problem-oriented policing is not a new concept — that it is simply a new name for other policing activities such as community policing, crime prevention and crime analysis. Problem-oriented policing interrelates with these policing strategies and has some common attributes. However, it is also conceptually distinct.

For example, community policing aims to generally strengthen police and community interaction, including shared decision-making. In contrast, POP uses the community and other agencies in specific, targeted ways in order to address certain problems. POP also seeks input from the community but will generally preserve decision-making responsibility for police (Goldstein 1990).

It is important to explain the different terminologies used for problem-oriented policing and to illustrate how it differs from other policing concepts. This is done briefly below:

**Problem-oriented policing (POP)**

POP involves the devotion of police resources to analysing the underlying features of crime and community problems in a systematic way, and then developing, implementing and evaluating responses designed to deal with those underlying problems — rather than focusing simply on reacting to crimes after they have occurred.

**Problem-oriented partnership policing (POPP)**

POPP refers to an initiative launched by the QPS in May 1999. The incorporation of the term ‘partnership’ into what is more universally known as POP was used to emphasis the importance that the QPS places on working in partnership with the community to solve problems. To lessen the confusion that the use of both concepts might cause, this report adopts the more familiar term of problem-oriented policing (POP).

**Problem-solving**

The terms ‘POP’ and ‘problem-solving’ are sometimes used interchangeably. However, problem-solving refers to a systematic process (i.e. using a basic problem-solving model, such as SARA) for applying the principles of POP to reduce crime and community problems.

**Intelligence-led policing**

This involves looking for patterns in crime and thereby focusing and improving police operations; however, it is generally limited by the application of traditional responses to existing problems, instead of being tailored to a specific problem (Eck & Spelman 1987). POP is different in that it aims to analyse the problem...
systematically in order to develop tailor-made solutions aimed at reducing or eliminating the problem. As well, a POP problem analysis may consist of analysing information from other agencies, not just police statistics.

**Situational crime prevention**
This is underpinned by Opportunity Theory, which simply states that immediate situational factors are important in determining the occurrence of crime and that crime can be decreased by reducing the opportunities for offences. Many problem-oriented responses can involve applying the techniques of situational crime prevention (i.e. target hardening).

**Zero tolerance**
Zero tolerance has been described in different ways. Scott (2000), for example, claims that zero tolerance is antithetical to POP as it involves limited use of discretion and requires enforcing laws as strictly as possible. Kelling and Sousa (2001), on the other hand, argue that zero tolerance can involve the use of discretion and is not a mindless, repressive enforcement of the law. For example, through an intense concentration of law enforcement resources, zero tolerance policing can disrupt a pattern of crime or disorder, thereby creating a window of opportunity for the application of a range of other tailor-made solutions (Brookes 1997; Leigh, Reid & Tilley 1998).

**Third-party policing**
This is a term for ‘… police efforts to persuade or coerce non-offending persons to take actions which are outside the scope of their routine activities, and which are designed to indirectly minimise disorder caused by other persons or to reduce the possibility that crime may occur’ (Buerger & Green-Mazerolle 1998, p. 301). An example of this could be getting landlords to make changes to their property, or evicting troublemakers, either through persuasion or coercion, in order to decrease crime. Therefore, third-party policing includes not just sound partnerships between police and third parties, but also efforts to get third parties to take action that may be the result of police leverage or coercion, including the use of civil laws. Such a strategy may be part of an effective POP approach to a problem, and was briefly discussed in Goldstein’s original book (1990).

**The SARA problem-solving model**
Although there are a number of problem-solving models that can be applied to POP, the QPS has adopted the SARA model. This model was developed by Eck and Spellman (1987) in conjunction with the United States National Institute of Justice and the Newport News Police Department in the USA. The SARA model involves four distinct stages: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment. These are described below:

**Stage 1 — Scanning**
The first stage of the problem-solving process is scanning, which involves determining whether a problem really exists and whether any further action by police is necessary. In essence, scanning:

- provides a basic description of the problem
- identifies the location of the problem
- assesses the seriousness and urgency of the problem
- identifies who has the primary responsibility for causing or fixing the problem.
Stage 2 — Analysis
The purpose of stage 2 of the SARA model is to pinpoint the underlying conditions that contribute to the problem or allow it to persist. This involves a careful analysis of what is happening, when, where and how. Three key elements are common to most policing problems (persons, event and place):

- **Persons** — the individuals involved in the problem (victims, offenders and third parties)
- **Event** — the incident, or group of incidents, related to the problem, including:
  - what the incident entailed
  - the behaviour of any individuals involved in the incident
  - the harm done to any victim or third party
  - the sufficiency of the initial police response to the incident
  - the possibility of links to other incidents.
- **Place** — the spatial–temporal (space–time) features of the problem, including:
  - the location of the problem
  - the date, time and day of the week that the problem occurred
  - the features of any structures or places near where the problem occurred
  - the presence or absence of physical security measures
  - access (e.g. public transport, roads, paths).

Stage 3 — Response
In stage 3 of the SARA model, individual long-term solutions are designed to deal with the underlying conditions that are believed to give rise to a number or cluster of incidents occurring. Although eliminating the problem is the ultimate goal, this is not always possible. Where the response is unlikely to eliminate the problem, it aims to:

- reduce the number of incidents that the problem created
- reduce the seriousness of the problem
- design better methods for handling the problem in the future
- remove the problem from police consideration (Eck & Spelman 1987, pp. 5–6).

Goldstein (1990, pp. 105–147) suggests that general POP responses can include:

- concentrating attention on individuals or agencies responsible for the problem
- referring the problem to another agency for resolution
- coordinating a police response with responses from other agencies
- using mediation and negotiation to resolve the problem
- providing information or advice aimed at strengthening security, gaining compliance, or reducing fear and anxiety among those involved in the problem
- mobilising the community to take primary responsibility for the problem
- making better use of existing forms of social control (parents, teachers etc.) to resolve the problem
- altering the physical environment to reduce the opportunities for the problem to recur
- increasing regulation of the conditions that give rise to the problem
- identifying gaps in existing services or legislation.
In effect, the response stage involves implementing strategies designed to deal with the problem and are tailored to address the unique and local aspects of the problem under consideration.

Stage 4 — Assessment
The final stage is assessment. It is during this stage that the effectiveness of the response is evaluated. If the problem is reduced or eliminated the response has been effective. If, however, the problem has not been affected, the assessment phase may indicate that something else might need to be done. This might even require going back to stage 2 for further analysis (things may have been missed in the original analysis or it may not have been detailed enough) and deciding on alternative responses.

Implementing POP in a detective environment
To date, most applications of POP have occurred within the patrol or general duties areas — implementation of POP within a criminal investigation environment has been less common. This may be because criminal investigation has primarily been perceived as reactive, solving crimes that have already occurred (Forst 1998). Indeed, in a survey of Queensland police, Dean (2000) found that solving crimes after the fact is overwhelmingly how detectives think about their work and Brereton (1996) has described detective culture in Queensland as being ‘all about catching crooks’. Brereton suggests that ‘… detective work focuses on the criminal event and its aftermath, whereas POP is concerned with trying to prevent events from occurring, or at least recurring’ (1996, p. 6).

However, previous research (e.g. Greenwood et al. 1975) has shown that there are times when detectives have limited success in solving crimes after they have occurred (e.g. when witnesses are unable to provide unique identifying information about the incident or the suspect). Research has also shown that patrol officers and detectives have time that could be better used. For example, detectives’ time could be freed up by differential response and case screening (i.e. where all cases are not given equal effort). This suggests, therefore, that POP could hold some promise for criminal investigation.

Traditional, proactive detective work has consisted of strategies such as infiltrating undercover officers into drug organisations, the use of informants, or finding more creative ways of obtaining evidence (Dean 2000). However, a detective’s role could be broader than these traditional functions: detectives possess considerable and unique information (e.g. from interviews and investigations) that could be used to prevent crime, rather than just investigating existing cases. For example, the Newport News domestic violence program (Eck & Spelman 1987) resulted from a detective’s analysis of homicide data which indicated that half of the murders committed were the result of domestic violence and that half of these involved couples who had previously come to the attention of police. The detective surveyed officers to find out how they handled domestic violence cases and what their knowledge of available options were, and subsequently brought together a group of interested people from different agencies to come up with combined strategies to improve the handling of domestic violence cases.

Therefore, even though the main role of criminal investigators may be to solve crimes that have occurred, many of the ongoing problems facing detectives could be addressed by a careful analysis of patterns and by tackling the underlying problems, in a similar way to patrol or general duties officers. Similarly, many of the strategies that could be devised to deal with problems will very likely involve detectives working in conjunction with members of the community, as well as
uniformed officers. Forst (1998, p. 400) states that specific areas for improvement in problem-oriented criminal investigations include ‘collaboration with patrol officers and others, shift of focus from offences to offenders and locations, and a more coherent use of modus operandi files and related data sources’. Forst also argues that by combining traditional crime-solving methods with analyses of patterns and problems, criminal investigators could improve their crime-solving ability, as well as preventing crime.

In Queensland, POP initiatives had not been implemented by detectives before the trial project described in this report. However, some jurisdictions around the world have successfully implemented problem-oriented approaches to criminal investigation. For instance, the Edmonton Police Service in Canada produced a report (1997) which summarised numerous POP projects that detectives had initiated and carried out in partnership with the community. These projects covered a variety of problems including cigarette theft, gas station robberies, family violence, runaway youths, prostitution and stolen vehicles. Similarly, Peak and Glensor (1996) described POP projects that consisted of detectives working in conjunction with patrol officers to successfully address issues such as auto theft and drug dealing in American police departments. Anstee (2001) also reported successful POP projects involving detectives working in conjunction with community police officers and other agencies in the London borough of Barnet.

In Australia, Brown and Sutton (1997) attempted to implement a problem-oriented approach in the Victoria Police Drug Squad. One of the study’s aims was to have the drug squad identify, access and collate data from a variety of sources (e.g. crime statistics, health department data, coroner’s court data) to develop a comprehensive picture of what the problems regarding drug use were and to encourage a broader range of responses (including harm-reduction efforts) other than a simple law enforcement one. The authors argued that any strategies that police use should be based on their demonstrated effectiveness to achieve strategic goals, not simply because it was how police had always done things.

Unfortunately, Brown and Sutton (1997) found that the planned problem-oriented approach failed to take hold. The authors attributed this to the organisational culture and structure of the police service. More specifically,

... police had little incentive to think about data in a problem-oriented way. Data was processed for its immediate relevance to tactical, response-driven planning and activity. The idea of data being collected and analysed without flowing into immediate enforcement activity went against the established culture of police work. (p. 28)

The authors also noted that: ‘... police officers and managers in the drug squad lacked the authority to independently develop and put in place innovative responses.’ The authors pointed out that problem-oriented approaches implicitly assume organisational flexibility, which may not be available to many decision-makers in the hierarchy, and that successful examples of problem-oriented approaches have generally been conducted in either relatively small police departments or as demonstration projects in large departments where the project was kept separate from the rest of the organisation. The authors stated that the structure of many large police organisations is ‘... explicitly not one designed to accommodate or serve problem-oriented activity’ (p. 29).

Brown and Sutton also concluded that in order for POP to work, the police organisation must ‘fundamentally review its practices’ (p. 30) and that this had not yet happened in Australia, where POP has been seen simply as an additional technique ‘which can be grafted on to the side of existing operational strategies’. They also found that there is a danger that police organisations may simply adopt
‘... the rhetoric of problem-oriented policing while relegating problem-oriented strategies to peripheral or demonstration-style projects ...’ (p. 30).

Although examples are few, the implementation of POP in a detective environment in Australia and around the world has clearly achieved varying levels of success and there are some lessons to be learned from the examples described so far. POP in a detective environment may be effective, providing all of the elements of POP and the SARA model are implemented. Problems occur when the organisational structure or culture inhibit, or at least fail to facilitate, its progression. The skills and motivation of detectives are also important. Indeed, Leigh, Reid & Tilly (1996) noted that efforts to involve a criminal investigation division in the United Kingdom in POP had to be discontinued for lack of commitment from the officers involved.

Summary

The concept of POP has been around for more than two decades. However, in Queensland, as with many other parts of the world, it has been implemented in only a limited way by general duties officers and rarely by detectives. Perceptions about the very nature of investigative work, as well as various organisational barriers to its implementation, may have deterred many detectives from applying their investigative skills in a problem-oriented way. Nevertheless, the potential benefits of detectives applying POP have been illustrated, and some promising results from overseas suggest that this is an area worth developing.
In 2001 the CMC and the QPS agreed to trial a POP project with detectives on Queensland’s Gold Coast. The project was co-sponsored by the CMC and the QPS and funded by the QPS Policing Strategies Steering Committee.

Project setting

Given that Gold Coast City is Australia’s second largest local government area in terms of population and the seventh largest city, it was thought that the level of crime in the area would make it ideal for trialling POP within an investigative environment.

The Gold Coast Police District

The Gold Coast Police District is one of two districts included in the South East Region. The district covers almost all of Gold Coast City and incorporates several well-known resort localities, including Surfers Paradise and Broadbeach. The district itself is defined by the Queensland–New South Wales border to the south, the Pacific Ocean to the east, the Pimpama River to the north, and has a western boundary that runs through the hinterland. It is 1371 square kilometres in area, 59 kilometres in length and 30 kilometres at its widest point. The district is characterised by high-rise, resort and canal developments adjoining suburban home lots, and semi-rural and hinterland acreage properties. The estimated residential population of the Gold Coast Police District is 300 000 with an average annual growth rate of 5 per cent.

The Gold Coast Northern Investigative Group

The Gold Coast Police District is divided into two investigative groups: the Northern Investigative Group located at Surfers Paradise, and the Southern Investigative Group located at Burleigh Heads. The project was primarily situated within the Northern Investigative Group, but some links were established with the Southern Investigative Group during the initial phases of the project and for some of the case studies undertaken. At the time of the project, the Northern Investigative Group consisted of:

- Detective Inspector in Charge
- Detective Senior Sergeant — Operations
- Detective Senior Sergeant — Administration
- Eight investigative teams (each usually comprising one detective sergeant, two detective senior constables and two plain clothes constables)
- Two Juvenile Aid Bureau teams (each usually comprising one detective sergeant, two detective senior constables and two plain clothes constables).
The Northern Investigative Group is dedicated to investigating and solving serious crime and targeting organised crime and recidivist criminals. Staff who work in the group are experienced police officers who undergo an additional intensive period of training in law and the latest techniques in investigation. The duties of detectives and investigators assigned to the group, which are many and varied, include:

- taking crime reports
- attending crime scenes
- interviewing witnesses and suspects
- identifying and seizing exhibits
- conducting static surveillance operations
- conducting drug investigations
- charging offenders
- presenting evidence in court.

**Project objectives**

The project was principally designed to evaluate the effectiveness of detectives using POP to enhance the QPS’s investigative response to crime. The objectives and strategies of the project were determined and approved by a steering committee comprising senior staff from both the QPS and the CMC. The objectives of the project were as follows:

**Objective 1**
To improve the access to, and the quality and utility of, crime-related information to detectives at the Gold Coast District’s Northern Investigative Group by:

- creating a problem-solving cell (PSC) to identify crime trends in a timely fashion and make recommendations for operational priorities and initiatives
- employing a strategic analyst to regularly scan the crime-related data, participate in the PSC, contribute to the recommendations for operational priorities and analyse the impact of detective-driven POP activities.

**Objective 2**
To promote a greater understanding of problem-solving techniques (such as the SARA model) among detectives at Gold Coast District’s Northern Investigative Group by providing awareness training.

**Objective 3**
To assess the extent to which detectives at the Gold Coast District’s Northern Investigative Group apply problem-solving techniques, such as:

- treating the causes, as well as the symptoms, of crime and community concerns
- employing a broad range of strategies to address these issues
- seeking opportunities to work in partnership with other agencies to address these issues
- using the SARA model.

**Objective 4**
To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the pilot study, such as:

- the way operational priorities are selected
- how detectives respond to these priorities
- how detectives feel about applying problem-solving techniques
• whether any immediate quantitative or qualitative effects of the initiatives implemented during the pilot program were detected
• the usefulness of the operations and techniques selected for the pilot program for future operations
• resource requirements (especially personnel).

Project features

Establishment of a problem-solving cell

One of the key features of the project was the establishment of a problem-solving cell, or PSC. During the operation of the project, the PSC consisted of the crime manager, a detective senior sergeant, a strategic analyst and a tactician.

The purpose of the PSC was to provide expert operational and analytical support to the Northern Investigative Group. The PSC was designed to use a broad range of information to identify patterns in the types of reported crime, offender movement/behaviour and any relevant crime location characteristics. Once a pattern had been identified, the PSC was to design a response strategy to pinpoint and apprehend the offender or create the conditions that might reduce the risk of this type of offence occurring or recurring.

The role of the Strategic Analyst

A civilian strategic analyst was employed to work specifically on the project for a limited tenure. The role of this position was to provide the PSC with expert analytical and administrative support to assist with initiating problem-solving and crime prevention strategies, with a view to reducing crime and community-based problems.

Following a competitive selection process the analyst was appointed in September 2001 for a fixed 12-month term. The principal duties of the analyst were:

• providing analytical support to the PSC, including the collection, collation and presentation of data derived from police and public sources
• identifying and interpreting trends or patterns in data using statistical and geographic mapping techniques
• preparing daily reports detailing emerging patterns or trends in the type or location of reported crime
• providing detailed profiles relating to targeted individuals and associates
• assisting with the establishment of links and protocols with relevant agencies for the purpose of monitoring the movement of subjects of interest
• assisting with the design, implementation and monitoring of various problem-solving initiatives
• assisting with the development of new analytical processes and a resource guide, which were to support the further implementation of problem-solving in criminal investigation environments.

Application of the SARA problem-solving model

Throughout the trial the project team and problem-solving cell used the SARA model to aid its application of POP (see Figure 2.1, next page).
In Stage 1 of the model (scanning), the Strategic Analyst conducted an environmental scan and examined the nature and extent of the major crime categories in the Gold Coast District during the preceding 12 months. He also scanned all matters sent to the Northern Investigative Group for investigation on a daily basis. Using a broad range of police and public databases (e.g. Crime Reporting Information System for Police or CRISP, Calls for Service, Custody Index, Domestic Violence Index), he searched the data for patterns or clusters, in particular looking for links to other incidents and identified potential offenders and their methods of operation. If a pattern of activity was identified, the analyst prepared a short summary of the case for review. The PSC then determined whether the pattern or activity should be selected as a target for intervention. The targets selected for further development were subjected to extensive analysis (Stage 2) by the analyst using a broad range of criminal justice system and public databases.

After analysis, the matter was discussed by the PSC and a course of action decided upon (Stage 3 — response). In most cases, this involved designing and implementing a strategy that aimed to reduce the number of incidents with similar characteristics or focus on apprehending a particular offender. Although the PSC had hoped to develop the project to the point where the policing problem could be assigned to a particular detective, this largely did not occur. Instead, the analyst carried the principal responsibility for managing the response with the help of a very small team of detectives. The number of problems identified, however, could have readily required all Northern Investigative Group officers.

During the assessment stage (Stage 4) the Strategic Analyst monitored the local crime trends to determine whether any changes had occurred where POP responses had been implemented. In anticipation that such changes would be difficult to measure, given the short timeframe of the project and the limited scale of the responses provided, alternative data-collection measures (such as interviews with key informants) were also implemented. The CMC’s evaluation, provided by this report, was also designed to elicit some information about the effectiveness of the responses.

**Evaluation design**

The evaluation was designed to parallel the implementation of the operational aspects of the project: both used, to a large degree, the SARA model. From an evaluative perspective there were, essentially, two independent components: a process evaluation and an impact evaluation.
Process evaluation
In the long term, the effects or outcomes of any kind of program or intervention cannot be measured until it is clear that a program has been implemented properly. Regular monitoring of key implementation stages and processes occurred throughout the period of the project. The process evaluation sought to identify and collect information about the implementation of the project, particularly the extent to which the strategies and activities used were consistent with the design of the project. Information about the implementation process was obtained primarily from observations and interviews with the Strategic Analyst and police officers about the problems they had encountered and how they had been addressed.

Impact evaluation
The aim of the impact evaluation conducted by the CMC was to gauge the extent to which the project had achieved its stated objectives and to identify whether there had been any unintended consequences. Any immediate effects (such as a reduction in the number of offences in a target location) were measured by the Strategic Analyst’s assessment of each initiative using the SARA model (see the four case studies presented in Chapter 3).

Data sources
The main sources of data used in the evaluation were a daily diary, the collation of regular process reports, interviews and focus groups with key informants, and a review of official documents.

Daily diary
The Strategic Analyst kept a daily diary during the course of the project. The purpose of the diary was to record process-based information relating to the operation of the project. The diary captured a range of information such as dates, problems being discussed and the actions to be taken. It also provided the opportunity to comment about the processes as they occurred and to note any concerns.

Process report
The Strategic Analyst also kept a detailed record of the activities undertaken for each operation. The format used for the collection of these data was based on the SARA model (see Table 2.1, next page).

Interviews
During the course of the evaluation, CMC researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with key police personnel (e.g. detectives, intelligence officers, senior managers and the Strategic Analyst) to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each operation. Changes in attitudes, skills and behaviour relevant to POP and routine police work were also assessed informally. The questions asked during the interviews are shown in Table 2.2, next page.

Focus groups
In January 2002, a formal focus group was held with all available detectives and intelligence analysts of the Northern Investigative Group, both those who had and had not worked on the POP project, in an effort to assess the impact of the project on the broader work environment. The topics and questions used to guide the discussions are listed in Table 2.3, page 15.
Further focus groups were held towards the end of the project (in August and September 2002) with the detectives who had become heavily involved in one of the project operations (Astra) and the Strategic Analyst to assess their views about the project, their attitudes towards POP, the future prospects of the project, and the likelihood that these officers would continue to use a POP approach to crime.

Table 2.1: Process report (example)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE</th>
<th>DATA REQUIRED FOR EACH OPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Scanning (process)  | • Name of operation  
• Name of QPS personnel involved  
• Other personnel/organisations involved or consulted (e.g. community/business representatives)  
• Essential features of the problem (person, event, place)  
• How was the problem identified (e.g. calls for service, community, media, CRISP, hotspot)? |
| Analysis (process)  | • How was the problem selected (e.g. by severity, public interest, impact)?  
• What is the impact/potential impact of the problem (e.g. how many people will be affected)?  
• How serious is the problem (e.g. danger, damage, public concern)?  
• How complex is the problem?  
• How much impact can the police have?  
• How much impact can others have?  
• What are the levels of support required and available for solving the problem?  
• What are the underlying causes or contributing factors to the problem?  
• How were the causes/contributing factors identified? |
| Response (process)  | • What are the aims and objectives of the operational plan?  
• What are the problem-solving strategies to be used (e.g. modification of the physical environment, coordination of community resources, implementation of education programs)?  
• How was this response chosen (e.g. previous research, standard procedures, innovative idea)?  
• What are the resources required (personnel, equipment etc.)?  
• What is the planned timeframe for the operation (proposed begin and end dates)? |
| Assessment (process)| • How will the impact of the operation be measured (e.g. offender detained, number of educational programs implemented, crime rates reduced)?  
• What are the sources of data to be used for assessment? |
| Assessment (impact) | • What was the outcome of the operation (e.g. offender arrested, hotspot reduced, education programs implemented, increased response by external agency, effective partnerships formed)? |

Table 2.2: Interview questions (example)

| Process       | • Name of operation  
• Personnel interviewed  
• Where and how was the information about the project and its outcomes disseminated? |
|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Impact        | • What was the outcome of the operation (e.g. offender arrested, hotspot reduced, education programs implemented, increased response by external agency, effective partnerships formed)?  
• Describe any feedback about the operation (e.g. from detectives, community members).  
• What were the strengths of the operation?  
• What were the weaknesses of the operation?  
• Will this plan be used again? If so, how?  
• How difficult was it to use this approach within the constraints of routine policing?  
• How satisfied with the problem-solving approach were the personnel involved?  
• Have there been any changes in attitudes, skills or behaviour of the personnel involved due to application of POP approaches?  
• Has the approach to routine policing changed because of this experience? |
Assessing program success

In assessing the success of a pilot project, such as the project described in this report, it is important to be realistic about what the project can achieve. In this case, it was agreed that success would principally be gauged on its ability to achieve a number of goals over the short, medium and long term. These goals are described below.

Short-term goals:
- detectives at Surfers Paradise routinely using POP techniques
- retention of project strategies such as the Strategic Analyst and the PSC to provide timely advice to detectives as required.

Medium-term goals:
- ongoing application of creative proactive strategies to address crime and disorder and community problems in the area (including widespread use of the SARA model)
- ongoing partnerships formed with community agencies and other government departments to address community problems as they arise
- reduction in crime reports relevant to the POP initiatives undertaken.

Long-term goals:
- reorientation of how detectives approach their work to include a significant proportion of time spent on proactive initiatives to reduce crime
- positive changes in crime trends in the area
- enhanced police/community relations.

Table 2.3: Focus-group questions

| POP | • Until today, how much have you heard about POP and the SARA model? Please describe — where/how did you hear about it?  
|     | • Has anyone here been involved in a POP project before? Please describe — how, when, where. What did you learn from it?  
|     | • Has anyone used the SARA model before? Please describe — what did you learn from it?  
|     | • Has anyone used a different type of POP model? Please describe — what did you learn from it?  
|     | • What do you think POP can do for you — i.e. what are your expectations of your involvement in the project?  
|     | • Can you see any potential for POP to affect the bigger picture of policing — e.g. a change in crime trends?  
| Detectives | • Until now, how would you describe a typical day in your life as a detective?  
|            | • How do you imagine your day-to-day work might change by your participation in the project?  
|            | • Where, how or in what circumstances can you see POP fitting into your arsenal of investigative tools?  
| Project | • Has anyone been involved with the project PSC so far? (how, when etc.)  
|         | • Has anyone been involved with a PSC elsewhere? (how, when, where etc.)  
|         | • Has anyone had the chance to offer suggestions for operations relevant to the project so far?  
|         | • Does anyone have any thoughts about, or suggestions for, an operation regarding a particular crime or community problem that might be relevant to the project now? (To be replaced at follow-up with: Can anyone see the potential to continue the operations already undertaken for the project for other crime or community issues? Please describe).  

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Long-term goals:
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- positive changes in crime trends in the area
- enhanced police/community relations.
Table 2.4: Project aims and strategies, and evaluation type and methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIMS</th>
<th>STRATEGIES</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To improve the access to, and the quality and utility of, crime-related information to detectives at the Northern Investigative Group. | • Problem-solving cell (PSC)  
• Strategic Analyst | Process evaluation | Pre- or post-program interviews:  
• Strategic Analyst  
• members of the PSC  
• detectives.  
Project documentation |
| To promote a greater understanding of problem-solving techniques (such as the SARA model) among detectives at the Northern Investigative Group. | • Awareness training  
• SARA model | Process evaluation | Number of:  
• sessions  
• officers attending.  
Interviews or survey or focus group with detectives on:  
• attitudes  
• knowledge  
• use. |
| To assess the extent to which detectives at the Northern Investigative Group apply problem-solving techniques. | • Treating the causes, as well as the symptoms, of crime and community concerns.  
• Employing a broad range of strategies to address these issues.  
• Seeking opportunities to work in partnership with other agencies to address these issues.  
• Using the SARA model. | Process evaluation | Ongoing operation and post-project interviews.  
Project documentation |
| To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the pilot study. | Process evaluation  
Impact evaluation | Project documentation  
Post-project interviews |

Summary

Given its level of crime, the Gold Coast was perceived to be an appropriate setting for a trial POP project by detectives. A steering committee, comprising QPS and CMC personnel, devised four major objectives: the provision of improved crime data to detectives working in the Northern Investigative Group, the promotion and achievement of a greater understanding of problem-solving techniques among detectives in the group, an assessment of the extent to which detectives applied problem-solving techniques, and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the pilot study. These objectives were to be achieved within a 12-month timeframe. The CMC undertook to conduct process and impact evaluations parallel to the project’s implementation, and devised a number of instruments and processes to collect the necessary information.
This chapter describes four POP activities (case studies) undertaken for the project. The second part of the chapter provides the process and impact evaluations undertaken by the CMC. The process evaluation, in particular, explains to a large extent why the impact of the case studies was ultimately less effective than had been hoped.

Case studies

This section presents four case studies, each illustrating the approach taken in response to a specific problem identified by the PSC (problem-solving cell). The first three case studies illustrate the results of attempts to take a ‘unit-wide’ approach to POP (i.e. encouraging detectives to reframe everything they do in line with a problem-oriented approach). The fourth provides the results of a specialist team approach to the specific problem of car theft.

Each of the narratives reported here are based on interviews with members of the PSC and police detectives involved in the project. Each of the case studies is structured as follows:

- description of the problem
- response
- outcome
- the lessons learned and challenges identified.

Case study 1 — Mugger’s Mile

Description of the problem

The first initiative of the project aimed to address the problem of assaults, robberies and stealing offences occurring in a small area of Surfers Paradise nicknamed ‘Mugger’s Mile’. An analysis of the crime reports revealed that these muggings were a particularly serious problem during the summer season (i.e. ‘Schoolies Week’ and the Christmas–New Year period). This area had also received negative media publicity about the muggings; indeed, this was where the term ‘Mugger’s Mile’ had come from. The offences had taken place in the evening and early hours of the morning and were associated with certain liquor establishments.

Response

Discussions regarding this problem were held with some CIB members and uniformed officers from other areas of the QPS, as well as Liquor Licensing (Department of Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry Development), and the Gold Coast City Council staff involved with the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring room. QPS members also took part in meetings of an Alcohol Working Group, which included representatives from the Gold Coast City Council, Queensland Health and the Licensed Venues Association. This group attempted to tackle holistically issues associated with alcohol intoxication, and crime and safety in Surfers Paradise.
A number of strategies were proposed to deal with the problem:

- increasing police activity at high-risk times/places as identified by the analysis
- QPS officers working in conjunction with council CCTV personnel to share intelligence
- liquor licensing staff strictly enforcing liquor legislation
- licensed premises and shopping centres offering crime awareness advice for customers.

The following performance indicators were proposed to evaluate the operation’s effectiveness:

- the number of:
  - reported offences
  - arrests of offenders
  - intelligence reports from the CCTV room
- media reports
- feedback from a survey of business owners.

Unfortunately, the Mugger’s Mile initiative was implemented in only a very limited way. The commencement of these strategies was repeatedly delayed because of a lack of available staff. Ultimately, only a few shifts were conducted where officers targeted the problem and worked in conjunction with the CCTV room. Although a survey was designed to assess project implementation and the views of local business owners, the survey was never conducted because of the limited implementation of the intervention.

**Outcome**

Due to the limited implementation of the proposed responses, it was not possible to measure any changes in the number or type of offences on ‘Mugger’s Mile’. Nevertheless, there were a number of encouraging outcomes associated with the project. For example, partnerships were cultivated that held promise for future interventions. These external partnerships included City Council staff and other members of the Alcohol Working Group. The partnerships led to information sharing between council staff and QPS officers and greater use of the council’s CCTV surveillance equipment. The latter facilitated directed patrolling to trouble spots, and eventually led to the detection and arrest of some offenders. Overall, good relationships were built between QPS staff and members of the community who expressed appreciation for police efforts.

**Lessons learned/challenges identified**

Although the Mugger’s Mile initiative did succeed in building some good relationships between police and other members of the community, there were numerous difficulties associated with the response. As mentioned above, there were repeated delays due to staff not being available. As well, it was the Strategic Analyst who analysed the problem, organised meetings between stakeholders (internal and external), liaised with the City Council and pushed to implement the proposed strategies. The detectives’ involvement was very limited. Indeed, the PSC meetings frequently had only one detective in attendance.

Most detectives, therefore, did not ‘own’ this problem, and were not generally involved in it, except during three shifts when detectives were tasked to detect and arrest offenders. Most of the POP approaches were conducted by the analyst, with the detectives continuing to apply their standard responses (detect and arrest after the fact).
Case study 2 — Property security at the beach

Description of the problem

The second case study details efforts to reduce the loss of personal property in and around Gold Coast beaches and car parks. Analysis of relevant crime data over a 12-month period conducted by the Strategic Analyst revealed that the Gold Coast District had the highest reported rate of steal-from-vehicle offences in Queensland, which seemed to be concentrated in a small number of hotspot areas (i.e. car parks and beaches).

Response

As a result of the problem analysis, a number of possible responses were identified:

- installation of lockers on beaches
- installation of signs to warn tourists of the problem and increase general awareness
- installation of signs rating the security level of car parks
- use of video surveillance
- targeting of recidivist offenders.

The installation of lockers on beaches had been reported as a successful deterrent to stealing when implemented on Sydney beaches. Therefore a meeting was arranged by the QPS with head lifeguards and a representative from a company that manufactured locks and lockers to discuss the feasibility of installing approximately 45 lockers near lifeguards’ towers between Main Beach and Coolangatta. The highly visible towers were considered to be an appropriate location for the lockers. The locker company was also confident it could supply vandal-proof lockers, providing the community could supply the resources to do so. The lifeguards were very interested and, following this meeting, the QPS wrote to the Chief Executive Officer of the Gold Coast City Council suggesting this strategy be explored further. However, the Gold Coast City Council was opposed to involving lifeguards in the venture (because of concerns about lifeguards having to supply keys) and the strategy did not proceed.

Meetings were also held with representatives of the NRMA (a New South Wales-based insurance company) regarding the implementation of a car-park security rating: some car parks in NSW are rated on a five-tier system regarding their level of security and this is indicated at the entrance to the car park. The NRMA representative reported that this system had been used for three years in NSW and that there had been notable crime reduction in the places where the system had operated. The NRMA was also interested in the possibility of a nationwide scheme. Although funding was requested for warning signs to be placed in car parks, the money was not forthcoming and this strategy failed to progress.

In collaboration with the BCIQ a list of recidivist offenders was also compiled and forwarded to the District Special Operations Group for their consideration. However, this initiative did not proceed any further.

Outcome

The achievements for this initiative were similar to those highlighted in the Mugger’s Mile case study. That is, on the basis of a good analysis of the problem, a number of strategies were proposed to target the problem in a variety of ways by dealing with the three aspects (i.e. person, event and place) of the crime. Partnerships were initiated with both internal members of the QPS and external community representatives. However, the project failed to progress.
Lessons learned/challenges identified

Again, the work was mostly initiated by the Strategic Analyst (e.g. meetings with external members were arranged and attended by the analyst), while most of the detectives continued with their standard reactive work. Community involvement and/or resources were also required to address the problem, but were never mobilised.

Case study 3 — Drink-spiking and sexual assault

Description of the problem

The third initiative aimed to reduce the incidence of drink-spiking and related rape complaints in nightclubs in and around the Gold Coast.

In the lead-up to the project a number of rapes had been reported to the Southport Sexual Assault Support Service (SSASS) involving women who alleged that they had been given drinks spiked with stupefying drugs. Analysis of the crime data for the preceding 12 months, however, indicated that official complaints to police about alcohol or drug-related sexual offences were extremely low compared to the number of complaints to the SSASS.

Response

The proposed responses to this problem included:

- police involvement in an Alcohol Working Group
- poster displays informing the public about drink-spiking and ‘date rape drugs’ in nightclubs and hotels
- training of front-line police and counter staff about the symptoms and effects of these drugs (such as amnesia)
- the importation and distribution of ‘swizzle sticks’ (devices that change colour if a drink has been adulterated) from the United Kingdom.

The analyst met with a representative of the SSASS, who expressed a willingness to share information to help determine the nature and extent of the drink-spiking and date-rape problem on the Gold Coast. The possibility of a joint training initiative was also discussed. The Strategic Analyst also had discussions with personnel from the Victoria Police who had been involved in presenting educational material for police officers and potential victims.

Outcome

Apart from the involvement of the analyst in the Alcohol Working Group, the other proposed responses did not occur. Further, the detectives were not involved in the proposed responses in any way.

Lessons learned/challenges identified

It was hoped that the drink-spiking/date-rape initiative would see police developing advertising material and exploring the possibility of trialling drink-testing devices, as well as developing partnerships with the Gold Coast City Council, SSASS, Queensland Health and licensed premises. Apparently, there was limited interest shown by these potential partners in working with police and, as a result, the initiative failed to proceed. However, the Strategic Analyst was of the view that this initiative could have progressed had the project been extended and more time allocated to the public relations exercises required.
Case Study 4 — Unlawful use of motor vehicles (Operation Astra)

Description of the problem

Operation Astra was designed to trial the effectiveness of a highly specialised team of police investigators who were focusing their efforts on reducing car theft (i.e. unlawful use of a motor vehicle — UUMV).

The rate of this crime is very high in the Gold Coast District. For example, in 2001–02, the district had the highest number of reported UUMV offences (3042) of any police district in Queensland. In fact, nearly one in five of all UUMVs in Queensland occurred on the Gold Coast during that period, yet the clear-up rate on the Gold Coast for this offence (17%) was less than the state average (23%).

During the course of the project the Strategic Analyst conducted a detailed analysis of the problem. The analysis indicated that the problem was complex, because of the different motivations for stealing cars. Some offenders steal for joyriding/transportation (this is the largest group of offenders) while others are professional thieves who steal to resell the vehicle or parts. The problem analysis stage also consisted of hotspot analyses, offender profiling and meetings/discussions with external agencies such as the NRMA.

Response

The response was designed to tackle the different types of offenders as well as a number of other pertinent variables that had been identified by the analyst, such as high-risk locations, times and vehicles. Both short-term crackdown responses (such as inspections of car yards) and long-term proactive responses (such as a joyriding prevention package) were initiated to comprehensively target the different aspects of UUMV. Table 3.1(next page) identifies the range of strategies proposed and implemented (some to varying degrees) to deal with the problem. However, it is important to note that some of the proposed initiatives had not yet been fully implemented when the official trial of the project ended.

Outcome

The work of the Astra team was impressive with regard to the analysis of the issue and the extent and variety of responses that were designed to target all aspects of the problem. The enthusiasm and dedication shown by the entire team was highly commendable. For example, the Astra team formed numerous, significant partnerships (both externally and internally) in order to analyse the problem in detail, to share information and intelligence and to implement a range of intervention strategies. These strategies consisted of short-term reactive responses as well as long-term preventive ones. The partnerships enabled a holistic and coordinated approach to addressing the stolen car problem. Indeed, the work that the Astra team was doing was of such quality that the NRMA offered to fully fund their initiatives, but the QPS did not take up the offer.

Moreover, when evaluated by more traditional measures, the operation was beginning to have a significant impact on car theft. For example, within a matter of months 16 people had been arrested on 89 charges, 44 notices to attend had been issued and 10 people were cautioned. In addition, police statistics indicated that the number of stolen cars reported in the Gold Coast District had declined by 8.5 per cent in the first seven months of 2002 compared to the same period in the previous year.

Importantly, the entire Astra team was highly motivated, enthusiastic and dedicated to the project, which was clearly demonstrated by the quality of their work. All personnel involved expressed considerable satisfaction with the operation and felt that they were genuinely making a difference. The detectives and other
officers were making considerable use of the analyst’s skills in providing and analysing information and intelligence, were engaging in partnerships with relevant stakeholders, and were thinking about and implementing a range of responses to the problem (not just incident-driven investigation), which could have had long-term preventive results. There appeared to be evidence of a changing understanding in the importance of long-term strategic plans to keep a problem under control. The main concern was that the team would be unable to continue the project, because of the limited timeframe of the project, just when they felt that they were making a difference.

Table 3.1: Operation Astra — operational strategies, actions and evaluation measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Timely investigative response</td>
<td>1.1 Where possible, respond to all incidents where car-theft suspects have been detained and interview regarding similar linked offences and co-offenders.</td>
<td>• No. of suspects spoken to regarding car-theft matters. • Intelligence gained from interviewing suspects. • Clear up of vehicle-theft offences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. High-risk offenders</td>
<td>2.1 Develop intelligence profiles of local offenders. 2.2 Conduct operations on high-risk offenders and recidivists. 2.3 Develop target proposals of major car re-identifiers and package for Crime Operations to investigate particularly interstate links.</td>
<td>• No. of profiles developed v. number of high-risk offenders/ recidivists managed. • No. of operations conducted on recidivist offenders. • No. of target proposals forwarded to Crime Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High-risk repairers and car yards</td>
<td>3.1 Inspect registers and vehicles at suspect wrecking yards involved in acquiring stolen parts or disposal of car identifiers. 3.2 Inspect registers and vehicles at suspect vehicle repairers for criminal offences or breaches.</td>
<td>• No. of high-risk wrecking yards inspected. • No. of high-risk vehicle repairers inspected. • No. of criminal offences or breaches detected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Vehicle auctions</td>
<td>4.1 Conduct weekly inspections of damaged vehicle auctions, paying particular attention to statutory write-offs. 4.2 Entering write-off vehicle particulars onto the Miscellaneous Vehicle Register.</td>
<td>• No. of damaged vehicles inspected at weekly auctions. • No. of write-off vehicle particulars entered onto the Miscellaneous Vehicle Register. • No. of subsequent location hits on the vehicle register.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Car carrier/tabletop tow-truck vehicle stops</td>
<td>5.1 Vehicle stops of car carriers and tabletop tow trucks carrying high-risk cars travelling in the Region.</td>
<td>• No. of stops conducted. • No. of stolen cars detected being transported. • No. of arrests/charges made during vehicle stops related to car theft. • No. of operations involving Department of Transport staff. • No. of training lectures in the recognition of re-identified vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hotspot targeting</td>
<td>6.1 Conduct intelligence-driven high-profile patrolling. 6.2 Conduct random breath testing in hotspot locations.</td>
<td>• No. of requests to saturate identified hotspots. • No. of arrests/charges made at hotspots. • No. of cars stolen/recovered from hotspots. • No. of car-theft-related arrests/charges detected at random breath tests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lessons learned/challenges identified

Despite the success of Operation Astra, numerous difficulties were encountered. The operation started with only one allocated detective available. Shortly after the beginning of the operation the supervising inspector resigned from the QPS and was replaced. At first, the POP approaches were mainly conducted by the Strategic Analyst. The detectives’ involvement in the analysis and assessment process was somewhat limited and they tended to concentrate more on offender-focused enforcement roles, even though this was in a more coordinated and targeted way than had customarily been their style.

After a fairly slow start in April 2002, the Astra team soon worked together very effectively, with the detectives increasingly appreciating the value of establishing strategies and partnerships. However, by August of the same year, the official 12-month trial of the project ended and the contract for the analyst expired. This was a considerable blow to the operation for a number of reasons. Firstly, the team could not operate as effectively without the dedicated analyst and his specialist skills. In addition, many of the longer-term proactive responses (such as the joyriding prevention education package, the car park security rating program, the installation of immobilisers and the introduction of CPTED at shopping centres), some of which been initiated by the analyst, were not yet implemented (and, indeed, some were still in the discussion stage). A number of Astra team members also expressed concern at the beginning of the operation that their managers’ commitment to this operation would last only a short time and that they would be pulled off the project. Follow-up focus groups indicated that this had happened. Even though a specialist team such as this cannot be expected to operate indefinitely, it was considered important by those interviewed that long-term strategies should have been put into place before the trial was terminated.
Summary of case studies

Table 3.2 gives a brief overview of the initiatives undertaken for the project, the planned response according to the SARA model, the outcomes of each initiative and the lessons learned.

In brief, the first three projects were not implemented well, despite an effective use of the first two stages of the SARA model by the Strategic Analyst. The process evaluation described below gives some insight into why this was so. Ultimately, Operation Astra was successful and it is likely that its achievements would have been even greater had the project not come to the end of its 12-month trial. Again, the evaluation that follows illustrates the differences between the first three and the final case study and provides some insights into the best way forward.

Table 3.2: Overview of the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INITIATIVE</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
<th>LESSONS LEARNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case study 1 — Mugger's Mile</td>
<td>Increased:</td>
<td>Limited implementation due to lack of staff.</td>
<td>Succeeded in building some strong relationships with agencies and community members. Detectives had limited involvement in the initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• police visibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• use of CCTV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• enforcement of liquor licensing legislation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• awareness of crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Limited implementation due to lack of staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>New partnerships formed, which led to greater information sharing.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Succeeded in building some strong relationships with agencies and community members. Detectives had limited involvement in the initiative.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Detectives had limited involvement in the initiative.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Detectives had limited involvement in the initiative.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 2 — Property security at the beach</td>
<td>Attempted to:</td>
<td>No response to letter seeking council support for lockers.</td>
<td>Majority of work undertaken by civilian analyst with limited involvement by detectives. Timeframe for the project was not long enough to operationalise offers of support for various initiatives by external agencies (e.g. car-park signage).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• install lockers at beach locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• erect warning sign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• establish car-park security rating system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• increase video surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• target recidivist offenders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Limited implementation due to lack of staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Funding sought for signage but no response received.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Some support from the NRMA regarding expansion of their car-park signage program to Queensland.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>List of recidivist offenders provided to the District Special Operations Group, but not known if any action taken.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 3 — Drink-spiking</td>
<td>Discussions held with Gold Coast agency stakeholders.</td>
<td>Some willingness expressed by external agencies to share information.</td>
<td>Initiative did not proceed due to limited interest of stakeholders to work in partnership with police and minimal involvement by detectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions with Victoria Police regarding their drink-spiking program.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Process evaluation

The process evaluation considers the extent to which the project was consistent with its original design. It also examines a range of issues associated with the level of support given to the project. This assessment provides important information about the project, both for the evaluator and the project administrators. For the evaluator, knowledge about some of the challenges faced by individuals involved in the project helps to interpret the effectiveness of the case studies that inform the impact evaluation. Program administrators may find the information useful for the design and implementation of future programs of a similar nature.

The process evaluation focused on three questions:

- Did the project conform to the original design?
- Was there sufficient organisational support for the project?
- Was the project adequately resourced?

A range of data was used to answer these questions. These included interviews with the Strategic Analyst and the former Detective in Charge of the Northern Investigative Group about the operation and implementation of the project, as well as reviews of various file notes, correspondence and meeting minutes.
Conformity with project design

Management of the project was the responsibility of the QPS South Eastern Region and the Gold Coast District. The day-to-day operation of the project was the responsibility of the PSC. The CMC was jointly responsible for the design of the project and for evaluating it at its conclusion. Additional support for the project was provided by the Gold Coast District’s Intelligence Officer and a steering committee comprising senior QPS and CMC management and research staff which met bimonthly.

Table 3.3 provides a chronology of the events occurring during the project. This chronology includes the case studies described in the previous section of this chapter (right-hand column) as well as a number of procedural matters occurring alongside their implementation.

Table 3.3: Chronology of the project: process and impact issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PROCESS ISSUES</th>
<th>IMPACT ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>• Preliminary discussion with QPS South Eastern Region to gauge their interest in hosting a project focusing on the introduction of POP to a specialist investigative area.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2001</td>
<td>• 12-month pilot project approved by the CMC.</td>
<td>• Environmental scan of Gold Coast undertaken by analyst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint QPS–CMC Steering Committee formed and first meeting held.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>• Position of civilian Strategic Analyst advertised.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2001</td>
<td>• Strategic Analyst appointed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>• Second Steering Committee meeting.</td>
<td>• Mugger’s Mile initiative designed but not fully implemented during Schoolies Week due to lack of detectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of detectives available noted.</td>
<td>• ‘Property security at the beach’ initiative commenced with letter sent to Gold Coast City Council regarding the installation of secure lockers in and around Gold Coast Beaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>• Detectives allocated to the project assigned to alternative/urgent crime problems (including a number of homicides).</td>
<td>• Survey of Surfers Paradise business establishments prepared but not proceeded with because initiative not implemented according to plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>• Detectives allocated to the project again re-assigned to other priorities.</td>
<td>• List of recidivist offenders forwarded to the District Special Operations Group for action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rescheduled Mugger’s Mile initiative for the Christmas—New Year period not implemented due to lack of staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Request for POP funding for the cost of warning signs to deter vehicle/property theft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>PROCESS ISSUES</td>
<td>IMPACT ISSUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>• Focus group held with detectives/intelligence analysts assigned to the</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Investigative Group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of training noted and immediate training recommended.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of detectives for the project again highlighted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>• New direction for the project proposed that involved the creation of a</td>
<td>• Discussions held with sexual assault and health workers to reduce ‘spiking of drinks and sexual assault’ in Gold Coast nightclubs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>specific team focusing their efforts on the problem of UUMV ‘car theft’ (Astra).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>• Operation Astra begins with one detective and three uniformed staff</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assigned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic Analyst physically relocated with Astra team to Runaway Bay Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Station.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>• Officer in Charge of the Northern Investigative Group and District Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>depart Region.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>• Commencement of intelligence-driven patrolling targeting UUMV.</td>
<td>• Astra team forms partnership with Department of Transport and State Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Astra team forms partnership with Department of Transport and State Crime</td>
<td>Operations Command auto theft unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations Command auto theft unit.</td>
<td>• Identification and arrest of recidivist offender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Discussions held with NRMA regarding sponsorship of car-park rating system.</td>
<td>• Development of joyriding prevention education training package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intelligence-driven operation aimed at auto wrecking commenced.</td>
<td>• Introduction of three-month trial of enhanced Scenes of Crime response to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of joyriding prevention education training package.</td>
<td>UUMV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaison with media to increase awareness of the problem of car theft.</td>
<td>• Liaison with media to increase awareness of the problem of car theft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>• Three additional detectives assigned to Astra.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td>• Focus group held with analyst and detectives/general duties officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assigned to Astra.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic Analyst’s contract of employment ends.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>• Follow-up focus group held with detectives assigned to Astra.</td>
<td>• Some Astra interventions still functioning but project largely concluded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, the project overall was slow to start, although several crime problems were promptly identified by the PSC for targeting by the Northern Investigative Group on the basis of the environmental scan undertaken by the Strategic Analyst (e.g. assaults, theft and rape). However, the detectives did not get involved to any great extent with any of these initiatives, which left the civilian Strategic Analyst to struggle on his own for most of the duration of the project, thereby achieving limited success. For example, in the case of the Mugger’s Mile initiative, it was the civilian analyst who analysed the problem, organised meetings between
stakeholders (internal and external), liaised with the council and pushed to implement the proposed strategies, while the detectives continued with their normal work routines and only contributed at the end of the project by providing their standard responses (i.e. detect and arrest after the fact).

While the work that the analyst was performing was of a very high quality, the main aim of the project, which was to get detectives to implement POP processes, was therefore not initially achieved. Some of the problems confronted in the project, particularly in the early stages, included:

- lack of knowledge about POP by police generally
- difficulties forming partnerships and setting up long-term preventive strategies
- concern by officers that POP work would not be genuinely rewarded or supported within the QPS.

During the final three months of the 12-month trial, the project took a different direction. Specifically, a specialised squad of detectives was formed in April 2002 and tasked to work with the Strategic Analyst to focus on the problem of car theft. This initiative, Operation Astra, was considered to be successful. The team operated with dedication and enthusiasm, analysed the different aspects of a large and complex problem, developed responses designed to address all aspects of the problem (including long-term proactive responses), and forged meaningful partnerships with other stakeholders. The detectives also increasingly emphasised the need for long-term preventive strategies.

Organisational support for the project

Managerial support

In May 1999, before implementing this project, the QPS launched its problem-oriented and partnership policing (POPP) program. The initiative was given strong support from the State Government through a specific budget allocation, which allowed for the establishment of a funding program and facilitated the production of training materials and the development of a marketing program. In addition to the government’s financial commitment to the program, the Commissioner of Police has also taken an active interest in the program. For example, POP is one of the operational issues now monitored through the Operational Performance Review (OPR) system and, as a result, all OPRs now require evidence of problem-solving initiatives conducted within the districts.

During the 12 months that the project was in operation, support at the regional level was consistently high. However, throughout 2001 and 2002 there was considerable staff turnover in the Gold Coast District, especially at senior and middle management levels. For example, during the course of the project the officer in charge of the Northern Investigative Group (a detective inspector), who was directly responsible for the project, was changed three times. As a result, the project lost both continuity and momentum. According to one of the world’s leading experts on the subject of implementing POP in an operational policing environment, this is not particularly surprising as leadership and adequate supervision are often the most problematic areas for POP implementation (Saville & Rossmo 1995).

The attitudes of operational police

Support for the project by operational police was mixed: some detectives were enthusiastic about their involvement in the trial while others were almost hostile to the notion of applying POP in an investigative environment. However, it seemed that the hostility or lack of support for the project may have been a result of the detectives’ lack of knowledge of POP. It was clear from the outset that many
of the detectives assigned to the Northern Investigative Group had very little understanding of POP. Those with some understanding tended to view POP as a discrete event, usually funded separately and not part of the standard police response. In fact, none of the detectives spoken to during the initial phases of the project felt that POP was intended to be used within their normal duties as investigators and many believed that they would not be able to apply a POP approach without blocks of dedicated time.

Some additional attitudes of the detectives towards the project, or towards POP more generally, included:

- **Lack of information regarding the project.** Detectives serving in the Northern Investigative Group generally felt that they had not been informed enough about the project and there appeared to be some resentment towards its implementation.

- **Belief that crime prevention efforts only displace crime.** Some detectives were of the opinion that crime prevention efforts only displace crime from one area to another and are unlikely to achieve a genuine decrease in crime overall. Therefore, they believed that detectives using a POP approach would, in the end, achieve very little.

- **External agencies work against the QPS.** Some detectives believed that some external agencies work against what they are trying to achieve, making it difficult to form useful partnerships with other stakeholders.

- **Isolation from uniform staff and local stations/knowledge.** Some detectives felt that the current structure of criminal investigation in the district did not facilitate a coordinated approach to problems. Some detectives felt that it might be more effective to be assigned to local stations and work in conjunction with uniformed officers and apply POP at the ‘street level’.

- **Inappropriate performance measures.** Some detectives believed that their performance was judged mainly in terms of arrests and other measures related to traditional policing responses. They therefore believed that if they spent a lot of time on POP, it would not help their careers. More specifically, they felt that POP work was not genuinely supported or rewarded within the QPS.

In contrast to the views of those who were skeptical of the project's ability to succeed, there were some who steadfastly believed that the application of POP in a detective environment would improve the investigative response to crime. However, in the main, this view was only expressed by the small number of highly committed detectives and uniformed staff directly involved with Operation Astra.

**Training**

The fact that the detectives assigned to the Northern Investigative Group seemed to have a poor understanding of POP can largely be attributed to a general lack of training for them in this area. This is not particularly surprising as very few of the detectives would have been taught about POP at the academy during their early years of training. Furthermore, the detective training program operational at the time placed little or no emphasis on training in POP. This problem was one of the key issues raised by the QPS’s own evaluation of the implementation of POP (QPS 2001a).

Although the project team identified an urgent need for the detectives involved in the project to receive training that covered the benefits of the approach and how the techniques of POP could be applied in an operational context — and this was identified in the project plan — such training was not provided to the detectives during the period that the project was in operation, largely due to other priorities.
and the limited perception of its importance. In designing future programs of this type, consideration should be given to providing officers with specific training to increase their knowledge about POP and their proficiency at putting it into practice.

Project resources

Staff availability
The implementation of the project was hampered by constant staff movement in and out of the project. In addition, the instability in terms of staffing and the nature and intensity of the detectives’ workload tended to vary tremendously depending on what was happening at the time. For instance, during the initial stages of the project, whenever a major crime occurred on the Gold Coast the detectives immediately had to disengage from their involvement in the project and deal with the new higher priority matter. In addition, if the incident was particularly serious, such as a homicide, the entire Northern Investigative Group might be tasked to work on the case leaving virtually no staff to work on the project. Although this is entirely understandable, it needs to be recognised that this instability had a negative effect on the project’s ability to make an appreciable difference. However, this problem is not unique to this project, as Mazerolle states in her paper ‘Policing in the 21st century: what works and what doesn’t’:

… the organisational structures of most police agencies are not POP friendly. The inflexibility of shift rotations, the high staff turnover on short-term assignments, and the institutional constraints that make it difficult for patrol officers to free themselves from being slaves to the emergency call system represent three organisational characteristics that impeded effective implementation of POP. (2001, p. 5)

When Operation Astra started in April 2002 only one detective and three uniformed officers were assigned on a full-time basis. With the apparent success of the operation a further three detectives were assigned in July 2002. However, the complement of 10 detectives initially promised to the project was never reached. Despite this, the success of Operation Astra demonstrated the importance of allowing a small group of officers the opportunity to focus exclusively on a particular policing problem without being constrained by other policing demands.

Location of the Strategic Analyst, the specialist team and the PSC
When the project was originally conceived it was thought that the entire project team would be located with detectives in the Northern Investigative Group. Unfortunately, due to space limitations this never occurred. At the start of the project, the Strategic Analyst was allocated a workspace in the Juvenile Aid Bureau, which is located in the regional headquarters building two floors above the Northern Investigative Group. As a result, the analyst found it very difficult to form close working relationships with the detectives assigned to the group.

This issue was partly addressed during Operation Astra when the detectives, some uniformed general duties officers and the civilian analyst were relocated to Runaway Bay Police Station so that they would be able to work more closely together. Although this was a good move, the fact remains that throughout the entire period of the project, the Strategic Analyst, specialist team and the PSC never operated within the environment it was expected to change (i.e. the Northern Investigative Group).

Project implementation summary
Although there was considerable senior managerial support for the project, there were a number of major challenges associated with its implementation. The main difficulties encountered, especially during the early phase of the project, related
to the constant movement of staff in and out of the project, an overall lack of knowledge and training in POP and difficulties in locating the Strategic Analyst with the detectives. However, towards the end of the trial some of these difficulties were overcome with the start of Operation Astra.

Operation Astra worked differently to the previous operations implemented for the project. Specifically, a specialised squad of detectives was formed and tasked to work with the Strategic Analyst to focus on a specific problem (car theft). The team operated with dedication and enthusiasm, analysed the different aspects of a large and complex problem, developed responses designed to address all aspects of the problem (including long-term proactive responses), and forged meaningful partnerships with other stakeholders. The detectives also increasingly emphasised long-term preventive strategies and continuing analysis of the problem and their responses to it.

The primary differences between Astra and the other POP operations undertaken for the project were these:

- Officers were specifically allocated to the project and were able to use their time to develop long-term strategies in a way that might not have been possible otherwise.
- Staff were selected on the basis that they were genuinely interested in working in a different (i.e. POP) way.
- Staff had supervisors who were committed to ensuring the success of this trial.
- Detectives, uniformed officers and the civilian analyst operated from the same room at the station and worked as a team.
- The civilian analyst provided timely analysis of data and intelligence and worked in close collaboration with the officers.

From another perspective it is also important to consider whether Operation Astra represented something fundamentally different from any previous police operations targeting stolen cars. The clear view of those involved in the project was that it did. The detectives and uniformed officers who worked on Operation Astra believed that the operation was all about learning how to apply the SARA process, not just implementing a response to a particular policing problem. In particular, participants involved in the team felt that Operation Astra gave them the chance to tailor specific responses aimed at reducing the problem, as well as assessing these responses to determine whether they were effective.

Impact evaluation

The CMC’s impact evaluation aimed to gauge the extent to which the project achieved its four stated objectives and to identify any unintended consequences, whereas the impact of the four case studies presented earlier in this chapter was assessed by the Strategic Analyst as the final stage of the SARA process. The data used for the CMC’s evaluation came primarily from project records and interviews with members of the project team.

Objective 1 — To improve the access to, and the quality and utility of, crime-related information to detectives at Gold Coast District’s Northern Investigative Group

This first objective was, in part, to be achieved by the creation of a problem-solving cell. The role of the PSC was to assist detectives by identifying patterns in the types of reported crime, offender movement, offender behaviour and other relevant crime location characteristics that would help detectives in their investigations.
In addition to the creation of the PSC, a civilian analyst was employed to identify and interpret key trends or patterns in crime data, develop target profiles relating to individuals of interest, and assist detectives with the design and implementation of various POP-based operations.

During the course of the project, the Strategic Analyst completed a comprehensive analysis of the Gold Coast District's crime environment. That report, which identified a range of environmental, social and demographic factors relevant to the district, was designed to increase detectives' understanding of some of the 'drivers' of crime, as well as providing sufficient scope to initiate a range of strategic responses to various crime problems. In addition to this report, the analyst produced a number of shorter reports and advices about various other crime problems.

Although it is difficult to determine whether the project, especially during the first phase, actually improved the utility of crime-related information, there is no doubt that the project succeeded in improving the access and quality of the information available to detectives at the Northern Investigative Group. In fact, the effort on the part of the Strategic Analyst to provide information of this type was one of the outstanding features of the project.

Objective 2 — To promote a greater understanding of problem-solving techniques amongst detectives at Gold Coast District's Northern Investigative Group

It was hoped that by establishing a well-resourced demonstration project that it would increase the level of understanding and use of POP among detectives in the Northern Investigative Group. However, in the end, this objective was not achieved. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the Strategic Analyst was not located with the detectives until very late in the project, which meant that the analyst often worked in isolation and never really had the opportunity to promote POP or demonstrate how it could be used. Secondly, training was not provided to detectives that covered the benefits of the approach and how the techniques of POP could be applied in an operational context. Thirdly, just as the team was learning to use problem-solving as part of Operation Astra, the project ended.

Objective 3 — To assess the extent to which detectives at Gold Coast District's Northern Investigative Group apply problem-solving techniques

During the first phase of the project, there was little evidence that the project had succeeded in encouraging even a small number of detectives assigned to the Northern Investigative Group to apply POP. In fact, one of the major criticisms of the project expressed by some of those interviewed for the evaluation was that the detectives didn't seem to be involved in the project at all. However, during the second phase of the project (Operation Astra) this problem was largely overcome, at least for a small number of detectives.

Operation Astra was almost a textbook example of how to use POP techniques in a small team environment. For example, the Operation Astra team:

- adopted a structured approach (the SARA model) to the problem
- relied heavily on the use of information and intelligence to drive policing activity
- focused on treating the causes, as well as the symptoms of car theft
- employed a broad range of strategies to address the problem, including prevention
- established productive partnerships with other agencies and individuals to address the problem.
The success of Operation Astra, in terms of demonstrating the effectiveness of using the techniques of POP, was a major achievement for the project. However, in accordance with the original project proposal it would have been preferable had this level of success been achieved in the larger team environment (i.e. the Northern Investigative Group).

Objective 4 — To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the pilot study

The fourth and final objective was to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the project in terms of:

- the way operational priorities were selected by detectives and how they responded to these new priorities
- how detectives felt about applying problem-solving techniques
- whether any immediate quantitative or qualitative effects of the initiatives implemented during the pilot program were detected
- the usefulness of the operations and techniques selected for the pilot program for future operations.

Owing to a number of factors, such as the inability of the analyst to be located with the Northern Investigative Group, high staff turnover and a lack of knowledge among detectives about POP, very little headway was made during the first six months of the project. In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that the project had any impact at all in changing the way that operational priorities were selected or responded to by the detectives assigned to the group. However, after the decision was made to modify the project and establish Operation Astra, the project began to have an immediate impact. In particular, Operation Astra established that, given the right environment, an enthusiastic team can use information, intelligence and partnerships to develop long-term solutions to a problem, such as car theft, that may not have been possible otherwise.

However, only modest achievements were attained for the short-, medium- and long-term goals of the project. Longer-term goals could not occur because of the limited nature of the trial project and the loss of the Strategic Analyst, who had carried the bulk of the responsibility for the project (see Table 3.4, next page).
Table 3.4: Project achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>GOAL</th>
<th>ACHIEVEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>Detectives at Surfers Paradise routinely using POP techniques.</td>
<td>Only a few detectives were using POP techniques by the end of the project and these were limited to the Operation Astra team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retention of project strategies such as the Strategic Analyst and the PSC to provide timely advice to detectives as required.</td>
<td>The Strategic Analyst’s position was not renewed at the end of the project and the PSC was disbanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium term</td>
<td>Ongoing application of creative proactive strategies to address crime and disorder and community problems in the area (including widespread use of the SARA model).</td>
<td>Although some favourable external partnerships were formed during the project, the loss of the Strategic Analyst who had been primarily responsible for the formation of those relationships meant that, by and large, those relationships were not continued.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ongoing partnerships formed with community agencies and other government departments to address community problems as they arise.</td>
<td>Reduction in crime reports relevant to the POP initiatives undertaken. The Strategic Analyst reported some minor decreases in crimes in and around Mugger's Mile, but it is unlikely that these were due to the initiative, given its limited implementation. Operation Astra also resulted in a number of arrests, but whether this had any long-term effects was not measured, again, because the Strategic Analyst left at the end of his tenure.</td>
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<td>Long term</td>
<td>Reorientation of how detectives approach their work to include a significant proportion of time spent on proactive initiatives to reduce crime.</td>
<td>Follow-up interviews with the Operation Astra detectives indicated a strong desire to continue with the POP approach.</td>
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<td>Fall in crime trends in the area.</td>
<td>Given the limited implementation of the individual projects (except for Operation Astra) positive changes, even if they occurred, would be difficult to link to the project.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enhanced police–community relations.</td>
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Essentially, four operational activities were implemented by the project team during the 12 months of the trial. While the first three operations languished somewhat, failing to achieve full implementation, the last operation (Astra) appeared to be on the right track. The process and impact evaluations described in this chapter provide some insight into why this occurred.

In the long term, the overall effects or outcomes of any kind of program or intervention cannot be measured until it is clear that a program has been implemented properly. The process evaluation examined how the project worked, focusing both on the factors that facilitated the implementation and operation of the project and on any difficulties encountered. The evaluation clearly indicated a number of major challenges associated with the implementation of the project, especially during its early stages. Briefly, these were high staff turnover, lack of adequate training and the location of the PSC.

When the project was originally conceived it was envisaged that the entire project team would be located in the Northern Investigative Group. Unfortunately, due to space limitations this never occurred. As a result, the project’s Strategic Analyst found it very difficult to form close working relationships with the detectives assigned to the group.

This issue was partly addressed during Operation Astra. However, the fact remains that throughout the entire period of the project, the Strategic Analyst, specialist team and the PSC never had the opportunity to operate within the environment it was expected to change.

Despite the many difficulties encountered in implementing the project as it was originally designed, an organisation such as the QPS that makes an attempt to create opportunities for POP projects is significantly more advanced than a department that does nothing at all (Goldstein 1990). It is also important to note that there were, in effect, two phases to the implementation of the project. The first phase involved an attempt to directly involve the detectives in the day-to-day running of the project, which unfortunately did not occur.

The second phase involved the creation of a specialist team of detectives, uniformed police and the analyst. Although the formation of a small specialist team represented a major change in the focus of the project, there is clear evidence that this approach was quite successful in dealing with the problem of car theft on the Gold Coast.
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from the demonstration POP project undertaken by detectives on the Gold Coast described in this report. This chapter explores the lessons learned and illustrates potential avenues worthy of further exploration.

What can we learn from the project?

The utility of specialist POP teams

It may be that the dedicated team model that ultimately worked for this project could be used to target substantial problems again. However, the difference between such teams and the more commonly employed taskforces would need to be the emphasis that the team places on applying the POP process (i.e. the SARA model). As highlighted by this evaluation, the most successful approach trialled during the project involved the creation of a small team committed to analysing the problem and employing a range of both reactive and proactive strategies to provide a long-term solution. The team model template was effective and could readily be applied to other crime problems.

In the focus groups held early in the project, some detectives expressed their view that permanent specialist squads would be the best way to handle major problems. However, as Rossmo and Fisher (1993) point out, such squads can breed elitism, isolation and even corruption. Since the exposure of significant levels of corruption in Queensland by the Fitzgerald Inquiry of 1987–89, the QPS has actively worked against the formation of specialist squads to a large degree. This project, however, has clearly indicated that it may be possible to successfully target a major policing problem by establishing a small dedicated POP team on a short-term basis.

Ideally, the time limit given to these proposed POP teams should not be arbitrary. Indeed, the teams should be advised from the beginning that they will exist for a limited time only, and that time will be measured in accordance with the achievement of measurable goals and aims determined early in the process. In addition, the main goal of these teams should not simply be to react to a problem as it arises but, rather, to develop long-term solutions to a problem that could be monitored and maintained after the team is disbanded. After all, if long-term preventive strategies are not implemented then the problem is likely to return to its previous level after the conclusion of the crackdown.

There is no doubt that a complete service-wide implementation of POP is an important goal for the QPS. However, this may be difficult to achieve in the short term. The creation of specialist, time-limited POP teams may provide the QPS with a useful in-between step that could speed up the process of the adoption of POP.

The importance of POP training

One of the main findings of the process evaluation was that a lack of knowledge about POP among the detectives assigned to the Northern Investigative Group had been a major constraint on the implementation of the project, especially with
regard to attitudes towards an innovative approach to work. It seems likely that this could have been avoided if adequate training in the theory and processes of POP had been made available to them.

Ultimately, POP needs to be a philosophy that is infused through all aspects of the Queensland Police Service. Therefore, all officers, including detectives, need to be trained in the benefits and processes of POP. Ideally this training should be incorporated into all aspects of police training, not just limited to a once-off two-hour training package or lecture. This is largely because a short training course is unlikely to have a significant effect if the rest of the officers’ culture and experience is based on reactive law-enforcement responses. In the QPS review of POP (2001), the view of constables and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) was overwhelmingly that little or no POP training had been available, and that what was there was ineffective. Similarly, district officers stated that a lack of understanding of POP among staff was a crucial impediment to the successful implementation of POP (QPS 2002). More training may overcome this obstacle.

Future training in this area should not only explain what POP is and how to do it, but also dispel some of the currently held policing myths (e.g. the impact of random patrols on crime). The benefits of CPTED and other situational deterrents to crime could also be explained. For example, some detectives involved in the focus groups conducted for this evaluation believed that there was no point in engaging in preventive strategies as they thought this only had the effect of displacing crime, not reducing it. If officers do not believe that other alternatives are effective at making a genuine difference to crime levels and they still believe that traditional responses are effective, then they will not be inclined to try other strategies or approaches. Therefore, challenging beliefs about what is effective may be a fundamental step towards changing current thinking about POP.

Encouraging behaviour change

Clearly, POP requires behaviour change at both individual and organisational level. The application of the theoretical underpinnings of individual and organisational behaviour change to the issues raised by the project is illuminating. For the sake of brevity, two theories — the Transtheoretical Model of Change (stages of change) by Prochaska and DiClemente (1992) and Diffusion Theory by Rogers (1995) — are discussed as particularly pertinent. Both models have become widespread in promoting behavioural change in recent years, not only among individuals but also among organisations.

The stages of change model is basically an integrative model of intentional behaviour change that was developed from a number of psychological theories and applied to a wide variety of issues and problems, such as addictions (drug/alcohol abuse, smoking), healthy lifestyle change (exercise, weight control, sunscreen use, stress management), professional practice and organisational change. According to the theory, change is a process that takes place over time and involves progression through six stages:

1. **Pre-contemplation** — where there is no intention to take action in the foreseeable future.
2. **Contemplation** — where there is intention to change behaviour in the next six months; individuals or organisations are still considering the balance between the pros and cons and the costs/benefits etc.
3. **Preparation** — where there is the intention to take action in the immediate future.
4. **Action** — where specific overt modifications to behaviour occur.
5. **Maintenance** — where sustained behaviour occurs over time.
6. **Relapse** — where a few regress (considered a normal part of change).
The theory also recognises that transition through these stages can be affected by a series of external variables such as the way people think (e.g. fear of failure or inspiration to succeed) and behave (e.g. the use of rewards) and other intervening variables such as decisional balance (where we weigh the pros and cons of a situation) and self-efficacy (which is our confidence in the ability to change). The theory also recognises that the time of transition can be a period of considerable chaos and confusion.

The diffusion of an innovation (a new way of doing things) is also a process that is considered to occur over time. As with the stages of change model, Rogers believes that the diffusion of a new innovation has five distinct phases:

1. knowledge of the innovation
2. forming an attitude towards the innovation
3. deciding to adopt/reject the innovation
4. implementation of the new idea (this involves overt behaviour)
5. confirmation of this decision (institutionalisation).

The theory recognises that there are also individual differences in the adoption of an innovation and that, on average, few members of a population adopt an innovation quickly.

There are also a number of factors associated with an innovation that may affect its acceptance and diffusion. According to diffusion theory, these include its compatibility (when innovations are consistent with the economic, sociocultural and philosophical value system of the adopter, adoption is more likely to take place), its flexibility, reversibility, relative advantage (compared to the existing alternatives, for example), its complexity and cost-efficiency. It has been argued that innovations that involve higher risks are also less likely to be adopted.

The theory also points to a number of potential system failure points, including:

• the failure of the innovation itself (this might happen if the innovation has been poorly designed or inadequately evaluated)
• a failure in communication (failure at this stage normally means that the user was either unaware of the innovation or was improperly informed about its availability or its applicability)
• adoption failure (even if the innovation is efficacious and properly communicated it may not be adopted because of a host of factors ranging from differing value and belief systems to a lack of necessary resources)
• implementation failure (the innovation may not be implemented properly or even at all)
• maintenance failure, where even though an efficacious program may be successfully communicated, adopted and initially implemented, it can lose its momentum and dissipate rapidly.

From this perspective, the detective POP trial on the Gold Coast clearly illustrated some failures — communication efforts should have been increased to enhance the likelihood of the adoption of the planned innovations, clearly some of the responses were not fully implemented as planned (perhaps because of a failure to move those involved through to the action stage), and, overall, none of the operations reached the maintenance stage.

Diffusion theory also argues for the role of a change agent or innovation champion. The champion is generally someone who is charismatic and can throw his or her weight behind the innovation (Howell & Higgins 1990). However, the champions of the project — the OIC of the Northern Investigative Group — changed three
times during the 12-month trial, making momentum difficult to achieve. Further, the policing environment of the Gold Coast at that time was dynamic with numerous staff changes and a spate of serious offences, such as homicides, which drew their attention elsewhere. Also, the leaders may not have been fully prepared nor resourced to facilitate change adequately, especially given the pressures of other perceived priorities by their superiors.

One really can’t discuss organisational change without considering the concept of resistance and this was a particularly pertinent barrier to the implementation of this POP project with detectives. Research indicates that the main obstacle to successful change is employee resistance at all levels: front-line staff, middle managers and senior managers. The top reasons for employee resistance are a lack of awareness about the change, comfort with the ways things are, and fear of the unknown. Middle managers, in particular, resist change because of fear of losing control and overload of current tasks and responsibilities (BPR Online Learning Centre 2005). All too often resistance is due to an unplanned conflict between leaders who are prepared to take action and employees who have not been prepared (Prochaska, Prochaska & Levesque 2001).

A more promising approach to implementing initiatives such as problem-oriented policing is where leaders scientifically and sensitively assess the stages of change in individual employees and then match planned interventions to those stages. A predictable consequence is greater participation, less resistance and more progress (or change) towards the desired goal. Operation Astra, which finally got under way nine months after the project was initiated, was far more effective than its predecessors because it employed the services of enthusiastic POP action-oriented officers. Earlier attempts to encourage members of the Northern Investigative Group who were, at that stage, untrained in POP and unenthusiastic about changing their way of doing things, were far less successful.

It is also clear that the QPS as an organisation was in the action stage: when this project was initiated the Policing Strategies Steering Committee had been established to oversee the implementation of POP throughout the organisation, funding was available to support POP projects, the organisation had published a guide to implementing POP, along with a marketing strategy, and had initiated several reviews of its progress. According to the Deloitte and Touche Consulting Group (1996), however, less than 20 per cent of employees in an organisation are prepared to take action at any one time. A common mistake made by leaders, therefore, is to think that because they are now ready to take action, they can impose initiatives on employees who are not prepared. Keep in mind that leaders can spend considerable time and effort progressing through the early stages of change — they take the time to debate the pros and cons, read materials, talk to consultants and so on and by that stage have progressed themselves to the preparation stage and are ready to take action and proceed as if everyone else in the organisation has participated in such preparation (Prochaska, Prochaska & Levesque 2001). Leaders are often surprised by how much resistance to change is created when they try to impose action plans; worse, when employees find themselves in action-oriented programs for which they are not adequately prepared, they frequently drop out. Change is stressful enough even when we are adequately prepared for its demands, but action imposed on people who are not adequately prepared can become intolerable (Prochaska, Prochaska & Levesque, 2001, p. 258).

Clearly the Strategic Analyst was in the action stage while, as discussed previously, most of the detectives were in the pre-contemplation stage as few had been exposed to the concept of POP. However, by the end of the project it was clear that the perceived pros had increased about the project and the stage had changed for
some of the detectives when Operation Astra was under way. The Strategic Analyst even noted at that time that:

Operation Astra detectives have embraced the POP philosophy and are constantly bouncing around novel ideas concerning theft reduction strategies and partnership possibilities. Their input and participation in problem-solving is ongoing and in a dynamic stage.

So, one might conclude that there appears to have been a mismatch of stages between the detectives, the managers (the OIC) and the civilian analyst for the implementation of the project. Any further efforts to implement POP may therefore benefit from consideration of these theories of individual and organisational change management. For example, employees in the pre-contemplation stage can be encouraged to move on to the next stage by using strategies such as policy change, increased awareness of the pros and cons of an innovation, training, and offers of help. Similarly, attempts to motivate and increase confidence, the use of a cost–benefit analysis, brainstorming and expanded training may encourage individuals to move from contemplation to the preparation stage. Helping employees in the preparation stage to set realistic goals and providing materials and support will encourage them to move on to the action stage, and so on.

It is also important to keep in mind that getting a new idea adopted, even when it has obvious advantages, is often very difficult. Many innovations require a lengthy period, often many years, from the time they become available to the time they are widely adopted (Rogers 1995). The 12 months allocated to the trial may have been insufficient to develop the skills and enthusiasm necessary to undertake a ‘new way of doing things’ (an innovation) in a population of employees previously uninitiated to the concept of POP. Goldstein notes that change in an organisation requires time and that the speed of change is most dependent on officer attitudes:

... if forces are to adopt POP successfully, then several preconditions need to be met … the change process required to implement POP fully will not be achieved in weeks or months, but will require years. (UK Police Research Series)

The nature of POP supervision

One of the things identified in this project as impeding the success of POP was the loss of continuity and momentum caused by changes in line supervision. Consistent with other POP studies, the supervisor can ‘make or break’ the implementation of POP (Saville & Rossmo 1995). Similarly, the QPS (2001a) evaluation found that shift supervisors are the most influential and can be an impediment to POP if they are not interested in the process.

Although staff turnover in any organisation is inevitable, it needs to be recognised that during demonstration projects stability is an important ingredient of successful project implementation. Therefore, if the suggestion to create and deploy specialist POP teams is taken up by the QPS, one way of ensuring that the team has stable and knowledgeable leadership might be to create a pool of specially trained officers whose task would be to operationally supervise POP activity. In effect, the team could comprise local staff but would be led by a supervisor who was knowledgeable about POP and committed to ‘managing’ the proper implementation of POP activity for the duration of the team’s mission. Teams structured in this way would not have to be led by a supervisor with local or specialist knowledge about each issue (e.g. UUMV) as the local team members would possess that knowledge and this would help to minimise any resentment at having an ‘outsider’ tackle the problem. Another advantage to this method is that the areas where the operations are conducted will become ‘colonised’ by the POP
philosophy and process, thus transferring knowledge and skills to local officers to carry on in a way that does not appear to be happening at the moment.

The wisdom of discrete projects

While individual POP projects, such as those provided as an example in the QPS's *Problem-oriented and partnership policing: resource book* (2001b), show much promise, the challenge for the QPS remains to roll POP out organisation-wide so that it becomes a way of approaching each working day, not just a process to be embedded in discrete projects. This has not yet been achieved, although each project is a step in this direction.

Discrete projects that are terminated after a certain amount of time, such as the project described in this report, can be demoralising for all involved, irrespective of what was achieved. Although it may be difficult for the QPS to manage this transition, it is critical to the long-term success of POP that its implementation progress beyond that of a series of specially funded discrete projects. As this project clearly demonstrates, even with a very small POP team over a short period of time, it is possible to achieve some remarkable outcomes (e.g. 16 arrests, 89 criminal charges, 44 notices to attend, 10 persons cautioned), as well as team cohesion and internal and external partnerships, which tends to suggest that POP can be both effective and viable over the long term in specialist investigative environments.

Concluding remarks

The demonstration project described in this report has illustrated that, in the case of Operation Astra, detectives were willing to undertake an effective problem-oriented approach to their work, providing they have the resources, skill and expertise, managerial and organisational support, and ‘will’ to do it.

It is important to note that the contribution made by the civilian analyst cannot be underestimated. In fact, many of the successes recorded are due in large part to the work of that analyst. As a result, there may be merit in considering whether there is greater scope for integrating this role into policing on a larger scale.

Although significant barriers remain for the full acceptance and use of this innovative approach to investigative work, there are a number of lessons to be learned from this project that may enhance the QPS’s capacity to progress the use of POP by detectives in the future. Explicit exposure to POP training, supportive and educative supervision, the use of specialist teams to target specific crime or disorder problems and the application of theoretical approaches to behaviour and organisational change, are important tools that are likely to increase the useful implementation of POP in the investigative environment by the QPS.
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