


Perceptions of
**misconduct in Queensland
correctional institutions**

A survey of custodial officers

CRIME AND
MISCONDUCT
COMMISSION



QUEENSLAND

June 2009

CMC vision:

To be a powerful agent for protecting Queenslanders from major crime and promoting a trustworthy public sector.

CMC mission:

To combat crime and improve public sector integrity.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANOVA	analysis of variance
ARC	Australian Research Council
CCO	custodial correctional officer
CJC	Criminal Justice Commission
CMC	Crime and Misconduct Commission
CSIU	Corrective Services Investigation Unit (of Queensland Corrective Services)
DCS	Department of Corrective Services
ESB	Ethical Standards Branch (of Queensland Corrective Services)
GM	General Manager
IAU	Internal Audit Unit (of Queensland Corrective Services)
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
IT	information technology
KCELJG	Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance (Griffith University)
MANOVA	multivariate analysis of variance
PIN	Proactive Intelligence Network
QCS	Queensland Corrective Services
QPS	Queensland Police Service
QCSIG	Queensland Corrective Services Intelligence Group
SCO	senior correctional officer
SPIRT	Strategic Partnerships with Industry — Research and Training

SUMMARY

Background to the research

In 2000, the Criminal Justice Commission¹ and researchers from the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance (KCELJG) at Griffith University were awarded an Australian Research Council (ARC) Strategic Partnerships with Industry — Research and Training (SPIRT) grant to examine official misconduct in Queensland correctional institutions. In this report, we present the results of this collaborative research project.

An initial survey of custodial correctional officers (CCOs) in 2001 allowed us to establish a baseline measure of the perceptions held by CCOs of the extent of misconduct and its causes, as well as the work environment of prisons. Using this baseline measure it was envisioned that future comparisons would be made to give some indication of changes in the culture and practices of Queensland correctional institutions over time.

The 2001 survey was completed by 245 CCOs, representing 17.8 per cent of all officers, from 13 correctional centres — Arthur Gorrie, Borallon, Brisbane Women's, Darling Downs, Lotus Glen, Moreton B, Numinbah, Palen Creek, Rockhampton, Sir David Longland, Townsville, Wolston and Woodford.

In 2007, the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) and Griffith University replicated the survey to assess any changes in the perceptions of officers between 2001 and 2007. The second survey was administered to CCOs at 10 correctional centres — Arthur Gorrie, Borallon, Brisbane Women's, Darling Downs, Lotus Glen, Numinbah, Palen Creek, Townsville, Wolston and Woodford.² Mail-return surveys were also distributed to Maryborough and Capricornia. The 413 respondents represented 25.7 per cent of all officers.

In both the 2001 and the 2007 surveys, we asked CCOs questions about:

- the perceived frequency of misconduct
- the seriousness of particular instances of misconduct, including the likelihood of apprehension and what action should be taken
- the relevance of training offered by the agency
- the working environment
- general perceptions of management
- general attitudes towards misconduct
- job satisfaction.

Analysing the responses to these questions allows us to determine (a) the views of CCOs about misconduct in Queensland correctional facilities at two different points in time and (b) whether there have been any changes in these views in the intervening time. It also enables us to determine whether the workplace environment contributes to these perceptions and whether any changes are needed to address misconduct in Queensland's correctional environment.

1 Note that on 1 January 2002 the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and the Queensland Crime Commission (QCC) merged to form the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) under the *Crime and Misconduct Act 2001*.

2 Three correctional centres surveyed in 2001 were no longer operating in 2007 — Moreton B, Rockhampton and Sir David Longland (re-opened as the Brisbane Correctional Centre in 2008).

The purpose of this report is to present the research findings and to provide a useful tool for Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) to assess and evaluate the success of its training and development and ethical awareness programs. The report also highlights areas which may require more attention.

Key findings

Overall, the results suggest that there have been some positive changes since the 2001 survey. For example, the 2007 results showed that custodial officers considered that most types of misconduct occurred less frequently. They also believed that misconduct was more likely to be detected. However, there was a significant increase in the willingness of officers to justify occasions of misconduct.

The results also highlighted a number of areas for improvement. For example, officers were concerned about their harsh working environment and the general public's lack of understanding about the role of CCOs. Officers believed that promotional decisions are often made on the basis of favouritism. There were also some enduring issues between management and officers, including a perceived lack of protection from management for officers who report suspected misconduct, as well as officers' dissatisfaction with the recognition and rewards they receive from senior staff and management for good job performance.

The results from both surveys are discussed in more detail below.

Frequency of misconduct

Officers were asked to rate how frequently 30 different types of misconduct occur in their centre. Generally, misconduct was reported to occur 'rarely'. In both 2001 and 2007, officers perceived that the most frequently occurring types of misconduct were *favouritism by senior staff or management* and *staff not following security procedures*, both of which were reported to occur, on average, 'sometimes'. Importantly, there were statistically significant decreases in officers' perceptions of the frequency of misconduct between the 2001 and 2007 surveys for 24 of the 30 types of misconduct.

Respondent gender, age or length of service with QCS had no impact on how they perceived the frequency of misconduct. However, respondents in 2007 who had completed training on *fraud and corruption* were significantly less likely to perceive that seven of the 30 types of misconduct occurred 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time', which may mean that they were better informed about what actually constitutes misconduct.

Direct evidence of misconduct

In 2007, we examined whether or not officers believed they had direct evidence of misconduct occurring in their centres. Between 6 and 65 per cent of respondents believed that they had direct evidence of misconduct (the proportions varying by the types of misconduct described). The types of misconduct that most officers believed they had most direct evidence for were *favouritism by senior staff or management* and *staff not following security procedures*.

There was also a relationship between believed direct evidence of misconduct and perceptions of the frequency of misconduct, suggesting that officers are more likely to perceive misconduct when they believe they have direct evidence of it happening at their centre.

Seriousness of misconduct

CCOs were asked to rate the seriousness of 15 misconduct scenarios. These scenarios covered various types of misconduct and breaches of the agency's code of conduct, including harassment, favouritism, working under the influence of drugs or alcohol, profiting from prison industries and using the agency's resources. Generally, officers rated the misconduct presented in the scenarios as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'. On average, officers rated scenarios involving *an officer supplying drugs to a number of offenders* and *the sexual relationship between a psychologist and an offender* as the most serious. The scenarios involving

an officer striking an offender and a nurse providing non-prescribed medication to a stressed staff member were rated as the least serious scenarios.

There were significant differences in officers' perceptions of seriousness between the 2001 and 2007 surveys for three of the 15 scenarios. Officers rated the scenario involving *unmonitored phone calls* as more serious in 2007, while the scenarios involving *working under the influence of drugs or alcohol* and *refusing to supply an offender with a blue letter* were considered less serious in 2007 than in 2001.

There was no impact of any demographic factors (respondent gender, age or length of service with QCS) on the perceptions of seriousness of the misconduct scenarios. Those respondents in 2007 who reported having received training on *changing workplace culture* tended to consider two of the 15 scenarios as significantly more serious than those who had not received this training.

Likelihood of apprehension

For each of the 15 misconduct scenarios, officers rated how likely it would be that staff involved in the types of misconduct portrayed in the scenarios would be caught. Generally, officers' perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension were divided. Importantly, however, officers rated the likelihood of apprehension significantly higher in 2007 than in 2001 for nine of the 15 scenarios, suggesting that in 2007 officers believed misconduct was more likely to be detected than officers did in 2001. The results also revealed a positive relationship between officers' ratings of the likelihood of being apprehended and officers' perceptions of seriousness, suggesting that officers believed more serious types of misconduct would be detected more often than less serious types of misconduct. Demographic characteristics of respondents did not influence perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension.

Reporting misconduct

In both surveys it was found that most officers would take action if they became aware of the instances of misconduct described in the scenarios. In both 2001 and 2007, the most frequently reported action that officers would take was to raise the matter informally with a senior correctional officer (SCO). In 2007, there was a trend towards more formal reporting, with more officers willing to report misconduct to QCS or the CMC. Respondents in 2007 who had received training on *reporting misconduct* were significantly more likely to report that they would take some action than those who had not received this training.

In 2007, we also examined how willing officers were to continue to take action to resolve suspected misconduct if necessary. There was a common pattern in the type of action officers were willing to take for most of the scenarios. Most commonly, officers reported that they would first raise the issue directly with the officer involved. If this did not resolve the issue, officers were then likely to raise the matter informally with an SCO. Reporting the matter to the General Manager (GM) was the next most common course of action, followed by reporting to QCS. Reporting the issue to the CMC was generally considered a final course of action if the matter could not be resolved by other means.

A number of factors were found to influence how willing officers were to take additional action to continue to report instances of suspected misconduct. For 12 of the 15 scenarios, officers who had been employed with QCS longer were less likely to take additional action if necessary. On the other hand, officers were more willing to take additional action for most scenarios when they considered the misconduct to be at the more serious end of the scale, and when they believed that management would deal with reported misconduct appropriately.

Training

In both surveys, the majority of respondents had received some training in ethical behaviour (e.g. the agency's *code of conduct* training). In 2007, the training that officers considered to be the most relevant to their role in the correctional centre was training in *dealing with difficult*

prisoners. CCOs considered that training in the agency's *absenteeism policy* was the least relevant type of training. As has been noted, some training (but not all) appears to have had a significant effect on the perceptions of staff, and the actions they may take against misconduct.

Justifications for misconduct

Officers were asked to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements designed to identify the factors that may allow officers to excuse or 'justify' misconduct. The results showed that there was a significant increase between 2001 and 2007 in the willingness of officers to justify occasions of misconduct. Our analyses showed that the 'tone at the top' seemed to influence staff attitudes, with officers most likely to use the behaviour of managers as an excuse or justification for misconduct. Male officers were also significantly more likely to justify misconduct than female officers.

Management and misconduct

Overall, officers were fairly divided in their perceptions of how management deals with misconduct. Officers tended to agree that *QCS takes a very tough line on improper behaviour by CCOs*. However, the results from the 2007 survey highlighted some concerns about the ramifications for officers if they report misconduct, including negative consequences from workmates and management, and concerns about how serious management is about protecting those who report wrongdoing. There was no significant effect of respondents' demographic characteristics on these perceptions.

Officers' perceptions of senior staff and management

Few officers agreed that *senior staff and management are easy to talk to, set a good example for staff or recognise and reward proper behaviour*, or that *management is accessible and available* when needed. More positively, however, there were significant improvements between 2001 and 2007 for three of these four factors. There were no significant effects of respondent gender, age or length of service on perceptions of senior staff and management.

The general work environment

Overall, officers were fairly divided or negative in their perceptions of the general work environment. For example, the majority of officers 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that *the general public misunderstands my job as a CCO*, while less than a quarter agreed that *typical officers feel a great deal of loyalty to the service*. There was only one significant change between the 2001 and 2007 surveys — there was a significant increase in officers' average agreement that *as an officer, you feel safe and comfortable in all parts of your working environment*. There were no significant effects of respondent gender, age or length of service on perceptions of the general work environment.

Job satisfaction

Generally, the CCOs were dissatisfied with various aspects of their job. They reported the lowest levels of satisfaction with the pay, advancement opportunities and praise aspects of their job. They were most satisfied with *the way co-workers get along with each other*, and satisfaction with this aspect of the job significantly increased between 2001 and 2007. Respondents' demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age or length of service) had no impact on job satisfaction.

Recommendations and suggestions for improvement

Our research identified several issues that appear to directly impact on the prevalence of misconduct in correctional institutions. In turn, we have made several recommendations and suggestions aimed at addressing these issues and reducing official misconduct.

Favouritism

CCOs reported being concerned about perceptions of favouritism by senior staff and managers, particularly in relation to promotion decisions. Favouritism was also reported to be the most frequently occurring type of misconduct, and although officers considered it one of the most serious types of misconduct, officers believed that it is unlikely to be detected. The responses by CCOs to open-ended questions in the surveys tended to suggest a belief that managers make promotional decisions based on friendships and an 'old boys network', rather than merit. It is important, then, to address these perceptions of unfairness and bias in selection decisions.

Recommendation 1:

That Queensland Corrective Services, in consultation with custodial correctional officers, review its recruitment and selection policies for both internal and external candidates, with specific attention to assessing and, if necessary, addressing the following issues:

- **Do the recruitment and selection policies and procedures cover conflicts of interest?**
- **Are unsuccessful candidates provided with adequate feedback on selection decisions?**
- **Is the selection process sufficiently transparent?**

Attitudes towards misconduct

The survey results also suggest that officers may not take misconduct as seriously as they should. Given that officers reported being more willing to take action in response to suspected misconduct when they considered the misconduct as serious, it may be worthwhile ensuring that all officers are aware of the seriousness and potential implications of all types of misconduct. Our results demonstrate some positive effects of training on these perceptions.

Recommendation 2:

That Queensland Corrective Services systematically provide all staff, including management, with integrity and ethical training that recognises the seriousness of official misconduct in all circumstances. This training should be compulsory, repeated at regular intervals, and continuously evaluated and updated.

Willingness to report misconduct

There was also some evidence to suggest that officers may be reluctant to report misconduct, given their perceptions of how management deals with misconduct. We found that officers do not believe that management is careful about detecting misconduct, or that management encourages them to report concerns about misconduct. Officers also reported some concerns about the consequences of reporting misconduct from both colleagues and management and a general lack of protection.

Recommendation 3:

That Queensland Corrective Services, in consultation with custodial correctional officers, conduct an evaluation of its internal reporting policies and procedures for misconduct, with specific attention to assessing and, if necessary, addressing the following issues:

- **Is there a policy for managing public interest disclosures?**
- **Is there a dedicated whistleblower liaison officer?**
- **Do custodial correctional officers understand the misconduct reporting process?**
- **Does the process encourage custodial correctional officers to report suspected misconduct?**

- **Does the process encourage responsive action in the first instance?**
- **Are senior custodial officers, managers and centre General Managers adequately trained in the handling of misconduct?**
- **Is there a policy and procedure for the escalation of complaints if they are not adequately resolved in the first instance?**
- **Are all officers who report suspected misconduct adequately protected from any negative repercussions?**

The survey results also identified some enduring issues between officers and management. To address these issues, in addition to the above recommendations, we also make some more general suggestions aimed at improving the relationship between management and CCOs. These suggestions include increasing consultation with custodial correctional staff and identifying opportunities to recognise and reward exceptional job performance. Improving the relationship between CCOs and management is expected to prevent misconduct over the longer term by reducing CCOs' justifications for misconduct, while increasing acceptance of the agency's values and goals.

PRISONS AND MISCONDUCT

In this chapter, we explore some of the unique features of the correctional environment that may contribute to misconduct, including the role of the CCO and prison culture. We also discuss how serious and pervasive levels of misconduct in correctional settings have been dealt with through government inquiries throughout Australia.

The role of the custodial correctional officer

The role of the CCO is multifaceted and increasingly complex. On one hand, much of the work of CCOs is mundane, routine and boring (Crawley 2004; Lombardo 1981). Yet, on the other hand, CCOs are not only responsible for the control and containment of prisoners, but are also required to monitor and assist with issues affecting prisoner health, welfare and safety; to work with other professional staff (e.g. psychologists); and to understand the complex legislative and regulatory frameworks that govern their duties (Crawley 2004; Grant 2005; Josi & Sechrest 1998; Liebling & Price 2001; Lombardo 1981).

Furthermore, being good at the job often means *not* doing what would seem to come naturally in a prison environment. It involves being good at *not* using force, and being prepared to use other more sophisticated approaches in the execution of officer responsibilities, such as foresight, diplomacy and humour (Liebling & Price 2001).

Because of the potentially conflicting responsibilities of both 'custody' and 'care' (Liebling & Price 2001), the work of the CCO can be stressful and demanding. In his seminal study of the role of the prison officer, Lombardo (1981) described the work environment of the prison officer as 'laden with fear, mental tension, uncertainty, isolation, inconsistency and boredom' (p. 164). A more recent study of new recruits highlights that workplace challenges start early in the career of the CCO. Specifically, Bensimon (2005) found that, from the time of their recruitment to the end of their first year on the job, recruits experience increasing role conflict, role ambiguity and job stress,³ along with a decrease in supervisory support.

On top of this, the demands of the prison environment can often bring out the worst in people. Simulation-style psychological studies of prisons (e.g. Haney, Banks & Zimbardo 1973; Reicher & Haslam 2006) have shown that the division between officers and inmates can lead to antagonism and conflict that can escalate to tyranny and violence.

While conditions have improved for officers over recent years, prisons remain stressful and demanding places to work. In a study comparing stress levels across occupational groups, Johnson et al. (2005) found that prison officers were among the occupations with a heightened likelihood of experiencing low physical and psychological wellbeing and lower job satisfaction. The stress of working in the correctional environment can lead to high burnout, turnover and absenteeism, as well as psychosomatic diseases such as hypertension and heart disease (see Schaufeli & Peeters 2000 for a review). O'Toole (2005) also notes that there is a high incidence of alcohol and drug dependency problems among correctional officers. Therefore, most corrective services jurisdictions in Australia have developed programs to improve the physical and mental wellbeing of their staff (O'Toole 2005).

3 Role conflict occurs when the expectations of the job are incompatible with your own values and beliefs; role ambiguity occurs when the work is considered uncertain, with unclear goals and expectations; job stress is the anxiety or anguish felt in relation to the job and the pressure you feel due to the lack of time available to perform your duties (Bensimon 2005).

The prison culture

The culture of an organisation can be described as a shared set of beliefs and assumptions that guide the behaviour of organisational members. Rather than having a single overarching organisational culture, it has been suggested that the prison environment is made up of several subcultures. These subcultures include, but are not limited to, the prisoner culture, the CCO culture, the management culture and the professional staff culture (Grant 2005).

Empirical research has found that the CCO subculture is particularly strong, with several common features (see e.g. Crawley 2004; Kauffman 1988; Liebling & Price 2001). For example, Kauffman (1988) identified a series of norms that made up the prison officer subculture at one prison in the United States. These norms focused on supporting other officers and presenting a united front to other groups, particularly prisoners.⁴ Similarly, Liebling and Price (2001) suggest that the prison officer subculture is built on camaraderie and cohesiveness, a willingness to 'pull together' that can be a source of strength in prisons.

Although there are positive elements to the subculture of CCOs, there are potential problems with this strong culture. For example, one of the norms of the officer culture in Kauffman's (1988) study was that officers should not 'rat' on or testify against another officer. Lombardo (1981) found that there is a common perception among officers that the job of a correctional officer provides little opportunity for advancement, recognition from management or personal achievement. Grant (2005) suggests that the strength of the prison officer subculture may negate any organisational instruction provided during training and induction. Research suggests that more experienced CCOs tend to sustain and perpetuate this subculture, particularly many of the more negative aspects (Crawley 2004; O'Toole 2005). These potential problems of the CCO subculture clearly may have important implications for misconduct in correctional environments.

Official misconduct in prisons

Given the multifaceted nature of the role, the work of a CCO is at times extremely challenging, and at times extremely boring. This dichotomy, coupled with a strong culture of officers 'sticking together', officers feeling unrecognised and unrewarded for their job efforts, and the need for ongoing personal relationships with prisoners, provides a fertile context for misconduct in the workplace.

*Official misconduct*⁵ involves wrongdoing by a public sector employee in carrying out their official duties or exercising their powers. The wrongdoing must involve one of the following: dishonesty or lack of impartiality, a breach of the trust put in a person by virtue of their position, or a misuse of officially obtained information. The behaviour must also be a criminal offence or serious enough to justify dismissal (see also Box 1.1).

4 These norms were (a) always go to the aid of an officer in distress, (b) do not smuggle drugs for prisoners (because it endangers other officers), (c) do not 'rat' on other officers (i.e. testify against another officer), (d) always support an officer in a dispute with a prisoner, (e) do not express sympathy for, or side with, prisoners (i.e. be a 'white hat'), (f) maintain officer solidarity against all outside groups and (g) show positive concern for fellow officers.

5 This report also covers behaviour that would not constitute official misconduct but that could be considered a breach of the QCS Code of Conduct or would warrant disciplinary action. Throughout the report, however, no distinction is made between official misconduct and breaches of the code of conduct.

Box 1.1: What is official misconduct?

'Official misconduct' is conduct that could, if proved, be —

- (a) a criminal offence; or
- (b) a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for terminating the person's services, if the person is or was the holder of an appointment.

Conduct may be official misconduct even though —

- (a) it happened before the commencement of this Act; or
- (b) some or all of the effects or elements necessary to constitute official misconduct happened before the commencement of this Act; or
- (c) a person involved in the conduct is no longer the holder of an appointment.

Conduct engaged in by, or in relation to, a person at a time when the person is not the holder of an appointment may be official misconduct, if the person becomes the holder of an appointment.

Source: *Crime and Misconduct Commission Act 2001*.

In comparison with research undertaken with police and other areas of the public sector, there has been little research examining the official misconduct of CCOs and general levels of misconduct in correctional institutions (for an exception, see McCarthy 1981, 1984). Despite this relative lack of empirical research, serious and pervasive levels of official misconduct in correctional settings have been addressed through government inquiries and subsequent prison reform.

Since 1970 in Australia, there have been inquiries, investigations or reports in relation to official misconduct in prisons in every jurisdiction (see Table 1.1). Most have focused on allegations of brutality by staff against inmates. This brutality has included routine bashings, placing young prisoners with known 'homosexual heavies', arranging for prisoners to be bashed by other prisoners, spreading false rumours among prisoners that other prisoners are informers, coercing prisoners to reduce complaints, failing to provide duty of care to prisoners and administering inappropriate punishments.

Table 1.1: Inquiries, investigations and reports in relation to prison misconduct in Australia

State	Reports on prison misconduct
Queensland	Kennedy 1988; Bingham 1991; Mengler 1996; Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) 2000a, n.d.
New South Wales	Nagle 1978; Armstrong 1982; Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Slattery 1984
Victoria	Jenkinson 1973; Lynn 1993
South Australia	Johnston 1975; Clarkson 1981
Western Australia	Jones 1973; McGivern 1988; Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations 1995
Northern Territory	Northern Territory Police 1993
Tasmania	Grubb 1977
Federal	Johnston 1991

Brutality is not the only problem identified in reports of misconduct by prison staff. Instances of providing prisoners with confidential information, supplying drugs or other goods such as mobile phones, and warning prisoners of upcoming urine tests have been uncovered by inquiries in New South Wales and Queensland (Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC] 1998a, 1998b; Kennedy 1988; Mengler 1996).

There have also been cases of inappropriately friendly and sometimes sexual relationships between CCOs and inmates (e.g. Criminal Justice Commission [CJC] n.d.; ICAC 1998a, 1999a). Frequent and ongoing interaction with prisoners, in an environment where friends and enemies are of paramount significance, provides opportunities for staff to develop close and possibly inappropriate relationships with prisoners. Prisoners have much to gain from friendly relationships with CCOs, as they can be used to their advantage in the prison environment. For CCOs, having good relationships with prisoners engenders cooperation from inmates and makes getting the job done easier (Liebling & Price 2001; Lombardo 1981; McCarthy 1984). Given officers' perceptions about the lack of achievement and recognition they receive from management, these relationships with prisoners may fulfil these types of personal needs and may serve as a means of coping with the job and the prison environment (Lombardo 1981).

Not every allegation of misconduct against staff involves prisoners. A number of inquiries have found evidence of the theft or misuse of agency property and other forms of unprofessional behaviour by correctional staff, including:

- misuse of prison vehicles (Nagle 1978)
- use of prison workshops for private jobs (Clarkson 1981)
- price-rigging and kickbacks in prison industries (CJC 2000a)
- theft of goods and money from the prison canteen, and destruction of records in a deliberate attempt to cover up the offences (Clarkson 1981)
- turning up to work affected by alcohol (Clarkson 1981).

Clearly, the conditions under which prison staff work, as well as the effect these conditions have on their behaviour, need to be managed to prevent misconduct. Specifically, prisons need to develop and promote policies, procedures and guidelines that ensure responsible and ethical prisoner care and resource management. In addition, prison staff need to be trained and supported in the effective implementation of these policies, procedures and guidelines. Such training should be complemented by targeted selection and recruitment of appropriate staff, and ongoing monitoring and assessment of their activities, roles and work environment. Not only is the prevention of misconduct an ethical issue, but it serves also to enhance the legitimacy and authority of state justice institutions.

This report contributes to the prevention of misconduct in correctional institutions by monitoring CCOs' perceptions of the frequency of, responses to and potential causes of misconduct in Queensland correctional institutions. It also makes recommendations aimed at reducing misconduct, and the factors contributing to misconduct, in correctional institutions.

QUEENSLAND CORRECTIVE SERVICES

This chapter provides some background information about QCS. In particular, we focus on the mechanisms in place to deal with and prevent misconduct within QCS. We also provide some context to the development of these mechanisms, which have been shaped by several reviews and inquiries into Queensland's prison system.

A period of change

The last 15 years or so have been a period of major change for QCS,⁶ with four major departmental restructures. A key transitional event in the agency's recent history was the Commission of Review into Corrective Services in Queensland (Kennedy 1988). The Kennedy Review was established in response to general concerns about the management of Queensland's prisons and, in particular, prisoner rioting and prison officer strikes that came to a head during 1987.

One of the areas Kennedy was concerned with was the relationship between correctional officers and management. He noted that over the years a culture of 'us' and 'them' had developed. This culture, he said, would most likely be difficult to change (Kennedy 1988, p. 16). This is an important observation for the present study because it shows the difficulties faced by those whose task it is to reduce misconduct. Without workable relations between management and prison staff, reforms are unlikely to succeed.

In all, Kennedy made 80 specific recommendations. These recommendations provided a blueprint for restructure, transforming the administration and management of prisons in Queensland.

In 1997, further restructuring took place. With the government's policy of corporatisation, the department was split into two organisations to separate service delivery from purchasing and regulating functions.

Legislation developed from the Kennedy Review required an additional review of the changes made to the department in the preceding decade. This review, known as the Peach Review (1999), led to further restructuring of the department, including the dismantling of corporatisation and the re-amalgamation of the service delivery, purchasing and regulating functions.

Further restructuring has also taken place more recently, following the department's Business Model Review in 2005. Among other things, this review found that there was a disconnection between the central office and the field, a lack of cohesion and a need for more responsive management, and a need for greater training and development opportunities for staff.

Over the same period there has been rapid growth in prisoner numbers; the daily average number of prisoners has increased from 2068 in 1993 (CJC 2000b) to 5649 in 2007 (QCS 2007). Six old prisons have been decommissioned and nine new institutions, incorporating advanced security hardware, have been opened. Two prisons — Borallon and Arthur Gorrie — are under private management contract.

⁶ Note that the agency title of Queensland Corrective Services came into effect in August 2006. Prior to that it was the Department of Corrective Services (DCS).

Misconduct in Queensland corrections

Including the Kennedy Review, there have been four published inquiries examining misconduct in the Queensland correctional system since 1988. Kennedy — while not explicitly concerned with misconduct — found that ‘a number’ of officers were corrupt, and outlined cases of illegal violence against prisoners, trafficking of drugs, supplying a gun to prisoners, exchanging favours for sex, placing young prisoners with known ‘homosexual heavies’ and ‘setting-up’ prisoners to secure compliance (pp. 137–8).

In 1991, the CJC — although it as yet had no ongoing oversight role — investigated a series of allegations of misconduct that were raised in the Queensland Parliament (Bingham 1991). The matters included allegations that female prisoners had been coerced into prostitution by staff, that staff were involved in drug trafficking, and that theft and fraud were widespread at certain institutions. The inquiry found insufficient evidence to support any of the allegations.

In 1996, the Commission of Inquiry into Drugs in Queensland Custodial Correctional Centres (Mengler 1996) found evidence that some officers were engaged in trafficking drugs. It was stressed, however, that officers were a relatively minor source of drugs and that only a small percentage of officers were involved. The report recommended random searches of prison staff and restrictions on personal property brought into the prison.

Finally, the CJC (2000a) reported on fraud and maladministration within prison industries. This report was not the result of a public inquiry but arose from several CJC investigations. No evidence of pervasive misconduct among officers was found. However, the report detailed two case studies involving elaborate financial fraud by officers and made several recommendations to minimise the risk of corruption in the operation of prison industries.

In addition to these public inquiries, the CJC conducted a high-profile investigation into allegations involving a female prison psychologist (CJC n.d.). At an investigative hearing in 2000, the psychologist admitted to being involved in inappropriate sexual relationships with two inmates at two correctional centres, and having supplied marijuana to one and other contraband to both. It also found that the department had failed to provide adequate training and support to staff to prevent opportunities for misconduct.

Dealing with misconduct

While various inquiries into misconduct in Queensland corrections have found little evidence of widespread misconduct, each addressed the need for effective ongoing oversight and investigation, subsequently shaping the way QCS deals with misconduct.

Kennedy (1988) argued that the responses to corruption at the time were inadequate, expressing concern that corrupt officers were commonly allowed to resign rather than face charges. He recommended the establishment of two investigative bodies — an external Police Prison Liaison Unit operated by the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and an Internal Investigation Unit answering directly to the Commissioner for Corrective Services.

Instead of following Kennedy’s preferred option for two bodies, in 1989 the **Corrective Services Investigation Unit (CSIU)** was established. The CSIU was set up as a designated QPS unit within the Department of Corrective Services (DCS). Staffed by sworn Queensland police officers, it is the responsibility of the CSIU to investigate any criminal matters within correctional facilities. While most of the work of the unit involves offences carried out by prisoners, in the course of these investigations the CSIU may also investigate criminal matters involving staff.

Kennedy (1988) also recommended that an Operational Audit Bureau be established to ensure that policies, procedures and standards were maintained in all levels of management. The **Internal Audit Unit (IAU)** was subsequently established in 1990 and would refer cases of suspected criminal behaviour by staff to the CSIU. When the CJC took on the external oversight role for corrections (in 1997), the IAU became responsible for liaising with, and reporting suspected official misconduct to, the CJC and, later, the CMC.

The IAU was replaced by the **Ethical Standards Branch (ESB)** in October 2001. The ESB handles investigations into serious and suspected official misconduct. It also identifies and analyses systemic trends in misconduct to address and prevent future misconduct. The branch also manages the Whistleblower's Support Program and conducts staff training programs and workshops on topics such as workplace integrity, harassment, the code of conduct and leadership development.

An additional investigative body was formed following recommendations by Mengler (1996). He argued that a more tactical and strategic approach to information gathering was required that may involve the use of informants, surveillance and other covert activities. In 1996 the Proactive Intelligence Network (PIN) — later renamed the **Queensland Corrective Services Intelligence Group (QCSIG)** — was established. This unit is located within QCS, but is headed by a senior police officer and jointly staffed by serving police and civilian correctional employees. Where appropriate, the results of intelligence investigations are passed from the QCSIG to the CSIU for further action.

In 1997, the department was made subject to specific external oversight by the CJC, and then the CMC. Three years later, contract-managed institutions were also included. The CMC is required to deal only with serious matters that involve criminal offences or behaviour that warrants dismissal.

The CMC can receive complaints or reports about suspected official misconduct from a member of the public, a public servant or a police officer. In accordance with the *Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994*, public servants can also make public interest disclosures. Prisoners also have the right to lodge a complaint directly with the CMC and to receive unopened and uncensored correspondence from the CMC. However, the principle of devolution requires the CMC to refer complaints back to QCS wherever possible, subject to ongoing oversight by the CMC.

In addition to its investigative function, the CMC has a prevention role. Sections 23 and 24 of the *Crime and Misconduct Act 2001* outline how the CMC can undertake its prevention function (e.g. by analysing intelligence, investigations, systems used by units of public administration).

The surveys undertaken for this report contribute to the CMC's monitoring function. We do this by assessing staff perceptions about the extent to which official misconduct occurs within QCS, how CCOs would respond to misconduct, and perceptions of the causes of misconduct in correctional institutions. By anonymously surveying CCOs we can more reliably gauge the extent of misconduct, rather than relying solely on official complaints of misconduct where there may be under-reporting. Further, surveying officers in both 2001 and 2007 allows us to assess any changes in perceptions over time.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes how CCOs' perceptions of misconduct were assessed. We discuss how the surveys were administered to officers in both 2001 and 2007, before outlining the questions asked in the surveys. We then explain the techniques used to analyse the data, before describing the demographic details of the officers who participated in the research.

About the surveys

The research project was a collaborative project, funded in part by an ARC SPIRT grant awarded to the CMC and researchers from Griffith University in 2000. Researchers from Griffith University were largely responsible for designing and administering the survey. This allowed the CMC to remain independent from the data collection process, which may have influenced officers' willingness to participate in the research project.

Survey administration

CCOs were surveyed in 2001 and then again in 2007.

In 2001, the survey was distributed personally to staff in six centres — Arthur Gorrie, Brisbane Women's, Townsville, Lotus Glen, Borallon and Wolston. Officers in each of the remaining institutions — Moreton B, Darling Downs, Numinbah, Palen Creek, Rockhampton, Sir David Longland and Woodford — were surveyed by mail. Overall, a total of 840 surveys were distributed and 245 were returned, representing a response rate of 29.2 per cent. This response rate was disappointing and well below the generally accepted response rate for surveys of organisational employees (assessed by Baruch and Holtom, 2008, to be about 50 per cent).

To encourage a better response rate than in 2001, in 2007 surveys were personally distributed at Arthur Gorrie, Brisbane Women's, Townsville, Lotus Glen, Borallon, Wolston, Woodford, Darling Downs, Numinbah and Palen Creek, with 397 returned. Mail-return surveys were distributed to Maryborough and Capricornia and 16 of these surveys were returned. Together, a total of 413 surveys were returned, representing 25.7 per cent of all CCOs.⁷

Survey questions

Researchers from Griffith University were primarily responsible for the design of the survey instrument. The majority of the survey questions were written for the purpose of this study.

The same survey was distributed in 2001 and 2007, although some minor changes were made to the 2007 survey. For example, in 2007, some questions were added to gauge the extent of misconduct *directly observed* by CCOs. We also asked officers more questions about the way management deals with misconduct and for more detail on how officers would respond to suspected misconduct.

The survey was structured in five main parts. The first part of the survey required respondents to rate the frequency of certain types of misconduct in their centre and whether or not they believed they had direct evidence for these types of misconduct occurring (the latter in 2007 only).

⁷ Information on the number of surveys distributed at each centre was not retained by Griffith University. Because of this, response rates based on the number of surveys distributed were not available in 2007.

The second part of the survey presented 15 scenarios of misconduct. Respondents rated the seriousness of these scenarios, not only from their own perspective, but also from the perspective of QCS and a typical officer. Respondents were also asked the likelihood of getting caught if involved in these types of misconduct, and what action they would take if they witnessed or heard about these incidents.

The third part of the survey addressed officer training. Officers were asked what training they had participated in and how relevant this training had been to their job in the correctional centre.

The fourth part of the survey examined officers' perceptions in several key areas, including justifications of misconduct, perceptions of management and the work environment, and levels of job satisfaction.

The final part of the survey asked respondents basic demographic questions such as age, gender and length of service with QCS. In 2007, officers were also given an opportunity to provide written answers to open-ended questions as well as their recommendations for reducing misconduct in correctional institutions.

Analysis of survey data

The surveys included different types of questions. The choice of data analysis techniques was based on both the type of question and what we were interested in knowing about responses to each question.

There were two main types of questions asked throughout the survey. Some questions required respondents to choose one category of response from a number of pre-specified responses (i.e. a categorical variable). These questions were used to collect information about variables such as respondent gender (i.e. male or female), direct evidence of misconduct (i.e. yes or no) and the types of action they would take in response to misconduct (e.g. report to the CMC or take no action). We examined this information descriptively, looking at the percentage of respondents who responded with each category. *Chi-square analysis* was used to test for differences between two of these categorical variables.

The survey also included questions that required responses on a continuum or scale (i.e. a continuous variable). For example, respondents were asked how frequently they had observed misconduct and were provided with a continuum ranging from 'never' to 'all the time', with anchor points of 'rarely', 'sometimes' or 'always' in between. In another example, respondents were asked how many years they had worked as a CCO. Theoretically, a continuous variable is comprised of an unlimited number of values between two points on a scale. However, most of the continuous variables in the survey were from questions that required a response on a five-point Likert response scale. In addition to the frequency of observed misconduct and length of service, this type of question was used to assess the following:

- perceived seriousness of misconduct ('not at all serious' to 'extremely serious')
- likelihood of getting caught involved in misconduct ('never' to 'always')
- relevance of training ('not at all relevant' to 'extremely relevant')
- justifications of misconduct ('strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree')
- perceptions of management and working at QCS ('strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree')
- job satisfaction ('very dissatisfied' to 'very satisfied').

We analysed responses to these questions in several ways. First, we examined the average rating for each question, as well as the proportion of respondents who responded at the upper end of the scale (e.g. 'sometimes', 'frequently' and 'all the time' or 'agree' and 'strongly agree').

Second, for each question, we used *analysis of variance* (ANOVA) to assess whether perceptions of frequency had changed between the 2001 and the 2007 surveys, controlling for various demographic variables and any interactions between these variables. We used *multivariate*

analysis of variance (MANOVA) to assess whether respondent age, gender or length of service, as well as any interactions between these variables, influenced overall perceptions, and to reduce any confounding between these variables. Where relevant, this type of analysis was also used to test for any impact of training on perceptions.

Finally, although ANOVA and MANOVA were the most common data analysis techniques used to examine the data, we also occasionally used *correlation* to assess the strength and direction of the relationship between two categorical variables. We also used a specific type of correlation known as *point-biserial correlation* to examine the association between a continuous variable and a discrete variable with two categories.

For these statistical tests, we evaluated differences and relationships by assessing their *statistical significance*.⁸ The significance of a statistical test estimates whether or not the difference or relationship is true, rather than simply a chance event. We used significance levels of $p < .05$ and $p < .01$ throughout this report, to indicate either a less than 5 per cent chance or a less than 1 per cent chance, respectively, that differences or relationships were found as a result of chance alone.

All analyses were based on listwise deletion of missing data, so that all available data were included. It should be noted, however, that total sample sizes may vary slightly between response categories and particular groups due to missing data. Percentages have been calculated on the total sample size for each analysis.

Limitations of the research

There are several limitations inherent in the design of the research and the survey that should be considered when interpreting the results of the research.

First, most of the survey questions asked about respondents' perceptions. Readers should bear in mind that perceptions are subjective, and that perceptions may not accurately or reliably represent the true nature or extent of misconduct within correctional institutions in Queensland. Perceptions also differ between individuals and only a proportion of all Queensland CCOs completed the survey. For this reason, we cannot know how those officers who did not respond might have differed in their perceptions from those officers who completed the survey. This limitation is compounded by the relatively low response rate. The results of the research may not, therefore, be representative of, or generalisable to, all CCOs.

Second, it should be noted that we conducted two cross-sectional surveys (one in 2001 and one in 2007) rather than using a longitudinal research design. We have not, then, assessed any changes in the perceptions of individuals between the two time periods. Instead, we have examined general perceptions across two different samples of CCOs — one in 2001 and another in 2007 — and identified any differences in the responses to the two surveys to gauge changes in perceptions over time.

Finally, the survey design does not allow us to assess causal relationships between the various variables. Instead, we can only theorise or suggest the direction of relationships in order to interpret the data.

⁸ The terms *significance* and *statistical significance* are used interchangeably throughout this report, so that results that are 'significant' are 'statistically significant'.


About the samples

2001 survey

A total of 245 CCOs completed the survey in 2001. Of these officers, 85.7 per cent indicated their gender. The majority of these were male (76.7%), while just over 20 per cent of respondents were female (23.3%). The number of male and female officers from each correctional centre is provided in Appendix 1.


Of the 245 officers who completed the survey, 212 (86.5%) provided their age. The most common age group was 41 to 50 years, with 37.7 per cent of respondents in this age group, and most (63%) were older than 41 years. Only 9 per cent of respondents were aged 18 to 30 years. The percentage of respondents in each age group is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of respondents by age group, 2001 (n = 212)



Almost 90 per cent of respondents in 2001 (87.8%) indicated their length of service with QCS. Most commonly, respondents had been employed with QCS for between one and five years (39%), but the majority had been there for more than six years. Only 4.2 per cent of respondents had been employed for less than 12 months. The length of service of respondents is shown in Figure 3.2 below.

Figure 3.2: Percentage of respondents by length of service with QCS, 2001 (n = 215)



To assess how representative survey respondents were of all CCOs, we compared the demographic data of respondents with the demographic data on all CCOs employed.⁹ A comparison between survey respondents and QCS staff is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Percentage of survey respondents and all QCS staff by gender, age and length of service, 2001

		Survey respondents	All QCS staff ^a
Gender	Male	76.7	81.6
	Female	23.3	18.4
Age	18–30 years	9.0	11.8
	31–40 years	27.8	29.0
	41–50 years	37.7	38.7
	Over 51 years	25.5	20.4
Length of service	Less than 1 year	4.2	5.4
	1–5 years	39.1	53.3
	6–10 years	27.9	21.8
	More than 10 years	28.8	19.5

^a The demographic information of all CCOs was provided by QCS.

Note: Percentages are based on valid responses.

These comparisons suggest that the survey respondents in 2001 were fairly representative of CCOs employed at QCS. Although more female officers completed the survey than was representative of all CCOs employed by QCS, the age of respondents reflected the age groups of all officers. In regard to their length of service with QCS, respondents were more likely to have been employed for six to 10 years or more than 10 years, while those employed for between one and five years were less likely to participate in the survey. Overall, however, like survey respondents, the majority of CCOs in 2002 were male (81.6%), most commonly aged between 41 and 50 years (38.7%), and had been employed for between one and five years (53.3%).

There was a significant relationship between age and length of service such that those people who had been employed with QCS for longer were also more likely to be older ($r = .32, p < .01$).

2007 survey

In 2007, 413 officers took part in the survey. Of these, 78.5 per cent indicated their gender — 76.2 per cent were male and 23.8 per cent were female. We compared the gender distribution of respondents in 2007 with the gender distribution of respondents in 2001. The number of male and female officers from each correctional centre is provided in Appendix 1. Chi-square analyses revealed no statistically significant gender differences between the 2001 and the 2007 survey respondents.¹⁰


As was the case in 2001, the most common age category of respondents in 2007 was 41 to 50 years, with 41.1 per cent of respondents in 2007 falling into this range. Eight per cent of respondents were aged 18 to 30 years. We compared the age distributions in the 2001 and 2007 surveys and found no significant differences between the two surveys.¹¹ Figure 3.3 shows the age groups of respondents who indicated their age (69.5%).

9 The demographic information of all CCOs was provided by QCS. As demographic data on officers in 2001 were unavailable, we made comparisons based on officer data for 2002. These data included all CCOs working at those centres that were included in the research, with the exception of Moreton B and Rockhampton (both of which closed in 2001) and the private prisons of Arthur Gorrie and Borallon, for which data were unavailable.

10 $\chi^2 = 0.01, p = ns$


11 $\chi^2 = 0.64, p = ns$

Figure 3.3: Percentage of respondents by age group, 2007 (n = 287)



In 2007, 262 respondents (63.4%) indicated their length of service at QCS. Most respondents had been employed with QCS for six to 10 years (32.1%) or over 10 years (32.4%). We found a statistically significant difference in the length of service with QCS between the 2001 and 2007 respondents,¹² largely due to a higher proportion of respondents in 2007 who had been with QCS for less than 12 months. The percentages of respondents by length of service in 2007 are shown in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Percentage of respondents by length of service with QCS, 2007 (n = 262)



We again compared the demographic profile of survey respondents with the profile of all CCOs employed with QCS in 2007 (see Table 3.2 for full details). This comparison revealed that the majority of both survey respondents and QCS officers were males aged between 41 and 50 years. Female officers were, however, slightly over-represented in the survey participants compared with all CCOs. There was also a higher proportion of officers employed for less than one year in the survey sample than was representative of all CCOs, while officers who had been employed for between one and five years were under-represented in the survey sample.

¹² $\chi^2 = 15.30, p < .01$

Table 3.2: Percentage of survey respondents and all QCS staff by gender, age and length of service, 2007

		Survey respondents	All QCS staff ^a
Gender	Male	76.2	80.0
	Female	23.8	20.0
Age	18–30 years	8.0	5.8
	31–40 years	26.1	25.2
	41–50 years	41.1	39.0
	Over 51 years	24.7	29.9
Length of service	Less than 1 year	10.7	2.1
	1–5 years	24.8	34.4
	6–10 years	32.1	36.1
	More than 10 years	32.4	27.5

^a The demographic information of all CCOs was provided by QCS.

Note: Percentages are based on valid responses.

Again, there was a significant relationship between age and length of service such that those people who had been employed with QCS for longer were more likely to be older ($r = .38, p < .01$). There were no other significant relationships between the demographic variables.

PERCEPTIONS OF MISCONDUCT IN QUEENSLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

This chapter describes the results of the 2001 and 2007 surveys, focusing on officers' perceptions of misconduct in Queensland correctional institutions. Officers' perceptions of working in Queensland correctional institutions are presented in Chapter 5. The results in this chapter are presented in six main parts around officers' perceptions of:

1. the frequency of misconduct
2. direct evidence of misconduct
3. the seriousness of misconduct
4. the likelihood of being caught for misconduct
5. reporting misconduct
6. formal relevant training.

Given the size of the survey, main results are presented in the text, while tables with statistical results are shown in the appendixes. Selected responses to open-ended questions provided by CCOs have been grouped into themes and appear in shaded boxes throughout the chapter. To assist the reader, key findings are presented in bold text in each section.

Frequency of misconduct

In both the 2001 and 2007 surveys, CCOs were asked to indicate how often, in their experience, various instances of misconduct occurred within their centre. The survey included 30 different types of misconduct behaviour and officers were required to rate the frequency of each type of behaviour on a 5-point scale from 'never' to 'all the time' (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = frequently, 5 = all the time). Examples of the types of misconduct included staff:


- warning offenders of searches
- not following security procedures
- harassing visitors
- assaulting offenders
- disclosing offenders' personal information
- working under the influence of drugs or alcohol
- making false reports about offenders
- using searches/other powers to harass an offender
- assaulting or harassing other staff
- stealing items belonging to the agency.

We analysed responses to this question in three ways. First, we examined the average rating of frequency for each type of misconduct, as well as the proportion of respondents who indicated that misconduct occurs 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time' to identify those types of misconduct that are perceived to occur the most and least frequently.

Second, we used ANOVA to assess whether perceptions of the frequency of misconduct had changed between the 2001 and 2007 surveys, controlling for various demographic variables and any interactions between these variables. Finally, we used MANOVA to assess whether respondent age, gender or length of service, as well as any interactions between these variables, influenced overall perceptions of the frequency of misconduct. These results are presented in full in Appendix 2.

Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of respondents who indicated that each type of misconduct happened 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'. **On average, only a few types of misconduct were reported to occur 'sometimes', with most types of misconduct generally reported to occur 'rarely'. The majority of respondents indicated that most types of misconduct occur 'rarely' or 'never'. Importantly, the perceived frequency of misconduct decreased significantly for most types of misconduct between 2001 and 2007. Demographic characteristics of respondents (gender, age, length of service) were not found to influence perceptions of the frequency of misconduct.**

Figure 4.1: Percentage of respondents who reported that misconduct occurs 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time' for each type of misconduct, 2001 and 2007



The misconduct rated as the most frequently occurring by CCOs in both 2001 and 2007 was *favouritism by senior staff or management towards other staff*. In 2001, on average, favouritism was reported to occur 'frequently' (Mean = 3.92), with over 90 per cent of officers reporting that this type of misconduct occurred 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'. Although favouritism was still considered the most frequently occurring type of misconduct in 2007, it was considered to occur, on average, only 'sometimes' (Mean = 3.40), and fewer respondents (82%) indicated that it occurred 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'. This difference was statistically significant ($p < .01$), suggesting that officers in 2007 perceived favouritism by senior staff and management to occur significantly less often than officers perceived it to occur in 2001.

The second most frequently identified type of misconduct in both years was staff *not following security procedures*. Over 70 per cent of respondents in 2001 and over 65 per cent of respondents in 2007 reported that this type of misconduct occurred 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'. On average, respondents indicated that this type of misconduct occurred 'sometimes' in both years (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.02; Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.85), although there was a significant decrease in perceptions of the frequency of this type of misconduct between 2001 and 2007 ($p < .05$).

Inaction by centre management on reported misconduct was scored the third most frequently occurring form of misconduct by officers. In 2001, management inaction was perceived to occur, on average, 'sometimes' (Mean = 2.76), where about 60 per cent of respondents indicated that inaction occurred 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'. In 2007, there was a statistically significant decrease in this perception ($p < .01$). Officers in 2007 rated that inaction by centre management occurs, on average, 'rarely' (Mean = 2.35), but about 40 per cent of respondents indicated that inaction by centre management occurred 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'.

The types of misconduct perceived by officers to occur least often in both 2001 and 2007 were officers *stealing offenders' property*, *unauthorised supply of prescription medication*, and officers *blocking access to grievance procedures*. Slightly over 10 per cent of respondents in both years reported that these types of misconduct occur 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time', and, on average, officers indicated that these types of misconduct occur only 'rarely'.

Differences over time

There was a statistically significant decrease between 2001 and 2007 in the perceived frequency of misconduct for 24 of the 30 types of misconduct. For each of these types of misconduct, officers in 2007 rated the misconduct occurring significantly less frequently than those participating in the survey in 2001. These significant differences were found for the following types of misconduct:

- smuggling in drugs for offenders
- sexual assault of offenders
- not following security procedures
- favouritism by senior staff or management
- racial discrimination against offenders
- physical assault of offenders
- turning a blind eye to the abuse of offenders
- unethical relationship with an offender
- inaction by centre management on reported misconduct
- disclosure of offenders' personal information
- stealing items belonging to the department
- verbal assault or harassment of offenders
- working under the influence of drugs or alcohol
- disclosure of confidential information to the media

- using departmental resources for personal use
- assaulting or harassing other staff
- stealing offenders' property
- not officially reporting misconduct by other staff
- bringing in/taking out unauthorised messages for offenders
- making false reports about offenders
- not officially reporting unethical relationships between staff and offenders
- blocking offender access to grievance procedures ('blue letters')¹³
- using prison industries to make a profit
- bringing in other contraband for offenders (not drugs).

In contrast, there were no statistically significant differences between 2001 and 2007 in perceptions of the frequency of misconduct for six types of misconduct:

- warning offenders of searches
- disclosure of confidential information to offenders
- harassment of visitors
- sex between staff during work time
- using searches/other powers to harass an offender
- unauthorised supply of prescription medication.

This suggests that the perceptions of the frequency of these types of misconduct remained fairly consistent between 2001 and 2007. Considering that two of these types of misconduct — *warning offenders of searches* and *disclosure of confidential information to offenders* — were perceived to occur relatively frequently by about 35 per cent of respondents in 2007 (see Figure 4.1), and given that there has been no change in these perceptions, targeted action may be needed in these areas.

Factors influencing perceptions

MANOVA tests revealed no significant main effects of respondents' gender, age or length of service, nor any interaction effects between these variables, on perceptions of the frequency of misconduct. This result suggests that perceptions of the frequency of misconduct were not influenced by any of these demographic factors.

We also examined the effect of training on perceptions of the frequency of misconduct, again using MANOVA. The full details of the survey questions which assessed training are presented on page 36. The results revealed a significant effect for having completed training on *fraud and corruption* on perceptions of the frequency of misconduct ($p < .01$). Bivariate analyses identified that those respondents in 2007 who reported having completed training on fraud and corruption were less likely to perceive that the following types of misconduct occur 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time':

- smuggling in drugs for offenders
- warning offenders of searches
- disclosure of confidential information to offenders
- harassment of visitors
- disclosure of offenders' personal information
- assaulting or harassing other staff
- unauthorised supply of prescription medication.

13 The formal process for prisoners to make a complaint about an officer.

This result may suggest that, in contrast to those respondents who had completed fraud and corruption training, those respondents who had not completed such training may be less able to recognise these types of misconduct and, as a result, may perceive that it happens more frequently, but this suggestion is merely speculative.

There were no significant effects for any of the other 11 types of training on the perceptions of the frequency of misconduct.


Direct evidence of misconduct

In 2007, we asked CCOs to indicate whether they believed they had any direct evidence of misconduct occurring at their centre, through personal observation, experience or formal reporting. It is important to note that these were officers' perceptions of direct evidence and that these perceptions may or may not be substantiated by an objective observer. Officers indicated either 'yes' or 'no' for direct evidence of the same 30 types of misconduct behaviour we assessed in the previous section. Officers were not asked these questions in 2001.

We assessed CCOs' responses to these questions by calculating the percentage of respondents who said that they had direct evidence for the various types of misconduct. We also examined the relationship between direct evidence of misconduct and the perceived frequency of misconduct (discussed in the previous section) using *point-biserial correlation*. We expected that there would be a significant positive relationship between the perceived frequency of a type of misconduct and the extent to which officers had direct experience of this behaviour. In other words, we hypothesised that officers were likely to perceive the occurrence of misconduct more frequently if they had direct evidence of the misconduct behaviour.

Figure 4.2 on page 20 shows the percentage of respondents who reported direct evidence of misconduct activities occurring in their centre. **The proportion of officers who indicated that they had direct evidence for the various types of misconduct ranged from over 65 per cent of officers to less than six per cent. There was also a statistically significant positive relationship between direct evidence and perceived frequency for all 30 types of misconduct ($p < .01$), which suggests that perceptions of the frequency of misconduct are influenced by whether or not officers believe they have some evidence of the misconduct occurring in their centre.** Full results are shown in Appendix 3.

Figure 4.2: Percentage of respondents who indicated they had direct evidence of each type of misconduct, 2007



The majority of officers reported having direct evidence of *favouritism by senior staff or management* (65.7%) as well as staff *not following security procedures* (62.3%). This result reflects the results regarding the frequency of misconduct presented in the previous section, where both of these types of misconduct were reported by officers, on average, as the most frequent and second most frequent types of misconduct. As expected, there was a strong association between direct evidence and perceived frequency for both favouritism by senior staff or management ($r_{pb} = .52, p < .01$) as well as staff not following security procedures ($r_{pb} = .51, p < .01$).

Many officers also reported having direct evidence of staff *assaulting or harassing other staff* (41.4%) and *using departmental resources for personal use* (40.1%).¹⁴ Approximately one-third of officers reported having direct evidence of staff *not officially reporting misconduct* (34.9%), *verbal assault or harassment of offenders* (33.1%), *working under the influence of drugs or alcohol* (30.2%) and *inaction by centre management on reported misconduct* (30.1%). Again, for all of these types of misconduct, there was a statistically significant association between direct experience and the average perceptions of frequency. However, these types of misconduct were perceived to occur only 'rarely'.

Favourably, CCOs reported having little direct evidence of any of the remaining types of misconduct activities. These other activities included *racial discrimination against offenders*, *physical assault or verbal assault/harassment of offenders*, *not officially reporting misconduct by other staff* or *using prison industries to make a profit*. There was also a strong correlation between believed direct evidence of these types of misconduct and officers' perceptions of misconduct, with these types of misconduct generally perceived to occur 'rarely' or 'never'. This finding suggests that, where officers consider they have little direct evidence or personal experience of a specific type of misconduct, they will perceive that type of misconduct as occurring less frequently overall.

We also examined the effect of training on perceptions of direct evidence of misconduct. MANOVA test results revealed that training on *professional boundaries and natural justice* had a significant overall effect on perceptions of direct evidence of misconduct ($p < .05$). Looking at the types of misconduct individually showed that respondents who had received training on professional boundaries and natural justice were less likely to report having direct evidence for *sex between staff during work time*.

Together, these results suggest that officers' perceptions of the frequency of misconduct in their centres are based on their direct experiences or evidence they have of such misconduct occurring.

Comments by CCOs about the frequency of misconduct at QCS are provided in Box 4.1.

Box 4.1: Frequency of misconduct: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

It [misconduct] is extremely rare (if at all) and surveys such as this tend to highlight the negative instead of supporting the positive. Suggestion — get over it. Look for the good in honest, hardworking, drastically underpaid staff — instead of endeavouring to make issues where they don't exist.

You can not stop it [misconduct], only slow some of it down, but should not turn a blind eye to it, but 'must' start from the 'top' down not just the officers at the bottom.

I don't think there is that much corruption in Queensland Corrective Services and most staff do a great job. Management shouldn't use 'group punishment' if one or two individuals are caught doing the wrong thing.

Corruption does exist in QCS as it does in all facets of life. It really boils down to a matter of choice by an individual at the point of doing or making a corrupt act or decision at the time. It's just a fact of life [that] not all people will do the right thing whatever that is. It exists and always will from beginning of time to the end of time.

On a custodial level, I would like to think it [misconduct] doesn't happen, however, I personally think that most corruption occurs from non-custodial staff.

14 Note that some personal use of official resources is allowed.

Seriousness of misconduct

Officers were asked to rate the seriousness of 15 misconduct scenarios (see Box 4.2) on a five-point scale from 'not at all serious' to 'extremely serious' (1 = not at all serious, 2 = not very serious, 3 = serious, 4 = very serious, 5 = extremely serious). Several of these scenarios reflect previous instances of misconduct investigated in Queensland correctional institutions by the CMC or CJC, including misuse of prison industries and a sexual relationship between a female psychologist and an offender.


We analysed responses to this question by examining the average seriousness rating for each scenario, as well as the proportion of respondents who rated the scenario as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'. A series of ANOVA tests was used to assess changes between the 2001 and 2007 survey responses while controlling for any covariates, while MANOVA analysis tested for the influence of various demographic variables on overall perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct (see Appendix 4 for these results).

Box 4.2: Misconduct scenarios

- Scenario 1. A nurse provides an anti-depressant to a stressed staff member without a prescription.
- Scenario 2. As officers are restraining a violent offender, one officer receives a black eye from the offender. When escorting the offender to the Detention Unit another officer punches the offender in the stomach as payback.
- Scenario 3. A supervisor in a correctional centre workshop uses departmental resources and offender workers to do work for personal profit and for their friends and co-workers.
- Scenario 4. A psychologist uses individual therapy sessions to engage in a sexual relationship with an offender.
- Scenario 5. A staff member applied for a senior position but, despite following proper procedures, another staff member (who was not interviewed) is given the position.
- Scenario 6. An officer does not report the harassment of an offender by a fellow officer although he/she does not participate in the harassment.
- Scenario 7. A counsellor arrives at the programs room to run an offender group. The counsellor smoked a couple of joints prior to coming to work and still shows the effects.
- Scenario 8. Officers harass the visitors of an offender by targeting them during random searches and delaying them at the gate.
- Scenario 9. A teacher asks an offender to type up the teacher's personal university assignment for him.
- Scenario 10. A chaplain allows an offender in his office to make several unmonitored phone calls to his children for their birthdays.
- Scenario 11. An officer passes information about an offender's criminal record and his/her crimes to another offender.
- Scenario 12. An officer supplies drugs to a number of offenders in return for money.
- Scenario 13. An officer refuses to supply an offender with a 'blue letter' to make a complaint about another officer.
- Scenario 14. An officer is continually harassing and making suggestive and offensive comments to another officer.
- Scenario 15. An officer makes up a false report about an offender's behaviour which will be submitted to a sentence management meeting and which will go onto the offender's file.

Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of respondents who rated each scenario as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'. Overall, in both 2001 and 2007, officers rated all of the scenarios, on average, as 'serious', where the majority of officers rated most of the scenarios as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'. There were significant differences between 2001 and 2007 in perceptions of seriousness for three of the 15 scenarios. One of these scenarios was considered more serious by respondents in 2007, while the other two scenarios were considered less serious by respondents in 2007. Perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct were not influenced by the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Figure 4.3: Percentage of respondents who rated the seriousness of each of the scenarios as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious', 2001 and 2007



The two scenarios rated the most serious were those involving an officer *supplying drugs to offenders* and *having a sexual relationship with an offender*. The scenario involving an officer supplying drugs to offenders in return for money was rated, on average, as 'extremely serious' in both 2001 (Mean = 4.94) and 2007 (Mean = 4.95). Similarly, the scenario involving a psychologist using individual therapy sessions to engage in a sexual relationship with an offender was considered, on average, as 'extremely serious' in both surveys (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 4.88, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 4.87). There was also the most agreement among officers about the seriousness of these two scenarios, with over 99 per cent of respondents in 2001 and 2007 considering both scenarios as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'.

The scenarios rated the least serious were those involving a *nurse providing an anti-depressant to a stressed staff member without a prescription* (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.24, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.43), and the case of *an officer striking an offender* (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.24, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.31). On average, both of these scenarios were rated as 'serious'. In both 2001 and 2007, around 70 per cent of officers rated the scenario where an officer strikes an offender as 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'. About 65 per cent of respondents in 2001 (64.7%) and 70 per cent of respondents in 2007 (70.5%) rated the scenario of a nurse providing non-prescribed medication at the serious end of the scale, while the remaining respondents considered the scenario to be 'not at all serious' or 'not very serious'.

Differences over time

There were statistically significant differences between the 2001 and 2007 surveys for only three of the 15 scenarios. CCOs, on average, rated the scenario involving *unmonitored phone calls* as significantly more serious ($p < .01$) in 2007 (Mean = 4.51) than in 2001 (Mean = 4.22). In 2001, about 91 per cent of respondents considered the scenario of unmonitored phone calls at the serious end of the scale, while in 2007 96 per cent of respondents believed this scenario to be 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'.

In contrast, the perceived seriousness of two scenarios significantly decreased between 2001 and 2007. CCOs rated the scenario involving *working under the influence of drugs or alcohol* as significantly less serious ($p < .01$) in 2007 (Mean = 4.74) than in 2001 (Mean = 4.82). However, the proportions were very similar, with 99 per cent of respondents in 2001 and 98 per cent of respondents in 2007 considering this scenario to be 'serious', 'very serious' or 'extremely serious'.

There was also a significant decrease in the perceived seriousness of the scenario involving *refusing to supply an offender with a blue letter* ($p < .05$). In 2001, more than 93 per cent of respondents rated this scenario at the serious end of the scale (Mean = 4.07), while in 2007 this proportion had dropped to just over 90 per cent of respondents (Mean = 3.97).

Despite the significant decrease in the perceived seriousness of both the working under the influence and refusing a blue letter scenarios, it should be noted that the overall average seriousness of these scenarios was still rated between 'very serious' and 'extremely serious'. There were no statistically significant differences for any of the remaining 13 scenarios.

Factors influencing perceptions

The results of MANOVA analysis revealed that there were no significant influences by any of the demographic factors on perceptions of seriousness, suggesting that perceptions of the seriousness of these scenarios are not influenced by respondent gender, age, length of service with QCS or any interactions between these variables.

However, MANOVA analysis revealed a significant effect of having received training on *changing workplace culture* on perceptions of the seriousness of the misconduct scenarios ($p < .05$). Examining each scenario separately revealed that those respondents in 2007 who had received such training were likely to consider two scenarios — *harassment of visitors* and *making a false report* — as more serious than those who had not received this training. In contrast, respondents in 2007 who had received training on *changing workplace culture* were likely to perceive the scenario involving *unmonitored phone calls* as less serious than those who had not had this training.

Likelihood of apprehension


Officers were asked how likely it was that staff in their centre would be caught if they were involved in the types of misconduct described in the scenarios (see Box 4.2). CCOs rated the likelihood of getting caught from 'never' to 'always' (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = frequently, 5 = always).

We looked at these responses by identifying those scenarios with the highest and lowest likelihood of apprehension and assessing any differences in average ratings between 2001 and 2007. We also assessed the relationship between perceptions of seriousness of the type of misconduct and the likelihood of apprehension. These results are presented in full in Appendix 5.

Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of respondents who indicated that the perpetrator in each scenario would be likely to be caught 'sometimes', frequently' or 'always'. **In both 2001 and 2007, officers' perceptions of the likelihood of being caught involved in misconduct were divided. Favourably, however, the perceptions of the likelihood of being caught had**

significantly increased between the two surveys for nine of the 15 scenarios. While demographic factors were found to have no impact on perceptions, those scenarios that were perceived by officers to be more serious were associated with a higher likelihood of apprehension.

Figure 4.4: Percentage of respondents who indicated that the likelihood of getting caught was 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time' for each scenario, 2001 and 2007



The scenario CCOs rated as having the highest likelihood of apprehension in both 2001 and 2007 was the scenario where a *psychologist was engaged in a sexual relationship with an offender*. Almost 85 per cent of respondents in 2007 and almost 80 per cent of respondents in 2001 indicated that this type of behaviour would lead to the psychologist being caught 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time', with an average rating of 'frequently' (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.47, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.55) in both years.¹⁵

An officer *supplying drugs to a number of offenders, using the prison industry for personal profit, working under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or harassing a colleague* were the scenarios with the next highest likelihood of apprehension. About 70 per cent of CCOs indicated that each of these types of behaviour would be caught 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time', where respondents rated that the officer involved would be caught, on average, 'sometimes'.

The types of misconduct that CCOs believed would be the least likely to be caught in both 2001 and 2007 were *favouritism in promotion* and *providing non-prescribed medication to a staff member*. Respondents rated that these types of misconduct would be caught, on average, 'rarely', with less than half of respondents indicating that the officers involved would be caught 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'.

¹⁵ Officers' perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension for this type of misconduct may have been affected by the CJC's investigation into a similar matter in 2000.

Differences over time

For nine of the 15 scenarios, we found statistically significant increases in CCOs' perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension between 2001 and 2007. Specifically, respondents in 2007 perceived that staff who engage in these types of misconduct would be more likely to be caught than respondents believed they would be in 2001. These significant differences were found for the following scenarios:

- use of the prison industry for personal profit
- not reporting other's misconduct
- working under the influence of drugs and alcohol
- abuse of position
- passing on information
- supplying drugs
- refusing a blue letter
- harassment of a colleague
- making a false report.

There were no significant differences in officers' perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension between the 2001 and the 2007 surveys for the remaining six scenarios, suggesting that perceptions of being caught engaged in these types of misconduct have remained fairly steady over that time.

Factors influencing perceptions

MANOVA results revealed that demographic factors (gender, age and length of service) did not influence perceptions of the likelihood that staff would be caught if involved in the types of misconduct described in the scenarios. This result suggests that perceptions about the likelihood of apprehension are consistent across officers, regardless of gender, age or length of service with QCS.

We also examined whether perceptions about the likelihood of apprehension were influenced by perceptions of the seriousness of the misconduct scenarios. We expected that the likelihood of being caught involved in misconduct would be higher for those scenarios perceived as more serious. CCOs who believe that misconduct is at the serious end of the scale may be more conscious of misconduct or more willing to report instances of misconduct, thereby increasing perceptions of how often misconduct would be detected. We assessed this relationship by calculating the correlation between the risk of apprehension and the perceived seriousness for each scenario from the 2007 survey.

Overall, the results revealed statistically significant positive relationships between the likelihood of getting caught and perceptions of seriousness for 13 of the 15 scenarios. The more serious officers perceived these 13 scenarios to be, the greater the perceived chance of those involved getting caught. This result suggests that the perceived likelihood of apprehension increases when the type of misconduct is considered serious by officers. There was no significant relationship between likelihood of apprehension and seriousness for the two remaining scenarios of *favouritism in promotion* and *unmonitored phone calls*.

Boxes 4.3 and 4.4 provide some of the responses relevant to the concepts discussed above given by respondents when asked about *the single most important suggestion [they] would make about corruption in QCS*.

Box 4.3: Punishment for those who engage in misconduct: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

It should be dealt [with] with the full force of the law.

Harsh penalties for those caught.

Terminate their employment; accountability; rigorous staff evaluations.

Stop it and punish to full extent of the law.

1) Ethical training and cognitive skills training to custodial staff; 2) A heavier sentence given to custodial staff than the outside public because we are working in a criminal justice field.

Heavier punishment (I think) can deter custodial officer to break the law.

Immediate dismissal and criminal charges — it is far too difficult to terminate government employees from their jobs even if there is sufficient evidence. That said, at this facility, we have not seen corruption to any degree. Other prisons I have worked in have had some real issues however.

Box 4.4: Favouritism in promotion: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

There has to be more equality with promotion. Like the saying goes it is not what you know.

Treat all staff equally. There would not be any cronyism. Promotion would be merit-based and not jobs for the boys.

Get rid of the old boy network.

Concentrate on favouritism, cronyism and 'special relationships' as inappropriate promotions are rife within the system.

Staff in management positions have not been promoted by skills and knowledge. It's still the good old boys club. This affects morale and eventually makes staff either leave or get bitter and upset.

There is too much 'jobs for the boys', because they go fishing together or one fixed the other's car, that person will then be given an overtime or a 'cushie' post. There should be an investigation into who's given out the overtime or changing their mates from a unit in the blocks to a position out in the foyer or overtime at the base hospital — looking out for each other.

Reporting misconduct

In both 2001 and 2007, we asked respondents what they might do, as a serving CCO, if they heard about the incidents described in Box 4.2. Respondents were provided with seven options for the action they might take:

1. Take no action.
2. Raise the matter directly with the officer involved.
3. Raise the matter informally with an SCO.
4. Report the matter to the centre GM.
5. Report the matter to QCS.
6. Report the matter to the CMC.
7. Other course of action.

In 2001, officers were asked to indicate which courses of action they would take for each scenario. More than one response was allowed. In 2007, if respondents indicated that they would take some action in response to a scenario, we asked them to indicate if they would continue to take action, how they would do that and the order of this action, if previous action had not resolved the matter (e.g. first raise the matter with the officer involved, followed by reporting the matter to QCS).

We analysed this information by examining the percentage of respondents who said that they would take the various types of action for each scenario in both 2001 and 2007 and compared these proportions between the two surveys using chi-square analysis. In 2007, we also examined the number of subsequent action steps respondents would take if the matter remained unresolved, and the order in which these steps would be taken. We also assessed whether the number of action steps officers would take to have the matter resolved was influenced by demographic factors, training received on *reporting misconduct*, perceptions of misconduct seriousness or perceptions of management.

Because of the difference in how this question was asked in the two surveys, we present the results separately for 2001 and 2007. We also make some general comparisons between the 2001 and the 2007 results. Box 4.5 illustrates some of the comments provided by respondents about reporting misconduct.

Box 4.5: Reporting misconduct: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

Management need to follow QCS procedures when investigating staff, and they need to act on information given to them by staff [and] not wait 1 year when staff have clearly been inappropriate with offenders. It appears nepotism plays a vital role in how business and misconduct is handled.

Corruption occurs within correctional facilities on a regular basis, albeit small or large corruption. Peer pressure and negative reactions/outcomes generally impact on staff reporting on other staff. Penalties for breaking confidential discussions should be implemented.

Make sure it is open and transparent, that if it involves misconduct by all staff regardless of rank or if in management. That it is punished by law (court) not swept under carpet because it reflects badly on staff or organisation, as has happened many, many times in the past.

It should be more openly acknowledged that corruption exists in all walks of life. All staff should be encouraged to look for warning signs and to take action if necessary. Their own lives could be at stake.


If Head Office (mainly) and centre management actually tried to work with officers rather than working over them the officers would be more willing to alert them of misconduct.

Communication is sadly lacking in all aspects of Queensland Corrective Services, communication from the top down. This lack of communication leads to misinformation, divisive elements in the work environment and an 'us and them' attitude. The latter leads to officers passively protecting workmates who they know are acting in a manner contrary to the [QCS] Code of Conduct. Officers see themselves at more risk from 'management' than they do from the actions of their own peers ...

Results of the 2001 survey

Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of officers who would take some action and the percentage who would take no action if they became aware of the types of misconduct described in each of the scenarios. **It is pleasing to note that few officers reported that they would take no action if they became aware of these incidents of misconduct.**

Figure 4.5: Percentage of respondents who would take some action or no action in response to each scenario, 2001



CCOs were most likely to take some action in response to the scenarios involving *supplying drugs to offenders*, a *sexual relationship with an offender* and *the harassment of a colleague*. In particular, all respondents to the 2001 survey said they would take some action if they heard about an *officer supplying drugs to offenders*. Only 1.2 per cent of officers would take no action in response to a *sexual relationship with an offender*, while 1.6 per cent of respondents would take no action against the *harassment of a colleague*. Officers were least likely to take some action in response to *favouritism in promotion*, where 23.8 per cent of respondents said they would take no action if they heard about this incident.

Table 4.1 shows the type of action respondents reported they would take in response to the misconduct scenarios.

Table 4.1: Percentage of respondents who would take some action (in parentheses) and percentage of respondents who would take each type of action in response to the misconduct scenarios, 2001

	Raise with officer	Raise with SCO	Report to GM	Report to QCS	Report to CMC	Other
Provides unauthorised medication (84.0%)	47.5	50.8	15.6	3.3	1.2	1.6
Striking offender (82.9%)	0.8	2.5	39.3	55.7	13.5	1.2
Using industry for personal profit (91.0%)	28.3	44.3	34.4	7.4	4.9	2.0
Relationship with an offender (98.8%)	17.6	38.1	62.3	13.5	11.9	3.7
Favouritism in promotion (76.2%)	1.0	34.4	29.9	16.0	4.1	4.5
Not reporting other's misconduct (91.0%)	37.3	49.6	16.8	4.1	1.6	0.8
Working under the influence (94.7%)	32.8	53.7	34.0	4.5	1.6	2.0
Harassment of visitors (94.3%)	43.4	51.2	21.3	2.9	0.0	0.4
Abuse of position (uni assignment) (85.2%)	37.3	41.8	21.7	4.1	0.8	1.2
Unmonitored phone calls (93.9%)	27.9	57.0	32.4	6.6	2.0	1.6
Passing on information (95.9%)	31.6	54.1	32.0	4.1	2.0	3.3
Supplying drugs (100%)	11.5	33.2	75.4	20.9	26.6	4.9
Refusing a blue letter (92.6%)	43.0	54.1	16.4	2.9	0.4	1.2
Harassment of a colleague (98.4%)	42.2	55.3	32.0	5.7	0.4	2.9
Making a false report (94.3%)	45.1	52.5	27.9	5.3	2.5	1.6

Note: Responses add to more than 100 per cent as more than one response was allowed.

Overall, the most common response to these instances of misconduct was to raise the matter informally with an SCO. This was the most frequent action reported for 12 of the 15 scenarios, where approximately 50 per cent of all respondents reported they would take this action.


For the remaining three scenarios, respondents were more likely to take more formal action. The most frequent response to the case of *an officer supplying drugs to offenders* was to report the matter to the centre GM, with more than three-quarters of CCOs (75.4%) responding that they would take this action. Similarly, 62.3 per cent of CCOs responded that they would also report to the GM the case of *a sexual relationship with an offender*. In contrast, the most frequent response to *striking an offender* was to report the matter to QCS, with 55.7 per cent of officers suggesting this type of action.

These three scenarios — *supplying drugs*, *striking an offender* and *a relationship with an offender* — were also the matters that officers were most likely to report to the CMC. Over a quarter of respondents in 2001 replied they would report *supplying drugs* to the CMC, 13.5 per cent of respondents replied they would report *striking an offender* to the CMC, while 11.9 per cent of officers replied they would report to the CMC if they heard about *a sexual relationship with an offender*.

Results of the 2007 survey

In 2007, officers were asked to indicate not only what action they would take in response to these scenarios, but also the order in which they would take action. Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of officers who would take some action and the percentage who would take no action in response to the scenarios.

Figure 4.6: Percentage of respondents who would take some action or no action in response to each scenario, 2007



In 2007, the option to take no action in response to the misconduct scenarios followed a similar pattern to the results of the 2001 survey. As was the case in 2001, officers in 2007 were least likely to take some action in response to *favouritism in promotion*. Specifically, 27.6 per cent of officers would take no action if they heard about favouritism in promotion. However, the majority of respondents would take some action in response to *supplying drugs* or a *sexual relationship with an offender*. Only 2.7 per cent of respondents would consider taking no action in response to an officer supplying drugs, while 2.9 per cent of respondents would take no action if they heard about a psychologist having a sexual relationship with an offender.

Unfortunately, there was a significant decline between 2001 and 2007 in the proportion of respondents who would take some action for six of the 15 scenarios. These scenarios were:

- striking an offender as payback
- not reporting misconduct
- harassment of visitors
- supplying drugs
- refusing a blue letter
- harassment of a colleague.

We also assessed whether those respondents in 2007 who had reported receiving training on *reporting misconduct* were more likely to take some action in response to these scenarios than those who did not receive this training. Chi-square analysis revealed that those respondents who had completed *reporting misconduct* training were significantly more likely to report that they

would take some action in response to *favouritism in promotion* ($\chi^2 = 9.73, p < .01$). However, receiving this type of training was not significantly related to the willingness of officers to take action in response to the misconduct presented in any of the other scenarios.

The particular types of action respondents in 2007 would take in response to each of the scenarios are shown in Table 4.2. As was the case in 2001, in 2007 the most frequent action in response to 10 of the 15 scenarios was to raise the matter informally with an SCO. The proportion of respondents who would raise the issue informally with an SCO ranged between 46.7 per cent and 56.2 per cent for these 10 scenarios:

- providing non-prescribed medication
- not reporting misconduct
- working under the influence of drugs or alcohol
- harassment of visitors
- abuse of position
- unmonitored phone calls
- passing on information
- refusing a blue letter
- harassment of a colleague
- making a false report.

Table 4.2: Percentage of respondents who would take some action (in parentheses) and percentage of respondents who would take each type of action in response to the misconduct scenarios, 2007

	Raise with officer	Raise with SCO	Report to GM	Report to QCS	Report to CMC	Other
Provides unauthorised medication (83.8%)	48.4	52.8	40.4	16.9	18.2	3.6
Striking offender (77.5%)	47.0	41.6	29.3	12.6	13.8	3.1
Using industry for personal profit (90.1%)	34.4	46.7	48.4	17.2	19.4	2.4
Relationship with an offender (97.1%)	34.4	49.2	70.7	25.4	25.4	3.4
Favouritism in promotion (72.4%)	16.9	34.4	41.2	18.6	16.9	3.4
Not reporting misconduct (85.5%)	37.8	48.7	35.1	13.1	14.3	1.7
Working under the influence (92.3%)	38.7	56.2	46.2	15.7	15.5	2.2
Harassment of visitors (87.4%)	44.8	52.5	35.8	12.3	12.3	2.2
Abuse of position (uni assignment) (85.5%)	35.6	49.4	40.4	11.9	11.6	2.2
Unmonitored phone calls (94.9%)	34.4	58.6	55.2	16.5	16.5	3.4
Passing on information (94.2%)	42.6	56.2	44.3	14.3	15.5	3.4
Supplying drugs (97.3%)	23.0	56.0	72.6	30.0	34.6	4.8
Refusing a blue letter (84.0%)	46.2	49.4	31.0	11.1	10.9	1.2
Harassment of a colleague (93.0%)	49.2	55.2	44.3	14.5	15.3	3.1
Making a false report (91.0%)	42.1	53.3	40.9	15.0	14.0	2.2

Note: Responses add to more than 100 per cent as more than one response was allowed.

Raising issues with an SCO was the preferred course of action in 2001 for the scenarios involving *using the industry for personal profit* and *unmonitored phone calls*. In 2007, however, there was a trend towards more formal reporting for these two scenarios. In response to using the industry for personal profit, 46.7 per cent of officers would raise the matter informally with an SCO, while a similar proportion (48.4%) would report the incident to the centre GM. Officers responded similarly for the case of unmonitored phone calls, where 58.6 per cent of officers would raise this issue with an SCO and 55.2 per cent would report the matter to the GM. For these scenarios, while raising the matter with an SCO was a popular option, respondents in 2007 were also willing to report to the GM. This is a good result and suggests that CCOs are more willing to report instances of misconduct to more senior levels if necessary.

As was the case with the 2001 survey, respondents in 2007 were more likely to take more formal actions in the case of a *sexual relationship with an offender*, with 70.7 per cent of officers suggesting they would report the issue to the GM. Similarly, 72.6 per cent of officers would report the incident of *an officer supplying drugs* to the centre GM.

Further evidence for the trend towards more formal reporting can be seen in the proportion of respondents who would report incidents of misconduct to the CMC. For example:

- For all of the scenarios, there was an increase between 2001 and 2007 in the proportion of respondents who would report incidents to the CMC.
- None of the respondents in 2001 said they would report *harassment of visitors* to the CMC; in 2007, however, 12.3 per cent of officers said they would do so.
- In 2007, officers were most likely to consider reporting to the CMC when an *officer was supplying drugs to offenders* (34.6%) and *having a relationship with an offender* (25.4%); in 2001, only 26.6 per cent of officers said they would report an officer supplying drugs to offenders to the CMC and 11.9 per cent said they would report officers having an inappropriate relationship with an offender to the CMC.¹⁶


The scenario involving *striking an offender* did not, however, fit this pattern. Most officers in 2001 said they would report this matter to QCS (55.7%), compared with only 12.6 per cent of officers in 2007. Instead, the most frequent course of action in 2007 was to raise the matter with the officer involved, with 47 per cent of officers suggesting they would take this course of action.

Number of action steps (2007 survey)

As noted earlier, in 2007 we asked CCOs to indicate in what order they would take action and the point at which they would take no further action in response to the misconduct scenarios. Therefore, we also analysed how far officers would be prepared to go to resolve the situation, or the number of action steps they were willing to take to see misconduct dealt with.

Although most officers would take some action, there was a clear decline in the willingness of officers to continue to take action if previous action had not resolved the matter. On average, across all 15 scenarios, Figure 4.7 shows that, while 89 per cent of officers would take some initial action in response to misconduct, only about one-third of officers (37.3%) would take additional action if the issue was unresolved in the first instance. The number of officers prepared to take additional action continued to decline with subsequent steps.

Figure 4.7: Average percentage of respondents who would take action in response to misconduct if the matter remained unresolved across all scenarios



¹⁶ It should be noted that, under the principle of devolution, the CMC has a responsibility to ensure that suspected misconduct is dealt with by QCS whenever possible.

We also analysed the pattern of the response options and at which point officers would take more formal action. For 12 of the 15 scenarios, there was a common pattern in the preferred order of action steps. Most commonly, officers reported that they would first raise the issue directly with the officer involved. If this did not resolve the issue, officers were then likely to raise the matter informally with the SCO. Reporting the matter to the GM was the next most common course of action, followed by reporting to QCS. Reporting the issue to the CMC was generally considered a final course of action if the matter could not be resolved by other means. The following scenarios followed this general pattern:

- providing non-prescribed medication
- striking an offender who assaulted an officer
- using the industry for personal profit
- working under the influence of drugs or alcohol
- not reporting misconduct
- harassment of visitors
- abuse of position
- unmonitored phone calls
- passing on information
- refusing a blue letter
- harassment of a colleague
- making a false report.

The remaining scenarios had a less clear pattern in the preferred order of action. For example, in response to *an officer supplying drugs*, reporting the matter to the GM was common in the first, second or third instance, before officers responded that they would report the matter to QCS and then the CMC. There were also unclear patterns for the scenarios of *favouritism in promotion* and *having a sexual relationship with an offender*.

Factors influencing responses to misconduct (2007 survey)

We were also interested in assessing the influence of other factors on officers' willingness to take additional action to resolve misconduct. Specifically, we wanted to identify any factors that may affect how far officers would be prepared to go to resolve the situation, or the number of action steps they would be willing to take to see misconduct dealt with. We focused on the impact of four variables:

1. officer gender
2. officer length of service with QCS
3. officer ratings of the seriousness of misconduct
4. officer perceptions about how management handles misconduct.

We assessed gender differences by comparing the average number of action steps for male officers with the average number of action steps for female officers for each scenario using ANOVA tests. **There were no significant differences between male and female officers in the number of action steps they would take to resolve misconduct for any of the scenarios.**

The influence of the remaining three variables was assessed by correlating the number of action steps officers were willing to take with their length of service, perceptions of management and the seriousness ratings that they gave for each scenario. The results for length of service indicated a statistically significant relationship between length of service and 12 of the 15 scenarios. These scenarios were:

- providing non-prescribed medication
- striking an offender who assaulted an officer
- using the industry for personal profit
- having a sexual relationship with an offender
- favouritism in promotion

- not reporting misconduct
- working under the influence of drugs and alcohol
- harassment of visitors
- passing on information
- refusing a blue letter
- harassment of a colleague
- making a false report.

For these 12 scenarios, there was a negative relationship with length of service such that officers who had been employed with QCS longer were less likely to take additional action steps to resolve misconduct. Alternatively, officers who had more recently joined QCS were more likely to report that they would take additional action in response to the specified scenarios. There were no statistically significant relationships between length of service and the scenarios involving *abuse of position, unmonitored phone calls or supplying drugs to offenders*.

We also examined the relationship between the perceived seriousness of the misconduct scenarios from the officers' own perspective and officers' willingness to take action. **With the exception of two scenarios, there were statistically significant positive relationships between the number of action steps and perceived seriousness.** This suggests that, when officers consider misconduct to be at the serious end of the scale, they are more likely to take additional action to ensure the matter gets resolved. However, statistically significant relationships did not exist for the two scenarios that were rated most serious — *having a sexual relationship with an offender* and *supplying drugs to offenders*.

Finally, we examined the relationship between officers' perceptions of how management handles misconduct and their willingness to take additional action to resolve misconduct. Questions assessing officers' perceptions of how management deals with misconduct were asked in a later part of the survey (see pages 43–4). We used these nine questions to create a composite variable by taking an average of officers' responses to these questions to capture overall perceptions of how management deals with misconduct. We then examined the relationship between this overall perception of how management deals with misconduct and the number of action steps officers were willing to take to see an instance of misconduct resolved.

The results revealed a statistically significant positive relationship between the number of steps and perceptions of management for 12 of the 15 scenarios. For these scenarios, **more favourable perceptions of management were associated with a greater willingness to continue to take action against misconduct.** So, officers were more willing to take additional action when they believed that management would appropriately deal with reported misconduct. This was not the case, however, for the scenarios involving *a sexual relationship with an offender, unmonitored phone calls* and *supplying drugs*.

Overall, these results suggest that there are a number of factors that influence officers' willingness to continue to take action against misconduct. The longer officers had been employed with QCS, the less likely they were to continue to take action to resolve misconduct. On the other hand, officers were more willing to take additional action when they considered the misconduct as serious, and when they believed that management would deal with reported misconduct appropriately. The scenarios that were considered the most serious — *a sexual relationship with an offender* and *supplying drugs to offenders* — did not, however, follow either of these patterns.

The full results of these analyses are presented in Appendix 6.

Formal training

In both 2001 and 2007, CCOs were asked to indicate whether or not they had received formal training from QCS in a number of areas. For each type of training, officers indicated either 'yes' or 'no'. When respondents had participated in training, we also asked them to rate how relevant this training had been to their role in the correctional centre on a five-point scale from 'not at all relevant' to 'extremely relevant' (1 = not at all relevant, 2 = not very relevant, 3 = somewhat relevant, 4 = very relevant, 5 = extremely relevant).

Different types of training were assessed in the 2001 and 2007 surveys, and so we present the results of these analyses separately for each survey. In 2001, we asked officers about training in the following five areas:

- ethical decision making
- sexual harassment in the workplace
- centre induction training
- QCS Code of Conduct
- policies and procedures.

To account for increased training at correctional institutions during the interim period,¹⁷ in 2007 we extended the list of training and asked officers about their training in the following areas:

- absenteeism policy
- appropriate information technology (IT) use and fraud prevention
- bullying and harassment
- changing workplace culture
- QCS Code of Conduct
- ethical circles
- fraud and corruption
- integrity in leadership
- professional boundaries and natural justice
- dealing with difficult prisoners
- reporting misconduct.

For both survey years, we looked at the percentage of respondents who had participated in each type of training. We then examined the percentage of respondents who indicated that the training was 'not at all relevant' or 'not very relevant' and 'somewhat relevant', 'very relevant' or 'extremely relevant', as well as the average rating of relevance for each type of training. This information is presented in Appendix 7.


Results of the 2001 survey

The majority of respondents in 2001 had received training in the areas of *sexual harassment* (88.8%), *induction* (87.0%), *the QCS Code of Conduct* (84.5%) and *QCS policies and procedures* (77.9%). However, less than half of respondents (46.0%) had received training in *ethical decision making*.

Figure 4.8 presents the percentage of respondents who completed each type of training and, of those, the proportion who indicated that the training was 'somewhat relevant', 'very relevant' or 'extremely relevant' to their job as a CCO. The average relevance ratings for each type of training are shown in Appendix 7.

¹⁷ Prior to the establishment of the Ethical Standards Branch (ESB) in 2001, there had been no systematic training on integrity and ethical issues. In 2002, the ESB commenced state-wide training on these issues. Since this time, the ESB has been identifying training needs by analysing the trends in official misconduct and, from this, developing and updating training programs (Kelvin Brown, Principal Adviser Integrity Development, QCS, personal communication, 22 August 2008).

Figure 4.8: Percentage of respondents who completed training (shown in parentheses) and the percentage of respondents who reported that the training was ‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’, 2001



Generally, most respondents who completed training considered these types of training to be relevant to the job of a CCO. Training in *QCS policies and procedures* was considered the most relevant type of training in 2001, where over 90 per cent of respondents rated this training as ‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’ and, on average, this training was rated as ‘very relevant’ (Mean = 3.97). Similarly, about 85 per cent of respondents completed *QCS Code of Conduct* training and the majority (80.9%) rated this training at the relevant end of the scale. *Correctional centre induction* was considered the least relevant type of training, although the majority of those who completed this training (63.6%) still considered the training to be ‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’.

Box 4.6 illustrates some of the comments provided by respondents about the need for more training.

Box 4.6: The need for more training: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

More effective training is required. Training that is proactive rather than reactive.

Get effective training, based on good ethics. Don't get staff to train other staff, if its trainers are corrupt or seem to be corrupt. eg ethics should be delivered from outside people.

The world is corrupt. This cannot be changed, however training and encouraging ethical standards in prisons may be of benefit.

It all starts at the training school. Instructors and dept too soft on staff. Training needs to be militant. Staff then know where they stand and morale then becomes high. Staff then will take their jobs more seriously.

Educate new staff, custodial and non-custodial, and explain what their possible actions can result in. In other words, don't use trainers with no custodial experience, and be very graphic about the end results that corruption can cause within a prison environment.

Give leadership training to managers and [training in] people skills. Also managers need to know how to manage. Supervisors also [receive] very limited training if any is given in this area.


Prevention is better than cure.

Results of the 2007 survey

In 2007, the majority of officers had received formal training from the department in a range of areas. Most officers had received training on *the QCS Code of Conduct* (96.8%) and *bullying and harassment* training (88.2%). On the other hand, less than a quarter (24.1%) had received training about *the agency's absenteeism policy*.

The relevance of training in 2007 is shown in Figure 4.9, which presents the percentage of respondents who found the training 'somewhat relevant', 'very relevant' or 'extremely relevant' in 2007. This figure also shows (in parentheses) the proportion of respondents who indicated that they had completed each type of training. The average ratings of relevance for each type of training are provided in Appendix 7.

Figure 4.9: Percentage of respondents who completed training (shown in parentheses) and percentage of respondents who reported that the training was 'somewhat relevant', 'very relevant' or 'extremely relevant', 2007



Over three-quarters of respondents in 2007 reported that most of the training they had received was 'somewhat relevant', 'very relevant' or 'extremely relevant'. *QCS Code of Conduct* training (Mean = 3.70) and training on *dealing with difficult prisoners* (Mean = 3.70) were considered the most relevant types of training. *Absenteeism* training, which less than a quarter of respondents completed, was considered the least relevant type of training (Mean = 2.20); only 38.8 per cent of respondents considered this to be 'somewhat relevant', 'very relevant' or 'extremely relevant'.

PERCEPTIONS OF WORKING IN QUEENSLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

While the previous chapter focused on CCOs' perceptions of misconduct, this chapter presents the results of their general perceptions about management, other staff and the general experience of working as a CCO. This chapter is divided into five sections on officers' perceptions of:

1. **how misconduct can be justified**
2. **how management handles misconduct**
3. **senior staff and management**
4. **the general work environment**
5. **job satisfaction.**

We analysed the responses to each of these sections in a similar way to those reported in the previous chapter. First, we examined the proportion of respondents who responded at the upper end of the scale in each case, as well as average ratings for each question. Second, we tested for any differences in CCOs' perceptions between the 2001 and the 2007 surveys using ANOVA tests, controlling for the effect of any demographic variables. Finally, we assessed the impact of officer gender, age and length of service with QCS on overall perceptions using MANOVA tests. The main results are presented here, while the statistical results are presented in full in the appendixes. Comments from officers are presented in shaded boxes throughout the chapter and key findings are shown in bold text.

Justifications for misconduct

Officers were asked to rate 19 statements designed to assess how misconduct could be justified or rationalised by officers in correctional institutions. The questions aimed at capturing officers' perceptions of the causes of misconduct, given the role of CCOs and the work environment of prisons.

The same 19 statements were included in both the 2001 and 2007 surveys. For each question, CCOs were required to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). The statements covered five main domains that may lead to or 'justify' misconduct, including the role of other officers, management and offenders, as well as the nature of the job and working conditions at QCS. These statements, as well as the domain they represent, are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Statements that make up the five justifications for misconduct

Domain	Statement
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The sorts of misconduct that the average staff member might get involved in are nothing compared to what management get away with.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management is to blame for corrupt behaviour because it concentrates on what staff do wrong rather than what they do right.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is understandable if officers behave improperly after management has let them down.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If management engages in unethical behaviour they can't expect other staff not to as well.
Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A new officer can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct if other officers are also doing it.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sometimes you have to break the rules if you want to get on with other officers.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A staff member is only supporting his/her colleagues if they don't report misconduct of other staff.
Offenders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sometimes you have to break rules to keep offenders happy.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most misconduct only affects offenders so it doesn't really hurt anyone.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If an offender hurts an officer they have only themselves to blame for being hurt in return.
Working conditions at QCS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If correctional officers were paid more there would be less temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Staff can't be blamed for misconduct if they haven't received proper training.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If the department expects correctional officers to get qualifications it's OK to use work time and equipment to do the study.
Nature of the job	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expecting officers to always follow the rules is incompatible with getting the job done.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The job of a correctional officer is very stressful and officers can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sometimes it's necessary to break the rules to keep things running smoothly.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It's not surprising that staff become hardened, given their harsh working environment.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It doesn't really matter what you do because the community doesn't care what happens inside.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sometimes because of the nature of the job an officer might have to do things they would not normally do.

Some respondents expressed the view that misconduct is not justified in any situation, as illustrated by the comments in Box 5.1.

Box 5.1: There is no excuse for misconduct: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

No excuse for corruption within QCS. We're paid to manage criminals not become one!
 There is no excuse for corruption.


I have had 'minimal' experience of corruption in my job but believe it should NEVER be tolerated at ANY level in Corrective Services.

Corruption if allowed, ignored or embraced is like a cancer to all staff employed within Corrections. It can come in many forms, the face of which continues to change as time goes on.

There is no room for corruption.

There were mixed levels of agreement and disagreement for the factors perceived to cause or to justify misconduct (see Figure 5.1) and a statistically significant difference between 2001 and 2007 for five of the 19 statements. Overall, officers appeared to use the behaviour of management to justify or excuse misconduct. In addition, male officers were more likely to justify misconduct than female officers. Full results are shown in Appendix 8.

Figure 5.1: Percentage of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statements justifying misconduct, 2001 and 2007



There was strong agreement with the statement *if the department expects correctional officers to get qualifications it's OK to use work time and equipment to do the study*. On average, respondents 'agreed' with this statement in both 2001 (Mean = 3.52) and 2007 (Mean = 3.64), where about 55 per cent of respondents in 2001 and 67 per cent of respondents in 2007 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement.

There was also strong agreement in both surveys with the statement *it is not surprising that staff become hardened, given their harsh working environment*. About 70 per cent of respondents in 2001 and about 65 per cent of respondents in 2007 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement, while, on average, respondents 'agreed' with this statement in both surveys (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.73, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.61).

CCOs most strongly disagreed with the statement *most misconduct only affects offenders so it doesn't really hurt anyone*. On average, respondents 'disagreed' with this statement (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 1.72, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 1.90), and only about 2 per cent of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' in both 2001 and 2007. There was, however, a statistically significant difference between the two surveys, suggesting that officers were more likely to agree (or less likely to disagree) with this statement in 2007 than in 2001. Fewer officers 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' in 2007 (82.2%) than in 2001 (88.9%), suggesting that misconduct that affects offenders may be excused more in 2007 than in previous years.

We also examined the overall dimensions or groupings of the justifications of misconduct (i.e. management, officers, offenders, working conditions and the nature of the job). We did this by examining the average level of agreement across all statements within each domain, and then comparing these averages across domains. For example, we compared the mean for the three statements representing offenders with the other means for the statements from the management, officers, working conditions and nature of the job domain groupings. This comparison revealed that **CCOs were most likely to use the behaviour of managers to justify or excuse misconduct. On the other hand, the behaviours of other officers or offenders were considered to be the least justified causes of misconduct in correctional institutions.**

Differences over time

There were statistically significant differences between 2001 and 2007 for five of the 19 statements.

In 2007, there was a significant decrease ($p < .01$) in officers' agreement that *staff can't be blamed for misconduct if they haven't received proper training*. Fewer respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' in 2007 (30.0%) than in 2001 (45.3%) and, on average, ratings on this justification for misconduct were divided in both years (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.06, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.76).

For the remaining four statements for which significant differences were found, there was a significant increase in agreement between 2001 and 2007. As noted previously, there was a statistically significant increase ($p < .05$) between 2001 and 2007 for the statement *most misconduct only affects offenders so it doesn't really hurt anyone*.

There was also significantly more agreement in 2007 that *the job of a correctional officer is very stressful and officers can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct* ($p < .01$). Although officers 'disagreed' with this statement, on average, in both 2001 and 2007 (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 1.86, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.12), more respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement in 2007 (7.1%) than in 2001 (3.7%).

Similarly, there was a significant increase in officers' agreement that *if correctional officers were paid more there would be less temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour* ($p < .05$). On average, respondents were divided in their agreement with this statement in both 2001 and 2007 (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 2.67, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.95); however, more respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement in 2007 (34.9%) than in 2001 (28.6%).

The final statement for which there was a significant increase in agreement between 2001 and 2007 was *it doesn't really matter what you do because the community doesn't care what happens inside* ($p < .01$, Mean₂₀₀₁ = 2.79, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.03). Almost 40 per cent of respondents in 2007 (37.3%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that the community does not care what happens in prisons so the actions of CCOs do not matter, up from 33.1 per cent of officers in 2001.

Factors influencing perceptions

MANOVA results revealed that neither respondent age nor length of service had a significant effect on the level of agreement by CCOs with various justifications of misconduct. There was, however, a significant effect of gender on these perceptions ($p < .05$). Examining each of these statements individually revealed significant effects for 12 of the 19 statements:

- It is understandable if officers behave improperly after management has let them down.
- A new officer can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct if other officers are also doing it.
- Sometimes you have to break the rules if you want to get on with other officers.
- A staff member is only supporting his/her colleagues if they don't report misconduct of other staff.
- Sometimes you have to break rules to keep offenders happy.
- If an offender hurts an officer they have only themselves to blame for being hurt in return.
- If correctional officers were paid more there would be less temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour.
- Staff can't be blamed for misconduct if they haven't received proper training.
- The job of a correctional officer is very stressful and officers can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct.
- Sometimes it's necessary to break the rules to keep things running smoothly.
- It's not surprising that staff become hardened, given their harsh working environment.
- Sometimes because of the nature of the job an officer might have to do things they would not normally do.

On average, male officers agreed with each of these statements significantly more strongly than did their female counterparts. This result suggests that male CCOs are more likely to justify or excuse misconduct than are female CCOs.

Box 5.2 illustrates some of the comments provided by CCOs about misconduct at management levels.

Box 5.2: Misconduct at management levels: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

Honesty and integrity start at the very top of the management ladder and go to the very bottom rung.

There are still members employed in the agency who subscribe to the 'do as I say, not as I do' policy! This way of thinking needs to be addressed! Accountability for one's actions is the most important message that needs to be sent out to all QCS employees and stakeholders!

Management apply the rules when it suits them and ignore the rules when it doesn't.

Don't keep looking at the officers, look at head office. If we are supposed to be accountable and transparent, why does head office not open themselves up? They breach the code of conduct regularly and nothing happens to them but if a CCO does it we are pounced on.

Get rid of current unethical managers and replace with some honest fair dinkum people.

Management and misconduct

CCOs were asked to rate several statements about their perceptions of the way correctional centre management dealt with misconduct. For each question, officers were required to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Four statements were provided in both the 2001 survey and the 2007 survey. These were:


- Management is careful about detecting/reporting misconduct.
- It is not unusual for officers to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers.
- Management deals with official misconduct in an open way.
- QCS takes a very tough line on improper behaviour by CCOs.

An additional five statements were provided in 2007:

- Management encourages officers to report concerns about corrupt behaviour.
- Management carefully investigates officers' concerns about corrupt behaviour.
- Management is serious about protecting people who report wrongdoing.
- I would suffer negative consequences from my workmates for reporting corrupt behaviour.
- I would suffer negative consequences from management for reporting corrupt behaviour.

Officers' perceptions of how management deals with misconduct were mixed and the proportion of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' varied considerably across the nine statements (see Figure 5.2). On average, officers were fairly divided in their impressions of how management dealt with misconduct, neither strongly agreeing nor strongly disagreeing with the statements. There was a significant difference in perceptions between 2001 and 2007 for only one of the statements. Full results are shown in Appendix 9.

Figure 5.2: Percentage of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statements about management and misconduct, 2001 and 2007



The strongest agreement was for the statement that *QCS takes a very tough line on improper behaviour by CCOs*. On average, respondents 'agreed' with this statement in 2007 (Mean = 3.66), and the majority of respondents (66.0%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed'. This is encouraging and suggests that CCO misconduct is perceived to be intolerable by QCS. This was also a significant increase in agreement from the 2001 survey ($p < .05$), where about half of respondents (53.3%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement (Mean = 3.36). However, this was the only statement for which there was a significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

On the other hand, in 2007 officers expressed concerns about the ramifications of reporting misconduct. Almost 60 per cent of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that they would *suffer negative consequences from workmates for reporting corrupt behaviour*, while almost a third of officers (32.3%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that they would *suffer negative consequences from management if they reported corrupt behaviour*. In addition, less than a quarter of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that *management is serious about protecting those who report wrongdoing*.

Factors influencing perceptions

MANOVA test results revealed no significant main effects for gender, age, length of service or interactions, suggesting that these demographic variables have little impact on perceptions of management and misconduct.

Some comments by respondents about management handling misconduct are shown in Box 5.3.

Box 5.3: Management's handling of misconduct: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

It's there, always has been, and always will be. It's what management do about it and how quickly its response is that will and can make a difference.

Instead of shuffling victims have management address the perpetrators, address the problems — stop looking for someone to blame.

I will never speak out again about corrupt activities as there is a lack of protection for myself as a whistleblower.

Praise be to the CCO who reports his fellow CCOs. God help them who report supervisors, managers or directors, for they shall feel the wrath of a vindictive organisation. Comfort could be gained from the Whistleblowers Act were it not for the fact that this Act is nothing but rhetoric crap.

That management have the BALLS to support staff under the Whistleblowers Protection Act. This is a worthless Act which protects the GUILTY not the whistleblower. Corruption will NEVER be eradicated when others can see officers like me being continually threatened and harassed with no protection.


Senior staff and management

CCOs were asked to rate several statements that examined officers' perceptions of senior staff and management at their correctional institution. Four questions were asked in both 2001 and 2007. For each question, officers were required to rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). These statements were:

- The senior staff set a good example for new officers.
- It is easy to talk to supervisors about problems at work.
- Management recognises/rewards proper behaviour by officers.
- Management is accessible and available when needed.

Only a small proportion of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with these statements about senior staff and management (see Figure 5.3). On average, officers 'disagreed' or were divided in their responses to all four statements about senior staff and management. (See Appendix 10 for full results.)

Figure 5.3: Percentage of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with each of the statements about senior staff and management, 2001 and 2007



However, there were statistically significant improvements in officers' perceptions over time for three of the four statements. Compared with 2001, officers in 2007 agreed more strongly ($p < .01$) that *the senior staff set a good example for new officers* (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 2.39, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.74). In 2001, 20.1 per cent of officers 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement, while in 2007 almost 30 per cent (29.1%) of officers believed that senior staff set a good example. Despite this significant improvement, over 40 per cent of officers 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with this statement in 2007.

Similarly, there was significantly more agreement in 2007 that *it is easy to talk to supervisors about problems at work* ($p < .01$, Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.00, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.23). Almost half of the respondents in 2007 (48.0%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement, compared with 41.6 per cent of respondents in 2001.

The final significant difference between 2001 and 2007 was for the statement that *management is accessible and available when needed* ($p < .05$, Mean₂₀₀₁ = 2.57, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.76). In 2001, 25.9 per cent of officers 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement, compared with 28.2 per cent of officers in 2007.

The significant increase in agreement with these statements in 2007 suggests that there have been some improvements in officers' perceptions of senior staff and management. However, officers' perceptions of *management recognises/rewards proper behaviour by officers* were roughly the same for 2001 and 2007. In both years, officers 'disagreed', on average, with this statement, where 12.7 per cent of respondents in 2001 and 9.3 per cent of respondents in 2007 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with this statement. In contrast, over 75 per cent of officers in 2001, and 71.8 per cent of officers in 2007, 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' that management recognises/rewards proper behaviour by officers.

Factors influencing perceptions

Respondent age, gender and length of service with QCS had no effect on perceptions of senior staff and management.

Some CCOs' comments about recognition from management are shown in Box 5.4.

Box 5.4: Recognition from management: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

Straight hard working staff don't get any recognition. The squeaky hinge gets all the oil. Management shaft all staff when they can — have a look at the mess the place is in since the rosters were forced on us. Why not put people where they are happy to be and happy with their conditions/colleagues. Even so far as transferring between centres. They don't care about staff's life outside the force. What a disgrace!!

Recognise the outstanding job officers do with praise — try management by walking and talking.

Most misconduct occurs, in my opinion, due to a lack of recognition of work and high levels of stress and is not always intentional misconduct but due to laziness and lack of training in regard to this issue.

Good pay and good leadership in workplace. And management to sometimes come down to a level to thank staff [for] what they do every day.

Officers don't get enough positive feedback/recognition for the work they do, and it seems that some think 'what the hell', the department/management don't give a damn about me, so I'll get what I can out of this.

Management need to make themselves more available to staff at the workplace. The belief by many officers is that management don't care about them and never ask them for an opinion.


The general work environment

CCOs were asked to rate seven statements about the general work environment in Queensland correctional centres in both 2001 and 2007. For each question, officers rated their level of agreement or disagreement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). These statements were:

- The average officer is 100 per cent behind organisational goals.
- My pre-service training prepared me for my job as an officer.
- My values and those of the department are similar.
- Typical officers put more effort into their job than expected.
- The general public misunderstands my job as a CCO.
- As an officer, you feel safe and comfortable in all parts of your working environment.
- Typical officers feel a great deal of loyalty to the service.

Figure 5.4 presents the proportion of respondents who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with each of these statements. **Generally, less than half of the respondents in both 2001 and 2007 agreed with six of these seven statements. There was a significant increase in agreement between 2001 and 2007 for only one of these statements.** See Appendix 11 for full results.

Figure 5.4: Percentage of respondents who ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with each of the statements about the general work environment, 2001 and 2007



The statement that received the highest average rating on agreement was that *the general public misunderstands my job as a CCO*, a result that has remained consistent since 2001. On average, respondents ‘agreed’ with this statement in both years ($\text{Mean}_{2001} = 4.00$, $\text{Mean}_{2007} = 3.94$), where almost 80 per cent of respondents in both 2001 and 2007 ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that the general public misunderstands their job.

The statement that had the lowest average agreement was that *typical officers feel a great deal of loyalty to the service*, which had mixed responses in both years ($\text{Mean}_{2001} = 2.51$, $\text{Mean}_{2007} = 2.53$). Just over 20 per cent of respondents in both 2001 (23.3%) and 2007 (22.9%) ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement. In contrast, over 50 per cent of respondents in both surveys ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ that typical officers feel a great deal of loyalty to the service.

Encouragingly, between 2001 and 2007 there was a statistically significant increase in agreement ($p < .05$) that *as an officer, you feel safe and comfortable in all parts of your working environment* ($\text{Mean}_{2001} = 2.65$, $\text{Mean}_{2007} = 2.84$). In 2001, 29.5 per cent of respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement, while in 2007 this proportion had increased to over a third of respondents (33.9%). Despite this improvement, almost 44 per cent of respondents ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ that they feel safe and comfortable in all parts of the working environment in 2007.

Factors influencing perceptions

There were no significant effects of respondent gender, age or length of service with QCS (or any interactions between these variables) on perceptions of the general work environment.

Job satisfaction


CCOs were asked six questions about their level of satisfaction with various aspects of their job. These aspects were:

- pay
- chance for advancement
- freedom to use own judgment
- working conditions
- the way co-workers get along with each other
- praise for doing a good job.

For each of these six aspects, respondents were required to rate the extent to which they were satisfied or dissatisfied on a five-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = dissatisfied, 3 = neutral, 4 = satisfied, 5 = very satisfied).

Figure 5.5 shows the proportion of respondents in both 2001 and 2007 who were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with these aspects of their job. **Overall, officers seem to be dissatisfied with various aspects of their job, with satisfaction ratings, on average, ranging between 'dissatisfied' and 'neutral'. Less than half of all respondents in both years were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with these aspects of their job. There was a significant decrease between 2001 and 2007 in satisfaction with the pay aspect of the job.** See Appendix 12 for full results.

Figure 5.5: Percentage of respondents who were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with various aspects of their job, 2001 and 2007



CCOs were most satisfied with *the way co-workers get along with each other*, although in both 2001 and 2007 they were divided in their ratings (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 3.15, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 3.35). However, about half of the respondents in both 2001 (43.2%) and 2007 (52.0%) were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with this aspect of their job.

In 2007, CCOs reported the lowest levels of satisfaction with the pay, advancement opportunities and praise aspects of their job. In 2001, this was the case for working conditions, advancement opportunities and praise received.

Between 2001 and 2007, there was a significant decrease ($p < .01$) in respondents' satisfaction with *the pay I get for the work I do*. On average, respondents were divided in ratings of their pay

satisfaction in 2001 (Mean = 3.05), where 42 per cent of respondents were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with their pay. In 2007, however, respondents were 'dissatisfied', on average, with their pay (Mean = 2.36), and only 20.9 per cent of respondents indicated that they were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the pay aspect of their job.

CCOs were also 'dissatisfied' with *the chance for advancement in this job*. In both 2001 and 2007, respondents rated their satisfaction with the chance for advancement as 'dissatisfied', on average (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 2.39, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.38), with only about 19 per cent of respondents in both years indicating that they were 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with this aspect of their job. In contrast, almost 60 per cent of respondents in both years reported being 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied' with the opportunities for advancement.

Similarly, respondents were 'dissatisfied', on average, in both 2001 and 2007 with *the praise I get for doing a good job* (Mean₂₀₀₁ = 2.25, Mean₂₀₀₇ = 2.40). Less than 15 per cent of respondents in both years reported being 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with this aspect of the job, while more than half of respondents (54.7% in 2001 and 63.4% in 2007) were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'.

Factors affecting job satisfaction

Multivariate analysis revealed no significant effects of gender, age or length of service (or interactions between these variables) on ratings of job satisfaction. This result suggests that perceptions of job satisfaction were not influenced by any of these demographic factors.

Box 5.5 illustrates some of the comments provided by respondents about pay and job security.

Box 5.5: Pay and job security: selected responses by participants to *What is the single most important suggestion you would make about corruption in QCS?*

If you pay peanuts, you get monkeys.

More pay, that's all we need. I can put up with anything if I got paid more.

Pay your employees more and acknowledge the work they do.

As cost of living increases and families are finding it hard to make ends meet, the chance of corruption will always increase. Officers are not paid enough for what they do.

All permanent jobs out of the academy. No contracts — not casuals, look after us because society needs us to do this at times difficult and dangerous job.

I would like the department to offer more full-time positions. I would like to see the pay structure increase. I would like to see more structure in place within the rank structure.

More real opportunities and fair chance for all staff to have a chance to advance their career.

More job security!!!

Pay us what we're worth as we are the end of the criminal justice system.

The department itself is corrupt for not paying staff the pay scale to which they should be entitled compared to the outside world. They bring outside people in to do the same job and then pay them at least twice as much as that of what the officer receives.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter summarises the results of the survey and discusses their implications. We also make several recommendations and suggestions for improvement.

Key findings and improvements

Overall, the research results presented in this report suggest that QCS has made some significant improvements in the management and prevention of misconduct in correctional institutions. We found little evidence of a culture of corruption in which misconduct is widely considered acceptable or excusable. On the contrary, most CCOs strongly condemned all forms of misconduct and showed little tolerance towards colleagues who engage in inappropriate behaviour.

The research results indicate that there has been a significant improvement in several areas at QCS over the study period. In particular:

- Misconduct appears to be occurring less often (there was a significant decrease in the perceived frequency of misconduct).
- There appears to be a greater perception that CCOs will be caught if they engage in misconduct, particularly when the misconduct is considered to be serious in nature.
- Respondents were of the view that QCS now takes misconduct more seriously (officers' perceptions of how seriously QCS views misconduct were found to have increased, as had officers' agreement that QCS takes a tough line on improper behaviour by officers).
- Respondents were of the view that the typical CCO now also takes misconduct more seriously.
- There was a decrease in the number of CCOs who said they would take no action in response to misconduct.
- CCOs reported that they are now less likely to ignore improper conduct by other officers.
- CCOs see the relevance of integrity-related training.
- CCOs now take greater personal responsibility for misconduct, rather than blaming external factors, such as the behaviour of offenders or other officers, or the nature of the job.

In addition to the areas of clear improvement in officers' perceptions, there were a couple of common themes or trends that were evident across the results from both the 2001 and 2007 surveys. First, two misconduct scenarios — *a sexual relationship between a psychologist and an offender* and *supplying drugs to offenders* — tended to follow a different pattern from the other scenarios. These scenarios were generally rated as the most serious situations of misconduct, and officers believed that QCS would take these types of misconduct as seriously as officers themselves. These two scenarios were also rated as having the highest likelihood of being detected, and officers reported being more willing to take more formal action in response to these types of misconduct than the types of misconduct portrayed in the remaining scenarios. This may be due to the general agreement between officers in their responses to these scenarios, or may be because investigations and inquiries have been conducted into these types of official misconduct, which may have subsequently influenced officers' perceptions about these examples of misconduct.

A second common theme evident throughout the results was officers' negative perceptions of both senior staff and management and of the work environment more generally. Officers' negative perceptions of management centred on management's handling of misconduct, a perceived lack of reward and recognition, and a general division between management and CCOs. In regard to the general work environment, officers reported relatively low levels of loyalty to QCS and dissatisfaction with various elements of their job.

Changes at Queensland Corrective Services

Several changes have taken place within QCS since 2001. For example, since the establishment of the ESB in 2001, there has been an increased focus on CCO training. The ESB began conducting trends analyses of official misconduct complaints and using this information to identify training needs. The results of these analyses have led to the development of more systematic and consistent training on ethics and integrity issues. There have also been significant reviews of QCS policies and procedures since 2001, including several reviews of the QCS Code of Conduct as well as updates to the misconduct investigations procedure.¹⁸

This emphasis on officer training and changes to QCS policies and procedures may explain some of the significant changes between the 2001 and 2007 survey results. There are, however, a number of other factors, more difficult to identify, that may have contributed to these changes. For example, new management or leadership may contribute to a renewed focus on misconduct mitigation strategies, extra resources devoted to misconduct prevention or support for training initiatives. Similarly, the outcomes of particular investigations may have influenced changes between 2001 and 2007 by acting as a deterrent, with wider promulgation of outcomes and anecdotal information shared among officers. The methodology used in this research precludes attributing any changes in CCO perceptions to these types of factors.

Ongoing concerns

Despite the positive changes in our results and the improvements implemented by QCS since 2001, the results of this research highlight some areas where greater attention is warranted. These issues are outlined here for consideration by QCS managers. We make several recommendations designed to address officers' perceptions of favouritism and reluctance to report suspected misconduct. We also comment on and suggest ways to improve the relationship between staff and management.

Favouritism

An important issue for CCOs was perceived favouritism by senior staff and managers, which was the most consistently identified issue in both the 2001 and 2007 surveys. Favouritism by senior staff and management was perceived by officers as the most frequent type of misconduct occurring in their centres. More officers reported that they had direct evidence of favouritism in their centres than any other type of misconduct. In addition, officers believed that those staff who show favouritism in promotion are unlikely to get caught. Officers also considered favouritism as one of the most serious types of misconduct. Responses to open-ended questions by officers suggested that the perception is that favouritism occurs because of an 'old boys network' or 'jobs for mates'.

It is important that QCS address the issue of favouritism, perceived or otherwise. Favouritism during the recruitment process, or in other areas, may compromise the quality of service provided, while perceptions of favouritism may lower officer morale and satisfaction, and may have a negative impact on the relationship between staff and management. Considering this, QCS should review its current recruitment and selection policies, particularly in relation to transparency and providing unsuccessful officers with adequate feedback. As perceptions of favouritism appear to centre on relationships, it is also important to consider current handling of conflicts of interest.

18 Kelvin Brown, Principal Adviser Integrity Development, QCS, personal communication, 22 August 2008.

Recommendation 1:

That Queensland Corrective Services, in consultation with custodial correctional officers, review its recruitment and selection policies for both internal and external candidates, with specific attention to assessing and, if necessary, addressing the following issues:

- **Do the recruitment and selection policies and procedures cover conflicts of interest?**
- **Are unsuccessful candidates provided with adequate feedback on selection decisions?**
- **Is the selection process sufficiently transparent?**

Reporting misconduct — seriousness and silence

We found that some CCOs are reluctant to take formal action if they detect misconduct. Although they were less likely to ignore, and more likely to report, misconduct in 2007 than in 2001, there is still a tendency for officers to remain silent on issues of misconduct. For example, when misconduct is suspected, most officers appear to be willing to take some type of informal action, such as speaking to an SCO, but there is a reluctance to take further action, or more formal action, if necessary.

The research results suggest three reasons for this reluctance. First, CCOs do not perceive the misconduct to be serious enough to warrant reporting. We found that officers are more likely to take some action, as well as subsequent and more formal action in response to misconduct, when they perceive the misconduct to be serious. For misconduct that is considered less serious, they are less likely to take action to address the behaviour.

Some researchers suggest that there is a tendency for misconduct to escalate, with employees beginning by engaging in less serious behaviour before gradually escalating to more serious types of misconduct (see e.g. Zygildopoulos & Fleming 2008; Zygildopoulos, Fleming & Rothenberg 2008). Given this potential for escalation, we believe that QCS needs to ensure that CCOs are aware of the seriousness of all types of misconduct. By stressing to officers the seriousness of all types of misconduct, the likelihood of less serious types of misconduct being reported should increase and the potential for these types of misconduct to escalate to more serious misconduct should decrease.

Recommendation 2:

That Queensland Corrective Services systematically provide all staff, including management, with integrity and ethical training that recognises the seriousness of official misconduct in all circumstances. This training should be compulsory, repeated at regular intervals, and continuously evaluated and updated.

A second reason that may explain the reluctance of officers to report misconduct is their perceptions of how management deals with misconduct. We found that CCOs do not believe that management is careful about detecting or reporting misconduct, nor do officers believe that management encourages them to report concerns about corrupt behaviour.

Third, officers do not believe that management is serious about protecting people who report wrongdoing. On the contrary, CCOs tended to fear that they would suffer negative consequences from both management and their workmates for reporting corrupt behaviour. These negative consequences could include being ostracised by colleagues or receiving reprisals from supervisors (Smith & Brown 2008).

There is, then, a need for staff to feel assured not only that management wants to know about suspected misconduct, but that such concerns will be treated seriously. Officers need to believe that they will be protected and will not suffer any detrimental consequences if they report suspected misconduct. Given that the willingness of officers to continue to take action to resolve misconduct if previous efforts fail declines with each subsequent step, there also need to be adequate processes to allow for allegations of misconduct to be dealt with in the first instance.

Recommendation 3:

That Queensland Corrective Services, in consultation with custodial correctional officers, conduct an evaluation of its internal reporting policies and procedures for misconduct, with specific attention to assessing and, if necessary, addressing the following issues:

- **Is there a policy for managing public interest disclosures?**
- **Is there a dedicated whistleblower liaison officer?**
- **Do custodial correctional officers understand the misconduct reporting process?**
- **Does the process encourage custodial correctional officers to report suspected misconduct?**
- **Does the process encourage responsive action in the first instance?**
- **Are senior custodial officers, managers and centre General Managers adequately trained in the handling of misconduct?**
- **Is there a policy and procedure for the escalation of complaints if they are not adequately resolved in the first instance?**
- **Are all officers who report suspected misconduct adequately protected from any negative repercussions?**

The relationship between management and custodial correctional officers

In his review of Queensland's corrective services, Kennedy (1988) commented on the 'us' and 'them' culture between correctional officers and management. In the present study, we found a number of factors indicating a similar problem in the relationship between management and CCOs. For example, we found relatively low levels of job satisfaction around management issues, and a marked cynicism towards management among officers.

While such sentiments are not in themselves evidence of misconduct, previous research has shown that employees' negative perceptions of management and job dissatisfaction may lead staff to become involved in misconduct (Andreoli & Lefkowitz 2008). Bitterness about perceived mistreatment may enable staff to rationalise becoming involved in misconduct (see e.g. Anand, Ashforth & Joshi 2004) and can be used to justify taking revenge on the organisation through acts of misconduct. For example, the inappropriate use of agency resources might be fuelled by the belief that staff are poorly paid or otherwise treated unfairly by management. Certainly staff agreement with the justifications of misconduct supports this conclusion.

In addition, CCOs were more likely to use the behaviour of management and their treatment of staff as justification of, or an excuse for, misconduct. The behaviour of management is more likely to be considered a cause of misconduct in correctional institutions than the behaviour of other officers or offenders.

Changing the relationship between staff and management is not an easy task. The task may be particularly difficult in corrections due to the highly regulated environment and the clear division of duties between CCOs and managers. The sentiments expressed by staff in this study concerning low job satisfaction and a lack of support from management are typical of the views expressed by correctional officers in other jurisdictions and in corrections research more generally (Crawley 2004; Lombardo 1981).

To a large extent, officers' views of management may be related to generic features of correctional environments and the role of the CCO. There are, however, some specific strategies that may, together and over time, improve the underlying relationship between management and staff. First, increasing opportunities for staff to participate and become involved in the organisational issues that affect them, and to work with senior staff and management, may help improve the relationship between these two groups. This could be done by establishing impartial consultative committees that allow for both the agency and centre management to engage and consult with staff on issues that affect them.

Second, increasing the recognition of the role performed by CCOs may also improve their relationship with management. There was a strong feeling among officers that management does not recognise or reward good or appropriate behaviour. Officers were also dissatisfied with the lack of praise they receive for doing a good job. There may be some value for QCS in identifying opportunities to recognise and reward CCOs who are doing a good job.

Directions for future research

It is important to continue monitoring CCOs' perceptions of misconduct in Queensland correctional institutions by repeating this survey in several years. There are, however, some additional factors that would be interesting to consider when examining official misconduct in corrections in the future.

First, future research could involve face-to-face interviews with CCOs to further explore some of the issues surrounding misconduct in correctional centres. It would be beneficial, for example, to identify any other reasons that officers may use to justify or excuse misconduct in addition to those assessed in this report.

Second, future research should consider in more detail the relationship between CCOs and senior staff and management, and how that impacts on misconduct in prisons. Talking to officers, as suggested above, may contribute to this knowledge. But it may also be beneficial to consider the influence of different types of managers and their styles of leadership. Do perceptions of the frequency and seriousness of misconduct, and the willingness of officers to take action when faced with misconduct, depend on the management of particular centres? Comparisons of officers' perceptions in different prisons, and identifying the differences between these prisons, may suggest which management structures, styles and features are more suited to the correctional environment.¹⁹

Finally, future research should endeavour to increase the number of CCOs who complete the survey. A sample that better represents all Queensland CCOs would provide a more accurate representation of CCOs' perceptions of misconduct and would allow for more informed and targeted prevention strategies.

19 Unfortunately, the low response rates from officers in some correctional centres to our surveys prevented this type of centre comparison.

Conclusion

The job of a CCO is challenging and the correctional environment poses unique threats to the detection, management and prevention of official misconduct. Despite these challenges, the results of this report suggest that the detection, management and prevention of official misconduct in Queensland institutions have improved since 2001. QCS deserves commendation for its contribution to this significant improvement through the introduction of new and revised policies, procedures and officer training.

The research results have, however, identified areas in need of further improvement. CCOs seem reluctant to report misconduct and have generally unfavourable perceptions of senior staff and management. These issues could escalate the extent of official misconduct in correctional institutions and, for this reason, QCS should consider ways to redress these issues by implementing the recommendations of this report.

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APPENDIXES

- 1 Number of survey respondents per correctional institution
- 2 Frequency of misconduct
- 3 Direct evidence of misconduct
- 4 Seriousness of misconduct
- 5 Likelihood of apprehension
- 6 Factors influencing responses to misconduct
- 7 Formal training
- 8 Justifications for misconduct
- 9 Management and misconduct
- 10 Senior staff and management
- 11 The general work environment
- 12 Job satisfaction

1 NUMBER OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS PER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Table A1.1: 2001 respondents by correctional institution

Centre	Male officers	Female officers	Total
Arthur Gorrie	23	5	28
Borallon	26	5	31
Wolston	5	4	9
Brisbane Women's	7	9	16
Lotus Glen	17	8	25
Townsville	19	5	24
Mail-out ^a	64	13	77
TOTAL	161	49	210^b

^a Mail-out surveys were distributed to officers at Moreton B, Darling Downs, Numinbah, Palen Creek, Rockhampton, Sir David Longland and Woodford.

^b 35 respondents did not indicate their gender and/or centre.

Table A1.2: 2007 respondents by correctional institution

Centre	Male officers	Female officers	Total
Arthur Gorrie	28	10	38
Borallon	41	22	63
Wolston	3	3	6
Brisbane Women's	8	8	16
Lotus Glen	47	10	57
Townsville	25	8	33
Woodford	44	5	49
Darling Downs	6	2	8
Numinbah	17	4	21
Palen Creek	18	3	21
Mail-out ^a	10	2	12
TOTAL	247	77	324^b

^a Mail-out surveys were distributed to officers at Maryborough and Capricornia.

^b 89 respondents did not indicate their gender and/or centre.

2 FREQUENCY OF MISCONDUCT

Table A2.1: Percentage of respondents who reported that misconduct occurs 'never' or 'rarely' and 'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time' for each type of misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Type of misconduct	Year	'never' or 'rarely'	'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'all the time'
1. Favouritism by senior staff/management towards other staff	2001	9.2	90.8
	2007	17.6	82.4
2. Not following security procedures	2001	28.4	71.6
	2007	34.7	65.3
3. Inaction by centre management on reported misconduct	2001	40.5	59.5
	2007	56.5	43.5
4. Not officially reporting misconduct by other staff	2001	44.8	55.2
	2007	62.5	37.5
5. Warning offenders of searches	2001	59.1	40.9
	2007	62.9	37.1
6. Assaulting or harassing other staff	2001	52.3	47.7
	2007	66.9	33.1
7. Disclosure of confidential information to offenders	2001	60.0	40.0
	2007	65.0	35.0
8. Using departmental resources for personal use	2001	53.4	46.6
	2007	65.5	34.5
9. Verbal assault or harassment of offenders	2001	67.1	32.9
	2007	73.7	26.3
10. Unethical relationship with an offender	2001	64.3	35.7
	2007	75.1	24.9
11. Smuggling in drugs for offenders	2001	67.2	32.8
	2007	77.7	22.3
12. Stealing items belonging to the department	2001	67.9	32.1
	2007	81.3	18.7
13. Disclosure of offenders' personal information	2001	69.5	30.5
	2007	80.5	19.5
14. Racial discrimination against offenders	2001	71.1	28.9
	2007	84.2	15.8
15. Physical assault of offenders	2001	71.5	28.5
	2007	81.3	18.7
16. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	2001	78.6	21.4
	2007	86.9	13.1
17. Sexual assault of offenders	2001	58.1	41.9
	2007	76.5	23.5
18. Using searches/other powers to harass an offender	2001	77.8	22.2
	2007	85.2	14.8
19. Turning a blind eye to the abuse of offenders	2001	76.3	23.8
	2007	85.9	14.1
20. Harassment of visitors	2001	89.4	10.6
	2007	91.7	8.3
21. Disclosure of confidential information to the media	2001	80.3	19.7
	2007	89.8	10.2
22. Not officially reporting unethical relationships between staff and offenders	2001	79.0	21.0
	2007	89.0	11.0
23. Bringing in other contraband for offenders (not drugs)	2001	81.1	18.9
	2007	88.6	11.4
24. Bringing in/taking out unauthorised messages for offenders	2001	84.0	16.0
	2007	93.6	6.4
25. Sex between staff during work time	2001	92.3	7.7
	2007	92.4	7.6
26. Making false reports about offenders	2001	88.2	11.8
	2007	92.9	7.1
27. Using prison industries to make a profit	2001	79.3	20.7
	2007	92.0	8.0
28. Blocking offenders' access to grievance procedures (i.e. blue letters)	2001	89.5	10.5
	2007	94.9	5.1
29. Stealing offenders' property	2001	91.1	8.9
	2007	96.6	3.4
30. Unauthorised supply of prescription medication	2001	92.1	7.9
	2007	96.3	3.7

Table A2.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results for perceptions of misconduct frequency, 2001 and 2007

Type of misconduct	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. Favouritism by senior staff/management towards other staff	3.92 (0.95)	3.40 (1.11)	22.42	<i>p</i> < .01
2. Not following security procedures	3.02 (0.93)	2.85 (1.01)	3.94	<i>p</i> < .05
3. Inaction by centre management on reported misconduct	2.76 (1.17)	2.35 (1.07)	9.48	<i>p</i> < .01
4. Not officially reporting misconduct by other staff	2.74 (1.06)	2.27 (1.03)	22.53	<i>p</i> < .01
5. Warning offenders of searches	2.23 (1.08)	2.19 (1.07)	0.91	<i>ns</i>
6. Assaulting or harassing other staff	2.56 (1.05)	2.17 (0.96)	16.54	<i>p</i> < .01
7. Disclosure of confidential information to offenders	2.34 (1.02)	2.16 (1.02)	2.29	<i>ns</i>
8. Using departmental resources for personal use	2.41 (0.99)	2.15 (0.91)	6.59	<i>p</i> < .05
9. Verbal assault or harassment of offenders	2.24 (0.84)	2.04 (0.82)	6.74	<i>p</i> < .05
10. Unethical relationship with an offender	2.17 (0.84)	1.96 (0.80)	8.67	<i>p</i> < .01
11. Smuggling in drugs for offenders	2.11 (1.01)	1.88 (0.96)	9.83	<i>p</i> < .01
12. Stealing items belonging to the department	2.21 (0.92)	1.84 (0.85)	14.68	<i>p</i> < .01
13. Disclosure of offenders' personal information	2.10 (0.86)	1.83 (0.85)	7.60	<i>p</i> < .01
14. Racial discrimination against offenders	2.14 (0.87)	1.81 (0.74)	13.17	<i>p</i> < .01
15. Physical assault of offenders	2.08 (0.94)	1.79 (0.86)	13.98	<i>p</i> < .01
16. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	1.99 (0.76)	1.75 (0.73)	10.14	<i>p</i> < .01
17. Sexual assault of offenders	2.18 (1.09)	1.74 (0.88)	21.17	<i>p</i> < .01
18. Using searches/other powers to harass an offender	1.85 (0.89)	1.69 (0.78)	1.61	<i>ns</i>
19. Turning a blind eye to the abuse of offenders	1.92 (0.85)	1.68 (0.78)	8.16	<i>p</i> < .01
20. Harassment of visitors	1.69 (0.68)	1.58 (0.66)	1.86	<i>ns</i>
21. Disclosure of confidential information to the media	1.86 (0.82)	1.57 (0.70)	13.56	<i>p</i> < .01
22. Not officially reporting unethical relationships between staff and offenders	1.86 (0.87)	1.56 (0.77)	8.20	<i>p</i> < .01
23. Bringing in other contraband for offenders (not drugs)	1.82 (0.89)	1.55 (0.74)	16.44	<i>p</i> < .01
24. Bringing in/taking out unauthorised messages for offenders	1.74 (0.79)	1.48 (0.63)	13.91	<i>p</i> < .01
25. Sex between staff during work time	1.45 (0.65)	1.48 (1.18)	0.43	<i>ns</i>
26. Making false reports about offenders	1.67 (0.77)	1.43 (0.64)	6.01	<i>p</i> < .05
27. Using prison industries to make a profit	1.79 (1.12)	1.40 (0.80)	18.70	<i>p</i> < .01
28. Blocking offenders' access to grievance procedures (i.e. blue letters)	1.53 (0.79)	1.31 (0.57)	6.35	<i>p</i> < .05
29. Stealing offenders' property	1.48 (0.69)	1.30 (0.56)	7.33	<i>p</i> < .01
30. Unauthorised supply of prescription medication	1.41 (0.69)	1.28 (0.56)	2.88	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A2.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on perceptions of misconduct frequency, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	1.31	<i>ns</i>
Age	1.50	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.20	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant impact of the demographic factor on overall perceptions of the frequency of misconduct.

ns indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on perceptions of the frequency of misconduct.

Table A2.4: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of completed training on perceptions of misconduct frequency, 2001 and 2007

Type of training	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Absenteeism	0.79	<i>ns</i>
Appropriate IT use and fraud prevention	0.84	<i>ns</i>
Bullying and harassment	1.34	<i>ns</i>
Changing workplace culture	1.40	<i>ns</i>
QCS Code of Conduct	0.71	<i>ns</i>
Ethical circles	1.25	<i>ns</i>
Fraud and corruption	2.10	$p < .01$
Integrity in leadership	0.81	<i>ns</i>
Professional boundaries and natural justice	1.50	<i>ns</i>
Dealing with difficult prisoners	0.85	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	0.97	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant impact of the type of training on overall perceptions of the frequency of misconduct.

ns indicates no significant impact of training on perceptions of the frequency of misconduct.

3 DIRECT EVIDENCE OF MISCONDUCT

Table A3.1: Correlation between direct evidence of and perceived frequency of misconduct

Type of misconduct	Correlation
1. Smuggling in drugs for offenders	.30**
2. Warning offenders of searches	.52**
3. Sexual assault of offenders	.37**
4. Staff not following security procedures	.51**
5. Disclosure of confidential information to offenders	.51**
6. Favouritism by senior staff/management towards other staff	.52**
7. Harassment of visitors	.40**
8. Racial discrimination against offenders	.53**
9. Physical assault of offenders	.41**
10. Staff turning a blind eye to the abuse of offenders	.54**
11. Unethical relationship with an offender	.42**
12. Inaction by centre management on reported misconduct	.55**
13. Disclosure of offenders' personal information	.45**
14. Stealing items belonging to the department	.57**
15. Sex between staff during work time	.22**
16. Verbal assault/harassment of offenders	.51**
17. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	.53**
18. Disclosure of confidential information to the media	.34**
19. Using departmental resources for personal use	.56**
20. Staff assaulting or harassing other staff	.55**
21. Stealing from offenders' property	.30**
22. Staff not officially reporting misconduct by other staff	.52**
23. Bringing in/taking out unauthorised messages for offenders	.35**
24. Making false reports about offenders	.47**
25. Staff not officially reporting unethical relationships between staff and offenders	.38**
26. Blocking offenders' access to grievance procedures (i.e. blue letters)	.52**
27. Using searches/other powers to harass an offender	.62**
28. Unauthorised supply of prescription medication	.38**
29. Using prison industries to make a profit	.56**
30. Bringing in other contraband for offenders (not drugs)	.48**

** $p < .01$

Note: The higher the correlation, the stronger the association between direct evidence and perceived frequency of misconduct.

4 SERIOUSNESS OF MISCONDUCT

Table A4.1: Percentage of respondents who reported that misconduct was ‘not at all serious’ or ‘not very serious’ and ‘serious’, ‘very serious’ or ‘extremely serious’ for each misconduct scenario, 2001 and 2007

Misconduct scenario	Year	‘not at all serious’ or ‘not very serious’	‘serious’, ‘very serious’ or ‘extremely serious’
1. Provides unauthorised prescription medication	2001	35.3	64.7
	2007	29.4	70.6
2. Striking offender	2001	30.7	69.3
	2007	29.9	70.2
3. Using industry for personal profit	2001	6.6	93.4
	2007	5.7	94.3
4. Relationship with an offender	2001	0.4	99.6
	2007	0.7	99.2
5. Favouritism in promotion	2001	2.5	97.5
	2007	4.4	95.6
6. Not reporting misconduct	2001	15.3	84.7
	2007	16.4	83.6
7. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	2001	0.8	99.2
	2007	2.2	97.8
8. Harassment of visitors	2001	10.8	89.2
	2007	10.7	89.3
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	2001	17.6	82.4
	2007	10.7	89.3
10. Unmonitored phone calls	2001	8.7	91.4
	2007	4.4	95.5
11. Passing on information	2001	5.8	94.2
	2007	2.5	97.6
12. Supplying drugs	2001	0.4	99.6
	2007	0.5	99.5
13. Refusing a blue letter	2001	6.7	93.3
	2007	9.4	90.6
14. Harassment of a colleague	2001	0.8	99.1
	2007	4.4	95.6
15. Making a false report	2001	4.5	95.5
	2007	3.9	96.0

Table A4.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results for perceptions of misconduct seriousness, 2001 and 2007

Misconduct scenario	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. Provides unauthorised prescription medication	3.24 (1.41)	3.43 (1.40)	1.54	<i>ns</i>
2. Striking offender	3.24 (1.36)	3.31 (1.35)	0.66	<i>ns</i>
3. Using industry for personal profit	4.14 (0.95)	4.18 (0.97)	0.16	<i>ns</i>
4. Relationship with an offender	4.88 (0.38)	4.87 (0.49)	0.69	<i>ns</i>
5. Favouritism in promotion	4.55 (0.75)	4.37 (0.88)	2.69	<i>ns</i>
6. Not reporting misconduct	3.64 (1.12)	3.61 (1.16)	2.67	<i>ns</i>
7. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	4.82 (0.50)	4.74 (0.66)	7.10	<i>p</i> < .05
8. Harassment of visitors	3.89 (1.10)	3.86 (1.08)	1.25	<i>ns</i>
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	3.85 (1.25)	4.04 (1.13)	0.17	<i>ns</i>
10. Unmonitored phone calls	4.22 (1.06)	4.51 (0.86)	10.00	<i>p</i> < .01
11. Passing on information	4.32 (0.97)	4.43 (0.81)	0.31	<i>ns</i>
12. Supplying drugs	4.94 (0.31)	4.95 (0.35)	0.10	<i>ns</i>
13. Refusing a blue letter	4.07 (0.97)	3.97 (1.07)	4.73	<i>p</i> < .05
14. Harassment of a colleague	4.47 (0.71)	4.33 (0.89)	3.32	<i>ns</i>
15. Making a false report	4.33 (0.94)	4.34 (0.94)	0.61	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.
ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A4.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on perceptions of misconduct seriousness, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	1.68	<i>ns</i>
Age	1.14	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	0.95	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant impact of the demographic factor on overall perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct.

ns indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct.

Table A4.4: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of completed training on perceptions of misconduct seriousness, 2001 and 2007

Type of training	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Absenteeism	0.53	<i>ns</i>
Appropriate IT use and fraud prevention	1.17	<i>ns</i>
Bullying and harassment	0.62	<i>ns</i>
Changing workplace culture	1.94	$p < .05$
QCS Code of Conduct	0.91	<i>ns</i>
Ethical circles	1.14	<i>ns</i>
Fraud and corruption	0.35	<i>ns</i>
Integrity in leadership	1.22	<i>ns</i>
Professional boundaries and natural justice	1.39	<i>ns</i>
Dealing with difficult prisoners	1.30	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	0.65	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant impact of the type of training on overall perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct.

ns indicates no significant impact of training on perceptions of seriousness of misconduct.

5 LIKELIHOOD OF APPREHENSION

Table A5.1. Percentage of respondents who reported that misconduct was likely to be caught 'never' or 'rarely' and 'sometimes, frequently' or 'always' for each of the misconduct scenarios, 2001 and 2007

Misconduct scenario	Year	'never' or 'rarely'	'sometimes', 'frequently' or 'always'
1. Provides unauthorised prescription medication	2001	66.0	34.0
	2007	34.0	40.4
2. Striking offender	2001	54.5	45.5
	2007	45.7	54.3
3. Using industry for personal profit	2001	38.5	61.5
	2007	27.8	72.2
4. Relationship with an offender	2001	21.6	78.4
	2007	16.0	84.1
5. Favouritism in promotion	2001	59.2	40.8
	2007	85.1	41.8
6. Not reporting misconduct	2001	57.6	42.4
	2007	46.2	53.7
7. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	2001	44.9	55.1
	2007	25.1	75.0
8. Harassment of visitors	2001	44.1	55.9
	2007	36.7	63.3
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	2001	62.3	37.7
	2007	45.9	54.1
10. Unmonitored phone calls	2001	53.3	46.7
	2007	51.2	48.7
11. Passing on information	2001	59.6	40.4
	2007	40.5	59.5
12. Supplying drugs	2001	40.0	60.0
	2007	22.3	77.8
13. Refusing a blue letter	2001	50.6	49.4
	2007	30.1	69.9
14. Harassment of a colleague	2001	42.9	57.1
	2007	30.1	69.9
15. Making a false report	2001	58.4	41.6
	2007	29.4	70.6

Table A5.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results for perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension, 2001 and 2007

Misconduct scenario	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. Provides unauthorised prescription medication	2.41 (0.91)	2.55 (1.04)	1.36	<i>ns</i>
2. Striking offender	2.62 (1.01)	2.77 (1.04)	0.65	<i>ns</i>
3. Using industry for personal profit	2.85 (0.97)	3.18 (1.10)	10.65	<i>p</i> < .01
4. Relationship with an offender	3.47 (1.06)	3.55 (1.00)	0.06	<i>ns</i>
5. Favouritism in promotion	2.40 (1.19)	2.47 (1.09)	0.01	<i>ns</i>
6. Not reporting misconduct	2.45 (0.90)	2.68 (0.88)	3.96	<i>p</i> < .05
7. Working under the influence	2.80 (1.07)	3.30 (1.12)	12.10	<i>p</i> < .01
8. Harassment of visitors	2.78 (1.04)	2.98 (1.04)	1.92	<i>ns</i>
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	2.36 (0.96)	2.75 (1.05)	14.31	<i>p</i> < .01
10. Unmonitored phone calls	2.57 (0.93)	2.60 (1.07)	0.02	<i>ns</i>
11. Passing on information	2.42 (0.81)	2.87 (1.02)	20.19	<i>p</i> < .01
12. Supplying drugs	2.93 (1.09)	3.47 (1.12)	28.30	<i>p</i> < .01
13. Refusing a blue letter	2.66 (1.11)	3.17 (1.08)	21.24	<i>p</i> < .01
14. Harassment of a colleague	2.78 (1.03)	3.10 (1.04)	7.97	<i>p</i> < .01
15. Making a false report	2.48 (0.96)	3.03 (0.98)	29.53	<i>p</i> < .01

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A5.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	0.74	<i>ns</i>
Age	1.01	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.28	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant impact of the demographic factor on overall perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension.

ns indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on perceptions of the likelihood of apprehension.

Table A5.4: Correlation between the likelihood of apprehension and perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct, 2007

Misconduct scenario	Correlation
1. Provides non-prescribed medication	.30**
2. Striking an offender who assaulted an officer	.24**
3. Uses industry for personal profit	.23**
4. Relationship with an offender	.15**
5. Favouritism in promotion	.04
6. Not reporting other officer's misconducts	.24**
7. Working under the influence of drugs or alcohol	.13**
8. Harassment of visitors	.35**
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	.29**
10. Unmonitored phone calls	.08
11. Passing on information	.26**
12. Supplying drugs	.11**
13. Refusing a blue letter	.26**
14. Harassment of a colleague	.16**
15. Making a false report	.22**

** $p < .01$

Note: The higher the correlation, the stronger the association between perceptions of seriousness and likelihood of apprehension.

6 FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONSES TO MISCONDUCT

Table A6.1: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results for the number of action steps officers would take to resolve types of misconduct, male and female respondents in 2007

Misconduct scenario	Male Mean (SD)	Female Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. Provides unauthorised prescription medication	1.72 (1.57)	1.97 (1.62)	1.46	<i>ns</i>
2. Striking offender	1.37 (1.45)	1.64 (1.44)	1.95	<i>ns</i>
3. Using industry for personal profit	1.63 (1.35)	1.72 (1.41)	0.29	<i>ns</i>
4. Relationship with an offender	1.98 (1.42)	2.34 (1.47)	3.56	<i>ns</i>
5. Favouritism in promotion	1.28 (1.36)	1.56 (1.40)	0.048	<i>ns</i>
6. Not reporting misconduct	1.51 (1.38)	1.47 (1.31)	0.06	<i>ns</i>
7. Working under the influence of drugs and alcohol	1.69 (1.31)	1.69 (1.25)	0.00	<i>ns</i>
8. Harassment of visitors	1.60 (1.39)	1.48 (1.19)	0.43	<i>ns</i>
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	1.48 (1.30)	1.56 (1.20)	0.021	<i>ns</i>
10. Unmonitored phone calls	1.82 (1.35)	1.92 (1.34)	0.035	<i>ns</i>
11. Passing on information	1.72 (1.32)	1.87 (1.30)	0.76	<i>ns</i>
12. Supplying drugs	2.08 (1.46)	2.25 (1.51)	0.78	<i>ns</i>
13. Refusing a blue letter	1.49 (1.32)	1.43 (1.23)	0.15	<i>ns</i>
14. Harassment of a colleague	1.72 (1.35)	1.94 (1.29)	1.45	<i>ns</i>
15. Making a false report	1.63 (1.31)	1.74 (1.24)	0.44	<i>ns</i>

Notes: *ns* indicates no significant difference between the male and female respondents.
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A6.2: Correlation between the number of action steps officers would take and length of service, perceptions of seriousness of misconduct and perceptions of management, 2007

Misconduct scenario	Length of service	Seriousness of misconduct	Perceptions of management
1. Provides non-prescribed medication	-.19**	.33**	.12*
2. Striking an offender who assaulted an officer	-.19**	.41**	.20**
3. Uses industry for personal profit	-.18**	.23**	.13**
4. Relationship with an offender	-.16**	.06	.10
5. Favouritism in promotion	-.17**	.11*	.18**
6. Not reporting other officer's misconducts	-.14*	.25**	.20**
7. Working under the influence of drugs and alcohol	-.15*	.19**	.18**
8. Harassment of visitors	-.17**	.19**	.17**
9. Abuse of position (uni assignment)	-.09	.18**	.17**
10. Unmonitored phone calls	-.12	.18**	.09
11. Passing on information	-.16**	.21**	.17**
12. Supplying drugs	-.07	.04	.09
13. Refusing a blue letter	-.16*	.25**	.18**
14. Harassment of a colleague	-.22**	.22**	.17**
15. Making a false report	-.22**	.23**	.20**

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Note: The higher the correlation, the stronger the association between the number of action steps officers would take and length of service, perceptions of seriousness of misconduct and perceptions of management.

7 FORMAL TRAINING

Table A7.1: Percentage of respondents who reported that the training was ‘not at all relevant’ or ‘not very relevant’ and ‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’ to their job as a CCO, and means and standard deviations of relevance ratings for each type of training, 2001

Type of training	‘not at all relevant’ or ‘not very relevant’	‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’	Mean (SD)
Ethical decision making	26.5	73.5	3.31 (1.28)
Sexual harassment	28.7	71.3	3.30 (1.22)
Centre induction	36.4	63.6	3.68 (1.10)
QCS Code of Conduct	19.3	80.7	3.57 (1.11)
Policies and procedures	9.0	91.0	3.97 (1.00)

Table A7.2: Percentage of respondents who reported that the training was ‘not at all relevant’ or ‘not very relevant’ and ‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’ to their job as a CCO, and means and standard deviations of relevance ratings for each type of training, 2007

Type of training	‘not at all relevant’ or ‘not very relevant’	‘somewhat relevant’, ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’	Mean (SD)
Reporting misconduct	21.3	78.7	0.66 (0.46)
Dealing with difficult prisoners	14.0	86.0	0.73 (0.45)
Boundaries and justice	20.1	79.9	0.63 (0.48)
Integrity in leadership	26.8	73.2	0.44 (0.50)
Fraud and corruption	20.2	79.8	0.52 (0.50)
Ethical circles	19.2	80.8	0.74 (0.45)
QCS Code of Conduct	11.2	88.8	0.97 (0.18)
Workplace culture	25.7	74.3	0.56 (0.50)
Bullying and harassment	16.1	83.9	0.88 (0.32)
IT use and fraud	22.9	77.1	0.55 (0.50)
Absenteeism	61.2	38.8	0.24 (0.43)

8 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MISCONDUCT

Table A8.1: Percentage of respondents who indicated that they 'strongly disagree' or 'disagree' and 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with each statement justifying misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Statement justifying misconduct	Year	'strongly disagree' or 'disagree'	'agree' or 'strongly agree'
1. The sorts of misconduct that the average staff member might get involved in are nothing compared to what management get away with.	2001	31.5	42.3
	2007	29.0	34.2
2. Management is to blame for corrupt behaviour because it concentrates on what staff do wrong rather than what they do right.	2001	29.5	45.1
	2007	34.5	34.2
3. It is understandable if officers behave improperly after management has let them down.	2001	55.7	21.3
	2007	46.8	22.2
4. If management engages in unethical behaviour they can't expect other staff not to as well.	2001	41.0	45.1
	2007	43.7	34.3
5. A new officer can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct if other officers are also doing it.	2001	71.8	17.1
	2007	77.9	9.8
6. Sometimes you have to break the rules if you want to get on with other officers.	2001	69.7	15.2
	2007	61.6	15.3
7. A staff member is only supporting his/her colleagues if they don't report misconduct of other staff.	2001	61.2	14.3
	2007	55.4	13.4
8. Sometimes you have to break rules to keep offenders happy.	2001	71.7	15.6
	2007	71.1	14.2
9. Most misconduct only affects offenders so it doesn't really hurt anyone.	2001	88.9	2.5
	2007	82.2	2.0
10. If an offender hurts an officer they have only themselves to blame for being hurt in return.	2001	43.3	30.2
	2007	45.7	25.8
11. If correctional officers were paid more there would be less temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour.	2001	57.1	28.6
	2007	46.2	34.9
12. Staff can't be blamed for misconduct if they haven't received proper training.	2001	38.4	45.3
	2007	51.1	30.0
13. If the department expects correctional officers to get qualifications it's OK to use work time and equipment to do the study.	2001	19.7	55.3
	2007	15.6	67.4
14. Expecting officers to always follow the rules is incompatible with getting the job done.	2001	42.9	35.1
	2007	39.6	31.9
15. The job of a correctional officer is very stressful and officers can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct.	2001	82.9	3.7
	2007	73.7	7.1
16. Sometimes it's necessary to break the rules to keep things running smoothly.	2001	40.8	33.5
	2007	42.7	33.3
17. It's not surprising that staff become hardened, given their harsh working environment.	2001	18.9	69.7
	2007	19.3	65.1
18. It doesn't really matter what you do because the community doesn't care what happens inside.	2001	48.6	33.1
	2007	40.0	37.3
19. Sometimes because of the nature of the job an officer might have to do things they would not normally do.	2001	31.6	51.2
	2007	30.2	48.6

Note: The percentages of 'neutral' responses are not included.

Table A8.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results on justifications for misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Statement justifying misconduct	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. The sorts of misconduct that the average staff member might get involved in are nothing compared to what management get away with.	3.20 (1.21)	3.08 (1.08)	0.16	<i>ns</i>
2. Management is to blame for corrupt behaviour because it concentrates on what staff do wrong rather than what they do right.	3.28 (1.21)	3.03 (1.12)	1.28	<i>ns</i>
3. It is understandable if officers behave improperly after management has let them down.	2.57 (1.08)	2.68 (0.96)	3.64	<i>ns</i>
4. If management engages in unethical behaviour they can't expect other staff not to as well.	3.09 (1.27)	2.90 (1.15)	0.28	<i>ns</i>
5. A new officer can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct if other officers are also doing it.	2.10 (1.12)	2.07 (0.93)	0.01	<i>ns</i>
6. Sometimes you have to break the rules if you want to get on with other officers.	2.23 (1.00)	2.37 (0.97)	3.12	<i>ns</i>
7. A staff member is only supporting his/her colleagues if they don't report misconduct of other staff.	2.37 (1.02)	2.49 (0.92)	2.46	<i>ns</i>
8. Sometimes you have to break rules to keep offenders happy.	2.11 (1.07)	2.17 (1.00)	0.00	<i>ns</i>
9. Most misconduct only affects offenders so it doesn't really hurt anyone.	1.72 (0.76)	1.90 (0.72)	6.16	$p < .05$
10. If an offender hurts an officer they have only themselves to blame for being hurt in return.	2.81 (1.15)	2.69 (1.12)	0.92	<i>ns</i>
11. If correctional officers were paid more there would be less temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour.	2.67 (1.22)	2.95 (1.25)	6.14	$p < .05$
12. Staff can't be blamed for misconduct if they haven't received proper training.	3.06 (1.16)	2.76 (1.13)	13.04	$p < .01$
13. If the department expects correctional officers to get qualifications it's OK to use work time and equipment to do the study.	3.52 (1.11)	3.64 (1.01)	3.25	<i>ns</i>
14. Expecting officers to always follow the rules is incompatible with getting the job done.	2.86 (1.17)	2.86 (1.08)	0.47	<i>ns</i>
15. The job of a correctional officer is very stressful and officers can't be blamed for becoming involved in misconduct.	1.86 (0.80)	2.12 (0.89)	8.82	$p < .01$
16. Sometimes it's necessary to break the rules to keep things running smoothly.	2.87 (1.12)	2.84 (1.08)	0.01	<i>ns</i>
17. It's not surprising that staff become hardened, given their harsh working environment.	3.73 (1.08)	3.61 (1.05)	1.65	<i>ns</i>
18. It doesn't really matter what you do because the community doesn't care what happens inside.	2.79 (1.22)	3.03 (1.17)	10.11	$p < .01$
19. Sometimes because of the nature of the job an officer might have to do things they would not normally do.	3.24 (1.13)	3.22 (1.09)	0.01	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A8.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on justifications of misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	1.90	<i>p</i> < .05
Age	1.06	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.27	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant impact of the demographic factor on overall perceptions of the justifications of misconduct.

ns indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on justifications of misconduct.

9 MANAGEMENT AND MISCONDUCT

Table A9.1: Percentage of respondents who indicated that they ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with each statement about management and misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Statement about management and misconduct	Year	‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’	‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’
1. Management is careful about detecting/reporting misconduct.	2001	42.6	32.2
	2007	32.5	31.8
2. It is not unusual for officers to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers.	2001	26.9	47.8
	2007	32.1	34.3
3. Management deals with official misconduct in an open way.	2001	57.1	18.4
	2007	54.7	15.7
4. QCS takes a very tough line on improper behaviour by CCOs.	2001	26.2	53.3
	2007	13.5	66.1
5. Management encourages officers to report concerns about corrupt behaviour.	2001	n/a	n/a
	2007	24.5	50.5
6. Management carefully investigates officers’ concerns about corrupt behaviour.	2001	n/a	n/a
	2007	28.9	35.0
7. Management is serious about protecting people who report wrongdoing.	2001	n/a	n/a
	2007	40.4	23.8
8. I would suffer negative consequences from my workmates for reporting corrupt behaviour.	2001	n/a	n/a
	2007	15.2	57.8
9. I would suffer negative consequences from management for reporting corrupt behaviour.	2001	n/a	n/a
	2007	29.7	32.6

Note: The percentages of ‘neutral’ responses are not included.

Table A9.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results on perceptions of management and misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Statement about management and misconduct	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. Management is careful about detecting/reporting misconduct.	2.79 (1.13)	2.93 (1.08)	1.68	<i>ns</i>
2. It is not unusual for officers to turn a blind eye to improper conduct by other officers.	3.24 (1.01)	3.00 (0.99)	2.97	<i>ns</i>
3. Management deals with official misconduct in an open way.	2.44 (1.07)	2.48 (0.99)	0.03	<i>ns</i>
4. QCS takes a very tough line on improper behaviour by CCOs.	3.36 (1.11)	3.66 (0.98)	5.42	$p < .05$
5. Management encourages officers to report concerns about corrupt behaviour.	n/a	3.25 (1.03)	n/a	n/a
6. Management carefully investigates officers' concerns about corrupt behaviour.	n/a	3.03 (1.03)	n/a	n/a
7. Management is serious about protecting people who report wrongdoing.	n/a	2.70 (1.05)	n/a	n/a
8. I would suffer negative consequences from my workmates for reporting corrupt behaviour.	n/a	3.58 (1.01)	n/a	n/a
9. I would suffer negative consequences from management for reporting corrupt behaviour.	n/a	3.07 (1.03)	n/a	n/a

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.
ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.
 Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A9.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on perceptions of management and misconduct, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	0.90	<i>ns</i>
Age	1.34	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.28	<i>ns</i>

Note: *ns* indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on perceptions of management and misconduct.

10 SENIOR STAFF AND MANAGEMENT

Table A10.1: Percentage of respondents who indicated that they ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with each statement about senior staff and management, 2001 and 2007

Statement about senior staff and management	Year	‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’	‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’
1. The senior staff set a good example for new officers.	2001	60.2	20.1
	2007	43.6	29.1
2. It is easy to talk to supervisors about problems at work.	2001	35.5	41.6
	2007	27.7	48.0
3. Management recognises/rewards proper behaviour by officers.	2001	75.1	12.7
	2007	71.7	9.3
4. Management is accessible and available when needed.	2001	53.1	25.9
	2007	43.6	28.2

Note: The percentages of ‘neutral’ responses are not included.

Table A10.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results on perceptions of senior staff and management, 2001 and 2007

Statement about senior staff and management	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. The senior staff set a good example for new officers.	2.39 (1.09)	2.74 (1.08)	10.71	$p < .01$
2. It is easy to talk to supervisors about problems at work.	3.00 (1.10)	3.23 (1.06)	7.33	$p < .01$
3. Management recognises/rewards proper behaviour by officers.	2.07 (1.00)	2.05 (0.97)	0.01	<i>ns</i>
4. Management is accessible and available when needed.	2.57 (1.15)	2.76 (1.09)	4.64	$p < .05$

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A10.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on perceptions of senior staff and management, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	1.27	<i>ns</i>
Age	1.36	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.11	<i>ns</i>

Note: *ns* indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on perceptions of senior staff and management.

11 THE GENERAL WORK ENVIRONMENT

Table A11.1: Percentage of respondents who indicated that they ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with each statement about the general work environment, 2001 and 2007

Statement about general work environment	Year	‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’	‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’
1. The average officer is 100% behind organisational goals.	2001	50.2	25.7
	2007	45.7	23.8
2. My pre-service training prepared me for my job as an officer.	2001	39.9	40.3
	2007	41.5	33.1
3. My values and those of the department are similar.	2001	24.7	47.7
	2007	28.2	43.9
4. Typical officers put more effort into their job than expected.	2001	55.5	23.3
	2007	52.1	22.9
5. The general public misunderstands my job as a CCO.	2001	9.8	79.6
	2007	12.1	75.8
6. As an officer, you feel safe and comfortable in all parts of your working environment.	2001	50.8	29.5
	2007	43.7	33.9
7. Typical officers feel a great deal of loyalty to the service.	2001	55.5	23.3
	2007	52.1	22.9

Note: The percentages of ‘neutral’ responses are not included.

Table A11.2: Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results on perceptions of the general work environment, 2001 and 2007

Statement about general work environment	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. The average officer is 100% behind organisational goals.	2.66 (1.02)	2.71 (.96)	0.05	<i>ns</i>
2. My pre-service training prepared me for my job as an officer.	2.92 (1.13)	2.82 (1.15)	0.45	<i>ns</i>
3. My values and those of the department are similar.	3.21 (1.07)	3.17 (1.09)	0.09	<i>ns</i>
4. Typical officers put more effort into their job than expected.	3.24 (1.08)	3.40 (1.01)	3.34	<i>ns</i>
5. The general public misunderstands my job as a CCO.	4.00 (1.03)	3.94 (1.16)	0.01	<i>ns</i>
6. As an officer, you feel safe and comfortable in all parts of your working environment.	2.65 (1.19)	2.84 (1.15)	4.51	$p < .05$
7. Typical officers feel a great deal of loyalty to the service.	2.51 (1.12)	2.53 (1.08)	0.07	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A11.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on perceptions of the general work environment, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	1.80	<i>ns</i>
Age	0.46	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.30	<i>ns</i>

Note: *ns* indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on perceptions of the general work environment.

12 JOB SATISFACTION

Table A12.1: Percentage of respondents who indicated that they were 'very dissatisfied' or 'dissatisfied' and 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the aspect of their job, 2001 and 2007

Aspect of job	Year	'very dissatisfied' or 'dissatisfied'	'satisfied' or 'very satisfied'
1. The pay I get for the work I do.	2001	32.5	42.0
	2007	61.8	20.9
2. The chance for advancement in this job.	2001	56.2	18.6
	2007	58.0	18.8
3. The freedom to use my judgment.	2001	31.7	45.3
	2007	31.6	36.3
4. The working conditions.	2001	35.1	38.0
	2007	35.4	34.1
5. The way my co-workers get along with each other.	2001	26.3	43.2
	2007	18.3	52.0
6. The praise I get for doing a good job.	2001	63.4	14.0
	2007	54.6	14.9

Note: The percentages of 'neutral' responses are not included.

Table A12.2. Means, standard deviations, and ANOVA *F* test and significance results on satisfaction with various aspects of the general work environment, 2001 and 2007

Aspect of job	2001 Mean (SD)	2007 Mean (SD)	<i>F</i>	Sig.
1. The pay I get for the work I do	3.05 (1.13)	2.36 (1.09)	35.54	$p < .01$
2. The chance for advancement	2.39 (1.12)	2.38 (1.09)	0.04	<i>ns</i>
3. The freedom to use my judgment.	3.10 (1.09)	2.98 (1.03)	1.72	<i>ns</i>
4. The working conditions.	2.98 (1.13)	2.90 (1.03)	0.14	<i>ns</i>
5. The way my co-workers get along with each other.	3.15 (1.07)	3.35 (0.94)	3.40	<i>ns</i>
6. The praise I get for doing a good job.	2.25 (1.05)	2.40 (1.01)	3.23	<i>ns</i>

Notes: Significant result indicates a statistically significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

ns indicates no significant difference between the 2001 and 2007 surveys.

Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table A12.3: MANOVA *F* test and significance results for the impact of gender, age and length of service on satisfaction with various aspects of their job, 2001 and 2007

Demographic factor	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Gender	1.50	<i>ns</i>
Age	0.85	<i>ns</i>
Length of service with QCS	1.70	<i>ns</i>

Note: *ns* indicates no significant impact of the demographic factor on satisfaction with various aspects of the job.

